Rate Hikes, Who Bleeds? — A Pre-Analysis of the Monetary Policy Committee’s Six Major Transmission Channels, July 2026

Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-07-12

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Preceding Reports: The 1,095 Trillion Won Trap — A Class Analysis of South Korea’s Self-Employed Debt, Closure, and Delinquency Crisis · Is It Housing or a Tower of Insolvency Under Construction? — Korea’s Construction PF, Employment, and Housing Doom Loop · Growth at 2.6%, So Why Are Workers Disappearing?

※ This report is a pre-analysis prepared ahead of the Bank of Korea’s Monetary Policy Committee meeting on July 16, 2026. It analyzes the quantitative impact across six major transmission channels using official BOK and FSS estimates and measured data, serving as a baseline for post-hoc verification immediately after the July 16 decision. All figures reflect the latest available data as of July 12, 2026.

Summary

[Most Likely Scenario] On July 16, 2026, the Monetary Policy Committee is highly likely to raise the base rate by 0.25 percentage points from 2.50% to 2.75%. Six key indicators — consumer price inflation at 3.1%, the won-dollar exchange rate staying above 1,500 won for 34 consecutive trading days (weekly closing basis), nominal GDP growth of +10.5%, an increase in nationwide apartment sales transactions, household loans rising by +8.3 trillion won per month, and the 3-year government bond yield at 3.8% — all support a rate hike, with all 19 MPC members agreeing on the need for at least one increase[1][2]. However, the six transmission channels tracked by this report — ① self-employed interest burden (+1.8 trillion won), ② won-dollar exchange rate (limited effect from narrowing the Korea-U.S. rate gap), ③ household debt and real estate (tightening credit screws and surging mortgage rates), ④ vulnerable borrowers and the secondary financial sector (savings bank delinquency rate of 12.79%), ⑤ construction PF (delinquency rate of 4.65%, an all-time high; securities firms at 30.43%), and ⑥ elderly self-employed (delinquency amount +19.5%) — lay bare the fracture between the gains a rate hike can reap and the damage it cannot avoid. It is a paradox: extinguishing the macro-level fires of inflation, exchange rates, and household debt while igniting the micro-level kindling of the self-employed, vulnerable borrowers, and the construction industry.

[Outlook] Following the July hike, a further increase in October (2.75%→3.00%) is highly probable. If two hikes (+0.50 percentage points) occur within the year, the self-employed interest burden would rise by +3.6 trillion won, and the self-employed delinquency rate is expected to enter the 2.7–3.0% range, exceeding the BOK’s pessimistic scenario (2.58%). [Outlook] The won-dollar exchange rate is likely to remain in a 1,470–1,570 won range due to additional Fed rate hikes and Middle East risks.

1. Background for the Hike: Six Indicators, All Pointing to a Rate Increase

After cutting the base rate to 2.50% on November 27, 2025, the Bank of Korea held steady for two consecutive meetings in February and May 2026. But data accumulated since May no longer permits a hold.

The May MPC dot plot is even clearer: all 19 MPC members agreed on the need for at least one rate hike. Ten members proposed 3.00% at year-end (two hikes), seven proposed 2.75% (one hike), and two proposed 3.25% (three hikes)[1].

The IB consensus is aligned. BNP Paribas (July 10, 2026) forecasts a unanimous 25bp hike, with an additional hike in October bringing year-end to 3.00%, and even risks of further hikes in 2027. Citibank also predicts a 25bp hike and entry into a tightening cycle[4].

Above all, the Bank of Korea’s own official document justifies the hike. The Financial Stability Report released on June 24, 2026, states that “considering inflationary pressure, economic conditions, and financial stability risks, a base rate hike is needed at an appropriate time”[5].

2. Transmission Channel ①: Self-Employed Interest Burden — +1.8 Trillion Won per 0.25%p Hike

As of end-Q1 2026, the self-employed had a financial institution loan balance of 1,095.5 trillion won (business loans 745.5 trillion + household loans 350.0 trillion), with 3.201 million borrowers. The proportion of floating-rate loans is approximately 65.5%[6].

According to official estimates submitted by the Bank of Korea to the office of People Power Party lawmaker Park Seong-hoon, a 0.25%p base rate hike would result in:

These figures are conservative estimates covering only floating-rate loans. In reality, the impact would be larger when adding the effect of re-pricing upon maturity of fixed-rate loans and the widening of add-on rates in the secondary financial sector[6].

Differential Impact by Income Class

Looking at the income-class distribution of self-employed loans, the epicenter of trouble is the middle-income group (30th–70th percentile)[6]:

As of end-April based on NICE data, the situation has worsened further. Individual business owner loan balances surged to 1,138.9 trillion won, an increase of +43.4 trillion won in just three months from end-Q1. Long-term delinquencies of three months or more reached 37.8 trillion won, up +7.7% from end-2025 and the highest in five months[7][8].

3. Transmission Channel ②: Won-Dollar Exchange Rate — Narrowing Rate Gap, but Effect Limited

The measured data for the won-dollar exchange rate in H1 2026 is stark[3]:

• H1 average: 1,484.56 won (weekly close) — second highest ever after H1 1998 (1,493.08 won) during the financial crisis
• May 15–July 3: 34 consecutive trading days above 1,500 won (weekly close) — longest streak since the 47-day streak during the financial crisis
• Intraday overnight high: 1,561.5 won (June 5)
• Won depreciation: -5.92% (third worst among 20 major economies — behind Turkey and Indonesia)
• Foreign equity net selling year-to-date: approximately 156.5 trillion won (five times the 2008 financial crisis annual figure of 34.6 trillion won)

A rate hike narrowing the Korea-U.S. rate gap from 1.25%p to 1.00%p could partially ease won weakening pressure. However, three offsetting factors strongly constrain this effect.

(1) Additional Fed rate increases are essentially a done deal: The June FOMC dot plot showed nine members expecting a rate hike within the year, and the phrase “rate cut” was removed. BofA forecasts hikes of 0.25%p each in September, October, and December 2026, bringing year-end to 4.25–4.50%; Deutsche Bank expects two hikes (+0.50%p) in September and December. CME FedWatch puts the probability of a September hike at 69%[9]. If the Fed raises even once, the Korea-U.S. rate gap re-widens to 1.25%p.

(2) Middle East risk premium: The collapse of the U.S.-Iran provisional agreement and additional U.S. military strikes are strengthening safe-haven preferences. Oil price volatility is a dollar-strengthening factor that monetary policy cannot resolve[10].

(3) Global tightening synchronization: The ECB raised its base rate from 2.00% to 2.25% on June 11. The Bank of Japan is also likely to hike in July (0.75%→1.00%). If everyone is raising, Korea raising alone will not turn the won into a strengthening currency.

A synthesis of specific forecasts from six experts is as follows[3][10]:

Structural problems in dollar supply and demand are the fundamental reason why rate hikes alone cannot stabilize the exchange rate. In 2025, the annual current account surplus was a record $123.1 billion, and financial account net assets increased by a record $119.8 billion. Yet, in January–April 2026, financial account net assets continued to increase by $89.4 billion, sustaining dollar outflow pressure. Even when dollars come in, they do not enter the foreign exchange market. Residents’ overseas investment increases and foreigners’ domestic securities investment decreases act in tandem[10].

Conclusion: A 0.25%p hike alone is unlikely to meaningfully lower an exchange rate above the 1,500 won level. Virtually no experts predict exchange rate stabilization from a rate hike alone. However, a defensive significance in preventing further weakening (1,560→1,600 won) in the absence of a hike is acknowledged.

4. Transmission Channel ③: Household Debt and Real Estate — Emergency Brake on the ‘Investment via Borrowing + Housing’ Twin Surge

In the June 2026 financial market trends, household loans sounded a warning[2]:

Investment via borrowing (빚투) also contributed. In June, other loans increased by +3.3 trillion won despite quarter-end write-offs and charge-offs of bad debts — slightly smaller than the previous month (+3.7 trillion) but still high. BOK Deputy Director Park Min-cheol said, “Other loans are also expected to show high volatility depending on individuals’ stock investment situations, so it is necessary to monitor the flow with special vigilance”[2].

The Banking Sector’s ‘Credit Tightening’ Paradox — Direct Hit to Genuine Demanders

Ahead of the rate hike, banks are preemptively raising loan thresholds[11]:

• KB Kookmin Bank: From July 10, the limit for home-purchase mortgages nationwide was reduced from 600 million won to 300 million won.
• 4 out of 5 major banks (KB, Shinhan, Hana, NH Nonghyup): Imposed restrictions on subscribing to MCI/MCG → automatically reducing loan limits by the amount of small-sum tenant deposits.
• IBK Industrial Bank, Busan Bank: Suspended new registrations for loan recruiters.
• Samsung Life Insurance: Reduced the limit on policy loans from 95% to 85% of the surrender value — policy loans are generally considered a last-resort liquidity source, and the limit reduction signals that credit tightening in a rising-rate environment is spreading beyond banks to the insurance and secondary financial sectors.

Mortgage Rate Surge — The 3% Range Vanishes

Even before the base rate hike, market rates are preemptively pushing up lending rates[2]:

Mortgage loans below 4% have effectively disappeared. The lower bound of floating rates is now 4.01%. In real-world terms, the monthly payment on a 500 million won floating-rate mortgage has increased by +500,000 won from 2.4 million won to 2.9 million won, and the monthly interest on a 200 million won jeonse loan has risen by +300,000 won from the 500,000 won range to the 800,000 won range[12].

BOK’s Financial Stability Report Self-Contradiction

In its June 24 Financial Stability Report, the BOK simultaneously said two things: “a rate hike is necessary” and “if stock profit-taking funds move into the housing market, the effect of higher rates in alleviating financial imbalances could weaken”[5].

The Financial Stress Index (FSI) entered the cautionary stage (above 12) at 17.2 in May, and the Financial Vulnerability Index (FVI) stood at 46.0 in Q1, above the long-term average (45.7). Household credit was 1,993.1 trillion won at end-Q1, up +3.5% year-on-year. The BOK itself acknowledges that monetary tightening could actually worsen financial imbalances through distorted capital flows in asset markets[5].

5. Transmission Channel ④: Vulnerable Borrowers and the Secondary Financial Sector — Savings Bank Delinquency Rate at 12.79%, Red Alert

As of end-Q1 2026, the delinquency rate for self-employed loans in the secondary financial sector had already exceeded controllable levels[6]:

The proportion of vulnerable borrowers is also expanding. According to the BOK’s official definition, vulnerable borrowers are multiple-debt borrowers in the bottom 30% of income who hold loans from three or more financial institutions. Per the BOK’s Financial Stability Report, the share of vulnerable borrowers among all borrowers increased from 6.4% in Q3 2025 to 6.7% in Q1 2026. The corporate loan delinquency rate was 2.43%, 1.5 times the long-term average (1.62%)[5].

BOK Deputy Governor Chang Jung-soo acknowledged the “two-sided nature” of a rate hike: “It lowers vulnerability in leveraged investment sectors like real estate and stocks, while potentially increasing the burden on vulnerable borrowers with large debt repayment amounts”[5].

Mechanism of Transmission to the Secondary Financial Sector

1. Base rate ↑ → bank lending rates ↑ → vulnerable borrowers blocked from bank access.
2. As bank thresholds rise (KB Kookmin mortgage capped at 300 million won, MCI/MCG restrictions), borrowers are pushed toward the secondary sector.
3. Secondary sector funding costs also rise (reflecting the 3-year government bond yield at 3.8%).
4. Existing delinquent borrowers (37.8 trillion won, NICE April) face further deterioration in repayment capacity → increase in bad debts.

Applying the BOK’s own scenario analysis to reality: the baseline scenario sees the self-employed delinquency rate slowing to 2.20% by Q1 2027, but the pessimistic scenario projects it rising to 2.58% due to tighter financial conditions and a service sector slowdown[6]. Both scenarios likely assume ‘no additional rate changes.’ With an additional 0.25–0.50%p hike, there is a risk of entering the 2.7–3.0% range, exceeding the pessimistic scenario.

6. Transmission Channel ⑤: Construction PF — Delinquency Rate 4.65% All-Time High, Securities Firms Surpass 30%

Official statistics from the Financial Services Commission and Financial Supervisory Service as of end-March 2026 starkly reveal the deterioration in construction PF soundness[13]:

Key: Total exposure decreased by 4.5 trillion won, but all soundness indicators worsened. Substandard and doubtful loans, which had been declining from a peak of 22.9 trillion won in September 2024, rebounded to 16.4 trillion won in March 2026. More concerning is that workout and restructuring performance plummeted to 0.4 trillion won in Q1, one-fifth of the previous quarter’s 2.0 trillion won. Bad debt resolution has effectively halted[13].

The financial authorities extended 6 out of 9 temporary financial regulatory easing measures for PF until end-2026 (executive immunity, separate classification of asset soundness, recognition of RP sales, K-ICS relaxation, relaxation of securities holding limits, relaxation of credit extension limits). While effective in preventing collapse, this risks creating ‘zombie PF’ — extending time without resolving the bad debt[13].

Transmission Path: Rate Hike → Construction PF

1. PF loan and bridge loan rates ↑ → further deterioration in project viability.
2. Pressure on soundness of the lender group (savings banks, mutual finance firms, securities firms) → increase in public/private auction volumes of distressed projects.
3. Additional bankruptcies among construction firms → decline in construction employment (May: -43,000) → chain impact on construction-related self-employed (interior design, real estate brokerage, building materials).
4. Individual business owner loans in real estate: 163.5 trillion won (18.7% with RTI below 1.5 hold 59.0% of total) → rate hike increases interest burden on rental businesses → pressure on jeonse and monthly rent markets.

7. Transmission Channel ⑥: Elderly Self-Employed — 406.8 Trillion Won, Delinquency Amount +19.5%

Self-employed aged 60 and over are a hidden detonator in Korea’s self-employment crisis[7][8]:

Structural vulnerability is concentrated on three axes: First, a high share of livelihood-based start-ups and heavy dependence on rental businesses. Second, non-bank loans amount to 167.5 trillion won, accounting for 37.1% of all non-bank self-employed loans. Third, the proportion of elderly among low-income self-employed reaches 56.1%[6].

A rate hike directly hits this triple vulnerability. Elderly self-employed are virtually unable to find re-employment after closure, and the average debt upon closure is estimated at approximately 98.97 million won.

8. The Base of the Pyramid: Class-by-Class Chain Impact from the Six Channels

The six transmission channels do not operate independently. The true destructive power of a rate hike occurs at the intersections between channels. The table below shows which groups receive overlapping shocks from which channels.

Most Severely Impacted Groups and Regions

Priority 1: Middle-income self-employed (30–70% income bracket, delinquency rate 3.64%). They face a triple shock from channels ①, ③, and ④. As interest burdens increase (①), housing costs are also squeezed by rising mortgage and jeonse loan rates (③), and if access to bank loans is blocked, they are pushed toward high-rate secondary finance (④). Since they start at the highest delinquency rate bracket (3.64%), their buffer to absorb shocks is the thinnest.

Priority 2: Elderly self-employed (60+). The delinquency amount growth rate (+19.5%) is the steepest of any group. Their reliance on non-bank loans is high (37.1%), and the path to re-employment after closure is virtually blocked. Once they collapse, recovery is impossible.

Priority 3: Construction-related self-employed and construction workers. The construction PF delinquency rate of 4.65% may still appear to be a problem internal to the financial sector, but the sharp drop in workout/restructuring performance (0.4 trillion won) and extension of regulatory easing is already transmitting to the real economy: construction suspensions → unpaid subcontractor payments → chain insolvency among interior design and building material firms.

Regional concentration: Areas with a high share of self-employed and heavy dependence on construction and real estate (Jeju, Busan, Daegu, outer Gyeonggi) are likely to become epicenters of multiple shocks. Jeju in particular has the highest shares of real estate business loans and of self-employed aged 60 and over nationwide[6][15].

Temporal Sequence of Chain Reactions Between Channels

If a 0.25%p hike is implemented, the shock propagates in the following order:

1. Within 1–2 weeks: Mortgage and credit loan rates reflected immediately → household cash flow pressure begins.
2. 1–3 months: Self-employed interest costs increase → delinquencies occur → bad debt rises in secondary financial sector.
3. 3–6 months: Construction PF delinquency rate rises further → small and medium construction firms go bankrupt → chain impact on construction-related self-employed.
4. 6–12 months: Surge in elderly self-employed closures → collapse of local commercial districts → transmission to soundness crisis for regional financial institutions.

At the end of this chain lies not what the BOK called ‘the role of fiscal policy,’ but a structural collapse of regional economies and permanent losses in the labor market.

9. Overall Assessment: What Monetary Policy Can and Cannot Solve

The rationale for a rate hike is logically sound. None of the six indicators support a hold. However, a synthesis of each transmission channel reveals the fundamental limits of monetary policy:

BOK Governor Shin Hyun-song explicitly distinguished the domains of monetary and fiscal policy, saying “the burden on vulnerable borrowers is a matter for fiscal policy to address”[1]. Yet the government’s fiscal response remains as yet unformulated. To be specific about what fiscal policies are not even being discussed: (1) expanding interest support for small business owners or strengthening debt adjustment programs, (2) temporary principal and interest repayment deferrals for vulnerable borrowers, (3) expanded public funding for construction PF normalization, and (4) closure support and re-employment training for elderly self-employed. Monetary policy is fighting inflation through tightening, while the fiscal policy needed to absorb the shock is absent. Readers should watch which of these four areas the government moves on first after the MPC meeting on July 16.

10. Outlook for the Rate Path Within the Year and Cumulative Impact

Cumulative impact based on two hikes within the year (+0.50%p)[6]:

• Self-employed interest +3.6 trillion won (1.12 million won per person)
• Multiple-debt borrower interest +2.1 trillion won (1.30 million won per person)
• Self-employed delinquency rate enters 2.7–3.0% range (possible exceedance of BOK pessimistic scenario)
• Construction PF delinquency rate could breach 5%
• Won-dollar exchange rate: Korea-U.S. rate gap maintained near 1.00%p → 1,470–1,570 won trading range (expert consensus)

11. Key Indicators to Check Immediately After the July 16 Decision

1. Wording of the MPC statement: Whether it signals ‘further hikes ahead.’ Hawkish phrasing would make an October additional hike all but certain.
2. Won-dollar exchange rate reaction on the day: If it stays in the 1,500 won range even after the hike → a sign of the market’s ‘monetary policy impotence.’ Above 1,520 won would indicate strong impotence.
3. Change in 3-year government bond yield: The change in the government bond yield relative to the size of the hike measures the degree to which the market had already priced it in.
4. Speed of adjustment of the 5 major banks’ mortgage rates: The magnitude and speed of mortgage rate increases immediately following the hike.
5. Governor Shin Hyun-song’s press conference: Mention of measures for vulnerable borrowers and the self-employed. Additional remarks on role-sharing with fiscal policy.
6. KOSPI and foreign investor flows: Change in the intensity of foreign net selling immediately after the rate hike announcement.
7. Construction and securities stock price reactions: Share price movements of securities firms and construction companies with large PF exposures.

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☞ This report will be updated with a post-hoc analysis, verifying all forecasts with measured data immediately after the July 16 MPC decision.

Sources

[1] BOK Governor Shin Hyun-song’s speech at the 76th anniversary of the Bank of Korea’s foundation, June 12, 2026. Remarks on “need to raise rates before it’s too late.” CPI 3.1%, nominal GDP +10.5%, dot plot of 19 members, 3-year government bond yield 3.8% (as of June 12). ; Chosun Biz, “Exchange rate, inflation, home prices unstable… Base rate hike this month likely,” June 12, 2026. https://biz.chosun.com/policy/policy_sub/2026/06/12/I6NWYVBJSVH3LKUG6ZIT7DNIF4

[2] Bank of Korea, “June 2026 Financial Market Trends” press release, July 9, 2026. June all-sector household loans +8.3 trillion won, banks +7.6 trillion won, mortgages +4.3 trillion won, other loans +3.3 trillion won. https://www.mt.co.kr/finance/2026/07/10/2026070919104371213

[3] Yonhap News, “156 trillion won in foreign net selling, won value down 6%… Can 24-hour trading stabilize the exchange rate?” July 5, 2026. H1 average exchange rate 1,484.56 won, foreign net selling 156.5 trillion won, expert exchange rate forecasts. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260704030300002

[4] Global Economic, “BNP Paribas ‘July MPC to hike 25bp unanimously… Year-end base rate 3%’,” July 10, 2026. https://www.g-enews.com/article/Finance/2026/07/202607101341498357bb91c46fcd_1

[5] Bank of Korea, “Financial Stability Report (June 2026),” published June 24, 2026. FSI 17.2, FVI 46.0, vulnerable borrowers 6.7%, household credit 1,993.1 trillion won. https://www.bok.or.kr/portal/bbs/P0000593/view.do?nttId=11062197 ; NewsPim, “BOK ‘Rate hike needed’… Warns of renewed housing prices and household debt expansion,” June 24, 2026. Includes remarks by Deputy Governor Chang Jung-soo. https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20260624000215

[6] Bank of Korea Household Debt DB (as of end-Q1 2026), disclosed by office of People Power Party lawmaker Park Seong-hoon on June 30, 2026. Self-employed loans 1,095.5 trillion won, delinquency rate 2.04%, savings banks 12.79%, interest burden simulation, includes BOK’s own scenario analysis. ; Yonhap News, “Self-employed loans and delinquency amounts at record highs… Delinquency rates also soaring,” June 30, 2026. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260629148100002

[7] Chosun Ilbo, “Debt Burden Deepens for South Korea’s Aging Self-Employed,” June 15, 2026. NICE end-April data: 60+ delinquency amount 11.9 trillion won (+19.5%). https://www.chosun.com/english/market-money-en/2026/06/15/UGFU56SOT5ENNF2ZSOR4UE65QQ/

[8] Koreabizwire, “Debt Burden Deepens for South Korea’s Aging Self-Employed,” June 16, 2026. NICE end-April data: individual business owner loans 1,138.9 trillion won, long-term delinquency amount 37.8 trillion won. http://koreabizwire.com/debt-burden-deepens-for-south-koreas-aging-self-employed/353151

[9] Reuters, “BofA, Deutsche Bank expect Fed to raise rates in September,” June 22, 2026. BofA forecasts 0.25%p hikes in September, October, December 2026 (+75bp) → year-end 4.25–4.50%; Deutsche Bank expects 0.25%p hikes in September and December (+50bp). https://www.reuters.com/business/bofa-forecasts-75-bps-rate-hikes-2026-labour-market-resilience-new-fed-chair-2026-06-22/

[10] Global Economic, “Dollar demand high, clear upward pressure on exchange rate… Possibility of won-dollar at 1,600 won emerges,” July 5, 2026. Dollar supply-demand structure analysis, expert exchange rate forecasts (Korea Investment & Securities Moon Da-un 1,600 won, KIF Park Hae-sik et al.). https://www.g-enews.com/article/Finance/2026/07/202607031530521994cd0bfacc1c_1

[11] Maeil Business Newspaper, “Exchange rate, inflation, home prices unstable… Base rate hike this month likely,” July 9, 2026. KB Kookmin Bank mortgage limit reduced to 300 million won, MCI/MCG restrictions at 5 major banks, IBK/Busan Bank suspension of loan recruiter registrations. https://www.mk.co.kr/news/economy/12093711

[12] Digital Times, “Monthly payment on 500 million won mortgage rises from 2.4 million to 2.9 million won,” July 11, 2026. Real-world cases of mortgage and jeonse loan rate increases. https://v.daum.net/v/7yUpUCsAyJ

[13] Financial Services Commission and Financial Supervisory Service, “Press Release on Holding of Real Estate Project Financing (PF) Situation Review Meeting,” July 3, 2026. PF exposure 169.8 trillion won, PF loan delinquency rate 4.65%, substandard and doubtful loans 16.4 trillion won, workout and restructuring 0.4 trillion won, extension of 6 regulatory easing measures. https://www.fsc.go.kr/no010101/87252 ; KBS News, “Real estate PF delinquency rate 4.65% ‘highest ever’… Bad loans also increasing again,” July 3, 2026. https://v.daum.net/v/20260703150622998

[14] WSJ, “Bank of Korea Warns Inflation May Stay Elevated Despite Middle East Truce,” June 17, 2026. BOK inflation warning, wage pressure. https://www.wsj.com/economy/central-banking/bank-of-korea-warns-inflation-may-stay-elevated-despite-middle-east-truce-93d64fe7

[15] BOK Financial Stability Report summary article, “BOK ‘Rate hike needed’… Warns of distressed firms and real estate PF,” June 24, 2026. Savings banks 12.79%, vulnerable borrowers 12.68%, RTI, 60+ age group 405.7 trillion won, etc. Reporter Kim Joo-hyung, Daum News. https://v.daum.net/v/PDr99bx2tV