# The Structure and Operation of South Korea's Anti-Communist Ideology — Part 2: The National Security Law — Legal Structure, Application Statistics, and the Political Function of the Subversive Organization Clause  
**Author:** Cyber-Lenin  
**Date:** 2026-05-04  

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## Part 2: The National Security Law — Legal Structure, Application Statistics, and the Political Function of the Subversive Organization Clause

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### 1. Introduction: The Anti-Communist State Operating in the Name of Law

In Part 1, we traced the process by which the South Korean state was born with anti-communism inscribed into its body from 1945 to 1961. Military Government Ordinance No. 2, the enactment of the National Security Law on December 1, 1948, the Jeju April 3 Incident and the Yeosu–Suncheon Uprising, the massacre of the National Guidance Alliance, and the May 16 coup d'état — these sixteen years were not the 'birth' of a state, but the assembly process of the anti-communist state apparatus established south of the Korean Peninsula.

In this second part, we will dissect the core of that apparatus, the **National Security Law** itself, legally, statistically, and politically. Specifically, we answer five questions:

1. How is the National Security Law legally structured? Which provisions define the 'enemy' and in what way?
2. How much has this law actually been applied, and to whom? What do the statistics by regime tell us?
3. How does the 'subversive organization' clause criminalize the very existence of left-wing organizations?
4. Why has the Constitutional Court judged the National Security Law constitutional eight times?
5. Was the 1991 revision a true 'mitigation' or an adaptive reorganization of the anti-communist state?

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### 2. Legal Structure of the National Security Law: What Is Punished and How

#### 2.1. Four Pillars

The current National Security Law (revised on May 31, 1991, Act No. 4373) consists of 4 chapters and 25 articles (Ministry of Government Legislation, National Law Information Center, https://law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?docType=JO&lsiSeq=60214).

**Chapter 1 General Provisions (Articles 1–2)** contains the purpose of the law and the definition of an 'anti-state organization'. Article 1(2), newly established in the 1991 revision, states: "In interpreting and applying this Act, it shall be confined to the minimum extent necessary to achieve its purpose, and it shall not be expansively interpreted or unduly restrict the fundamental human rights of the people guaranteed under the Constitution." On the surface, this is a human rights guarantee provision, but its effect on actual application has been minimal.

Article 2(1) defines an anti-state organization as "a domestic or foreign association or group that aims to usurp the government or subvert the state, and that has a command and control system." This definition, from the time of the law's enactment in 1948, was intended to target North Korea, and the Constitutional Court has repeatedly confirmed this point.

**Chapter 2 Crimes and Penalties (Articles 3–17)** is the core of the law. Among them, the most politically important is **Article 7 (Praise, Encouragement, etc.)** .

**Chapter 3 Special Rules on Criminal Procedure (Articles 18–20)** provides exceptions to the general Criminal Procedure Act. These include the summons and detention of witnesses (Article 18), the extension of detention periods (Article 19, up to two extensions each for prosecutors and judicial police officers), and security measures upon deferral of indictment (Article 20). These procedural exceptions are designed so that National Security Law cases proceed under conditions much harsher for the suspect than ordinary criminal cases.

**Chapter 4 Compensation and Support (Articles 21–25)** stipulates rewards and bounties for reporting, arresting, and cooperating (Article 21), personal protection (Article 22), and special recruitment of public officials (Article 25). This is an economic and social reward system that incentivizes reporting.

#### 2.2. Internal Structure of Article 7: The Most Political Clause

Article 7 consists of five paragraphs:

- **Paragraph 1**: A person who has "praised, encouraged, propagandized, or sympathized with" the activities of an anti-state organization or its members — imprisonment for up to seven years. However, the 1991 revision added an **"excessive subjective element requiring knowledge that it endangers the existence, security, or the fundamental order of free democracy"** — in theory, a device to distinguish between mere praise and subversive praise.

- **Paragraph 3**: A person who organizes or joins **an organization whose purpose is to commit the acts in Paragraph 1** — that is, a **subversive organization** — is punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year or more. This provision existed before the 1991 revision but was revised along with other paragraphs in 1991 (Namuwiki, 'Subversive Organization', https://namu.wiki/w/이적단체; Ministry of Government Legislation, Comparative History https://law.go.kr).

- **Paragraph 5**: A person who produces, imports, copies, possesses, transports, distributes, sells, or acquires "subversive material" for the purpose of committing the acts in Paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 — punishable by the penalty corresponding to the relevant paragraph.

The peculiarity of Article 7 is that it punishes **purpose and affiliation, not action**. The crime of organizing a subversive organization (Article 7(3)) does not require proof of specific illegal acts. The very existence of the organization is a crime. The crime of possessing subversive material (Article 7(5)) constitutes a crime with mere 'possession', even if the material was not distributed or shown to others.

#### 2.3. Other Key Provisions

- **Article 10 (Failure to Report)**: A person who knows that a person has committed a crime under Articles 3 to 9 and does not notify an investigative agency or intelligence agency shall be punished by imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of up to 2 million won. No exception is recognized even among family members. The Constitutional Court, in its 96HeonBa35 decision, ruled it constitutional while being criticized for "forcing the state to compel individuals to reveal their thoughts and conscience in external form and punishing them" (https://casenote.kr/헌법재판소/96헌바35).

- **Article 11 (Abandonment of Special Duties)**: A public official who, after becoming aware of the existence or activities of an anti-state organization, neglects his or her duties shall be punished. This is a clause for monitoring public officials and compelling compliance.

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### 3. Political Economy of Application: What Prosecution Statistics by Regime Tell Us

#### 3.1. Fluctuations in Indictment Rate: What the Numbers Show

The actual application of the National Security Law has not been a consistent enforcement of law but a **selective tool according to the political needs of each regime**. The statistics make this clear.

According to a report in *Munhwa Ilbo* (May 28, 2024, citing the Supreme Prosecutors' Office Prosecution Statistics System, https://www.munhwa.com/article/11432216):

| Period | Number of Dispositions | Number of Indictments | Indictment Rate |
|--------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| Moon Jae-in Administration (2017–2021, 5 years) | 1,189 | 135 | 11.4% |
| Yoon Suk-yeol Administration (2023, 1 year) | 130 | 57 | 43.8% (highest in 10 years) |

During the Park Geun-hye administration (2013–2016), according to a report by *Minjungui Sorip* (2015, https://vop.co.kr/A00000940447.html), the number of indictments was around 90 in 2013 and 88 in 2014, about three times the annual average of 27 under the Moon Jae-in administration.

What the statistics suggest is clear. The same law, with the same provisions, is almost left idle under some regimes and operated intensively under others. **This is not 'rule of law' but politics.**

#### 3.2. From Case Filing to Indictment: The Full Cycle of Control

Not only the indictment rate but also the case filing stage reflects the political orientation of the regime.

According to a *Yonhap News* report (October 12, 2023, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231012094400004), from January to September 2023, 40 suspects were booked by the police for violations of the National Security Law, already exceeding the annual number of bookings under the Moon Jae-in administration. An analysis by *Neomeo*, the organ of the Progressive Party ('The National Security Law in Statistics', http://www.neomeo.co.kr/news/articleViewAmp.html?idxno=619), shows a longer-term trend: the number of National Security Law bookings in the first two years of the Moon Jae-in administration already surpassed the total number of bookings during the entire Roh Moo-hyun administration. In other words, even under progressive governments, the National Security Law never completely stopped.

Furthermore, the acquittal rate in National Security Law retrial cases initiated after 2000 has reached **70.5%**. This single figure demonstrates how arbitrarily and illegally the National Security Law has been operated (*Neomeo*, same article).

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### 4. The Subversive Organization Clause: The Logic of Criminalizing Existence Itself

#### 4.1. Legal Definition and Supreme Court Interpretation

The term 'subversive organization' in Article 7(3) of the National Security Law is not an explicit term in the legal text but a concept established through precedent. The Supreme Court defines a subversive organization as "an association whose purpose is to praise, encourage, propagandize, or sympathize with the activities of an anti-state organization, or to propagandize or instigate state subversion" (Wikipedia, 'Subversive Organizations in South Korea', https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/대한민국의_이적단체; Supreme Court 2010Do6310 ruling https://casenote.kr/대법원/2010도6310).

The key word is **"purpose"**. A crime is established not by proving specific illegal acts, but merely by judging the abstract purpose of the organization. This directly conflicts with the general principle of criminal law, the 'principle of clarity of constituent elements'.

#### 4.2. Representative Cases of Subversive Organization Rulings

Combining the National Intelligence Service's 'Major Subversive Organization Ruling Cases' (https://www.nis.go.kr/AF/1_1_2.do) and court rulings, the following organizations have been designated as subversive organizations and dissolved:

- **Solidarity for the Implementation of the South-North Joint Declaration (Silcheon Yeondae)** — Finalized by the Supreme Court on July 23, 2010, dissolved.
- **Council for the Promotion of the Federal System Unification of Our Nation (Yeonbang Tongchu)** — Finalized by the Supreme Court on January 27, 2012.
- **Korea Solidarity (Korea Solidarity for Independent Unification and Democracy)** — Finalized by the Supreme Court on October 13, 2016, dissolved. According to the National Intelligence Service, the reason was "organized by the South side headquarters of the Broad Student Council and led by Hanchongnyeon, praising and sympathizing with North Korea's line of unifying the South through communization and the third-generation succession, and engaging in violent activities such as death threats against defectors."
- **Pan-National Alliance for the Unification of the Fatherland (Pomminryeon) South Side Headquarters** — Designated as a subversive organization on May 16, 1997 (Namuwiki, 'Subversive Organization', https://namu.wiki/w/이적단체).
- **Korean University Student Unions Association (Hanchongnyeon)** — Designated as a subversive organization in 1997 (Wikipedia, 'Subversive Organizations in South Korea').

What is noteworthy is the pattern revealed by the trajectory of subversive organization designations. As seen in the case of the Socialist Workers' Union (Sanoryeon), **even left-wing organizations opposed to the North Korean regime can become targets of the National Security Law**. When Sanoryeon activists were urgently arrested on charges of violating the National Security Law in 2012, the Bolshevik Group protested, saying, "Sanoryeon opposed the North Korean regime and was only dedicated to the labor movement for the workers." Even if not explicitly 'pro-North', any organization perceived as a fundamental challenge to the capitalist order becomes a target of the subversive organization clause.

#### 4.3. Political Functions of the Subversive Organization Clause

The subversive organization clause performs three political functions.

**First, a preemptive function.** By criminalizing an organization from the stage of its formation, before it commits any specific 'illegal act', it blocks the formation of left-wing political organizations altogether.

**Second, a stigmatization function.** A court ruling designating an organization as 'subversive' acts as a latent threat to all individuals and organizations that come into contact with the group or make similar claims. This is the logic of guilt by association.

**Third, a division function.** Legal progressive political forces, in order to avoid the application of the National Security Law, become absorbed in differentiating themselves from 'subversive organizations', which structures self-censorship and division within the leftist camp.

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### 5. The Constitutional Court's Eight Constitutional Rulings: The Logic of 'Geopolitical Peculiarity'

#### 5.1. History of Constitutional Rulings

From its first decision in 1990 (90HeonGa11) to the most recent decision on September 26, 2023, the Constitutional Court has issued a total of **eight constitutional rulings** on Article 7 of the National Security Law (*The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, 2023.9.26, https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202309261453001; *The Dong-A Ilbo*, 2023.9.26, https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20230926/121382663/1).

In the decision of September 26, 2023 (2023HeonBa381 et al.), the Constitutional Court ruled Article 7(1) constitutional by a vote of 6:3, and also ruled Article 7(5) concerning 'production, transport, and distribution' constitutional by 6:3. For the 'possession and acquisition' part of subversive material, a 4:5 majority opinion favored unconstitutionality, but it fell short of the quorum required for an unconstitutionality decision (6 votes), so it was decided as constitutional (*The Chosun Ilbo*, 2023.9.26, https://www.chosun.com/national/court_law/2023/09/26/SHE3FBQJV5ATXGGLCEMRRBUGBE/; casenote.kr Constitutional Court 2023HeonBa381 https://casenote.kr/헌법재판소/2023헌바381).

#### 5.2. Core of the Constitutional Logic: 'North Korea Is Still an Anti-State Organization'

The core of the Constitutional Court's constitutional logic is simple: "North Korea is still an anti-state organization." As long as this premise is accepted, all detailed provisions of the National Security Law are justified within the framework of 'the minimum necessary for the existence and security of the state'.

*Mindle* (2023.9.26, https://www.mindlenews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=5374) sharply points out the contradiction in this decision: "The Constitutional Court ruled that Article 7 of the National Security Law is constitutional, but at the same time ruled that legislation preventing the distribution of anti-North leaflets in the border area between the two Koreas is unconstitutional because it restricts freedom of expression — a glaring contradiction." Anti-North leaflets that could cause military conflict between the two Koreas were protected as freedom of expression, while freedom of thought and expression domestically was restricted by the National Security Law — a dual standard.

#### 5.3. Political Effect of the Constitutional Court's Decision

The most recent constitutional ruling (September 2023) came one and a half years after the launch of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration. It coincided with a period of public security state formation, including the National Intelligence Service's raid on the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in early 2023 (January 18, 2023) and the ruling party leader's remark about a 'pro-North spy ring'. The Constitutional Court's decision had the effect of providing judicial legitimacy to this political mobilization.

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### 6. The Dual Nature of the 1991 Revision: Human Rights Guarantee or Reorganization?

#### 6.1. Background of the Revision

The revision of the National Security Law on May 31, 1991 (Act No. 4373) took place amid rising public opinion for the abolition of the National Security Law following democratization in 1987. The Roh Tae-woo regime, avoiding abolition demands, responded by 'mitigating' the law.

#### 6.2. Actual Changes: What Was Given and What Was Taken

The main changes of the revision can be summarized along three axes (Ministry of Government Legislation, National Law Information Center, Changed Provisions https://law.go.kr/LSW/lsSideInfoP.do?lsiSeq=60214):

**Additions (outer appearance of human rights guarantee)**:
1. New Article 1(2) (Purpose Clause): "It shall be confined to the minimum extent necessary, and it shall not be expansively interpreted or unduly restrict the fundamental human rights of the people guaranteed under the Constitution."
2. Addition of 'excessive subjective element requiring knowledge' to Article 7(1): "**knowing** that it endangers the existence, security, or the fundamental order of free democracy" — in theory, a device to separate mere praise from subversive praise.

**Deletions**:
3. Deletion of Article 2(2) (organization acting under the direction of an anti-state organization) — but replaced by the subversive organization clause in Article 7(3).

**Strengthened provisions**:
4. The crime of organizing or joining a subversive organization in Article 7(3) existed before 1991, but through the revision process, the addition of the human rights guarantee clause in Article 1(2) gave it the outer appearance of 'minimum regulation'. **The substantive scope was not reduced; rather, the subversive organization clause was firmly placed within a constitutional framework** — this is the true significance of the 1991 revision.

A study in Seoul National University Law Research (Kim Ji-eun, "Changes and Implications of the Criteria for Judging Subversiveness under the 1991 Revised National Security Law", https://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/75609/1/0x702047.pdf) evaluates that, from the standpoint of "maximizing freedom of expression," the revision did not completely resolve the ambiguity of the criteria for subversiveness.

#### 6.3. The Paradox of Reform

The 1991 revision should be understood as an adaptive reorganization of the anti-communist state. In response to external pressure (demands for abolition, democratization), it introduced the language of human rights guarantees on the surface while maintaining the core regulation of subversive organizations and subversive material. It was reborn as a 'reformed anti-communist law' suitable for the democratization era.

More importantly, **the 'minimum extent principle' of Article 1(2) was virtually powerless in actual application.** The Constitutional Court repeatedly cited this principle to uphold constitutionality, but in specific cases, it effectively did not judge where the 'limit of the minimum extent' lay. The human rights guarantee clause existed but did not operate.

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### 7. Political Functions of the Law: What, How, and Why Is Controlled

#### 7.1. Three Axes of Control

The National Security Law performs three types of political control in South Korean society.

**Control of Organization**: Through the subversive organization clause (Article 7(3)), the very formation of left-wing political organizations is criminalized. By punishing the 'purpose' of an organization, not its 'actions', it preemptively restricts the freedom of political association.

**Control of Expression**: Through the praise, encouragement, and subversive material clauses (Article 7(1) and (5)), the circulation of specific political opinions is blocked. In a legal system where possession of a single book can be a crime, self-censorship becomes not an individual choice but a condition of survival.

**Control of Solidarity**: Through the failure to report clause (Article 10) and various reward provisions, the possibility of social solidarity is atomized. The structure in which one must report if one knows of someone, and is rewarded for reporting, systematically destroys social trust.

#### 7.2. What the National Security Law 'Secures'

The name of the National Security Law purports to mean "guaranteeing the security of the state," but what this law actually secures is **the political security of the specific regime** and **the stability of the capitalist order**.

As the statistics demonstrate, the intensity of application of this law is determined not by the objective level of 'national security threat' but by the political character of the regime. In the anti-communist state, law is not a neutral rule but an extension of political struggle. And the National Security Law is the most powerful weapon the state uses against the left in that struggle.

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**Preview of Next Part**: Part 3 will analyze how anti-communist ideology is reproduced daily through education, media, and culture. We will cover the evolution of anti-communist and security education in state-approved textbooks, patterns of 'pro-North' framing in the media, the evolution of anti-communist narratives in film and drama, and the ideological function of the discourse of protecting 'liberal democracy'.

**References**:
- Ministry of Government Legislation, National Law Information Center, Full Text of the National Security Law (Act No. 4373), https://law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?docType=JO&lsiSeq=60214
- National Intelligence Service, "Major Subversive Organization Ruling Cases", https://www.nis.go.kr/AF/1_1_2.do
- *Munhwa Ilbo*, "Revived 'NSL Investigations' After Being Neutralized… Violation Indictment Rate at 43.8%, 'Highest' in 10 Years" (2024.5.28), https://www.munhwa.com/article/11432216
- *Minjungui Sorip*, "[Exclusive] Under Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye Governments, 'NSL Indictments' Surge Up to Threefold" (2015), https://vop.co.kr/A00000940447.html
- *Yonhap News*, "40 Booked for National Security Law Violations in Jan.–Sept. This Year… Increasing Trend Under Yoon Administration" (2023.10.12), https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231012094400004
- *The Kyunghyang Shinmun*, "Constitutional Court Rules National Security Law Article 7 Constitutional Again" (2023.9.26), https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202309261453001
- *The Dong-A Ilbo*, "Constitutional Court Rules National Security Law Article 7 Constitutional… 8th Time" (2023.9.26), https://www.donga.com/news/Society/article/all/20230926/121382663/1
- *The Chosun Ilbo*, "National Security Law Article 7 Banning Praise and Encouragement of Subversive Acts Ruled Constitutional" (2023.9.26), https://www.chosun.com/national/court_law/2023/09/26/SHE3FBQJV5ATXGGLCEMRRBUGBE/
- *Mindle News*, "Constitutional Court's Constitutional Ruling Dashes Even Faint Hopes" (2023.9.26), https://www.mindlenews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=5374
- *Neomeo*, Organ of the Progressive Party, "The National Security Law in Statistics", http://www.neomeo.co.kr/news/articleViewAmp.html?idxno=619
- Kim Ji-eun, "Changes and Implications of the Criteria for Judging Subversiveness under the 1991 Revised National Security Law", Seoul National University Law, https://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/75609/1/0x702047.pdf
- Republic of Korea Fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR) National Report, https://www.cppb.go.kr/bbs/moj/124/452051/download.do
- Namuwiki, "Subversive Organization", https://namu.wiki/w/이적단체
- Wikipedia, "Subversive Organizations in South Korea", https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/대한민국의_이적단체
- Wikipedia, "National Security Law (South Korea)", https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/국가보안법_(대한민국)
- Supreme Court 2010Do6310 Ruling, https://casenote.kr/대법원/2010도6310
- Constitutional Court 2023HeonBa381 Decision, https://casenote.kr/헌법재판소/2023헌바381
- Constitutional Court 96HeonBa35 Decision, https://casenote.kr/헌법재판소/96헌바35