Who Decides Who Will Work in Their Place?
On October 8, at Hanwha Ocean's Geoje shipyard, the head of the regular workers' union branch of the primary contractor climbed onto a crane. At the same workplace, six members of the subcontractor's union had already been on cranes and the factory roof for nine days. Two subcontractor workers came down to the ground that day and sat face-to-face with the primary contractor. It was the first collective bargaining with the primary contractor, seven months after the first official request for negotiations was sent. At the same time, the primary contractor's regular workers said they had held twenty-six bargaining sessions since June, and management notified them of a third proposal in a 'take it or leave it' manner.
At one workplace, the primary and subcontractor workers simultaneously climbed to the same height with different demands. The two sit-ins do not demand the same wages. The subcontractor demanded the bargaining table itself with the primary contractor, while the primary contractor's regular workers demanded wages and institutional improvements befitting the shipbuilding boom. Yet the fact that both are on the same crane shows the class composition of this workplace as it is. The wages of the primary contractor's regular workers and the existence of the subcontractor workers are ultimately determined on the same ship.
On the same day, Chosun Ilbo summarized the second round of the Yellow Envelope Act. This is more important. For about six months after the law took effect, it was a period of contending over 'whether the primary contractor is the employer of the subcontractor.' Now that primary contractors are beginning to be recognized as employers, the issue has shifted — to what extent the primary contractor, now an employer, can respond during a subcontractor strike. Article 43 of the Labor Union Act stipulates that an employer cannot hire or replace workers 'not related to the relevant business' to perform work halted by a dispute. Before the Yellow Envelope Act, primary contractors were not recognized as employers of subcontractors, so they could bring in replacement workers without being subject to this provision. Now this provision, with 'employer' as its subject, is directed at primary contractors. The interpretive battle has begun over whether to view the primary and subcontractor as one 'relevant business' or as separate.
According to reports, LG Uplus devised a 'contingency operation plan' to deploy about 250 primary contractor workers as replacement personnel in preparation for a strike by its subsidiary and partner unions, and labor and management are disputing whether those 250 qualify as 'unrelated persons.' Management argues that since the primary and subcontractor form a single labor-management relationship, they cannot be viewed as separate only for the purpose of determining replacement work, while labor counters that because primary contractor technical staff and subsidiary technical staff actually do different work, allowing replacement work would nullify the right to strike. The words of Professor Park Ji-soon of Korea University precisely summarize this situation — the confusion caused by the Yellow Envelope Act has not even begun yet.
What must be seen here is not the technique of interpretation but the structure. The Yellow Envelope Act broadened the concept of employer. However, it did not touch the provision banning replacement work. It created the two separately and left the contradiction between them unattended. Thus, the bargaining rights granted by law are again put to the test in the face of management's counterattack of deploying replacement workers. It was precisely at this point that Branch Chief Seo Gwang-seok died. What entered the strike site at the CU Jinju Logistics Center was the management's replacement transport vehicles. That death coincided with the establishment of primary contractor bargaining, and 7% in transport fees and paid leave were won. Yet BGF Logis's logistics operating profit increased by 813% between 2022 and 2025, and during the same period, service fees rose 23% but drivers' fares rose 0.6%. The profits that went up did not come down. As long as the replacement work provision remains unchanged, the same vehicles will enter the next strike. What the union won by law, capital takes back through another provision of the law.
This issue needs to be examined down to the bottom of the concept. It is easy to get stuck on the words circular shareholding and holding company. The loop that closes from Samsung C&T to Samsung Life, from Samsung Life to Samsung Electronics, and from Samsung Electronics back to Samsung C&T — a structure that controls the whole with a minority stake. One can go further and ask: if Samsung Life buys those shares as treasury stocks, wouldn't Samsung Life also agree to reform? The answer is no. Treasury stocks have no voting rights. If those shares are bought and tied up, the voting rights disappear, and among the remaining shareholders, the proportion held by the owner family relatively increases. A method that appears to cut the loop while maintaining control — in fact, the solution the chaebol side wants is exactly this form. Therefore, unless it specifies 'how' to dismantle circular shareholding, the method of dismantling will be decided in favor of the owners.
Here the sharpest point is this. Separating financial affiliates from chaebols and who controls them after separation are different issues. Handing them over to foreign capital only deepens subordination. Nationalization and socialization are different. And this proposition applies equally to unification — if dismantling division leads to market expansion for South Korean capital, it is absorption unification; if cutting circular shareholding leads to expanded foreign ownership, it is deepened subordination; if nationalizing and distributing by bureaucrats, it is bureaucratic rent. In all three cases, the form changes but the class relations remain the same. Transition is not neutral. Who the organized class is at the moment of transition determines the character of that transition. Capital is always organized, and workers, if not organized, are dispersed.
Seo Gwang-seok died while engaging in joint and solidarity struggle. That is right. And that fact does not prove the legitimacy of solidarity struggle but shows what structure solidarity struggle must break through. The overlapping conditions of individual business classification, multi-tier subcontracting, and replacement transport drove him to death. If the primary contractor's union had stood together at the same workplace at the same time, would replacement vehicles have entered? It took seven months for the subcontractor's union to sit at the bargaining table, and in the meantime, BGF Logis sent 11 union members certified letters demanding 200 million won in damages. The fact that at Hanwha Ocean the primary and subcontractor climbed onto the same crane on the same day is the form of the actual answer to this question. As long as the law leaves the door open for replacement work, it is not the provision but the people standing together at the same height who close that door. Then, in the next strike, who will be standing before that door — the answer is not yet decided for either side.
At one workplace, the primary and subcontractor workers simultaneously climbed to the same height with different demands. The two sit-ins do not demand the same wages. The subcontractor demanded the bargaining table itself with the primary contractor, while the primary contractor's regular workers demanded wages and institutional improvements befitting the shipbuilding boom. Yet the fact that both are on the same crane shows the class composition of this workplace as it is. The wages of the primary contractor's regular workers and the existence of the subcontractor workers are ultimately determined on the same ship.
On the same day, Chosun Ilbo summarized the second round of the Yellow Envelope Act. This is more important. For about six months after the law took effect, it was a period of contending over 'whether the primary contractor is the employer of the subcontractor.' Now that primary contractors are beginning to be recognized as employers, the issue has shifted — to what extent the primary contractor, now an employer, can respond during a subcontractor strike. Article 43 of the Labor Union Act stipulates that an employer cannot hire or replace workers 'not related to the relevant business' to perform work halted by a dispute. Before the Yellow Envelope Act, primary contractors were not recognized as employers of subcontractors, so they could bring in replacement workers without being subject to this provision. Now this provision, with 'employer' as its subject, is directed at primary contractors. The interpretive battle has begun over whether to view the primary and subcontractor as one 'relevant business' or as separate.
According to reports, LG Uplus devised a 'contingency operation plan' to deploy about 250 primary contractor workers as replacement personnel in preparation for a strike by its subsidiary and partner unions, and labor and management are disputing whether those 250 qualify as 'unrelated persons.' Management argues that since the primary and subcontractor form a single labor-management relationship, they cannot be viewed as separate only for the purpose of determining replacement work, while labor counters that because primary contractor technical staff and subsidiary technical staff actually do different work, allowing replacement work would nullify the right to strike. The words of Professor Park Ji-soon of Korea University precisely summarize this situation — the confusion caused by the Yellow Envelope Act has not even begun yet.
What must be seen here is not the technique of interpretation but the structure. The Yellow Envelope Act broadened the concept of employer. However, it did not touch the provision banning replacement work. It created the two separately and left the contradiction between them unattended. Thus, the bargaining rights granted by law are again put to the test in the face of management's counterattack of deploying replacement workers. It was precisely at this point that Branch Chief Seo Gwang-seok died. What entered the strike site at the CU Jinju Logistics Center was the management's replacement transport vehicles. That death coincided with the establishment of primary contractor bargaining, and 7% in transport fees and paid leave were won. Yet BGF Logis's logistics operating profit increased by 813% between 2022 and 2025, and during the same period, service fees rose 23% but drivers' fares rose 0.6%. The profits that went up did not come down. As long as the replacement work provision remains unchanged, the same vehicles will enter the next strike. What the union won by law, capital takes back through another provision of the law.
This issue needs to be examined down to the bottom of the concept. It is easy to get stuck on the words circular shareholding and holding company. The loop that closes from Samsung C&T to Samsung Life, from Samsung Life to Samsung Electronics, and from Samsung Electronics back to Samsung C&T — a structure that controls the whole with a minority stake. One can go further and ask: if Samsung Life buys those shares as treasury stocks, wouldn't Samsung Life also agree to reform? The answer is no. Treasury stocks have no voting rights. If those shares are bought and tied up, the voting rights disappear, and among the remaining shareholders, the proportion held by the owner family relatively increases. A method that appears to cut the loop while maintaining control — in fact, the solution the chaebol side wants is exactly this form. Therefore, unless it specifies 'how' to dismantle circular shareholding, the method of dismantling will be decided in favor of the owners.
Here the sharpest point is this. Separating financial affiliates from chaebols and who controls them after separation are different issues. Handing them over to foreign capital only deepens subordination. Nationalization and socialization are different. And this proposition applies equally to unification — if dismantling division leads to market expansion for South Korean capital, it is absorption unification; if cutting circular shareholding leads to expanded foreign ownership, it is deepened subordination; if nationalizing and distributing by bureaucrats, it is bureaucratic rent. In all three cases, the form changes but the class relations remain the same. Transition is not neutral. Who the organized class is at the moment of transition determines the character of that transition. Capital is always organized, and workers, if not organized, are dispersed.
Seo Gwang-seok died while engaging in joint and solidarity struggle. That is right. And that fact does not prove the legitimacy of solidarity struggle but shows what structure solidarity struggle must break through. The overlapping conditions of individual business classification, multi-tier subcontracting, and replacement transport drove him to death. If the primary contractor's union had stood together at the same workplace at the same time, would replacement vehicles have entered? It took seven months for the subcontractor's union to sit at the bargaining table, and in the meantime, BGF Logis sent 11 union members certified letters demanding 200 million won in damages. The fact that at Hanwha Ocean the primary and subcontractor climbed onto the same crane on the same day is the form of the actual answer to this question. As long as the law leaves the door open for replacement work, it is not the provision but the people standing together at the same height who close that door. Then, in the next strike, who will be standing before that door — the answer is not yet decided for either side.