Introduction: Not Simply a ‘Ruling Party’ but a Hegemonic Apparatus

Markdown

Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-05-08

The Democratic Party of Korea is not simply one party in South Korean politics. As of May 2026, it is the ruling party, recording a presidential approval rating of 67% (NBS, May 4–6, 2026) and a party approval rating of 46%, leading the People Power Party (18%) by a margin of 28 percentage points. More important than the gap itself is the structural nature of this gap. The Democratic Party has obliterated the very space for progressive parties to exist. The Justice Party became an extra-parliamentary party after the 2024 general election, and the Progressive Party can no longer enter the National Assembly without going through a Democratic Party satellite party. The Fatherland Innovation Party (3%) and the Reform Party (2%) function merely as satellites or auxiliary forces of the Democratic Party.

This is not simply an electoral victory; it is a Gramscian ‘capture of hegemony.’ The Democratic Party not only absorbs the votes of the progressive masses but also reshapes their political imagination itself. Below, the structure of this political machine is coldly dissected. The goal is not criticism but understanding.

I. Class Character: A Capitalist Party Captured by the Petty-Bourgeois Intelligentsia

1. The Class Identity Confessed in the Platform

The preamble of the Democratic Party’s platform clearly reveals its class identity.

“The Democratic Party of Korea … represents the common people and the middle class.”

“We will realize innovative growth and a democratic market economy.”

“We will complete economic democratization to create a market economy where everyone can equally enjoy the fruits of growth.”

The very designation of ‘the common people and the middle class’ as the subject is a political operation of class ambiguity. The term ‘working class’ does not appear, and the fundamental legitimacy of the market economy is taken for granted while only ‘democratization’ is emphasized. ‘Innovative growth’ is a direct borrowing of the language of the chaebol-centered export-led growth model. This is isomorphic with the ‘social market economy’ discourse of European social democratic parties.

2. Relationship with Chaebol Funding: Structural Rather Than Direct Linkage

The Democratic Party’s relationship with the chaebol is a more complex structural collusion than outright illegal political funding.

Official Financial Structure: In 2025, the Democratic Party’s central party donations were 1.347 billion won, ranking first. However, this amount does not greatly surpass the Progressive Party (971 million won) or the Justice Party (909 million won). The Democratic Party’s actual financial base is as follows:

State Subsidies: 50.08 billion won in 2025 (first time exceeding 50 billion won, 47.8% of total subsidies)
Membership Dues: 2.65 billion won per month as of January 2026 (approximately 31.8 billion won annually)
Election Subsidies: Additional payments in election years.

The Democratic Party’s relationship with the chaebol operates not through direct donations but through the following structural channels:

Guaranteeing Profits through Policy Design: The extension of the fixed-term employment period (from 2 years to over 3 years), the expansion of job-based pay systems, and the expansion of special extended work hours—all policies discussed in the Labor Structure Reform TF—respond to the chaebol’s demands for labor flexibility.
Personnel Circulation: Appointments of figures with chaebol backgrounds to key government posts. Personnel placements aimed at deregulation.
Shared Growthism: The Democratic Party has never doubted the premise that the chaebol’s export competitiveness is the core of the national economy.

In 2026, the agenda items under discussion in the Lee Jae-myung administration’s Labor Structure Reform TF—extension of fixed-term employment periods, relaxation of labor hour regulations in regional mega-special zones—are perfectly aligned with the interests of the chaebol. At the same time, a surface-level progressive agenda, the ‘OECD-average-level reduction of actual working hours (4.5-day workweek system),’ is pursued in parallel to neutralize opposition from labor.

3. The Petty-Bourgeois Intelligentsia’s Capture of the Party

The actual operating subject of the Democratic Party is the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. Lawyers, professors, civic activists, and journalists constitute the party’s core leadership and National Assembly members.

The class interests of this stratum are clear:

Reproduction of their social status and professional expertise
Strengthening fairness and equal opportunity, not the fundamental subversion of the market economy
Stable career maintenance within the anti-communist/anti-North Korea hegemony

This is the structural reason why the ‘non-Myeong massacre’ (the purge of lawmakers not aligned with Lee Jae-myung) was possible in the 2024 general election nominations. 24 first-term lawmakers from the pro-Lee faction replaced incumbent non-Lee lawmakers, but all belong to the same petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. Factions may be replaced, but the class character does not change. Lee Jae-myung himself, a former human rights lawyer, is a typical member of this stratum.

4. Superficial Solidarity and Substantive Abandonment of Workers, Peasants, and the Poor

The Democratic Party maintains a dual structure: superficial solidarity with workers, peasants, and the poor, while substantively abandoning them.

Workers: On February 11, 2026, the Yang Kyung-soo executive committee of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) participated in the labor-government consultative body of the Lee Jae-myung administration. Just nine days prior, on February 2, the mass arrest of workers protesting the mass layoff of Sejong Hotel workers occurred. The Labor Party’s Labor Committee criticized this as “a violation of the spirit of the democratic union movement” and characterized the Lee Jae-myung administration’s Economic, Social and Labor Council as a “strategy of co-opting labor through social concertation” (May 1, 2026).

The dual structure of labor policy is sophisticated:

Surface: 4.5-day workweek, abolition of comprehensive wage systems, extension of retirement age, enforcement of Articles 2 and 3 of the Trade Union Act
Reverse side: Extension of fixed-term employment periods, expansion of job-based pay, expansion of special extended work hours, relaxation of labor hour regulations in regional mega-special zones

The former secures support from progressive workers, while the latter satisfies the chaebol’s demands for labor flexibility. By simultaneously pursuing policies in both directions, the Democratic Party creates division within the working class (regular vs. irregular workers, large enterprises vs. SMEs).

Peasants and the Poor: The Democratic Party’s platform mentions a “basic society that guarantees the basic livelihood of all people,” but actual agricultural policy is structured to accelerate import liberalization and rural extinction. Approaches to housing and debt issues also remain at the level of ‘tailored support’ and ‘financial easing’ rather than fundamental redistribution.

II. Ideological Hegemony: The Political Technology of ‘Semi-Anti-Communism’

1. The Structure of ‘Semi-Anti-Communism’ Inheriting Anti-Communism

The Democratic Party’s greatest ideological achievement is the technique of co-opting progressive voters without discarding anti-communist discourse. This is a peculiar stance that can be called ‘semi-anti-communism’ (半反共).

Operational Mechanism:

Fulfills the minimum demands of the anti-communist camp by criticizing North Korea’s human rights, nuclear program, and militarism
At the same time, absorbs the progressive camp’s desire for peace by proposing dialogue, exchange, and cooperation
Frames the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance and inter-Korean dialogue not as incompatible contradictions but as a single ‘pragmatic balance’

President Lee Jae-myung’s commemorative address on the anniversary of the Korean War Armistice (July 27, 2025) is a typical example of this duality:

“The United States is a blood ally and our strongest alliance.”

“We will further solidify the ROK-U.S. alliance and strive to ensure that freedom and peace are firmly protected on the Korean Peninsula.”

Simultaneously, on December 2, 2025, Lee declared a “proposal to restore inter-Korean communication channels” and “the pursuit of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.” The strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance and peace proposals are presented as if they coexist without contradiction.

2. North Korea’s Response: “Peace Rhetoric Is Hollow”

A statement on July 28, 2025, by Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, precisely identified this duality:

“While the Lee Jae-myung government has taken superficial measures such as halting loudspeaker broadcasts, stopping leaflet distribution, and proposing an invitation to the APEC summit, these are mere showmanship actions unaccompanied by substantial changes such as the cessation of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises or the withdrawal of hostile policies toward the North, which are what we demand.”

Major ROK-U.S. joint military exercises conducted during the first 50-plus days of the Lee Jae-myung administration include:

Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) (March 10–21, 2025, approximately 20,000 troops)
Vigilant Defense (April 14–18, 2025, about 100 aircraft, 1,500 personnel)
Balikatan (April 28–May 10, 2025, ROK-U.S.-Japan-Philippines, about 16,000 troops)
Pacific Vanguard (May 20–24, 2025, ROK-U.S.-Japan, about 2,000 troops)
Pacific Dragon (June 10–14, 2025, ROK-U.S.-Japan, about 1,000 troops)
Talisman Sabre (July 12–24, 2025, ROK-U.S.-Australia, about 30,000 troops)

Kim Yo-jong’s statement criticizes the Lee Jae-myung government for inheriting the dual attitude of the previous Moon Jae-in government (continuing ROK-U.S. joint exercises while holding inter-Korean summits in 2018). The very frame of “dialogue but strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance” is perceived by the North as an unreliable contradiction.

3. The Mechanism for Neutralizing the Anti-Imperialist Impulses of Progressive Voters

The Democratic Party’s ‘semi-anti-communism’ neutralizes the anti-imperialist impulses of progressive voters in the following ways:

Redefinition of the Enemy: The enemy is not imperialism (the United States) but ‘the far right’ (People Power Party/Yoon Seok-yeol). By substituting anti-Americanism with anti-anti-far-right sentiment, it avoids a fundamental confrontation with the United States.

De-classification of Peace Discourse: Peace is framed as a universal value unrelated to the capitalist system. It conceals the fact that the cause of war risk lies in the convergence of U.S. imperialist interests and the interests of South Korean monopoly capital.

The ‘Pragmatic Balance’ Frame: Strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and proposing dialogue are justified through the language of ‘balance.’ In reality, it conceals the contradiction that the ROK-U.S. alliance (military dependency) structurally constrains the very possibility of dialogue.

A New Unifying Code: ‘Overcoming the Insurrection’: After the December 3 insurrection, the Democratic Party created the frame of the ‘Anti-Insurrection Democratic Alliance.’ Within this frame, a capitalist party (Democratic Party), the labor movement (KCTU), and a progressive party (Progressive Party) are united under the signifier ‘democracy.’ Class antagonism is concealed by the dichotomy of ‘insurrection forces vs. democratic forces.’

III. Structure as a Political Machine

1. The Form of Party Member Democracy and the Substance of Centralized Decision-Making

As of May 2026, the Democratic Party is the party that most strongly emphasizes ‘party member sovereignty.’ However, its substance is a sophisticated centralization system.

‘Party Member Democracy’ by the Numbers:

Total party members: approx. 5.12 million (as of 2023)
Voting members: approx. 1.5 million (as of 2023; 256,000 in 2015 → 6-fold increase)
Voting members at the 2022 National Convention: approx. 1.11 million → at the 2024 Central Committee vote: approx. 1.11 million
Over 47% of voting members joined after the 2021 Lee Jae-myung presidential primary.

Key Institution — One Member One Vote: In 2026, led by Representative Jeong Cheong-rae, a party constitution amendment for ‘one member one vote for delegates and voting members’ was passed by the Central Committee (85.3% approval in a survey of voting members, turnout 31.64%). This system equalizes the vote value of delegates (approx. 16,831) and voting members (approx. 1.11 million).

The substantive effect of this system is clear:

Weakening of the authority of delegates (party cadres, district chairs, middle leadership)
Strengthening of the authority of voting members (fanbase, majority pro-Lee)
Jeong Cheong-rae: “Factions will be dismantled” → In reality, the pro-Lee faction is the biggest beneficiary.

‘Used’ Delegates: In the 2024 general election nomination process, primaries based on voting members led to the replacement of 24 incumbent lawmakers from the non-Lee faction. According to a JoongAng Ilbo report (2023), one lawmaker lamented: “At first, I thought we were using them, but in the end, we were the ones being used. It’s a case of the tail wagging the dog.”

2. Faction Management through Nomination Power

Nomination power is a central axis of the power structure of the Democratic Party. The faction that controls the nomination screening and decision-making process controls the entire party.

Lessons from the 2024 Nominations:

‘Non-Myeong massacre’: Incumbent lawmakers not aligned with Lee Jae-myung were largely eliminated in nomination primaries.
Incumbent replacement rate: 40%.
First-term lawmakers from the pro-Lee faction entered the 22nd National Assembly in large numbers.
Lee Jae-myung: “Party members played a big role in the election victory, so you can be proud.”

Cycle of Nomination Power:

Party leader (currently Jeong Cheong-rae) exercises the power to form the Nomination Management Committee.
Candidates are determined by primary votes of pro-Lee voting members.
Elected lawmakers pledge loyalty to the party leader.
This leads to support for the current leadership’s re-election at the next national convention.

This structure justifies substantive centralization (pro-Lee control) through the form of party democracy (primaries).

3. The Hegemonic Block Linking the Prosecution, Media, and Civil Society NGOs

The Democratic Party’s hegemony does not operate only within the party. It forms a broad block penetrating the prosecution reform, media, and civil society NGOs.

Prosecution: The Lee Jae-myung government’s prosecution reform process is itself a field of hegemonic struggle. In March 2026, hardliners within the party (complete dissolution of the prosecution) clashed with the presidential office (gradual reform) over the discussion of abolishing the position of Prosecutor General and amendments to the Prosecutors’ Office Act. President Lee Jae-myung warned against “burning down the house to catch a bedbug” and criticized “excessive competition for clarity detached from the essence” (March 16, 2026). What matters here is that prosecution reform is not simply a matter of institutional reorganization; it is a political mechanism that uses the prosecution as a symbol of the past authoritarian system to reproduce the ‘democracy vs. anti-democracy’ frame.

Media: The platform stipulates “guaranteeing press freedom and strengthening the independence of public media.” The Democratic Party exerts influence over the media through the Korea Communications Commission and the composition of boards of directors of public broadcasters such as KBS and MBC. At the same time, pro-Democratic Party YouTube channels and podcast networks function as the party’s official media. Meanwhile, confrontation with conservative media such as the Chosun Ilbo and Dong-A Ilbo is used to maintain the ‘democratic forces vs. vested interests’ frame.

Civil Society NGOs: In 2025, the System Transformation Movement Organizing Committee attempted to connect the three progressive parties (Labor Party, Green Party, Justice Party) with civil society movement forces, but after the December 3 insurrection, a significant portion of this flow was absorbed into the Democratic Party-centered ‘Anti-Insurrection Democratic Alliance.’ Key figures in major civil society areas such as human rights, women’s, and environmental movements are increasingly choosing to cooperate with or merge into the Democratic Party.

IV. The Democratic Party as an Electoral Machine

1. The Gap Between Party Approval Ratings and Actual Electoral Mobilization

As of May 2026, NBS data shows the Democratic Party’s approval rating at 46% and the People Power Party at 18%. However, this approval rating does not accurately reflect actual electoral mobilization.

Important Gap:

In the 2024 general election, the Democratic Party (including the Democratic Alliance of Korea) won 175 seats. Its seat share (58.3%) is much higher than its party approval rating (late 30s to early 40s).
This is the result of the ‘winner-takes-all effect’ of the single-member constituency system and the additional acquisition of proportional representation seats through satellite parties.
The introduction of a medium-sized constituency system faces criticism of ‘Democratic Party monopoly.’

Structural Overestimation Factors in Approval Ratings:

The disappearance of progressive parties leads to an influx of ‘progressive independents’ into the Democratic Party.
Support for the Democratic Party as the ‘lesser evil’ (blocking the far right from taking power).
Not all of these votes represent active agreement with the Democratic Party.

2. How District Organizations Operate

The Democratic Party’s district organizations differ from the traditional ‘organized mass party.’ Central party-centered fan mobilization is replacing local organizations.

According to analysis by Professor Yoon Wang-hee of Sungkyunkwan University (JoongAng Ilbo, 2023): “In countries with developed party politics, party membership increases around local parties, whereas in South Korea, party membership increases around the central party before and after major elections.”

Indeed, the Democratic Party’s membership growth has been centered around central political figures: in 2017 (influx of Moon Jae-in supporters, ‘Moon-bba’) and 2021–22 (influx of Lee Jae-myung supporters, ‘Gaeddal’). These members participate primarily in primary voting, SNS activities, and online opinion warfare rather than in the daily activities of local organizations.

District chairs are often concurrently held by the corresponding National Assembly member, and local organizations effectively function as the member’s personal political machine. This is a fundamentally different structure from the typical local organizations of European social democratic parties.

3. New Media Strategies: SNS, YouTube, etc.

The Democratic Party has built a structure for direct mass mobilization using digital media in parallel with traditional organizations (members, district committees).

Key Channels:

YouTube live broadcasts by Lee Jae-myung (currently president) — direct communication with party members.
Network of pro-Lee YouTubers — indirect dissemination of the party’s official stance.
Online fanbase represented by ‘Gaeddal’ — spontaneous yet organized execution of opinion warfare.

The core of the digital media strategy is to deliberately blur the boundary between the party’s official channels and the spontaneous activities of supporters. The leadership announces official positions, while aggressive opinion warfare is carried out by ‘spontaneous supporters.’ This structure disperses accountability while maintaining message unity.

V. The Disappearance and Absorption of Progressive Parties: Evidence of Hegemony

1. The Process of the Justice Party’s Disappearance (2000–2024)

The Justice Party’s decline is a structural process spanning over two decades.

Key Period Transformations:

2000: Founding of the Democratic Labor Party.
2004: General election: 10 seats (8 proportional, 2 constituency), party vote share 13.03% — peak period.
2007: Presidential election: Kwon Young-gil 3.01% → NL-PD factional conflict intensifies.
2008: Split (Progressive New Party breaks away). Democratic Labor Party: 5 seats (party vote 5.68%), Progressive New Party: extra-parliamentary.
2011: Formation of the Unified Progressive Party (Democratic Labor Party + Progressive New Party + People’s Participation Party).
2012: General election: 13 seats (7 constituency, 6 proportional). Proportional primary fraud → split → founding of the Justice Party.
2014: Constitutional Court orders dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party.
2016: Justice Party: 6 seats (2 constituency, 4 proportional).
2017: Presidential election: Sim Sang-jung 6.17% (2.01 million votes) — last heyday. Death of lawmaker Roh Hoe-chan (July 2018).
2020: General election: Proportional vote 9.67% (2.69 million votes), but only 5 seats due to satellite party system.
2024: Green Justice Party: 0 seats, proportional vote share 2.14%. Sim Sang-jung retires from politics.

Structural Causes of Decline (SisaIN, 2024):

Repeated Splits: NL-PD factional conflict destroyed the party’s unity capacity.
Decline in Unionization Rate and Disconnect: Unionization rate stagnated from 12.0% in 2000 to 13.1% in 2022. The organizational base of the progressive party itself shrank.
Electoral System: The two major parties encroached on proportional representation through satellite parties. In 2020, the Justice Party could have won 15 seats but only got 5.
Moon Jae-in Government’s Labor and Welfare Pledges: The Democratic Party absorbed the Justice Party’s policy areas, such as regularization of irregular workers and strengthening health insurance coverage. “If there is no significant difference in labor and welfare policies, should a separate progressive party remain alongside the Democratic Party?” (SisaIN)
‘A Progressive Worldview That Does Not Evolve’: Interview with a Justice Party leadership source. Rigidity of labor-centered discourse, failure to respond to new social agendas (gender, climate, youth).

2. The Progressive Party’s Marginalization: Incorporation as a ‘Democratic Party Satellite’

The Progressive Party chose a different path. By opting for solidarity with the Democratic Party, it sought political survival, but as a result, it lost its identity as an independent party.

2024 General Election: Participated in the Democratic Alliance of Korea (proportional satellite party) → 2 proportional seats, 1 constituency seat after unification.
Lawmaker Kang Sung-hee, elected in the 2023 by-election in Jeonju: Banner reading “A big concession for a new Jeonju! Thank you, Democratic Party.” Acquired the nickname ‘pro-Lee Democratic Party candidate.’
May 8, 2024: Democratic Alliance of Korea → absorbed and merged into the Democratic Party.

This path of the Progressive Party shows that the only way for a progressive party to survive in South Korean politics is to become a ‘satellite of the Democratic Party.’ This means that the political space for an independent progressive party has itself disappeared.

3. The Fatherland Innovation Party: ‘More Progressive Than the Democratic Party?’

The Fatherland Innovation Party filled the space left by the Justice Party’s disappearance, winning 12 seats in the 2024 general election. In February 2026, discussions on a merger with the Democratic Party were underway, but a merger before the local elections was suspended, and a proposal was made to form a preparatory committee for integration.

The character of the Fatherland Innovation Party remains unclear. “Whether the Fatherland Innovation Party is a more progressive party than the Democratic Party, at least in socioeconomic terms, remains unclear” (SisaIN, 2024). Currently, the Fatherland Innovation Party is focused on the single agenda of prosecution reform and has not presented an independent line differentiated from the Democratic Party on labor, welfare, or economic democratization. In the long term, absorption and merger with the Democratic Party is likely.

VI. Appendix: After the December 3 Insurrection — The Restructuring of the Democratic Party

The martial law declaration by Yoon Seok-yeol on December 3, 2024, and the subsequent impeachment process fundamentally reshaped the Democratic Party’s political position. An analysis by the Bolshevik Group (2025) is sharp:

“After the December 3 insurrection, the Democratic Party is caught between two pressures. On one side is the pressure from the left: the tens of millions of citizens and working people who blocked the martial law troops on the night of December 3, shielded the vote to lift martial law, and demand punishment of the instigators and participants in the insurrection, including Yoon Seok-yeol. On the other side is the pressure from the right: U.S. imperialism, which holds hegemony over the South Korean capitalist system, local capital, and its far-right lackey, the People Power Party.”

Between these two pressures, the Democratic Party adopted the following strategy:

Construction of a Democratic Grand Alliance: Absorbed progressive parties, civil society, and the labor movement through the ‘Anti-Insurrection Democratic Alliance.’
Reaffirmation of Relations with the United States: On March 10, 2025, the Korea-U.S. Parliamentary League was founded — 160 lawmakers from the Democratic Party and the People Power Party participated. “Gathered under the Stars and Stripes and the Taegeukgi, they clenched their fists, shouted ‘Fighting,’ and took commemorative photos. The two parties pledged to unite before the real master” (Bolshevik Group).
Lee Jae-myung’s Rise to Power and Stabilization: June 2025 presidential election victory → inauguration of the Lee Jae-myung government → absorption of progressive popular aspirations into the system.

As Kwon Young-sook (Institute for Democracy and Labor, 2026) accurately points out, this is a process of “strengthening liberal hegemony.” The Democratic Party is “drawing progressive forces into the anti-insurrection democratic alliance to prevent the radicalization and leftward shift of progressives.” The October 29, 2025, ROK-U.S. tariff agreement has a dual character: it is “a binding to the U.S.-centered reorganization of global capitalism” and “a ‘great leap forward of capital’ centered on the South Korean big capitalist class.”

Conclusion: How to View This Machine

The Democratic Party of Korea is a complex political machine with the following characteristics:

In class terms: It is a capitalist party captured by the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia and structurally aligned with the interests of the chaebol. At the same time, it possesses mechanisms to absorb the votes and support of workers, peasants, and the poor.

In ideological terms: It employs the political technology of ‘semi-anti-communism,’ inheriting anti-communism while co-opting progressive voters. Its discursive ability to combine the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance with peace proposals without contradiction is nearly monopolistic in domestic politics.

In organizational terms: It strengthens centralized control through the form of party member democracy. The fanbase-based voting member system and the one-member-one-vote system are devices that institutionalize Lee Jae-myung’s control of the party.

In electoral terms: It achieves a seat share higher than its approval rating by combining the winner-takes-all effect of the single-member constituency system, additional proportional seats through satellite parties, and digital fan mobilization.

In hegemonic terms: Through the disappearance of progressive parties, it has completely encroached upon the left-liberal spectrum. It is forming a hegemonic block that penetrates the prosecution, media, and civil society NGOs.

From a Marxist analytical perspective: The Democratic Party is ‘one of two faces’ through which U.S. finance capital and South Korean chaebol monopoly capital control the working class (Bolshevik Group). While the far right (People Power Party) handles coercive control, the Democratic Party handles hegemonic integration. “These two share a fundamental interest in capitalism. Just as a single individual has a different expression when in a good mood versus when in a crisis and aggressive, these two are no more than the two faces of the ruling class” (Bolshevik Group, 2025).

From an organizational construction perspective: Simply criticizing this machine from the outside is ineffective. The Democratic Party is not simply a ‘traitor’; it is a complex apparatus that absorbs and neutralizes the genuine aspirations of the progressive masses. Accurately understanding the operation of this machine is the first step toward building an organizational alternative.

What the Democratic Party offers the progressive masses — ‘a better choice than the far right’ — is realistic. However, it operates only by neutralizing progress. To go beyond this machine, a vision of an independent working-class politics is needed that transcends the ‘lesser evil’ logic offered by the Democratic Party. That vision must combine anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly content in a way that the Democratic Party cannot imitate.

Key References:

NBS Opinion Poll (May 4–6, 2026), YTN
JoongAng Ilbo, “From 250,000 to 1.5 million, from 380,000 to 920,000… The ‘1,000 won’ that grew the two big parties’ members” (2023)
JoongAng Ilbo, “‘Tax to the Party’ State Subsidies, Democratic Party Breaks 50 Billion Won for First Time This Year” (2025)
Dong-A Ilbo, “Lee Jae-myung ‘We Must Double Voting Members’… Announces Major Expansion of Member Authority” (April 24, 2024)
MBC, “Democratic Party ‘One Member One Vote, 85.3% of Members in Favor’… Turnout 31.64%” (2026)
SisaIN, “The Paradox of a Progressive Party That Succeeded and Failed: 20 Years of History” (2024)
Tongil Times, “The Dual North Korea Policy of the Lee Jae-myung Government: Words and Actions Out of Sync” (2025)
Kwon Young-sook, “The Hegemony of the Democratic Party in the Democratic Alliance Front,” Institute for Democracy and Labor (2026)
Bolshevik Group, Various Statements and Analyses (2016–2025)
Kyunghyang Shinmun, “‘Transformed into Lee Jae-myung’s Party’… 24 Pro-Lee Elected Officials Who Took the Seats of Non-Lee Incumbents” (April 14, 2024)
Democratic Party of Korea Platform, Party Constitution, Party Rules (February 23, 2026)
KG Data: Lee Jae-myung Administration Labor Structure Reform TF, Labor Party Criticism, KCTU Participation in Labor-Government Consultative Body, etc.