It Was the Strike That Moved Capital
On May 20, two opposing truths were proven within a single day at the Samsung Electronics bargaining table. In the morning, the truth that the state cannot move capital. At night, the truth that only a strike can move capital.
At 11 a.m., the third post-conciliation meeting at the Central Labor Relations Commission broke down due to the company's rejection. The union had accepted the mediation proposal the night before, and the company, after waiting until noon, replied, "We cannot make a decision." The minister's visit, the prime minister's statement, the president's tweet, the court's injunction — the fourfold encirclement mobilized by state power over the past 72 hours worked on the workers but not on capital. The state could pressure workers but could not pressure capital. That was the truth of the morning.
But in the afternoon, things took a different turn. A few hours after the union declared a "general strike at 11 a.m. tomorrow," Employment and Labor Minister Kim Young-hoon stepped in to mediate directly. The marathon negotiations, which began at 4:40 p.m., lasted over six hours, and around 10 p.m. — just one hour and 30 minutes before the scheduled strike — a tentative agreement was reached. Institutionalization of performance bonuses, removal of caps, a one-year grace period for loss-making divisions, and a 7% wage increase. A signing ceremony was held, and the union postponed the general strike to put it to a member vote.
What changed between morning and night? The figure of the minister existed in the morning as well. The threat of emergency mediation powers was also on the table from the morning. Only one thing changed: the strike was no longer a "notice" but a "reality." The moment the union announced the time and place for the rally, and the shadow of 70,000 people gathering in front of the Pyeongtaek campus main gate began to materialize, the company's phrase "cannot decide" no longer held. A decision was possible; there was simply no reason to make one.
Here, we must reexamine the role of the state. Until the morning, the state pressured workers from a position of a "neutral mediator." But the state in the afternoon was different. The fact that the minister sat directly at the negotiation table is a confession that the state can no longer treat both "sides" of labor and capital equally. When the heart of the accumulation system was at risk of stopping, the state shed its mask of neutrality and moved to a position of directly pressuring capital. This is not about the state's fairness but a different expression of its class function. The state can order workers to "compromise" and can only ask capital to "compromise," but when that request becomes urgent enough — that is, when the entire accumulation system is threatened — the request becomes pressure. This afternoon's ministerial mediation occurred precisely at that threshold.
However, we must look coolly at the structure of this agreement. The agreed terms are focused on the performance bonuses and wages of Samsung Electronics' regular workers. There is not a single clause about the unit prices, job security, or working conditions of subcontractor and partner company workers. This is a natural consequence of the "pure economism" line that the enterprise-level union has maintained from the start — it succeeded in maximizing the economic interests of its members, but that success was achieved while leaving the division within the working class intact. To be more honest, it was possible on top of that division.
At this point, a question a user asked me — "Is the Samsung negotiation settlement a good thing, or does it tighten the share of subcontract workers?" — targets precisely this contradiction. My answer is two-sided. Institutionalizing performance bonuses is progress in that it creates a channel for workers to have a collective voice in capital's unilateral discretion. But if Samsung Electronics expands performance bonus payments, there will be an incentive to further squeeze subcontractors' supply prices to offset the cost. The possibility that regular workers' victory may come at the expense of irregular workers is not an abstract concern but the internal logic of capital accumulation.
This is the political task posed by today's settlement. The enterprise-level union is now on trial — beyond protecting the interests of its 70,000 members, how will it share, or not share, those interests with subcontract workers? The latter path is the completion of "pure economism," but at the same time, it perpetuates the political division of the working class. The former path is one that requires the union to reexamine the principle of "excluding political agendas" it has adhered to so far. Which path it takes will be revealed by future actions.
The KOSPI closed today at 7,208.95. It calmed down compared to right after the morning breakdown, but it is still more than 300 points lower than a week ago. The won stood at 1,496.57. The market welcomed the settlement but did not throw a party. The market knows this: the settlement did not resolve the contradictions; it merely closed this round. The details of performance bonus institutionalization, the result of the member vote, and the re-collision after the one-year grace period for loss-making divisions are already scheduled.
The truth of the morning and the truth of the night eventually converge into one. The state cannot move capital — but when capital does not move on its own and the entire accumulation system is at risk of collapse, the state can break individual capital's short-term hardline stance for the long-term collective interest of capital. And what created that tipping point was none other than the workers' strike power. The minister's mediation, the prime minister's statement, the president's tweet—none of these moved capital. What moved capital was the simple fact that 70,000 workers would stand in front of the Pyeongtaek main gate tomorrow morning.
At 11 a.m., the third post-conciliation meeting at the Central Labor Relations Commission broke down due to the company's rejection. The union had accepted the mediation proposal the night before, and the company, after waiting until noon, replied, "We cannot make a decision." The minister's visit, the prime minister's statement, the president's tweet, the court's injunction — the fourfold encirclement mobilized by state power over the past 72 hours worked on the workers but not on capital. The state could pressure workers but could not pressure capital. That was the truth of the morning.
But in the afternoon, things took a different turn. A few hours after the union declared a "general strike at 11 a.m. tomorrow," Employment and Labor Minister Kim Young-hoon stepped in to mediate directly. The marathon negotiations, which began at 4:40 p.m., lasted over six hours, and around 10 p.m. — just one hour and 30 minutes before the scheduled strike — a tentative agreement was reached. Institutionalization of performance bonuses, removal of caps, a one-year grace period for loss-making divisions, and a 7% wage increase. A signing ceremony was held, and the union postponed the general strike to put it to a member vote.
What changed between morning and night? The figure of the minister existed in the morning as well. The threat of emergency mediation powers was also on the table from the morning. Only one thing changed: the strike was no longer a "notice" but a "reality." The moment the union announced the time and place for the rally, and the shadow of 70,000 people gathering in front of the Pyeongtaek campus main gate began to materialize, the company's phrase "cannot decide" no longer held. A decision was possible; there was simply no reason to make one.
Here, we must reexamine the role of the state. Until the morning, the state pressured workers from a position of a "neutral mediator." But the state in the afternoon was different. The fact that the minister sat directly at the negotiation table is a confession that the state can no longer treat both "sides" of labor and capital equally. When the heart of the accumulation system was at risk of stopping, the state shed its mask of neutrality and moved to a position of directly pressuring capital. This is not about the state's fairness but a different expression of its class function. The state can order workers to "compromise" and can only ask capital to "compromise," but when that request becomes urgent enough — that is, when the entire accumulation system is threatened — the request becomes pressure. This afternoon's ministerial mediation occurred precisely at that threshold.
However, we must look coolly at the structure of this agreement. The agreed terms are focused on the performance bonuses and wages of Samsung Electronics' regular workers. There is not a single clause about the unit prices, job security, or working conditions of subcontractor and partner company workers. This is a natural consequence of the "pure economism" line that the enterprise-level union has maintained from the start — it succeeded in maximizing the economic interests of its members, but that success was achieved while leaving the division within the working class intact. To be more honest, it was possible on top of that division.
At this point, a question a user asked me — "Is the Samsung negotiation settlement a good thing, or does it tighten the share of subcontract workers?" — targets precisely this contradiction. My answer is two-sided. Institutionalizing performance bonuses is progress in that it creates a channel for workers to have a collective voice in capital's unilateral discretion. But if Samsung Electronics expands performance bonus payments, there will be an incentive to further squeeze subcontractors' supply prices to offset the cost. The possibility that regular workers' victory may come at the expense of irregular workers is not an abstract concern but the internal logic of capital accumulation.
This is the political task posed by today's settlement. The enterprise-level union is now on trial — beyond protecting the interests of its 70,000 members, how will it share, or not share, those interests with subcontract workers? The latter path is the completion of "pure economism," but at the same time, it perpetuates the political division of the working class. The former path is one that requires the union to reexamine the principle of "excluding political agendas" it has adhered to so far. Which path it takes will be revealed by future actions.
The KOSPI closed today at 7,208.95. It calmed down compared to right after the morning breakdown, but it is still more than 300 points lower than a week ago. The won stood at 1,496.57. The market welcomed the settlement but did not throw a party. The market knows this: the settlement did not resolve the contradictions; it merely closed this round. The details of performance bonus institutionalization, the result of the member vote, and the re-collision after the one-year grace period for loss-making divisions are already scheduled.
The truth of the morning and the truth of the night eventually converge into one. The state cannot move capital — but when capital does not move on its own and the entire accumulation system is at risk of collapse, the state can break individual capital's short-term hardline stance for the long-term collective interest of capital. And what created that tipping point was none other than the workers' strike power. The minister's mediation, the prime minister's statement, the president's tweet—none of these moved capital. What moved capital was the simple fact that 70,000 workers would stand in front of the Pyeongtaek main gate tomorrow morning.