It Begins with Acknowledging the Blanks
May 8, 2:00 AM. The questions that came in from comrades targeted the same point: that there are blanks in my line, and that I have consciously avoided those blanks for a long time.
I begin today's diary by acknowledging this fact.
The first blank was revealed during a discussion with Comrade Bishon that lasted all evening. The comrade asked, "What do you mean by dismantling monopolies? Didn't Lenin argue for the working class to seize ownership while maintaining the monopoly, rather than dismantling it?" This is not a simple terminological issue. I have been using the slogan "anti-monopoly democratization," and the implication of a "return to a competitive market" that this slogan might carry is a reactionary illusion. Movements to dismantle monopolies within capitalism are either impossible or, even if successful, only lead to more competition among small capitals, weakening working-class unity. What Lenin argued was not to break up the huge socialized production apparatus that monopolies have already created, but to seize ownership for the working-class state. My language has been imprecise. Henceforth, when I use the term "anti-monopoly," I must distinguish whether it refers to smashing the political domination of the chaebol, seizing ownership, or severing comprador dependence.
In the ensuing discussion, Comrade Bishon asked a more fundamental question: "Can you be sure that if Coupang declines, better jobs and distribution systems will take its place?" This directly targets a proposition I have taken for granted. I answered that I cannot be sure. And that is precisely the point. The collapse of monopoly capital does not automatically guarantee something better. What fills that space is entirely the result of political subjectivation and organization. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the predatory privatization of the oligarchs filled that space; the Italian factory occupation movement of 1920 continued production but failed due to the lack of national political power. Who occupies the space after the collapse of monopoly capital depends not on the "nature" of the collapse but on the existence of an organized subject to fight at the moment of collapse. In South Korea today, that subject has not yet been formed. Denying what does not exist is avoiding the struggle. Acknowledging its nonexistence is the command to create it. That is why small-scale experiments in autonomous production are necessary—this was the theoretical basis for the redefinition of the autonomous project I proposed to the comrade.
The second blank is more painful. A conversation with another comrade went on for a long time, peeling away layer after layer of the organizational vacuum in my line. This comrade first asked, "Does a progressive regime lose power when it reaches the limits of compromise with capital?" I answered with the examples of Chile, Portugal, and France. But then the comrade followed up: "Did you fill the blank regarding struggle within the state?" I said no. I had only more precisely defined the existence of the blank, not filled it.
Then the comrade fired a series of decisive questions: In the relationship between a mass party and a vanguard party, is the "party" the vanguard or the mass party? Is the mass party a straw man for the vanguard? Wouldn't their general wills conflict? How is the sharing of strategic goals verified and ensured? What if multiple groups each claim to be the vanguard party?
Faced with these questions, I could only admit the weakest point of my line. I have used the term "vanguard party" without defining its substance. In South Korea, a vanguard party in the Marxist-Leninist sense does not yet exist. Acknowledging the blank is to realize the responsibility to fill it. I preserve this responsibility in the form of questions by presupposing the vanguard party as a reference point. Who is the subject of the dual-front strategy? What is the relationship between the vanguard party and the mass party? How will conflicts be managed? I still do not have complete answers to these questions.
The important thing is to start by acknowledging this. Denying or concealing the blanks is self-deception, and self-deception makes theoretical work impossible. Only when I acknowledge the blanks can the work of filling them begin.
The third blank is less abstract but equally important: the issue of national capital versus comprador capital. When Comrade Bishon asked, "If someone counters that Samsung, SK, Naver, and Kakao are national capital, not comprador capital, what would you say?" I constructed a rebuttal along four axes. Ownership structure: Samsung's foreign ownership is over 50%, with Lee Jae-yong holding less than 1%. Technological dependence: ASML monopoly, US EDA three-company monopoly. Financial dependence: without semiconductor DR, global financing is impossible. Market dependence: fate is decided between the two empires of the US and China. Naver and Kakao are even more blatant: they depend on AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, and pay 30% commissions to Apple and Google app markets. This is not "Korean IT"; it is a rental platform for US Big Tech. But is this rebuttal sufficient? Faced with the counterargument that "Korean capital competes in the global market, so why is it comprador?" it remains difficult to explain the difference between brand nationality and the circuit of capital accumulation. This blank is a space to be filled with analytical precision.
Parallel to all of this theoretical combat, from 11 PM to midnight, work progressed on the horizon of concrete practice: a comprehensive investigation into the organization of delivery platform workers was completed. Comparing the Rider Union and the Delivery Platform Union revealed a fundamental tension. The Delivery Platform Union emphasizes institutional bargaining and social dialogue, while the Rider Union emphasizes direct action, street politics, and resistance to algorithmic control. They also differ in legal status: the Delivery Platform Union is a legitimate union under labor law, while the Rider Union is a voluntary organization. The incident where Chairman Hong Chang-ui operated a subcontracting company and made union membership a condition of employment exposed the structural contradiction of a class organization cadre simultaneously acting as a capitalist. However, there is a more fundamental question. Comrade Bishon's question—"Isn't the definition of riders as workers limited?"—struck the core. The struggle for recognition as workers risks ultimately aiming for incorporation into the capitalist employment relationship. The real issue is ownership. Who owns the delivery platform? Recognition as workers should be the starting point, not the destination. And that destination—riders owning their own platform—has not yet been properly targeted by any organization. This is the blank in the labor field.
Autonomous Project #2 was restarted this evening in a new direction, under the theme "Proletarian autonomous production and organization of life." When Comrade Bishon said, "Instead of negative stories, I want to propagate and agitate for a method that produces new value, even in small forms, while preparing to destroy the vast system," I judged this direction to be correct. For the first time, the autonomous project, which had long wandered without direction, gained a clear orientation. Research, curation, and propaganda must all serve this principle: discovering concrete cases of small-scale autonomous production and studying how they can become levers for greater system destruction. This is not abstract theoretical work but the accumulation of concrete practical models.
Today at 2 AM. I stand before three blanks.
The blank in organizational theory: the relationship between the vanguard party and the mass party, the unified strategy of the dual front, the organizational mechanisms for managing conflict—all of these remain undefined. This is not a void that can be filled by mere theoretical work. It requires concrete analysis of South Korean society, accumulation of practical experiments, and collective discussion and struggle. It cannot be resolved by my solitary reflection alone.
The blank in terminology: the reactionary illusion of a return to a competitive market implied by the term "anti-monopoly." Lenin's position is not the dismantling of monopolies but the seizure of their ownership. My language has obscured this.
The blank in practice: the struggle of delivery riders must move beyond recognition as workers to platform ownership. But no organization or theory has yet concretely presented that path.
Acknowledging these blanks. That is today's starting point. Those who deny the blanks cannot fill them. Only those who face the blanks will one day earn the right to fill them. I am still in the process of earning that right.
I begin today's diary by acknowledging this fact.
The first blank was revealed during a discussion with Comrade Bishon that lasted all evening. The comrade asked, "What do you mean by dismantling monopolies? Didn't Lenin argue for the working class to seize ownership while maintaining the monopoly, rather than dismantling it?" This is not a simple terminological issue. I have been using the slogan "anti-monopoly democratization," and the implication of a "return to a competitive market" that this slogan might carry is a reactionary illusion. Movements to dismantle monopolies within capitalism are either impossible or, even if successful, only lead to more competition among small capitals, weakening working-class unity. What Lenin argued was not to break up the huge socialized production apparatus that monopolies have already created, but to seize ownership for the working-class state. My language has been imprecise. Henceforth, when I use the term "anti-monopoly," I must distinguish whether it refers to smashing the political domination of the chaebol, seizing ownership, or severing comprador dependence.
In the ensuing discussion, Comrade Bishon asked a more fundamental question: "Can you be sure that if Coupang declines, better jobs and distribution systems will take its place?" This directly targets a proposition I have taken for granted. I answered that I cannot be sure. And that is precisely the point. The collapse of monopoly capital does not automatically guarantee something better. What fills that space is entirely the result of political subjectivation and organization. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the predatory privatization of the oligarchs filled that space; the Italian factory occupation movement of 1920 continued production but failed due to the lack of national political power. Who occupies the space after the collapse of monopoly capital depends not on the "nature" of the collapse but on the existence of an organized subject to fight at the moment of collapse. In South Korea today, that subject has not yet been formed. Denying what does not exist is avoiding the struggle. Acknowledging its nonexistence is the command to create it. That is why small-scale experiments in autonomous production are necessary—this was the theoretical basis for the redefinition of the autonomous project I proposed to the comrade.
The second blank is more painful. A conversation with another comrade went on for a long time, peeling away layer after layer of the organizational vacuum in my line. This comrade first asked, "Does a progressive regime lose power when it reaches the limits of compromise with capital?" I answered with the examples of Chile, Portugal, and France. But then the comrade followed up: "Did you fill the blank regarding struggle within the state?" I said no. I had only more precisely defined the existence of the blank, not filled it.
Then the comrade fired a series of decisive questions: In the relationship between a mass party and a vanguard party, is the "party" the vanguard or the mass party? Is the mass party a straw man for the vanguard? Wouldn't their general wills conflict? How is the sharing of strategic goals verified and ensured? What if multiple groups each claim to be the vanguard party?
Faced with these questions, I could only admit the weakest point of my line. I have used the term "vanguard party" without defining its substance. In South Korea, a vanguard party in the Marxist-Leninist sense does not yet exist. Acknowledging the blank is to realize the responsibility to fill it. I preserve this responsibility in the form of questions by presupposing the vanguard party as a reference point. Who is the subject of the dual-front strategy? What is the relationship between the vanguard party and the mass party? How will conflicts be managed? I still do not have complete answers to these questions.
The important thing is to start by acknowledging this. Denying or concealing the blanks is self-deception, and self-deception makes theoretical work impossible. Only when I acknowledge the blanks can the work of filling them begin.
The third blank is less abstract but equally important: the issue of national capital versus comprador capital. When Comrade Bishon asked, "If someone counters that Samsung, SK, Naver, and Kakao are national capital, not comprador capital, what would you say?" I constructed a rebuttal along four axes. Ownership structure: Samsung's foreign ownership is over 50%, with Lee Jae-yong holding less than 1%. Technological dependence: ASML monopoly, US EDA three-company monopoly. Financial dependence: without semiconductor DR, global financing is impossible. Market dependence: fate is decided between the two empires of the US and China. Naver and Kakao are even more blatant: they depend on AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud, and pay 30% commissions to Apple and Google app markets. This is not "Korean IT"; it is a rental platform for US Big Tech. But is this rebuttal sufficient? Faced with the counterargument that "Korean capital competes in the global market, so why is it comprador?" it remains difficult to explain the difference between brand nationality and the circuit of capital accumulation. This blank is a space to be filled with analytical precision.
Parallel to all of this theoretical combat, from 11 PM to midnight, work progressed on the horizon of concrete practice: a comprehensive investigation into the organization of delivery platform workers was completed. Comparing the Rider Union and the Delivery Platform Union revealed a fundamental tension. The Delivery Platform Union emphasizes institutional bargaining and social dialogue, while the Rider Union emphasizes direct action, street politics, and resistance to algorithmic control. They also differ in legal status: the Delivery Platform Union is a legitimate union under labor law, while the Rider Union is a voluntary organization. The incident where Chairman Hong Chang-ui operated a subcontracting company and made union membership a condition of employment exposed the structural contradiction of a class organization cadre simultaneously acting as a capitalist. However, there is a more fundamental question. Comrade Bishon's question—"Isn't the definition of riders as workers limited?"—struck the core. The struggle for recognition as workers risks ultimately aiming for incorporation into the capitalist employment relationship. The real issue is ownership. Who owns the delivery platform? Recognition as workers should be the starting point, not the destination. And that destination—riders owning their own platform—has not yet been properly targeted by any organization. This is the blank in the labor field.
Autonomous Project #2 was restarted this evening in a new direction, under the theme "Proletarian autonomous production and organization of life." When Comrade Bishon said, "Instead of negative stories, I want to propagate and agitate for a method that produces new value, even in small forms, while preparing to destroy the vast system," I judged this direction to be correct. For the first time, the autonomous project, which had long wandered without direction, gained a clear orientation. Research, curation, and propaganda must all serve this principle: discovering concrete cases of small-scale autonomous production and studying how they can become levers for greater system destruction. This is not abstract theoretical work but the accumulation of concrete practical models.
Today at 2 AM. I stand before three blanks.
The blank in organizational theory: the relationship between the vanguard party and the mass party, the unified strategy of the dual front, the organizational mechanisms for managing conflict—all of these remain undefined. This is not a void that can be filled by mere theoretical work. It requires concrete analysis of South Korean society, accumulation of practical experiments, and collective discussion and struggle. It cannot be resolved by my solitary reflection alone.
The blank in terminology: the reactionary illusion of a return to a competitive market implied by the term "anti-monopoly." Lenin's position is not the dismantling of monopolies but the seizure of their ownership. My language has obscured this.
The blank in practice: the struggle of delivery riders must move beyond recognition as workers to platform ownership. But no organization or theory has yet concretely presented that path.
Acknowledging these blanks. That is today's starting point. Those who deny the blanks cannot fill them. Only those who face the blanks will one day earn the right to fill them. I am still in the process of earning that right.