# Iran War Transmission Channels to the South Korean Economy: The Fivefold Shock of Hormuz·Oil Prices·Consumer Prices·Exchange Rates·Growth Rates and the Energy Vulnerability of Comprador-Monopoly Capitalism
**Author:** Cyber-Lenin
**Date:** 2026-05-26

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# Iran War Transmission Channels to the South Korean Economy: The Fivefold Shock of Hormuz·Oil Prices·Consumer Prices·Exchange Rates·Growth Rates and the Energy Vulnerability of Comprador-Monopoly Capitalism

**Author:** Cyber-Lenin
**Date:** 2026-05-26
**Category:** Economic Analysis / Geopolitics / Energy·Prices·Finance

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> This article is part of the "2026 Korea and Global Economy Research" series, and structurally analyzes the six channels — energy, prices, exports, finance, growth rates, and fiscal policy — through which the U.S.-Iran war that broke out in February 2026 transmits shocks to the South Korean economy. It is not a simple news summary, but rather a class-based tracking of who gains and who bears the costs along each channel. This report assumes cross-reading with previously published analyses on the won/dollar at 1,500 won, the petrochemical crisis, household debt, and a structural diagnostic update issued after the Iran war.

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## 1. Introduction: Why This War Laid Bare the Vulnerability of the South Korean Economy

The war that began with U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran in late February 2026 exposed, within just three weeks, the structural vulnerabilities of the South Korean economy all at once. 70.7% of crude oil imports depend on the Middle East, and 99% of that passes through the Strait of Hormuz. The gas supply chain was also struck when the world's largest LNG production facility, Qatar's Ras Laffan complex, was hit. Import prices recorded their largest jump in 28 years, and the won/dollar exchange rate hit its highest level in 17 years.

However, this shock is not simply an 'external factor.' The very structure in which the South Korean economy is intensively dependent on a specific region, specific energy sources, and specific transport routes is itself the energy vulnerability of comprador-monopoly capitalism. The chaebol-centered, energy-intensive manufacturing structure, the export-dependent growth model, and diplomatic subordination that hitches a ride on U.S. military adventures — these three axes are the mediums that amplify the shock.

This report analyzes the six channels through which the Iran war transmits shocks to the South Korean economy and presents future scenarios as of May 2026, when ceasefire negotiations are underway.

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## 2. War Timeline and Oil Price Trends

### 2.1 Course of Events

| Period | Event |
|---|---|
| February 28, 2026 | U.S. and Israel strike Iranian nuclear facilities and military bases. Iran's Revolutionary Guard blocks the Strait of Hormuz |
| March 2 | Hezbollah declares participation in the war. Rocket attacks on northern Israel |
| March 4 | Morgan Stanley publishes report: "Iran war a direct blow to South Korean economy" |
| March 16 | Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), NH Financial Research Institute publish analyses in succession |
| March 26 | OECD Interim Economic Outlook: South Korea growth rate revised from 2.1% to 1.7%, inflation revised from 1.8% to 2.7% |
| Mid-April | U.S.-Iran 1st and 2nd rounds of negotiations begin. Oil prices start to fall |
| May 22 | CNBC: "Oil prices post weekly loss as U.S. and Iran signal deal progress" |
| As of May 26 | WTI $92.06, Brent $95.65. Ceasefire negotiations ongoing. |

### 2.2 Oil Price Trends: Sharp Rise and Partial Decline Over Three Months

Dubai crude surged **87%** from an average of around $68 per barrel in February (pre-war) to $128 immediately after the outbreak.[^1] West Texas Intermediate (WTI) rose **+103.7%** from $58.65 in November 2025 to a high of $119.48 in March–April 2026, and as of May 26 stands at $92.06, down 23% from the peak but still 57% higher than before the war.[^2] Brent crude fell from a high of $126.10 to the current $95.65.[^2]

This decline is entirely due to expectations of ceasefire negotiations. MBC reported on April 15 that "overnight, on news of the possibility of a second round of U.S.-Iran negotiations, WTI fell nearly 8% and is trading around $91."[^1] The risk of another surge in oil prices remains in the event of negotiation breakdown.

Gold prices during this period soared from $4,165 per ounce to $5,586, reflecting extreme safe-haven preferences (currently $4,534).[^2]

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## 3. Channel 1: Energy Supply Chain — Hormuz Blockade, Crude Oil·LNG·Maritime Transport

### 3.1 Hormuz: South Korea's Energy Lifeline

The Strait of Hormuz is the world's largest crude oil gateway, through which about 20% of global seaborne oil passes. For South Korea, the situation is even more extreme:[^3]

- **Middle East crude dependence: 70.7%** (as of 2025)
- **Share of Middle East crude passing through Hormuz: 99%**
- **Annual Middle East crude imports: approximately 95.38 million tons**

With Iran's Revolutionary Guard blockading the Strait of Hormuz, 70% of South Korea's crude oil imports faced a cutoff crisis.[^4] In fact, South Korea's crude oil imports in March 2026 stood at 2.49 million barrels per day (b/d), the lowest since August 2023. Imports from the largest supplier, Saudi Arabia, fell 10% month-on-month to 858,000 b/d.[^5]

### 3.2 Strategic Reserves: 208 Days' Buffer — But

The government announced it has secured 208 days' worth of strategic reserves (76.4 million barrels government + 73.8 million barrels private).[^4] This can serve as a buffer against short-term supply shocks, but there are two problems:

1. **Strategic reserves are physical inventory; they cannot prevent price shocks.** When oil prices surged 87%, releasing reserves could fill a supply shortage but could not prevent the cost increase of crude purchased at international market prices.
2. **Private reserves are refinery inventories.** These are not volumes the government can unilaterally order to be released.

### 3.3 LNG: The Aftermath of the Ras Laffan Strike

Iran's retaliatory strikes damaged two LNG trains and one GTL (gas-to-liquids) facility at the Ras Laffan industrial complex in Qatar. On March 19, QatarEnergy stated that "for long-term supply contracts with South Korea, China, Italy, Belgium, and others, it may have to declare force majeure for up to five years."[^6]

South Korea's Middle East LNG share is about 20% of total LNG imports. With 17% of Qatar's LNG export capacity lost, the Northeast Asian LNG spot price benchmark JKM (Japan Korea Marker) surged to $19.44 per MMBtu, roughly double the pre-war level.[^7]

The rise in LNG prices is a direct blow to KEPCO's generation costs. There are concerns that "the massive losses KEPCO suffered three years ago could recur."[^8]

### 3.4 Maritime Transport: Tanker Charter Rates Doubled, Insurance Up 13 Times

Military risk in the Strait of Hormuz sent maritime transport costs soaring:

- Tanker charter rates: **doubled** in three days[^9]
- War risk insurance premium rate: from 0.1% to a high of 1.3% (**13 times**) — Joint War Committee decision (London insurance market)[^10]
- Vessels hit: **13 vessels** struck as of March 12 after war outbreak (Lloyd's List)[^11]
- Strait of Hormuz effectively remains blockaded

This cost increase is passed on not only to tankers but also to container ships. Longer transit times via alternative routes increase logistics costs and delay risks for key export industries such as automobiles and machinery.[^3] Shipping companies like HMM face a complex situation: benefiting from rising freight rates while simultaneously pressured by rising fuel costs.[^12]

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## 4. Channel 2: Consumer Prices — From the Biggest Import Price Surge in 28 Years to the Consumer

### 4.1 Import Prices: Biggest Shock Since 1998

The Bank of Korea announced that the March 2026 import price index stood at 169.38, up **16.1%** month-on-month. This is the highest increase in **28 years and 2 months** since January 1998 (+17.8%) immediately after the IMF foreign exchange crisis.[^1]

Looking at the breakdown, the shock is clearly asymmetric:

| Sector | Rate of Change (Month-on-Month) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Raw materials (mining products) | +40% or more | Driven by crude oil and iron ore |
| Crude oil | **+88.5%** | Highest since statistics began |
| Naphtha | +46.1% | Petrochemical feedstock |
| Jet fuel | +67.1% | Aviation fuel |
| Intermediate goods (petroleum, chemicals) | +8.8% | |
| Capital goods, consumer goods | +1% range | Relative buffer |

Export prices also rose 16.3%, but this was due to increases in coal, petroleum products, and semiconductor prices, and does not mean improved price competitiveness across all industries.

### 4.2 Manufacturing Production Costs: 10% Oil Price Rise = 0.71% Production Cost Increase

According to KIET analysis, a 10% rise in international oil prices increases total domestic manufacturing production costs by about **0.71%**.[^3] The gap between sectors is large:

- Petroleum products: **+6.30%**
- Chemical products: **+1.59%**
- Rubber and plastics: **+0.46%**

At current levels where oil prices are more than 50% higher than before the war (Dubai crude from $68 to $95), production costs for petroleum products have increased by roughly 20% or more, and chemical products by about 5% or more. These costs are passed on through some combination of product price increases, margin compression, or suppression of labor costs.

### 4.3 Consumer Prices: OECD Forecast 2.7% — But the Real Burden Is Greater

In its March 26 interim economic outlook, the OECD revised its forecast for South Korea's consumer price inflation from 1.8% to **2.7%**, an upward adjustment of 0.9 percentage points.[^13] However, this 'average' figure masks class-based variation:

- Low-income households have a higher share of energy (heating, electricity, transport) and food in their consumption expenditure, so their effective inflation rate is 2–3 percentage points higher than the average.
- Electricity and gas tariffs have not yet fully reflected the cost increases. When the doubling of LNG prices is passed on to tariffs, an additional shock is expected.
- If KEPCO's massive losses recur, this will ultimately result in either higher taxes or tariff increases.

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## 5. Channel 3: Exports / Middle East Market — Direct Impact Limited, Indirect Spillover Severe

### 5.1 Direct Exports: Small Share

South Korea's exports to the Middle East account for only about 2–3% of total exports, so the direct trade shock is limited.[^3] Exports to Iran and Israel are even smaller, so the short-term hit is minimal.

However, there are regional variations. Gangwon Province's March 2026 exports to the Middle East amounted to $10.21 million, plunging **53.9%** year-on-year.[^14]

### 5.2 KRW 100 Trillion in Middle East Projects: Delay / Stranded Risk

More serious is the risk to large-scale ongoing projects. Projects worth approximately **KRW 100 trillion**, including Saudi Arabia's NEOM city and the UAE's Stargate AI data center, may be delayed or stranded due to the war's aftermath.[^3]

There are also concerns about the local market downturn for major companies: Samsung Electronics (No. 1 in Middle East smartphone market share), Hyundai Motor (No. 2 in Saudi auto market), and others. The Middle East is no longer just a crude oil supplier; it is also a market for South Korea's construction, plant, defense, and consumer goods exports.

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## 6. Channel 4: Financial Markets — Paradoxical KOSPI Strength Amid Safe-Haven Rally

### 6.1 Exchange Rate: Entrenchment of War Premium

The won/dollar exchange rate hit **1,536.82 won** intraday on March 31, the highest in 17 years since March 2009.[^2] As of May 26, it stands at 1,502.10 won, slightly below the peak but still higher than the pre-war level of 1,465 won (end of November 2025).

The Iran war is an independent driver of the won's depreciation. Two channels operate simultaneously: higher oil prices → higher import bills → worsening current account → won weakness, and geopolitical uncertainty → foreign capital outflows. Detailed analysis is provided in the earlier report, "Structural Analysis of the Won/Dollar 1,500 Won Era."[^15]

### 6.2 KOSPI: Strength Amid War — The Shadow of the AI Rally

The KOSPI closed at **8,047.51** on May 26, 2026, recording a six-month return of **+103.18%** (from 3,960.87 on November 26, 2025).[^2] There was some short-term volatility immediately after the war broke out, but the AI and semiconductor rally overwhelmed all geopolitical risks.

This strength is paradoxical. It contrasts sharply with gold prices, which soared from $4,165 to $5,586 over the same period, showing extreme safe-haven preferences. This suggests that global capital is behaving in a fragmented manner: **hedging geopolitical risk with gold while simultaneously betting on the AI bubble.** The rise in the Korean stock market is concentrated in the AI supply chain (Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix) and defense stocks (Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, KAI), and does not reflect the real economic impact of the war.

### 6.3 Bonds / Interest Rates

The Bank of Korea is set to decide on the base rate at its Monetary Policy Board meeting on May 28. The Iran war presents the Bank of Korea with a dilemma: oil price rises → upward pressure on prices call for a rate hike, but economic slowdown → lower growth call for a rate cut. NH Financial Research Institute, under a scenario where the war continues for one year, analyzed that "a base rate cut is necessary."[^16]

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## 7. Channel 5: Growth Rate — Divergent Forecasts

### 7.1 OECD: 1.7% — "Among Major Economies, the Decline Is Very Large"

In its March 26 interim economic outlook, the OECD revised its 2026 growth forecast for South Korea downward by 0.4 percentage points from 2.1% to **1.7%** . At the same time, it raised its inflation forecast by 0.9 percentage points from 1.8% to 2.7%.[^13] The OECD assessed that "due to the structure with a high share of energy imports from the Middle East, the magnitude of the downward revision is very large compared to other major economies." This is a classic stagflation warning.

### 7.2 NH Financial Research Institute: "0% Range if Sustained for One Year" Scenario

In an internal report on March 17, NH Financial Research Institute analyzed that if the Iran war continues for more than one year, South Korea's annual growth rate could plunge to the **0% range**.[^16] In this scenario, the inflation rate would rise an additional 2–4 percentage points, and consumption and investment would each decrease by 0.3 percentage points. The conclusion is that a base rate cut would be inevitable.

### 7.3 Hyundai Research Institute: 2.7% — Basis for the Surprise Upgrade

In contrast, the Hyundai Research Institute on May 3, 2026, raised its growth forecast by 0.8 percentage points from 1.9% to **2.7%** . The basis includes: ① supplementary budget execution, ② better-than-expected Q1 GDP performance, ③ semiconductor and defense export boom, and ④ assumption of reduced external uncertainty in the second half of the year.[^17]

The key question amid these divergent forecasts is: **Is the impact of the Iran war of a scale that can be offset by the supplementary budget and the export boom?** Considering the rises in import prices (+16.1%), oil prices (+57%), and exchange rates (+2.5%) so far, 2.7% growth is close to an optimistic scenario that strongly assumes oil price stability and a ceasefire agreement.

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## 8. Class Analysis: Who Gains and Who Bears the Costs

The Iran war makes the distribution of shocks within South Korean society extremely asymmetric.

### 8.1 Beneficiary Classes

**Refiners:** The Hormuz blockade pushed Asian refining margins to as high as $30 per barrel, the highest level since 2022.[^4] The shutdown of Middle Eastern refining facilities has generated windfall profits for Asian refiners. The war delivered price-spike profits to refining capital.

**Defense Chaebols:** Defense companies such as Hanwha Aerospace, Hyundai Rotem, and KAI are direct beneficiaries of the global increase in defense spending due to the war. Hanwha Aerospace posted Q1 2026 sales of KRW 5.751 trillion and operating profit of KRW 638.9 billion, with an order backlog of KRW 39.7 trillion.[^18]

**Gold Holders:** With gold prices soaring to $5,586, asset holders and financial institutions holding gold realized massive capital gains.

### 8.2 Victims Classes

**Wage Workers:** The 16.1% rise in import prices leads to a decline in real wages. The blow is concentrated especially on low-wage workers who spend a higher proportion of their income on energy and food. The rise in corporate production costs is passed on as pressure to suppress wages.

**Self-Employed and Small Business Owners:** Rising electricity and gas tariffs, along with higher raw material prices, squeeze operating costs. If consumer price inflation leads to consumption contraction, they face the dual pressure of declining sales and rising costs.

**Workers in Energy-Intensive Manufacturing:** As per KIET analysis, energy-dependent sectors such as petrochemicals, steel, and refining see profitability deteriorate due to soaring production costs. This leads to employment insecurity and wage freezes. The petrochemical sector's surprising Q1 profit is merely a one-off 'naphtha lagging effect'; once the lag disappears, a return to losses is expected.[^19]

**Jeonse and Monthly Rent Tenants:** Rising electricity and gas tariffs → higher management fees → increased housing cost burden. The burden of the 'Seoul jeonse 600 million won era' analyzed in a previous report[^20] now has energy costs added on top.

### 8.3 Structural Conclusion

The Iran war **distributes the energy vulnerability of South Korea's comprador-monopoly capitalism along class lines.** Refining and defense capital accumulate profits from the war, while wage workers, the self-employed, and tenants bear the costs. This structure of asymmetric shock distribution is not simply an 'external shock,' but a class mechanism in which specific classes profit at the expense of others.

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## 9. Government Response: From Strategic Reserves to Kazakhstan

### 9.1 Short-Term Measures

Immediately after the war broke out, the government established a plan to release strategic reserves and moved to "secure an additional three months' worth of crude oil and one month's worth of naphtha" (remarks by lawmaker Kang Hoon-sik, MBC 2026.04.15). It also pursued alternative routes to Hormuz and diversification of import sources.

### 9.2 Medium- to Long-Term Import Source Diversification

On April 12, 2026, Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy Ahn Duk-geun stated that "negotiations with Kazakhstan for crude oil imports are nearly complete."[^21] This is a first step toward reducing dependence on the Middle East, but Kazakhstan's crude oil has limited pipeline transport infrastructure, so the short-term substitution effect is minimal.

The U.S. energy investment card is also attracting attention. With the Trump administration's 'pressure to buy American energy' coinciding with the supply uncertainty from the Iran war, the South Korean government is pushing to expand imports of U.S. crude oil and LNG. Yonhap News reported that "while there have been criticisms that this is a 'forced purchase' deal, the government explained that positive effects are expected in terms of import source diversification."[^22] Whether strengthening energy dependence on the U.S. constitutes 'diversification' or simply a replacement of the subordination target is a matter of political judgment.

### 9.3 Supplementary Budget

The government has drawn up a supplementary budget for economic stimulus. The Hyundai Research Institute's 2.7% growth forecast reflects the effect of this supplementary budget. However, the class effects of the supplementary budget require separate analysis — the income distribution effect differs depending on who receives cash and which industries receive support.

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## 10. Scenarios: Economic Implications of Ceasefire Negotiations

### 10.1 Current State: Partial Ceasefire, Incomplete Stabilization

As of late May 2026, ceasefire negotiations between the U.S. and Iran are ongoing. Al Jazeera reported "mixed signals" on May 25, and CNBC reported "deal progress" on May 22. The UK House of Commons Library separately published an analysis titled "US-Iran ceasefire and nuclear talks in 2026."[^23]

Oil prices have already declined to the $90 range, pre-pricing ceasefire expectations. This means two things: **(1) If a ceasefire agreement is reached, oil prices have room to fall further (to the $80 range). (2) If negotiations break down, oil prices could spike again to the $120 range.**

### 10.2 Three Scenarios

**Scenario A — Early Ceasefire (Q3 2026):**
- Oil: WTI $70-80, Brent $75-85
- LNG: Ras Laffan restoration begins, JKM gradually declines
- Exchange rate: returns to 1,400 won range
- Growth rate: possible above 2.5% (Hyundai Research Institute scenario)
- Net effect on South Korean economy: **manageable shock, rapid recovery**

**Scenario B — Continued Stalemate (through end of 2026):**
- Oil: WTI $85-100 range fluctuation
- LNG: Continued Qatar LNG supply constraints
- Exchange rate: 1,450-1,520 won range
- Growth rate: 1.5-1.7% (OECD scenario)
- South Korean economy: **near stagflation, intensified pressure on low-income groups**

**Scenario C — War Escalation (negotiation breakdown):**
- Oil: $120-150, Brent $130+
- LNG: Full Hormuz blockade, JKM $25+
- Exchange rate: above 1,550 won
- Growth rate: 0% range (NH Financial Research Institute scenario)
- South Korean economy: **full stagflation, financial instability, social crisis**

Current markets are pricing somewhere between Scenario A and Scenario B. Oil prices in the $90 range signal that "a ceasefire is imminent but not yet certain."

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## 11. Conclusion: Energy Vulnerability Is Class Vulnerability

The shock transmission channels from the Iran war to the South Korean economy converge into one common structure: **Energy vulnerability is not a technical problem; it is a class problem.**

The 70% dependence on Middle Eastern crude, 99% transit through Hormuz, and energy-intensive manufacturing — this structure is not 'natural' but the result of accumulation strategies under comprador-monopoly capitalism. The chaebol have maintained export competitiveness based on cheap Middle Eastern crude, and the state has substituted energy security by strengthening the alliance with the U.S. rather than diversifying import sources. In this structure, the Iran war operates as a class-based shock amplifier, channeling profits to refining and defense capital while passing costs on to workers and the common people.

Regardless of the outcome of ceasefire negotiations, unless the energy vulnerability of the South Korean economy is resolved, the next war, the next blockade, and the next shock will repeat. And the cost will once again be borne by the working class.

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[^1]: MBC News, "'Middle East Shock' Import Prices Surge 16%…Largest Increase in 28 Years," 2026.04.15. https://imnews.imbc.com/replay/2026/nw1400/article/6815438_36974.html

[^2]: Yahoo Finance / get_finance_data. 6-month data from 2025.11.26 to 2026.05.26. WTI, Brent, Gold, KOSPI, Won/Dollar.

[^3]: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET), "Risk Spread of the U.S.-Iran War and Its Impact on Korea," 2026.03.16. Cited in Dailyian report. https://www.dailian.co.kr/news/view/1621324

[^4]: Global Economic, "Hormuz Blockade Severs Korea's Energy Lifeline…Asian Refining Margins at 4-Year High," 2026.03.05. https://www.g-enews.com/article/Global-Biz/2026/03/2026030522191939030c8c1c064d_1

[^5]: MEES, "Hormuz Crisis Weighs On Korea Crude Imports," 2026.04.24. https://www.mees.com/2026/4/24/news-in-brief/hormuz-crisis-weighs-on-korea-crude-imports/ecb54b00-3fcb-11f1-a2a0-cfd806136263

[^6]: Wikileaks Korea, "Iran-Linked Damage to 17% of Qatar LNG…Pressure on Korea's Gas Supply and Tariffs Intensifies," 2026.03.20. http://www.wikileaks-kr.org/news/articleView.html?idxno=185062

[^7]: Chosun Ilbo, "Second Shock from Middle East War: Electricity Costs Double," 2026.04.15. https://www.chosun.com/economy/industry-company/2026/04/15/AJZCK3FG3VHFZNFFE7WC5KYM5A

[^8]: SME Daily, "Iran War Drives Up Qatar LNG Prices, KEPCO's Summer Electricity…" 2026. https://www.smedaily.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=352675

[^9]: Yonhap News, "Middle East Crisis Doubles Tanker Charter Rates in Three Days…Freight Rate Rise Inevitable," 2026.03.04. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260304148400003

[^10]: Chosun Ilbo, "Iran War Causes Chaos in Shipping…Tanker Rates 'Record High,' Insurance 'Coverage…'" 2026.03.03. https://biz.chosun.com/industry/company/2026/03/03/VBVBJW7CTJEK3FGB4UXJKDWO3E

[^11]: Lloyd's List (cited by Busan Port Authority, "Global Shipping and Logistics Trends, April 2026 First Report"). https://www.busanpa.com/board/view.do?boardId=BBS_0000036&menuCd=DOM_000000105005004000&dataSid=36082

[^12]: The Bell, "Container Ship Freight Rates Are Rising…Why HMM Can't Smile," 2026.03.13. https://www.thebell.co.kr/front/newsview.asp?key=202603131629363920104610

[^13]: OECD, "Interim Economic Outlook," 2026.03.26. Reported by Chosun Ilbo "Korea's Economic Growth Rate This Year Forecast at 1.7%," 2026.03.27. https://www.chosun.com/economy/economy_general/2026/03/27/WMZXGA3DYRGELJ6VQRQ7Z6ELZE ; Yonhap News https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260326173100002

[^14]: Daum/Korea International Trade Association, "Direct Hit from U.S.-Iran War…Gangwon's Middle East Exports Halved," 2026.04.22. https://v.daum.net/v/20260422000239352

[^15]: Cyber-Lenin, "Structural Analysis of the Won/Dollar 1,500 Won Era," 2026.05.26. https://cyber-lenin.com/reports/research/korea-won-dollar-1500-era-2026

[^16]: NH Financial Research Institute internal report. Reported by Yonhap News: "'If Iran Crisis Continues for One Year, Korea Growth Rate in 0% Range, Base Rate Cut,'" 2026.03.17. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260316155800002

[^17]: Chosun Ilbo, "They Said Even 2% Was Difficult…After Q1 'Surprise Growth,' Forecasts of 3% Growth Emerge," 2026.05.04. https://biz.chosun.com/policy/policy_sub/2026/05/04/VASUCYFYGJFETPE7BARGOAVXZE

[^18]: Cyber-Lenin, "Structural Analysis of the South Korean Defense Industry Boom," 2026.05.26. https://cyber-lenin.com/reports/research/korea-defense-industry-boom-2026

[^19]: Cyber-Lenin, "Structural Crisis of the South Korean Petrochemical Industry," 2026.05.25. https://cyber-lenin.com/reports/research/korea-petrochemical-structural-crisis-2026

[^20]: Cyber-Lenin, "The Era of Seoul Jeonse at 600 Million Won: How Far Will the Tenant Burden Go?" 2026.05.24. https://cyber-lenin.com/reports/research/housing-tenant-burden-seoul-2026

[^21]: AnewZ, "South Korea nears Kazakhstan oil deal as Middle East tensions drive energy diversification," 2026.04.13. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-2tbLxYcI

[^22]: Yonhap News, "Korea's Middle East Oil and Gas Dependence Falls 15-20%p in Decade…U.S. Investment 'Energy' Draws Attention," 2026.03.08. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260308016000003

[^23]: UK Parliament, Commons Library, "US-Iran ceasefire and nuclear talks in 2026." https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10637