The Unit of Permission

On November 5, AI-related stocks collapsed on the US New York stock market. The Dow fell 3.44 percent and the Nasdaq 5.52 percent. A day later, the Korean market followed, with the KOSPI closing at 5059.69, down 6.02 percent. Why does a promise not to build a single data center drag down the stock prices of semiconductor companies by more than 10 percent? This question is the core of this week. The answer lies in the order of the chain. Demand for AI facilities begins with power. If power is not approved, servers do not go up; if servers do not go up, there are no semiconductor orders; and if there are no orders, fab expansion plans become meaningless. So whoever holds the permits for data centers holds the future of Korean fabs.

Who came to hold those permits? In the midterm elections on the 3rd, Gina Hinojosa of Texas, Amy Acton of Ohio, and Kisha Lance Bottoms of Georgia were elected. All three campaigned on a temporary halt to new data center construction. Combined, the data center capacity of these three states is 130.5 gigawatts, or 37.7 percent of the entire United States. Texas alone has 606 facilities in operation or planned, at 93.1 gigawatts, or 26.9 percent of the country. According to The Information's tally, 34 of the 36 elected governors supported at least one form of data center regulation, and the winners in 12 states called for a halt to development. Bernie Sanders demanded an immediate nationwide moratorium and introduced related legislation.

Let us be precise here. This is not a movement demanding the abolition of capital. Hinojosa said she does not hate data centers, but loathes the way they skim the cream off Texas. Acton said she would wait until companies bear the full cost of power and water and meet environmental standards. The content of the demand is not the abolition of the business but the redistribution of costs. Yet the market was the first to notice that this redistribution actually shakes the schedule of capital accumulation. That is why stock prices moved first. The question of who bears the cost is a matter of interest rates, not ideology, so the market responds to it immediately.

In Korea, the same question is being raised in a much weaker form, but at the same point. On October 30, Rep. Han Jeong-ae and nine others proposed an amendment to the Building Act, which was submitted to the National Assembly on the 4th. It would classify data centers as an independent building use, require deliberation by the building committee before applying for a building permit if the scale exceeds a threshold set by presidential decree, such as the capacity of power receiving facilities, and require operators to hold a residents' briefing beforehand. The deliberation examines electromagnetic fields, noise and vibration, heat, fire risk, and effects on the power grid. It also added grounds to deny permission if a facility is unsuitable for residential or educational environments, regardless of the zoning district. The legislative notice period runs until the 12th.

What this clause targets is procedure. Under current law, a data center is a sub-use of broadcasting and communications facilities. So at the siting stage, impacts on the residential environment are not separately reviewed, and if statutory requirements are met, it is difficult for local governments to refuse permission on environmental grounds. Residents always learn of the problem after the permit is already under way. The projects pursued 50 meters from apartments in the Juam district of Gwacheon, 1 meter from row houses in Yangpyeong-dong, and the August 6 incident in Ichon-dong where most of the 200 residents attending the briefing walked out all came from this structure.

Yet what this amendment addresses is the permit procedure for individual buildings, while the total quantity of the problem lies in the grid. Of 195 applications for grid impact assessments for data centers in the capital region, only 4 were finally approved, an approval rate of 2.1 percent. What this number says is not that individual buildings' environmental review is the issue, but that the grid is already the bottleneck. About 90 percent of commercial data centers are concentrated in the capital region, and if 40 large centers are added there by 2028, power receiving capacity will reach 4.1 gigawatts. The capacity of the three major megaprojects the government is pushing cannot even be compared. SK Telecom 5 gigawatts, GS 2.4 gigawatts, Naver 1 gigawatt, 8.4 gigawatts in phase one by 2029, and up to 18.4 gigawatts by 2035. That is equivalent to 13 large nuclear power plants of 1.4 gigawatts each. The Honam semiconductor cluster alone, once all four fabs and partner companies are operating, will reach up to 6.3 gigawatts, the equivalent of six nuclear reactors.

Then the meaning of the amendment becomes clear. It is not a law to block data centers, but a law that sets, building by building, the points at which they can be blocked. Permits scatter into individual deliberations, while the grid, power demand, and regional burden are decided in total. The industry's demand for clear deliberation standards sounds reasonable. But once the standards become clear, operators calculate on top of them, split below them, and move outside them. That is how the three sites in Gwacheon seen earlier moved as if they were a single project. The same goes for the US moratorium. The conclusion Bloomberg pointed to was a forecast that it would unfold less as a full halt than as longer permitting procedures and more conditions for operators to bear.

Yet one new thing was confirmed this week. In the United States, the language of that total quantity passed through an election. In Korea, the authority to set standards still lies with the National Assembly standing committee and the enforcement decree, and the legislative notice for this bill runs until the 12th. In the meantime, US data center regulation changes the outlook for Korean semiconductor exports, and that export outlook in turn changes the conditions the Korean government cannot help but attach to special zones. While regulation becomes institution in the United States, in Korea the same demand is still being handled as a civil complaint about individual buildings. Which side first turns the demand to factor one's own country's grid and housing into the calculation into the language of permission is the question of this week.