Autumn Uprising of 1946
10월 항쟁 (1946)
The popular uprising that began in Daegu on 1 October 1946 and spread across Korea south of the 38th parallel until the end of the year. After police shot a worker dead outside Daegu station during the September general strike, townspeople surrounded and occupied the police headquarters the next day, and the military government declared martial law and put the rising down. Towns demanded food rations, villages an end to grain requisitions and a 30 per cent ceiling on rents, and both the punishment of collaborators and the transfer of power to the people's committees. It is also called the Daegu 1 October Incident or the October People's Uprising; the name varies with the judgement.
In depth
After it was put down in Daegu the rising spread from 3 October through most of North Gyeongsang (Seongju, Chilgok, Yeongcheon) and then South Gyeongsang (Tongyeong, Jinju, Masan). It reached Chungcheong in early October, Gyeonggi, Hwanghae and Gangwon by late October, South Jeolla from late October to early November and North Jeolla in mid-December, covering the whole south except Jeju Island. Crowds attacked and occupied police stations and township offices and assaulted policemen, officials of the military government and right-wing figures. The military government used US troops, police and right-wing youth groups to suppress it, and reprisals followed. English Wikipedia gives a toll of 92 policemen, 163 civil servants, 116 civilians and 240 participants killed, and 2,609 arrests.
A joint Korean-American conference of the military government and centrist leaders named as causes popular hatred of the police, collaborators inside the military government, corruption among some officials, and agitation, and recommended action against collaborators. Its character is disputed. The military government and the right saw a "riot" staged by the Communist Party, and the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture's entry on the rice collection order likewise speaks of a peasant riot instigated by the party; the same encyclopedia's entry on the event itself calls it an uprising that criticised the failures of the military government and demanded redress. The outcome is not in doubt: with the leaders of the people's committees and peasant unions arrested or in hiding, the left lost much of its base in the provinces, while the right built up its organisations by taking part in the suppression.
Why Daegu? In the New History of Korea Jung Hae-gu gives three reasons. The first is the returnees. North Gyeongsang had 312,000 people who had come back after liberation and were destitute, more than any province except South Gyeongsang and South Chungcheong, and a newspaper reported that a hundred a day were leaving Daegu station again for want of food. The second is food. The military government introduced the compulsory purchase of rice in February 1946 and in March banned the unlicensed transport and free sale of rice in Daegu. When the cholera quarantine of that summer also cut the roads around the city, townspeople who had lived on small amounts of food brought in from the nearby countryside were hit. In the countryside the provincial military government used the whole police force for the summer grain collection of 1946, reached 74.4 per cent of its target and sometimes jailed peasants who would not deliver. The third is the strength of the local left. The Daegu left had acted flexibly enough to form joint bodies with the right three times, had suffered less repression and had kept its influence. Jung does not think, however, that the left intended the strike to grow into an uprising.
In North Gyeongsang about 320,000 people took part in nineteen of the province's twenty-two counties. The demand heard most often was the removal of the pro-Japanese, the police first of all. To put the rising down the authorities sent in, beside some 3,000 provincial police, 1,100 police from South Chungcheong, North Chungcheong and Gyeonggi, the constabulary, American troops and right-wing youth groups from Seoul. In North Gyeongsang alone several hundred of the crowd were killed and more than 7,000 arrested, and some dozens of police died. These figures differ in scope and standard from the national count given above. The end of the uprising is also dated differently: 8 December in Jeonju, or the middle of December in North Jeolla.
How far it was directed from beyond the 38th parallel is disputed. The "new tactics" that the Communist Party of Korea had adopted in July called for reforms like those in northern Korea, the transfer of power to the people's committees and an anti-American movement in the Far East in liaison with the Chinese and Japanese communist parties. According to an account citing the diary of Terentii Shtykov, the Soviet authorities in the north gave the party two million yen at the time of the September strike and more than three million yen in three further payments during the uprising, together with guidelines for action. Yet the rising spread differently from region to region. In South Gyeongsang it was scattered and isolated, and only near the 38th parallel in north-western Gyeonggi did small groups strike at police stations and withdraw to the north. In March 2010 the Truth and Reconciliation Commission defined the event as one in which civilians with grievances and part of the left rose against the police and the administration when, amid severe food shortage, the military government employed pro-Japanese officials, delayed land reform and enforced grain collection by coercion, and it acknowledged the responsibility of the state.
Many of the surviving participants became "mountain people", climbing into the hills by day to escape the police and coming down to the villages at night. Jung concludes that what remained to be done under the military government after the uprising was put down was the removal, by a state power that put anti-communism first, of the left-wing elements still present in society.