Soviet Air Defence Forces lieutenant colonel who correctly dismissed the Oko false alarm and prevented nuclear war
The siren howled, but I just sat there for a few seconds, staring at the big, back-lit, red screen with the word 'launch' on it.
A Soviet Air Defence Forces lieutenant colonel. On 26 September 1983, while on duty at the Serpukhov-15 early-warning command centre, the Oko satellite system reported five US ICBMs had been launched, but Petrov judged that a first strike would involve hundreds of missiles, not five, and ground radar showed no confirmation, so he reported a system malfunction rather than an incoming attack. His decision prevented what could have become a Soviet retaliatory nuclear strike and earned him the title 'the man who saved the world.' He received neither disgrace nor reward for his actions, retired early in 1984, and lived in obscurity in a Moscow suburb until his death from pneumonia in 2017.
Activities and affiliations
- 1957–1967 Military command · Soviet Union · Military and defence
Career Timeline
- 1957Entered Kiev Radio-Technical School of the Air Defence Forces
- 1957–1967Served in Air Defence Forces, radar system maintenance
- 1967–1972Studied at Kiev Higher Engineering Radio-Technical College
- 1973Assigned to Serpukhov-15 early-warning command centre
- 1983.09.26Dismissed Oko false alarm, prevented retaliatory nuclear strike
- 1984Retired as lieutenant colonel
- 1984–1990sWorked at the institute that developed the early-warning system
Related historical events
The 1983 Early-Warning False Alarm and Nuclear Risk
On 26 September 1983, Oko, the satellite component of the Soviet early-warning system, warned of missile launches from the United States. Petrov, the duty officer at the Serpukhov-15 command centre, assessed the warning as false and reported that judgment up the chain of command. Nuclear-weapons specialist Pavel Podvig praises Petrov’s judgment while cautioning that the popular account of a lone officer preventing nuclear war is an exaggeration. The Soviet Union did not then maintain a launch-on-warning posture in which missiles would be fired solely on the basis of an alert; according to Podvig, it would have waited for confirmation of actual nuclear detonations before launching retaliatory missiles. The satellite warning was one element in a decision process involving several command levels and the top leadership. It is therefore impossible to say with certainty what outcome Petrov prevented. He did, however, insist to higher command that the computer-generated warning was false, a consequential contribution to reducing nuclear risk under pressure.