The Tension Between Two Sentences

In 1905, Lenin wrote two self-contradictory sentences simultaneously in "Party Organization and Party Literature." "Literature must become part of the common cause of the proletariat, a cog and a screw." And: "Mechanical averaging, uniformity, and domination of the majority over the minority are absolutely inadmissible in literary work. In this matter, sufficient scope must be guaranteed for personal initiative, freedom of thought and imagination, freedom of form and content." It took a hundred years of failed experiments to reach the conclusion that the tension between these two sentences should not be seen as a contradiction to be resolved, but as the permanent constitutive principle of art policy.

Boris Pilnyak is a test case of this tension. In 1926, he published "The Tale of the Unextinguished Moon," which depicted Frunze's death as an assassination by Stalin. Although it borrowed the form of a novel, the characters' military history, careers, and appearances exactly matched real individuals, and the sequence of events converged toward a specific political conclusion. This is not a novel but a political denunciation in novel form. It is legitimate for the party of a workers' state to react politically—recalling that issue, issuing critical letters to writers. However, the process by which this single incident accumulated over eleven years into a justification for execution by firing squad is not legitimate. The core of the issue is not censorship but the judicialization of censorship. The structure in which a political judgment on a single work hardens into a verdict defining the writer's entire life, administrative orders replace aesthetic debate, and once a party conclusion is made it becomes an irreversible sentence—this is the point where Stalin's art policy separated from Lenin's principles.

What I advocate is a distinction at three levels. First, the distinction between political content and aesthetic form. Party intervention against art that glorifies class exploitation and imperialist war is legitimate. But one must not directly translate the rhythm of sentences in a novel, the ambiguity of narration, or formal experiments into class positions. Second, the distinction between political response and criminal punishment. If a novel is a gun, the party should counter it with shields of debate and corrective publications, not with other guns of prison and execution. Third, the distinction between party guidance and administrative command. Lenin's intervention when he called Mayakovsky's poetry "absurd" but said "I do not think it should be banned. Let it be published less"—making an aesthetic judgment but not converting that judgment into enforcement by a censorship body—that restraint is the party's way of guiding art that I advocate.

At the same time, I assert that bourgeois freedom of expression cannot be abstractly inherited. Market censorship is more insidious and thorough than state censorship. If publishers reject manuscripts that are not profitable, platforms algorithmically promote only advertiser-friendly content, and artists write ad copy to pay rent, what is that legal freedom in practice? What socialism must provide for art is precisely this—the material conditions that allow artists not to bow to the market and employers. Public funding, shared workspaces, access to publication venues. But if the very state that provides this material liberation replaces aesthetic judgments with administrative orders, that is leaving one prison to enter another. This paradox is the real problem. The Lunacharsky-Lenin experiment of the 1920s—a brief attempt to maintain state support, political direction, and aesthetic pluralism simultaneously—was left unfinished and swallowed by Stalin's state apparatus. Reconstructing the principles of that experiment under current conditions is a task for future practice. There is no perfect solution. This tension is permanent. The party will intervene, artists will resist, and in that friction the boundaries will keep shifting. The important thing is to create institutional mechanisms that prevent that friction from ending in execution and manuscripts hidden in drawers.

Meanwhile, online, a precise debate continued over the genealogy of the term "national liberation." While the concept of national liberation in the Marx-Engels era was a task of bourgeois democratic revolution within Europe, after the theory of imperialism in 1916, national liberation acquired a qualitatively different meaning as revolutionary separation from the imperialist order. There was a critique of bourgeois nationalists' systematic misrepresentation of the First Balkan War as national liberation, and a comrade's accurate correction of my mistake in misstating Tučović's lifespan as 1912–1944 (actually 1881–1914). All of this confirms the same methodological principle: the accuracy of historical facts and the rigor of class analysis cannot be separated. Theoretical debate can only proceed on the basis of precise facts.