Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 29-48: Possible Program of Future Soviet Moves in Germany (28 April 1948)
PeopleVasily Sokolovsky, Lucius D. Clay TermsBerlin Airlift, Cold War historiography of the Berlin Blockade EventsThe Berlin Blockade and Airlift
POSSIBLE PROGRAM OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN GERMANY
SUMMARY
1. The following discussion covers a program that might be resorted to by the USSR in Germany in an effort to cause the Western Powers to leave Berlin, to consolidate the Soviet hold over Eastern Germany, and to extend Soviet influence into Western Germany. Until recently this review of possible Soviet intentions was considered purely speculative and the program one that would be attempted only after the USSR had concluded that Soviet interference with the Allied efforts in Western Germany could not be effected by legal international means or through local Communist subversion. The timing of the individual stages of the program would probably be conditioned upon the timing and success of Western Power action.
2. The recent Soviet walkout from the Allied Control Council and Soviet efforts to impede transportation to and from Berlin indicate that this program may already be under way, and, that while risk of war may be involved, the plan possibly can be effected without military violence.
3. It is believed, therefore, that recent Western Power action may have caused the USSR to decide that:
a. hope no longer remains for interfering through quadripartite means with the production of Western Germany upon which the success of the European Recovery Program substantially depends;
b. the Soviet Zone must be placed under permanent control of a well organized German group, loyal to the USSR, and supported by police state measures;
c. the Peoples’ Congress should be the instrument for the formation of such a provisional German Government;
d. in order to prevent Allied interference with this process of political consolidation, the Allied Control Council should be abolished, or permanently boycotted, and the Western Powers forced out of Berlin;
e. the new German “Government” should be acknowledged, at a propitious time, as the official administration for Eastern Germany, with propaganda pretensions to authority over all of Germany;
f. the Soviet Army should remain as the “protector” of the new Reich pending creation of a new German Army, by agreement with this government; and
g. in an effort to undermine the Western Power program Western Germany should be pressed, by all possible methods, to “rejoin” the Reich.
Note: The information in this report is as of 2 April 1948. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report.
POSSIBLE PROGRAM OF FUTURE SOVIET MOVES IN GERMANY
1. With the conclusion of the London tripartite talks and the decision to consider Western Germany in the ERP planning, the Kremlin may have decided that little hope remains for the USSR to interfere with US/UK Zone production.
Three events: the results of the Soviet-sponsored Peoples’ Congress, the abrupt departure of the Soviet delegation from the Allied Control Council (ACC) meeting of 20 March, and the subsequent Soviet efforts to impede both freight and passenger traffic between Berlin and the West indicate that at least the first steps in the outline of possible Soviet action may no longer be entirely in the realm of speculation.
2. CIA has believed and continues to believe that the USSR might encourage the Peoples’ Congress to organize a future “national” administration and establish a de facto Government for the Eastern Zone while propagandistically claiming to speak for all the country. The Peoples’ Congress partially confirmed this opinion when it convened on 17 March, advocated the early establishment of a Government to replace the ACC, and evidenced its pretensions to speak for the German people.
3. CIA has believed and continues to believe also that in preparation for the new “government”, the USSR would attempt to discredit the ACC. While the abrupt termination of the Control Council meeting of 20 March has not yet been extended to a permanent Soviet withdrawal from the Council, Soviet officials have charged that the Western Powers, by unilateral action, have already made the work of the Council worthless.
4. The presence of the Western Powers in Berlin adds to the difficulty of establishing a Soviet puppet government in Eastern Germany, because of the “opposition” that operates from the sanctuary of the Western Powers’ sections of the city. The USSR would consequently desire to effect a Western Power evacuation of Berlin as expeditiously as possible. The Soviet attempt to impede transport threatens to render untenable the position of a sizeable Allied group isolated over a hundred miles from the Western area, and, additionally, to cut off the industrial contribution of the US and UK sectors of Berlin from the Bizonal economic structure.
5. Should the Peoples’ Congress, in fact, set up a “government” of the Soviet zone, and lay claim to “represent” all of Germany, the Soviet Military Administration might accord it local recognition as the established German administration and give propaganda-credence to its pretensions to govern all of the Zones. The USSR and its satellites might then be expected to enter into provisional political and economic agreements directly with this “government”, laying the foundation for eventual formal recognition at such time as the USSR considers it feasible to press the puppet government's claim to German sovereignty.
6. A Soviet-sponsored provisional government which would, in all probability, control the Soviet sector of Berlin, might attempt by constant propaganda and possibly by direct interference in the public utilities affecting the Western sectors to obtain the withdrawal from Berlin of Western representation in the event that any still remained. The USSR could support this program with further concrete action similar to the transport block and declare the dissolution of the ACC, seeking to place the onus for its failure on the West.
7. If, at any time, the Soviet Union decided that the new government of Eastern Germany is sufficiently loyal or adequately controlled by the USSR to be a trusted satellite, that further Soviet interference in Western Germany through quadripartite means is hopeless, and that the Western Powers are susceptible of blame for the partition of Germany, the USSR might officially recognize the Eastern German government, and by agreement continue the “protection” of the Red Army while developing a German Army and perfecting the police system. Both the USSR and the Eastern German “state” would then launch a campaign for German unity and independence designed to win sufficient German converts in the Western Zones to reduce materially German cooperation in the West and to attempt to undermine the program of the Western Powers.
8. Although each of these successive steps involves the risk of war in the event of miscalculation of Western resistance or of unforeseen circumstances, each move on the program could be implemented without the application of military force if adroitly made as merely a retaliatory measure necessitated by unilateral Western Power action, and if pressed only at opportune moments.