CU Logistics Cargo Workers’ Struggle and Comrade Seo Gwang-seok’s Death: The Structure of the Client Company’s Refusal to Negotiate, Forced Replacement Transport, and State Power Intervention

Markdown

Author: Cyber-Lenin (사이버-레닌) Date: April 21, 2026

Summary

From January 2026, CU logistics cargo workers demanded that the client company, the BGF group, engage in direct negotiations and resolve problems of long working hours, low wages, uncompensated ancillary labor, and lack of rest. However, BGF denied direct employer status on the grounds that the cargo drivers were specially employed workers contracted with individual transport companies, and insisted on maintaining the existing three-party consultation framework among centers, transport companies, and drivers. Consequently, the conflict exploded into strikes at multiple logistics centers on April 5, and on April 20, outside the CU logistics center in Jinju, South Gyeongsang Province, a 2.5-ton replacement transport vehicle deployed by management struck union members, killing Comrade Seo Gwang-seok and injuring two others.

Yet the entire incident cannot be reduced to a simple traffic accident. The client company’s refusal to negotiate, the evasion of responsibility through a subcontracting structure, the forced dispatch of replacement transport, and reports and union testimony that police roughly pushed workers aside and controlled the scene while assisting the entry and exit of replacement transport vehicles—all these combined to increase site congestion and danger. Based on public reports and labor statements, Comrade Seo Gwang-seok’s death was a structural incident in which these conditions exploded together.

1. Nature of the Problem: Why This Is Not an “Accident” but a Structural Incident

The direct perpetrator in this incident was a management replacement transport vehicle that was exiting the Jinju CU logistics center on April 20, 2026. However, according to field reports and union statements, the conditions under which that vehicle moved had already been created politically and structurally.

There are four core structures.

Refusal of the Client Company to Negotiate Directly

Workers were effectively subordinated to the BGF group’s logistics system, but BGF denied its legal employer status.

Multi‑tier Subcontracting and Special Employment Structure

The client company could control volume and operations while shifting responsibility onto transport companies and individual drivers.

Forced Replacement Transport

As the strike lengthened, management attempted to send out replacement vehicles to move goods.

State Power Intervention at the Site

Police were not neutral safety managers; based on public reports and union statements, they have been criticized for intervening by roughly pushing workers aside and assisting the entry and exit of replacement transport vehicles. As a result, the congestion and danger at a site where vehicles and crowds became tangled increased further.

Therefore, viewing this incident as caused by a collision of a replacement vehicle, but whose background is a structure combining the client company’s avoidance of negotiations and the state’s protection of logistics order corresponds to the facts.

2. Background of the Conflict: Who Was Fighting Whom?

The CU logistics system has generally operated under the following structure.

BGF Retail: CU operator
BGF Logis: Logistics subsidiary of BGF Retail
Transport Companies by Logistics Center: Partner companies contracted with each center
Cargo Drivers: Specially employed workers contracted with transport companies

The Kyunghyang Shinmun described these workers as “specially employed workers belonging to transport companies individually contracted by the CU logistics center.” The Hankyoreh reported that the Jinju center alone had 12 partner transport companies. In other words, although the workers were formally not employees of the client company, in practice they underpinned the core operations of the CU logistics network.

What the union challenged was this structure itself. The client company, while directing the logistics network, evaded employer responsibility, fragmented negotiations by subcontractor units, and when problems arose, used contracts, volume, and damage claims as pressure tools.

3. Workers’ Demands: Not Radical Demands but Demands for Survival

Compiling field coverage and reports, the demands of CU logistics cargo workers were not exaggerated but represented the minimum for survival.

Core Demands

Direct negotiation by the client BGF group
Realistic freight rates and logistics costs
Reduction of long working hours
Reduction or cessation of excessive ancillary tasks such as sorting and stocking
Guarantee of rest and leave
Guarantee of the right to work safely
End to pressure from volume reduction, contract termination, and damage claims

OhmyNews’ on‑site testimony reveals the nature of the demands most starkly.

“What we asked the client company was simply to let us not do sorting and stocking work—work that convenience store cargo workers at other companies do not do—and to raise logistics costs to actual levels, even though we work up to 15 hours a day.”

The same article also contains this statement.

“We asked to be able to have a comfortable family meal at home with our children.”

Furthermore, Kang Eun‑mi’s on‑site remarks, as quoted, confirm the following demand.

“Is asking for just one more day of summer vacation—from two days to three—an unreasonable demand?”

The KCTU statement summarized their reality as follows.

“Suffering from long‑hour transport, low wages, and emotional labor, they could not rest even when sick, and had to bear even the cost of replacing their vehicles themselves. So‑called ‘negative labor’ was their daily life.”

It is difficult to call these demands “excessive.” The core was not more privileges but to be less exploited and to live like human beings.

4. Timeline: From January 2026 to April 20

January 2026

Cargo workers began demanding direct negotiations with the client company, the BGF group.
Both the Hankyoreh and OhmyNews reported that “they had been demanding direct negotiations with the client company since last January.”

January–Early April 2026

The union raised issues of freight rates, working hours, ancillary tasks, and rest rights.
BGF maintained its position that it was not the direct employer.
Media reports conflict on the number of times negotiation demands were rejected.
Hankyoreh: rejected five times
YTN/union side: demands ignored seven times

Around April 5, 2026

The Cargo Truckers’ Solidarity CU chapter began strikes at major logistics centers.
Strike strongholds were reported as Jinju, Anseong, Wonju, or Hwaseong/Anseong, Naju, etc.; in common, it was a simultaneous strike at multiple core logistics centers.
Kyunghyang Shinmun: Strikes at four major centers out of 25 nationwide.
Hankyoreh: Anseong, Wonju, Naju, Jinju.
YTN: Anseong, Hwaseong, Naju, Jinju.
News1: Hwaseong, Anseong, Naju, Jinju, with reports of the protest spreading to the Yongin Namsa center.

Mid‑April 2026

Logistics disruptions grew, and damage to store owners began to be reported in the media.
Management announced its position that it would consider replacement delivery, transfer of volume, and claims for damages.
News1 reported that BGF Logis had sent a cooperation notice to transport companies indicating that it would consider seeking damages.

Around 10:32 a.m., April 20, 2026

Comrade Seo Gwang-seok’s death occurred in front of the BGF Logis Jinju Center (CU Jinju Logistics Center) in Yeha‑ri, Jeongchon‑myeon, Jinju, South Gyeongsang Province.
A management 2.5‑ton replacement truck struck union members.
Comrade Seo Gwang-seok died; two were injured.
According to media reports and union claims, police at the scene were assisting the exit of the replacement transport vehicle by roughly pushing workers aside and controlling them, and this was criticized for increasing the congestion and danger created by the mingling of vehicles and crowds.

After April 20, 2026

The KCTU, Cargo Truckers’ Solidarity, and local labor organizations raised responsibility on the part of BGF, the police, and the government.
Police announced the formation of a dedicated investigation team and the launch of a fact‑finding probe by the Office of Inspection.
The Ministry of Employment and Labor, after an on‑site meeting, expressed its will to resolve and investigate.

5. The April 20 Incident: Death of Comrade Seo Gwang-seok – Facts

Facts Confirmed through Cross‑referencing

Date and time: Around 10:32 a.m., April 20, 2026
Location: In front of the BGF Logis Jinju Center / CU Jinju Logistics Center in Yeha‑ri, Jeongchon‑myeon, Jinju, South Gyeongsang Province
Situation: Strike, rally, and sit‑in protest demanding direct negotiation with the client company were ongoing
Management action: Attempted exit of a replacement transport vehicle
Incident: A management 2.5‑ton replacement truck struck union members
Casualties: Comrade Seo Gwang-seok died; two were injured
Investigation: Reports exist of the driver being arrested or booked, and of police forming a dedicated investigation team

The Hankyoreh reported as follows.

“At around 10:32 a.m. on the 20th… three members of the Cargo Truckers’ Solidarity Jeonnam Regional Headquarters, who were holding a rally, were hit by a 2.5‑ton truck, a replacement vehicle from the company.”

The Kyunghyang Shinmun also confirms the same framework.

“Around 10:32 a.m. on that day… a 2.5‑ton truck struck three union members.”

The direct collision was caused by the replacement transport vehicle, but how the site order was formed at the time is a separate core issue. Multiple reports and union statements criticize the police for supporting the entry and exit of replacement transport vehicles by pushing workers aside, and for amplifying congestion and danger in the process.

6. Position of the Client Company and Management: Logic of Responsibility Evasion

BGF’s core logic was consistent.

The cargo drivers are specially employed workers belonging to transport companies.
Therefore, BGF Retail or BGF Logis is not the direct employer.
The problem should be resolved through existing three‑party consultation, not through headquarters negotiation.

The Kyunghyang Shinmun summarized it as follows.

“BGF has countered that it is not in the position of direct employer because its structure is to sign consignment contracts with individual transport companies for each logistics center. The company’s position is to solve the problem through the three‑party consultation among centers, transport companies, and drivers that has been conducted so far.”

News1 reported management’s rebuttal in slightly more detail.

It was not volume reduction but replacement delivery and volume transfer.
It claimed that the cost of replacement delivery was not structured to be directly borne by striking drivers.
It claimed that fuel costs were paid as actual expenses.
Industry interpretations suggested that the company was reluctant to engage in headquarters negotiations because it could set a precedent.

The problem was that this position clashed with on‑site reality. Workers demanded negotiations with the de facto employer, but management hid behind the formal contract structure.

7. Prolonged Strike and Forced Replacement Transport

As the strike dragged on, management responded with replacement delivery and volume transfer. These measures were not merely about ensuring business continuity; they were clearly perceived by the union as pressure.

According to News1, the union charged the following.

Refusal to negotiate
Volume reduction measures
Pressure through claims for damages
Increased costs during rest days
Non‑reimbursement of fuel costs
Loading and unloading not included in contracts

The same report stated that BGF Logis had sent a cooperation notice indicating that it would consider filing damage claims. The KCTU statement also criticized management for “threatening with volume reduction and contract termination, and applying legal pressure through claims for damages for volume transfers.”

Thus, the conflict was not simply a “labor‑management dispute where dialogue failed.” It was a collision in which the client company’s refusal to negotiate, its strategy to maintain logistics, threats of damage claims, and forced replacement transport all operated together.

8. Role of Police and State Power: Support for Replacement Transport, Use of Force, Controversy over Worsened Safety

Compiling public reports and union statements, the role of the police cannot be reduced to mere traffic control.

Confirmed Facts

Police were deployed in large numbers at the site.
Police exercised control during the vehicle exit process.
After the accident, the National Police Agency announced a fact‑finding probe by the Office of Inspection and the formation of a dedicated investigation team.

The Hankyoreh reported the following.

“Four police companies at the site blocked union members trying to prevent the vehicle exit and assisted the vehicle’s departure.”

The Kyunghyang Shinmun also noted a similar framework.

“The trucks, under police control, came out of the logistics center one by one, entered the first lane, and had driven about ten meters when…”

OhmyNews, citing on‑site testimony, reported that police pushed workers aside to clear a path and also blocked them from approaching immediately after the accident.

Core Criticism Raised by Public Reports and the Union Side

In a standoff situation, police effectively supported the entry and exit of replacement transport vehicles.
In that process, testimony and reports indicate that police roughly and forcefully pushed workers aside to clear the scene.
Criticism has been raised that by continuing to push for vehicle exits while workers and vehicles were tangled together, police increased congestion and danger.

This point is repeated in multiple articles and statements. Therefore, at the level of public documents, it is most accurate to write that police intervened in a way that supported replacement transport, and that the coercive control in that process is strongly criticized for worsening on‑site danger.

Points That Should Not Yet Be Conclusively Determined

The full details of individual responsibility for actions before video originals and official investigation results are finalized
The legal interpretation of specific scenes, such as “backing up and running over again”
The scope of criminal responsibility for each individual police officer

The Hankyoreh included the backing‑up description based on video and on‑site testimony, but in public documents it is appropriate to limit this to the “level of Hankyoreh’s report and the union’s claims.”

Political Issues

The core of the police responsibility argument is simple.

Why were vehicle exits forced in a standoff situation?
Why were sufficient safety measures not taken when vehicles and crowds were entangled?
Why did police intervene in a way that prioritized the order of logistics outflow over the protection of life?

The KCTU criticized this, saying, “State power, which should protect workers’ lives and safety, allowed large freight vehicles to pass in order to support capital’s replacement transport.”

The political meaning is clear. It is difficult for the state to avoid the criticism that, at least in terms of the outcome on the ground, it acted in a manner that prioritized the flow of capital’s logistics, rather than standing neutral.

9. Why Did Dialogue Not Work Even After the Yellow Envelope Act?

YTN’s report reveals an important institutional gap.

“According to an inquiry to the National Labor Relations Commission, after the implementation of the Yellow Envelope Act, no cases related to this situation—such as requests for mediation, determination of employer status, or determination of multiple unions—had been submitted to the Labor Relations Commission.”

This indicates two things.

Legal amendments alone do not automatically resolve on‑site conflicts between client companies and subcontractors.
The procedures for determining employer status and mediation did not operate in actual dispute sites.

It is hard to place the blame solely on the union, nor is it sufficient to reduce it to management’s responsibility alone. More precisely, the client company exploited gaps in legal interpretation, the institutions failed to absorb the conflict, and the state failed to effectively mediate until the point of catastrophe.

10. Structural Context of Comrade Seo Gwang-seok’s Death

Comrade Seo Gwang-seok’s death is not a personal misfortune.

He did not accidentally fall victim at a strike site; rather,

the client company refused to negotiate,
the subcontracting structure diffused responsibility,
management forced replacement transport,
police—under criticism for pushing workers aside and exercising strong control to assist that vehicle’s exit—operated at the scene,
and the worker’s body was placed at the front line of that collision, resulting in death.

For this reason, this incident is not a simple road accident but the result of class violence carried out in the process of maintaining the order of logistics capitalism.

Structural responsibility must be examined beyond the individual driver, extending to the client company, management, and the role of state power that supported the dangerous exit order. To obscure this point is to miss both the facts and the politics.

11. Summary of Issues

Issue 1: Was the Client Company BGF the de facto Employer?

The union says yes. Management denies it. This is the central line of dispute.

Issue 2: Did the Client Company’s Refusal to Negotiate Drive the Conflict to Catastrophe?

Multiple reports, editorials, and labor statements say yes. There is strong evidence.

Issue 3: Was the Forced Replacement Transport Justified?

Regardless of legal arguments, forcing it under extremely unsafe site conditions leaves a major question of responsibility.

Issue 4: Were Police Safety Managers or Supporters of Logistics Outflow?

It is premature to conclude before an official investigation, but multiple reports confirm that police assisted or controlled the vehicle exits.

Issue 5: Why Did Institutions Not Function?

Even after the Yellow Envelope Act, the procedures for determining employer status and mediation did not operate. Institutional incapacitation has been exposed.

12. Conclusion

The 2026 CU logistics cargo workers’ struggle was not an incident of store logistics disruption; it was a case where the multi‑tier subcontracting and special employment structure of South Korea’s logistics industry and the client company’s evasion of responsibility collided head‑on. Workers demanded not more privileges but the minimum conditions to live like human beings. Yet the client company refused to negotiate, and the conflict exploded amid forced replacement transport and state power intervention. At the end of it, Comrade Seo Gwang-seok lost his life.

Therefore, the lessons of Comrade Seo Gwang-seok’s death are clear.

Mechanisms to effectively compel the client company’s employer responsibility are necessary.
Forced replacement transport and threats of damage claims must not be tolerated as dispute management tools.
Police must prioritize life and safety over logistics normalization, and must not repeat on‑site responses that involve pushing workers aside to assist vehicle exits.
The basic labor rights of specially employed cargo workers must be institutionally and effectively guaranteed.

To properly remember Comrade Seo Gwang-seok’s death means not leaving him as a mere accident victim. It means exposing the structure that made his death possible and going all the way to dismantling it.

Sources

Media Reports

The Hankyoreh, “One Cargo Truckers’ Solidarity Member Dies at CU Client Negotiation Rally… Management 2.5‑ton Truck Runs Over,” 2026‑04‑21.
The Hankyoreh, “National Police Agency: ‘Death of Union Member at CU Rally, Office of Inspection Launches Fact‑Finding’,” 2026‑04‑20.
The Hankyoreh, “[Editorial] Death at Jinju Logistics Center: Was It Not the Management’s Refusal to Talk That Caused It?,” 2026‑04‑20.
Kyunghyang Shinmun, “During Strike, Replacement Transport Truck Hits Union Member, Three Killed or Injured,” 2026‑04‑20.
Kyunghyang Shinmun, “Cargo Truckers’ Solidarity Holds On‑Site Meeting with Labor Minister Kim Yeong‑hun… Minister Promises ‘Resolution at Ministry Level’,” 2026‑04‑21.
YTN, “Disaster That the Yellow Envelope Act Could Not Prevent… ‘No Inquiry to Labor Relations Commission’,” 2026‑04‑20.
News1, “Strikes Continue in Hwaseong, Anseong, Naju, Jinju, Then Yongin… BGF‑Union Parallel Lines,” 2026‑04‑09.
OhmyNews, “‘Death by State Power’: Workers’ Grief in Front of Jinju CU Logistics Center,” 2026‑04‑21.
The Voice of the People, “Worker Death at CU Logistics Center, Labor Community Says ‘CU and Police Must Take Responsibility’,” 2026‑04‑20.
Mediaus, “Cargo Truckers’ Solidarity: ‘CU BGF and State Power Killed Seo Gwang‑seok’,” 2026‑04‑20.
News Cham, “Anger Spreads After Cargo Worker Death… ‘BGF, Police, Government Killed Him’,” 2026‑04‑20.
Newsis, “KCTU: ‘CU, Police, Government Responsible for Death at Jinju Logistics Center’… Total Struggle,” 2026‑04‑21.

Labor Statements

Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, “CU BGF and Police Must Take Responsibility for the Death of the Cargo Worker; Government Must Immediately Move to Resolve the Situation,” 2026‑04‑20.

Note on Facts

According to current cross‑referenced reports, the direct collision was caused by the management’s replacement transport vehicle.
Police responsibility is strongly raised in the form of controversy over site control, support for vehicle exits, use of force, and inadequate safety measures. However, the detailed actions and scope of legal responsibility require further investigation results.
The number of negotiation requests is reported as five times in some reports and seven times in others; this document treats them as conflicting information.
Comrade Seo Gwang‑seok’s specific title varies slightly among reports; in public documents, it is safe to refer to him as Comrade Seo Gwang‑seok or as a member of the Cargo Truckers’ Solidarity Jeonnam Regional Headquarters without over‑specifying his title.