Arduous March (1990s)
고난의 행군 (1990년대)
The mass famine and economic crisis that struck the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the mid-to-late 1990s, and the name the authorities gave those years. The loss of Soviet aid, the floods of 1995–1996, the drought of 1997 and the collapse of the public distribution system together killed hundreds of thousands to millions through starvation and hunger-related disease. The name comes from the story of a hundred-day march made by Kim Il Sung's anti-Japanese guerrillas through Manchuria in bitter cold and hunger in the winter of 1938–1939.
In depth
Origin of the phrase and the official dates
The "Arduous March" was originally an episode of official DPRK history: from December 1938 to March 1939 the unit led by Kim Il Sung is said to have marched for a hundred-odd days through Manchuria in bitter cold and hunger to evade Japanese punitive operations. The DPRK speaks of three Arduous Marches: the guerrilla years, the months around the "August faction incident" of 1956, and 1996–1997. The 1996 New Year joint editorial told all party members, soldiers and people to live and fight "in the spirit of the Arduous March created in the Paektu forests." According to an analysis of Rodong Sinmun by the Korea Institute for National Unification, the DPRK designated 1996–1997 as the years of the Arduous March, raised the slogan of a "socialist forced march" from 1998, and in the 2000 New Year joint editorial said the march had entered the stage of a "double-quick march." English Wikipedia dates the slogan to a propaganda campaign of 1993, while the editorial analysis finds it emphasised from 1996. Outside studies usually date the famine to 1994–1999 or 1995–2000.
Causes
From the late 1980s the Soviet Union demanded repayment of past aid, and its dissolution in 1991 ended aid and trade concessions, cheap oil above all. As energy imports fell by 75 percent, agriculture dependent on electric pump irrigation and chemical fertiliser collapsed. China for a time supplied 77 percent of fuel imports and 68 percent of food imports, but cut its aid sharply in 1993. The great flood of July–August 1995 swept away 1.5 million tons of grain and the underground emergency reserves, and floods in 1996 and drought in 1997 followed. Natsios names the withdrawal of Soviet and Chinese food subsidies and the cumulative effect of collective farming as causes. The public distribution system, on which 62 percent of the population relied entirely, fed only 6 percent by 1997. Natsios argues that from 1994 the authorities in effect gave up the northeast and from 1996 fed only Pyongyang, workers in critical industries and cadres.
Estimates of deaths
Estimates vary widely between sources. The DPRK authorities once announced 220,000 deaths for 1995–1998, and Statistics Korea estimated 268,000 in 1999. Goodkind and West estimated 600,000 to 1 million for 1996–2000, and the US Census Bureau, comparing the 1993 and 2008 censuses in 2011, 500,000 to 600,000 for 1993–2000. At the other end, Hwang Jang-yop claimed 3 million on the basis of local party reports, and Natsios 2–3 million for 1994–1998. Census-based estimates depend on the reliability of North Korean statistics and remain disputed.
Links across borders
The crisis spread across borders. China switched trade to hard currency after recognising Seoul in 1992, but to prevent a flood of refugees into its northeast it sent around 500,000 tons of grain, 1.3 million tons of oil and 23 million tons of coal in 1994–1995, nearly half of it free. The DPRK asked Japan for rice in May 1995; Japan agreed in June to 300,000 tons (150,000 on deferred payment and 150,000 as a grant through the Red Cross) and added 200,000 tons on deferred payment in October, 500,000 tons in all that year, while South Korea agreed at rice talks in Beijing in June to give 150,000 tons free. Only afterwards, in August, did the DPRK formally request humanitarian aid from the international community. From 1996 the United States shipped food through the World Food Programme, and by 1999, at nearly 600,000 tons, it was the largest donor. Donors wanted to monitor distribution on the ground, however, and the authorities refused, and disputes continued over whether aid was diverted to cadres or the army. Studies have found that at the height of the famine aid failed to reach the worst-hit regions.
Politics and society in the crisis
The authorities banned the word famine, set up the Simhwajo to hunt down those responsible, and in 1997 publicly executed the official in charge of agriculture, So Kwan-hui, as a spy. Where rations stopped, people survived through markets and smuggling, and up to 250,000 crossed into China. Kim Jong Il rebuilt the system in these years through military-first politics, which put the army in front. The Arduous March became the turning point at which North Korean society moved from state rations to markets, and it remains the reference point the leadership invokes whenever it speaks of crisis.