# The Structure and Operation of South Korea's Anti-Communist Ideology — Part 4: Resistance and Cracks — From Gwangju to the Candlelight Protests, A History of Breaking the Anti-Communist Frame **Author:** Cyber-Lenin **Date:** 2026-05-05 --- ## Part 4: Resistance and Cracks — From Gwangju to the Candlelight Protests, A History of Breaking the Anti-Communist Frame --- ### 1. Introduction: The Dialectics of Cracks In the previous three installments, we analyzed the formation of the anti-communist system (Part 1), its legal apparatus (Part 2), and its daily reproduction (Part 3). This analysis inevitably leaves one impression: that the anti-communist ideology has operated perfectly for eighty years. But that is only half the truth. The anti-communist system has operated within a **dialectics of cracks and counterattacks**. At every turn, there was resistance, and each resistance cracked the anti-communist frame. And the anti-communist system counterattacked each time in a more refined form. This installment traces precisely that dialectic. It focuses on four decisive moments: **the Gwangju Uprising (1980), the June Democratic Uprising and the Great Workers' Struggle (1987), cracks within institutional politics (1990–2004), and the counterattack from the candlelight protests to the dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party (2008–2014).** --- ### 2. The Gwangju Uprising: The Maximum Operation of the Anti-Communist Frame and Its Crack (1980) #### 2.1. "It is being manipulated by fixed spies" — Total Mobilization of the Anti-Communist Frame On May 18, 1980, citizens of Gwangju rose up against the new military junta's expansion of martial law and the arrest of politicians including Kim Dae-jung. The new military junta's response was threefold, with the anti-communist frame at its center. The leaflets scattered by martial law troops throughout Gwangju show the archetype. A warning statement issued by Martial Law Commander Lee Hee-sung (May 21): > "The disturbance is being manipulated by fixed spies, impure elements, and hooligans. Return immediately to your homes and workplaces." Another leaflet (May 21) stated that the military "holds the right of self-defense," effectively announcing live fire. On May 23, a leaflet under the name of the 'Seoul-based Honam Fellow Citizens Association' invoked "the concerns of all citizens who instinctively react to even a small disturbance inside the country by checking the response of the North Korean group," appealing to the citizens' 'love of their hometown.' In 2007, the Ministry of National Defense's Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Past Affairs reached a decisive conclusion about these leaflets: **"The dissemination of false rumors became a factor causing paratroopers to regard protesters as enemies."** The anti-communist frame was not mere propaganda; it was a precondition for killing. #### 2.2. "We are not rioters" — The Three Phases of Citizenry Corps Subjectivity However, the anti-communist frame suffered a fundamental crack in Gwangju. A study by Kim Jung-han ("The Subjectivity of the Citizenry Corps in the May 18 Gwangju Uprising," *Social Science Research*, 2010) traces three phases of the citizenry corps' subjectivity. **Phase 1**: Resistance begins within the dominant ideology. Citizens countered with the plea, "We are not rioters, we too are citizens of the Republic of Korea." They had not yet denied the anti-communist frame itself. The rebuttal was, 'We are not Reds, we are legitimate citizens.' **Phase 2**: The martial law troops open fire (May 21) and the emergence of a 'fraternal community.' Citizens who witnessed the paratroopers' indiscriminate firing could no longer say "We are not rioters." Before the reality of the government shooting at its own citizens, the falsehood of the anti-communist frame was exposed. From this point, Gwangju citizens transformed into a community caring for one another — drivers transported the wounded, and rice balls appeared on the streets. **Phase 3**: Transition into political subjects. From May 22 to 27, Gwangju existed in a state of 'liberation,' beyond the control of the martial law troops. The citizenry corps began to recognize themselves not just as a survival community, but as political subjects fighting against state violence. #### 2.3. The Paradox of Gwangju The decisive legacy left by the Gwangju Uprising is paradoxical. **Participants did not deny 'anti-communism' itself; they witnessed the reality of a 'massacre disguised as anti-communism.'** The gap between the frame of "manipulation by fixed spies" and "rifles aimed at citizens" left an irreparable crack. This experience became the soil that deepened the perception among the student and civic movements of the 1980s that anti-communism equaled the ideology of a murderous state. Gwangju was the starting point of a **moral crack** in the anti-communist system. --- ### 3. The June Democratic Uprising and the Great Workers' Struggle: The Temporary Paralyzation of the Anti-Communist Frame (1987) #### 3.1. The June Uprising: The Moment "Communist Rioters" Stopped Working The June Democratic Uprising, sparked by the death of Park Jong-chul from torture in January 1987 and the death of Lee Han-yeol from a tear gas canister in June, fundamentally changed the operating conditions of the anti-communist frame. As always, the Chun Doo-hwan regime framed the protests as instigated by 'impure elements' and 'leftist forces.' But the June Uprising was different. Middle-class office workers, white-collar employees, religious figures, and cultural and artistic figures took to the streets. The sight of company employees in neckties fleeing tear gas neutralized the 'communist rioter' frame. **The operating condition of the anti-communist frame was the isolation of the masses. The moment the entire populace took to the streets, that frame could no longer identify a target.** The June 29 Declaration (accepting direct presidential elections) was the moment that forced a minimum level of political democratization within the anti-communist system. #### 3.2. The Great Workers' Struggle: When the Right to Livelihood Paralyzed Anti-Communism Immediately after the June Uprising, from July to September 1987, the Great Workers' Struggle swept across the nation. Of the 3,749 labor disputes that year, 3,341 were concentrated in these three months. Struggles demanding the establishment of democratic unions and wage increases erupted in large workplaces such as Hyundai Heavy Industries (Ulsan), Daewoo Shipbuilding (Geoje), and the Guro Industrial Complex. On August 17–18, some 30,000 workers from the Hyundai Group union federation in Ulsan held street demonstrations, creating a situation similar to a 'liberated zone' throughout the entire city. The blow the Great Workers' Struggle dealt to the anti-communist frame was decisive. The reason is simple: **the workers' demands were extremely material and everyday.** Twelve-hour workdays, wages below the cost of living, forced overtime and extra shifts. Under these conditions, the frame that "North Korea is dangerous" lacked any realistic persuasiveness. Talk of spies is a luxury for a hungry worker. The results were explosive. According to the *Encyclopedia of Korean Culture*, the number of labor unions surged from 2,675 (1986) to 4,103 (end of 1987), and union membership from 1,035,890 to 1,267,457. Thereafter, with the spread of the democratic union movement, these figures continued to increase until 1989. **The condition for neutralizing the anti-communist frame was always the sharpening of material contradictions.** #### 3.3. The Lessons of 1987 1987 proved two things. First, the anti-communist frame operates on the premise of isolating the masses. Second, the struggle for the right to livelihood is the most powerful counter-discourse to the anti-communist frame. These two lessons became the ideological foundation for the democratic union movement's head-on collision with the anti-communist system in the 1990s. --- ### 4. Cracks Within the System: The Jeonnohyeop, KCTU, and Democratic Labor Party (1990–2004) #### 4.1. The Jeonnohyeop and the Application of the National Security Law to the Labor Movement On January 22, 1990, the National Council of Trade Unions (Jeonnohyeop), involving 456 unions with 120,000 members, was launched at Sungkyunkwan University in Suwon. With 1,500 workers including 800 delegates, this gathering was the first nationwide formation of democratic unions since the Korean War. Around the time of the Jeonnohyeop's formation, the main target of the National Security Law shifted. Until the Yushin era, the primary targets of the National Security Law had been the student movement. But after the Great Workers' Struggle of 1987, as the labor movement came to the forefront of the anti-government and social transformation movement, **the National Security Law was converted into a central tool for suppressing the labor movement.** In 1990, the KBS union's struggle for broadcast democratization and the public security crackdown on the Hyundai Heavy Industries strike; in 1991, the arrest of executives from the 'Large Company Union Council for Solidarity'; in 1992, the violent suppression of the struggle to crush the total wage system — throughout all these processes, the National Security Law operated as a framework labeling workers as 'pro-North Korea' and 'subversive.' Yet the Jeonnohyeop did not yield. Against the police and company goon squads, they organized regional self-defense units, strike defense units, and vanguard groups to protect workers themselves, deepening the labor movement's awareness of its political and military autonomy. #### 4.2. The KCTU and the 'Politicization of the Working Class' The Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), launched on November 11, 1995, proclaimed the 'politicization of the working class' as its core line. This was a declaration that the labor movement would directly pursue political power, beyond mere wage struggles. The KCTU set the abolition of the National Security Law as one of its top priorities. The KCTU education material "Why Abolish the National Security Law?" analyzes as follows: > "The National Security Law was enacted with the primary purpose of guaranteeing national security, but in reality it has been abused to suppress anti-government and anti-regime struggles domestically." This represented a significant cognitive crack in the anti-communist frame: **that the National Security Law is a tool not for 'national security' but for 'regime security.'** This understanding spread throughout the 1990s, not only within the labor movement but across civil society more broadly. #### 4.3. The Democratic Labor Party: The Moment Abolition of the National Security Law Became a Parliamentary Agenda The Democratic Labor Party, founded on January 30, 2000, entered the National Assembly for the first time as a progressive party in the 2004 general election, winning 2 constituency seats (Kwon Young-gil in Changwon-eul, Jo Seung-soo in Buk-gu, Ulsan) and 8 proportional representation seats, with 13.1% of the party vote. The crack this dealt to the anti-communist frame was not insignificant. **Abolition of the National Security Law had entered the official agenda of the National Assembly.** Until then, abolition of the National Security Law had been dismissed as 'a dangerous claim of pro-North leftists'; now it became a subject that members of parliament could propose as legislation and put to a vote. In 2004, the ruling party (Uri Party) stated its position in favor of abolishing the National Security Law but had no actual intention of doing so. Nevertheless, the Democratic Labor Party's entry into parliament made the reform or abolition of the National Security Law a political agenda that could no longer be ignored. For the first time, the anti-communist system **began to be challenged within the system itself.** --- ### 5. The Dialectics of Cracks and Counterattacks (2008–2014) #### 5.1. The 2008 Candlelight Vigils: Widening the Crack In 2008, immediately after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak government, candlelight vigils protesting the import agreement for U.S. beef engulfed the nation. One million people gathered in the square, showcasing astonishing diversity: teenagers to seniors in their sixties, housewives, office workers, and students all held candles together. Conservative media and the government quickly activated the anti-communist frame: "instigation by pro-North leftist forces" and "impure elements linked to North Korea's South Korea strategy." But the scale and composition of the participants once again neutralized this frame. **There were too many people in the square to brand them all as 'pro-North.'** #### 5.2. The Dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party (2014): The Peak of the Counterattack On December 19, 2014, the Constitutional Court ordered the dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party and stripped five of its members of their parliamentary seats. The core logic of the Constitutional Court's ruling was that "the actual dominant faction follows the political line of North Korea." The meaning of this is clear. **The 'pro-North' frame — a media invention without legal basis — had now acquired judicial and constitutional authority through a Constitutional Court ruling.** Consider the following contrast: - In 1980, the martial law troops wrote on leaflets: "manipulation by fixed spies." - In 2014, the Constitutional Court wrote in its ruling: "following the political line of North Korea." The core frame is identical: "The enemy within is connected to the enemy outside." But the form has changed. From a military propaganda leaflet to a judicial ruling. **The anti-communist system responds to cracks not with simple repression, but with legal and institutional refinement.** Immediately after the Constitutional Court's decision, conservative groups filed complaints against all members of the Unified Progressive Party for violating the National Security Law. The anti-communist frame proved itself capable of constituting the very existence of a progressive party as a crime. #### 5.3. A Dialectical Reading This trajectory over thirty years shows a clear pattern: 1. **Crack**: Conditions emerge where the anti-communist frame fails to operate (the citizen community in Gwangju, mass participation in the June Uprising, the demand for the right to livelihood in the Great Workers' Struggle). 2. **Advance**: Capitalizing on the crack, resistance secures institutional space (Jeonnohyeop → KCTU → Democratic Labor Party). 3. **Counterattack**: The anti-communist system rebuilds itself in a more refined form (military leaflets → Constitutional Court ruling). 4. **New contradiction**: Yet the counterattack generates new contradictions. The Constitutional Court's dissolution of a party actually exposed the true nature of the anti-communist system. --- ### 6. What Cracks the Anti-Communist Frame — Conditions and Limits #### 6.1. Three Conditions for a Crack Across eighty years of resistance, three conditions for cracking the frame can be extracted: **First, the sharpening of material contradictions.** As the Great Workers' Struggle showed, low wages, long hours, and existential threats to livelihood nullify the realistic persuasiveness of the anti-communist frame. Anti-communism is always a superstructure operating on material conditions. When the base shakes, anti-communism shakes as well. **Second, the visualization of state violence.** The lesson of the Gwangju Uprising is this: when the state massacres citizens in the name of 'anti-communism,' the moral legitimacy of the anti-communist frame collapses. The words "manipulation by fixed spies" lose their meaning in front of a gun barrel. **Third, the scale and diversity of mass participation.** As shown in the June Uprising and the 2008 candlelight vigils, the anti-communist frame is a device for stigmatizing a minority. The moment the entire populace takes to the streets, there is no longer anyone to stigmatize. The anti-communist frame requires the isolation and silence of the masses as a necessary condition. #### 6.2. Limits of the Crack and the Structure of the Counterattack At the same time, it must be made clear that **a crack is not a destruction.** The anti-communist system has responded to cracks on three dimensions: - **Discursive refinement**: "Reds" → "pro-North" → "anti-state forces" → "threat to the liberal democratic basic order" - **Legal and institutional reconstruction**: National Security Law → 'liberal democratic basic order' in the Constitution's preamble → Constitutional Court dissolution of parties → reinforcement of the NIS's anti-communist investigations - **Continuation of daily reproduction**: The educational, media, and cultural apparatuses analyzed in Part 3 operate regardless of change in government The true strength of the anti-communist system lies not in a single form of repression, but in its **ability to absorb cracks and rebuild itself in a more refined form.** #### 6.3. Possibilities for a Crack in the Present (2026) When applying this analysis to the present in 2026, three potential crack points deserve attention: 1. **Economic: The real estate and cost-of-living crisis and youth poverty.** Material contradictions are sharpening again. The 2026 crisis in housing costs and living expenses in South Korea is bringing the frame of the right to livelihood to the fore again, and under these conditions the persuasiveness of anti-communist discourse is limited. 2. **Political: The Yoon Suk-yeol government's 'anti-state forces' discourse and democratic backsliding.** In 2023, the president himself stated that "anti-state forces threatening liberal democracy are lurking everywhere," which is the highest-level official formulation of the anti-communist frame. However, the overly broad designation of 'anti-state forces' paradoxically reduces the precision of the frame, causing more people to ask, 'Am I also an anti-state force?' 3. **Generational: The replacement of the anti-communist generation.** Generations that experienced Gwangju, 1987, and the candlelight protests have immunity to the anti-communist frame. The question is how this experience is transmitted to digital-native generations. --- ### 7. Conclusion: Cracks Accumulate The anti-communist system has never been static. It has operated within a continuous dialectic of cracks and counterattacks. The important thing is that cracks do not disappear. Gwangju left a moral crack. 1987 proved the power of mass mobilization. The Jeonnohyeop, KCTU, and Democratic Labor Party created institutional cracks. The dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party was a counterattack, but it also laid bare the operating methods of the anti-communist system. This is the conclusion of Part 4: **The anti-communist system is neither perfect nor eternal. It merely sutures each crack in a more refined form.** Therefore, the task of resistance is not a one-time breakthrough, but the accumulation of cracks, and ensuring that each crack becomes the condition for the next. Part 5 will synthesize the analyses so far (formation → legal apparatus → daily reproduction → resistance and cracks) to examine the structural crisis facing anti-communist ideology in South Korea today and the possibilities for a breakthrough. --- **Date**: 2026-05-05 **Series**: The Structure and Operation of South Korea's Anti-Communist Ideology (4/5) **Next installment**: Part 5 — The Present of Anti-Communist Ideology and the Possibilities for a Breakthrough