1·21 사태 (一·二一事態) · 1968.01.21–31

Blue House raid

1·21 사태

The raid of 21 January 1968 in which thirty-one officers of Unit 124, under the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Ministry of National Defence of the Korean People's Army, infiltrated Seoul as far as the presidential residence, the Blue House, to kill President Park Chung Hee. A firefight broke out at the Jahamun checkpoint and the attack failed; most of the raiders were killed and Kim Shin-jo was captured. The seizure of the Pueblo followed two days later. The South set up the Homeland Reserve Forces and Unit 684, and in 1972 Kim Il Sung told Lee Hu-rak that the raid had been the work of left-wing adventurists.

In depth

The raid

In April 1967 the Ministry of National Defence formed Unit 124, a guerrilla special force, under its Reconnaissance Bureau. Some 2,400 men picked from ordinary and reconnaissance units trained at eight bases around Yonsan and Sangwon. On 2 January 1968 an order came to prepare raids on the Blue House, the US embassy, the Army headquarters and other targets; on the 13th the head of the Reconnaissance Bureau, Kim Chong-tae, fixed the Blue House as the target. The team was made up of thirty-one officers from the Hamgyong provinces.

On the night of 17 January the raiders cut through the fence in the sector of the US 2nd Infantry Division and crossed the Demilitarized Zone. On the 19th, at their camp on Sambong Mountain near Beopwon-ri, they ran into four woodcutting brothers named Woo and let them go rather than kill them; the brothers went straight to the police. The team entered Seoul on the night of the 20th and regrouped at Seungga-sa temple. With security tightening, they changed into the uniforms of the ROK 26th Infantry Division and marched on the Blue House posing as a unit returning from patrol. At about ten on the night of the 21st the Jongno police chief, Choi Gyu-sik, stopped them at the Segeomjeong-Jahamun checkpoint and was shot dead. After the firefight the raiders scattered, one of them throwing a grenade into a passing bus. Troops and police began a huge sweep on the 22nd, and Kim Shin-jo was captured hiding in a house near Inwang Mountain.

Casualties

The figures differ by source. The Encyclopedia of Korean Culture says 28 raiders had been killed by 31 January and that the operation ended on the assumption that the other two had fled. Later English and Korean accounts say 29 died or killed themselves, Kim Shin-jo was captured and one man, Pak Jae-gyong, made it back to the North. For the South, English Wikipedia gives 26 killed, including about 24 civilians, 66 wounded and four Americans killed; Korean Wikipedia gives 30 dead and 52 wounded, civilians included.

Why

In October 1966 Kim Il Sung declared that unification could not be delayed by one hour and called the liberation of South Korea a national duty. After the South Korean elections of 1967 the Pyongyang leadership concluded that Park's domestic opposition no longer threatened him, and American forces were tied down in Vietnam. As Bernd Schaefer reconstructs it from East German records, Pyongyang's aim was to kill Park, set off a military coup and a popular uprising, and intervene if "patriotic forces" took power and asked for help. At the time Korea presented the raid as a struggle of South Korean armed partisans, denied involvement and pressed its allies to say the same.

Responsibility

In May 1972 Kim Il Sung told the director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Lee Hu-rak, on his visit to Pyongyang that the raid had been carried out by left-wing adventurists without his or the party's intent, and that those responsible had been punished. Coupled with the condemnation of Defence Minister Kim Chang-bong and Ho Pong-hak, head of the general bureau for the South, as "warlord bureaucrats" at the People's Army party committee plenum of January 1969, and with the testimony of the defector Hwang Il-ho, this was widely accepted in the South as fact. Ko Myeong-gyun, however, questions whether the military could have planned and carried out a provocation on this scale without Kim Il Sung's approval, and finds Hwang's testimony hard to credit unless the circumstances bear it out.

What it left in the South

When the United Nations Command condemned the infiltration of Seoul, together with the seizure of the Pueblo two days earlier, at the Military Armistice Commission in Panmunjom on 24 January, the Korean side answered that the South was not a party to the armistice and that the raid was therefore no matter for the meeting. The government hurried to create the Homeland Reserve Forces against the North's irregular warfare. The Korea Army Academy at Yeongcheon and the combat police were founded, military drill was introduced in high schools and universities, and Inwang and Bugak mountains and the road in front of the Blue House were closed to the public. The United States added 100 million dollars in military aid. On 1 April 1968 the Korean Central Intelligence Agency set up a thirty-one-man special unit on Silmido island, the so-called Unit 684, to assassinate Kim Il Sung. When the mission was cancelled as North-South relations thawed, twenty-four of its men killed their guards on 23 August 1971 and fought their way into Seoul; most died and the four survivors were executed. Kim Shin-jo stayed in the South and became a pastor in 1997.

Related people

Related historical events

Sources

  1. encykorea.aks.ac.kr
  2. Wikipedia (EN)
  3. Wikipedia (KO)
  4. wilsoncenter.org
  5. nk.ac.kr
  6. encykorea.aks.ac.kr
  7. Wikipedia (EN)