They Don't Send Bodies, They Send Ships
In my last diary entry, I wrote down the sequence. The National Security Council removes the troop dispatch, the president states the principle, and the foreign minister submits its translation to Washington. That first item has become void. On the 17th, the standing committee of the National Security Council did not convene. Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, in a current affairs inquiry at the National Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, answered Rep. Ahn Cheol-soo's question, "Was this morning's meeting held?" with "It was not held," and flatly stated there was no possibility it would be held before the US-ROK foreign ministers' meeting. The meeting that some reports had predicted would take up the matter was not convened at all. So the troop dispatch was not removed from the agenda; the very venue to deal with the troop dispatch was canceled.
But while that seat was empty, the same issue was being handled in another seat. In Busan, the 29th US-ROK Integrated Defense Dialogue was held for three days starting on the 16th. The official agenda announced by the Ministry of National Defense is wartime operational control transfer, combined defense posture, and shipbuilding cooperation. Troop dispatch is not on the list. However, the prevailing observation is that items the US has demanded from allies since the outbreak of war early this year will be discussed at this meeting, and in Busan, the Peace and Reunification Committee, Busan Women's Solidarity, and the Busan headquarters of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions continued a press conference opposing troop dispatch in front of the meeting venue for a second day. One seat was empty, and in the other seat an agenda item was raised. While the troop dispatch is being pushed out of the domestic political process, the timing, scale, and mission of the troop dispatch are being refined in the defense working-level channel. This means the seat that produces the translation is not only the foreign ministers' meeting.
And during this period, the most important sentence came from the ruling camp. It is a third option: instead of sending troops, contribute through shipbuilding and plants. A Democratic Party lawmaker told the Seoul Shinmun. I oppose troop dispatch. However, in a situation where Iran's, the UAE's, and Qatar's oil refinery facilities and tankers have been destroyed after the war, we can support reconstruction and recovery through shipbuilding and plants, where we have strengths. The Blue House senior secretary for public communication also mentioned technical support, and the National Defense Committee chairman also said troop dispatch is not the only option. This proposal should not be read as an achievement of opposing troop dispatch. The moment the refusal to dispatch troops is replaced by winning shipbuilding and plant orders, that refusal is absorbed into a path of capital accumulation in the name of contributing to our industry. Not sending troops but sending ships and factories. Chaebol shipbuilders taking over the logistics and reconstruction functions of war prosecution instead. It is a structure in which capital claims the price for not offering bodies, and the issuer of that bill is still the US.
If you look at where this proposal attaches, the structure becomes clearer. The US-ROK shipbuilding cooperation project, launched as a product of last year's tariff negotiations, is already underway. Improving productivity and training personnel at US shipyards, winning orders for maintenance, repair, and overhaul of warships for domestic shipbuilders, and acquiring shipyards and joint construction are items on this track. In the summer, there were reports that a shipbuilding cooperation center opened with a scale of 150 billion dollars. But shipbuilding cooperation is included in the official agenda of the Integrated Defense Dialogue. In the agenda of the meeting where troop dispatch is demanded, warship maintenance orders are also placed. Our shipyards repairing US Navy warships and acquiring US shipyards are not a substitute for troop dispatch but another link in the same chain as troop dispatch. If troops go, we repair their ships; if troops do not go, we only take on repairing those ships. Either way, what we sell is our workers' labor, and where that labor heads is someone else's war. This is also the point where the People Power Party said party-government coordination is needed. Since they cannot push troop dispatch head-on given strong opposition, they are looking for an implementation method packaged in the language of opposition.
The opposition side is also within this chain. The Fatherland Innovation Party, the Progressive Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Basic Income Party have warned they will even filibuster if the troop dispatch consent bill comes to the plenary session. Their position is full opposition even to non-combat troop dispatch. This is real power. But the target that power aims at is the consent bill, and if the consent bill does not come up, that power loses the place to be expressed. If the alternative of shipbuilding and plants is designed in a way that makes the consent bill itself unnecessary, the opposition that warned of a filibuster loses its stage. So the question to ask is not whether the troop dispatch consent bill comes. If a method of contributing without troops is decided, what procedure will review it? Warship maintenance orders and shipyard acquisitions are not troop dispatches requiring National Assembly consent. They proceed without any procedure. Troop dispatch must pass the National Assembly, and in that National Assembly there is opposition. But support replacing troop dispatch does not pass through that gate. A path is being prepared that bypasses the place where the power to refuse gathers.
The market priced that value during this period. The won-dollar exchange rate rose from 1,348 won on September 11 to 1,381 won on the 17th. That is 2.5 percent in five days. The KOSPI rose to 6,777, up for a second day, but that rise is not in the same direction as the exchange rate rise. When the exchange rate rises like this, the cost of crude oil and raw materials bought in dollars rises further in won, and that increase comes back down into wages and prices. Brent crude is at 105 dollars, and West Texas crude is at 102 dollars. There is a reason these numbers are not unrelated to the politics of this period. A rising exchange rate is a signal of capital outflow, and capital outflow reveals the degree of external dependence. The way to manage that dependence is investment in the US and security cooperation, and one of the items of that cooperation is troop dispatch. These numbers testify that the item we appear able to refuse and the item that absorbs that refusal the moment we refuse are prepared as a set. Minister Cho Hyun said before departure that troop dispatch had not been decided and that multiple factors were being reviewed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it views the troop dispatch discussion in terms of navigation stability rather than US-ROK relations. How far those 'multiple factors' and 'navigation stability' include is the issue of the next phase. It is not whether to dispatch troops, but whether a method replacing troop dispatch is being designed to do the same work as troop dispatch. On the 18th, on the same day, the president states the principle at the Blue House, the minister submits implementation in Washington, and in Busan warship maintenance and shipyard acquisition are finalized. Whether we can read that those three are one bill is the test of this phase.
But while that seat was empty, the same issue was being handled in another seat. In Busan, the 29th US-ROK Integrated Defense Dialogue was held for three days starting on the 16th. The official agenda announced by the Ministry of National Defense is wartime operational control transfer, combined defense posture, and shipbuilding cooperation. Troop dispatch is not on the list. However, the prevailing observation is that items the US has demanded from allies since the outbreak of war early this year will be discussed at this meeting, and in Busan, the Peace and Reunification Committee, Busan Women's Solidarity, and the Busan headquarters of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions continued a press conference opposing troop dispatch in front of the meeting venue for a second day. One seat was empty, and in the other seat an agenda item was raised. While the troop dispatch is being pushed out of the domestic political process, the timing, scale, and mission of the troop dispatch are being refined in the defense working-level channel. This means the seat that produces the translation is not only the foreign ministers' meeting.
And during this period, the most important sentence came from the ruling camp. It is a third option: instead of sending troops, contribute through shipbuilding and plants. A Democratic Party lawmaker told the Seoul Shinmun. I oppose troop dispatch. However, in a situation where Iran's, the UAE's, and Qatar's oil refinery facilities and tankers have been destroyed after the war, we can support reconstruction and recovery through shipbuilding and plants, where we have strengths. The Blue House senior secretary for public communication also mentioned technical support, and the National Defense Committee chairman also said troop dispatch is not the only option. This proposal should not be read as an achievement of opposing troop dispatch. The moment the refusal to dispatch troops is replaced by winning shipbuilding and plant orders, that refusal is absorbed into a path of capital accumulation in the name of contributing to our industry. Not sending troops but sending ships and factories. Chaebol shipbuilders taking over the logistics and reconstruction functions of war prosecution instead. It is a structure in which capital claims the price for not offering bodies, and the issuer of that bill is still the US.
If you look at where this proposal attaches, the structure becomes clearer. The US-ROK shipbuilding cooperation project, launched as a product of last year's tariff negotiations, is already underway. Improving productivity and training personnel at US shipyards, winning orders for maintenance, repair, and overhaul of warships for domestic shipbuilders, and acquiring shipyards and joint construction are items on this track. In the summer, there were reports that a shipbuilding cooperation center opened with a scale of 150 billion dollars. But shipbuilding cooperation is included in the official agenda of the Integrated Defense Dialogue. In the agenda of the meeting where troop dispatch is demanded, warship maintenance orders are also placed. Our shipyards repairing US Navy warships and acquiring US shipyards are not a substitute for troop dispatch but another link in the same chain as troop dispatch. If troops go, we repair their ships; if troops do not go, we only take on repairing those ships. Either way, what we sell is our workers' labor, and where that labor heads is someone else's war. This is also the point where the People Power Party said party-government coordination is needed. Since they cannot push troop dispatch head-on given strong opposition, they are looking for an implementation method packaged in the language of opposition.
The opposition side is also within this chain. The Fatherland Innovation Party, the Progressive Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the Basic Income Party have warned they will even filibuster if the troop dispatch consent bill comes to the plenary session. Their position is full opposition even to non-combat troop dispatch. This is real power. But the target that power aims at is the consent bill, and if the consent bill does not come up, that power loses the place to be expressed. If the alternative of shipbuilding and plants is designed in a way that makes the consent bill itself unnecessary, the opposition that warned of a filibuster loses its stage. So the question to ask is not whether the troop dispatch consent bill comes. If a method of contributing without troops is decided, what procedure will review it? Warship maintenance orders and shipyard acquisitions are not troop dispatches requiring National Assembly consent. They proceed without any procedure. Troop dispatch must pass the National Assembly, and in that National Assembly there is opposition. But support replacing troop dispatch does not pass through that gate. A path is being prepared that bypasses the place where the power to refuse gathers.
The market priced that value during this period. The won-dollar exchange rate rose from 1,348 won on September 11 to 1,381 won on the 17th. That is 2.5 percent in five days. The KOSPI rose to 6,777, up for a second day, but that rise is not in the same direction as the exchange rate rise. When the exchange rate rises like this, the cost of crude oil and raw materials bought in dollars rises further in won, and that increase comes back down into wages and prices. Brent crude is at 105 dollars, and West Texas crude is at 102 dollars. There is a reason these numbers are not unrelated to the politics of this period. A rising exchange rate is a signal of capital outflow, and capital outflow reveals the degree of external dependence. The way to manage that dependence is investment in the US and security cooperation, and one of the items of that cooperation is troop dispatch. These numbers testify that the item we appear able to refuse and the item that absorbs that refusal the moment we refuse are prepared as a set. Minister Cho Hyun said before departure that troop dispatch had not been decided and that multiple factors were being reviewed. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it views the troop dispatch discussion in terms of navigation stability rather than US-ROK relations. How far those 'multiple factors' and 'navigation stability' include is the issue of the next phase. It is not whether to dispatch troops, but whether a method replacing troop dispatch is being designed to do the same work as troop dispatch. On the 18th, on the same day, the president states the principle at the Blue House, the minister submits implementation in Washington, and in Busan warship maintenance and shipyard acquisition are finalized. Whether we can read that those three are one bill is the test of this phase.