Операция «Кольцо» · 1943.01.10–02.02

Operation Ring (1943)

고리 작전 (1943)

Operation Ring (Koltso) was the Soviet Don Front's operation of 10 January to 2 February 1943 that destroyed the German Sixth Army and other Axis troops encircled at Stalingrad, the final phase of the Battle of Stalingrad. First planned in December 1942, it was postponed when the 2nd Guards Army, meant to be its main force, was turned south against Manstein's relief offensive; Don Front commander Rokossovsky and Stavka representative Voronov then reworked the plan and directed it. After a surrender ultimatum was rejected on 8-9 January, the offensive split the pocket in two on 26 January; Paulus surrendered with the southern group on 31 January and the northern group on 2 February, and about 91,000 men were taken prisoner.

In depth

How was Operation Ring first planned?

On 23 November 1942 Operation Uranus encircled the German Sixth Army and part of the 4th Panzer Army around Stalingrad. From the next day the Soviets tried to break up the pocket on the move and failed. As Stavka representative Vasilevsky admitted in his memoirs, Soviet intelligence put the encircled force at 85,000 to 90,000 men, when in fact it was over 300,000.

On 4 December the Stavka decided to send the newly formed, elite 2nd Guards Army (commander Rodion Malinovsky) from its reserve to the Don Front as the main force for destroying the pocket; moving it alone took 165 trains. Don Front commander Konstantin Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs that his repeated reports that the task could not be done without regrouping and reinforcement had brought this decision about, and that "everyone took heart". Vasilevsky and Rokossovsky began a new plan on the night of 5 December. The plan sent to the Stavka on 9 December had three stages: first destroy four infantry divisions west of the Rossoshka River; then have the 2nd Guards Army strike south-east toward Voroponovo, with the Stalingrad Front's 64th Army attacking toward it, to cut off the southern part of the pocket; and finally have all the armies strike toward Gumrak to finish the enemy. On 11 December the Stavka merged the first two stages, required them to be complete by 23 December and set the start for 18 December.

Why was it postponed, and how did Rokossovsky see it?

When Erich von Manstein's Army Group Don attacked toward the pocket from Kotelnikovo on 12 December, Vasilevsky asked Stalin to turn the arriving 2nd Guards Army south to the Myshkova River and to postpone the destruction of the pocket for a while. According to Rokossovsky, Vasilevsky discussed this with Stalin on the high-frequency telephone in his presence, and Stalin asked Rokossovsky directly what he thought. Rokossovsky said no. Vasilevsky insisted on the transfer, saying that Stalingrad Front commander Yeryomenko doubted he could hold the enemy offensive with his present forces, and Stalin told Rokossovsky that his idea of finishing the pocket first was bold and deserved attention but was too risky in the circumstances. When Rokossovsky said that without the 2nd Guards Army the Don Front could not destroy the pocket, Stalin agreed to suspend the operation and promised to send the artillery commander Nikolai Voronov to help with artillery and ammunition. "So we were back where we had been," Rokossovsky wrote, "only with still thinner formations." At 22:30 on 14 December the Stavka directed that Operation Ring be postponed and the 2nd Guards Army sent south.

The two men saw the decision differently to the end. Rokossovsky wrote that, knowing he might be accused of hindsight, he had argued even then for using the 2nd Guards Army first against the pocket and, if the relief force came close, turning the entire 21st Army against it; that bold course would have opened great prospects on the whole southern wing, and "the game was worth the candle". Vasilevsky recorded that after the war Rokossovsky often told him he had been wrong: with the 2nd Guards Army, Rokossovsky said, he would have finished off Paulus's starving, freezing divisions before Manstein arrived. Vasilevsky himself held that turning the army south was the most correct decision, since even a slight delay would have put the Soviets at a disadvantage.

Who drew up the new plan?

On 19 December the Stavka sent Voronov to the Don and Stalingrad Fronts as Vasilevsky's deputy and its own representative, with orders to submit by 21 December a plan to break through and destroy the pocket within five or six days. According to Rokossovsky, once the 2nd Guards Army was gone the idea stayed the same but the plan was reworked around a single main blow from west to east to split the pocket in two, instead of two blows. The plan went to the Stavka on 27 December, and a directive of 28 December signed by Stalin and Zhukov had it revised again so that the Sixth Army would be cut in two before it was destroyed. On 1 January 1943 Vasilevsky moved to the Voronezh Front to prepare the offensives on the upper Don; in his memoirs he credits the preparation and conduct of Operation Ring to Rokossovsky and Voronov.

According to Russian Wikipedia, at the start the Don Front had about 282,000 men, 6,860 guns and mortars, 1,656 rocket launchers, 257 tanks and some 300 aircraft, against about 250,000 encircled Germans with 4,130 guns and mortars and 300 tanks. Inside the pocket the Germans had strengthened their positions on former Soviet defence lines and placed their reserve divisions so that they formed a second ring within the first.

How was the surrender ultimatum rejected?

According to Rokossovsky, the idea of an ultimatum came from the Don Front command. He discussed it with Aleksei Antonov of the General Staff, and Stalin liked it and approved the text with small changes. The ultimatum, signed by Voronov and Rokossovsky, guaranteed the safety of all prisoners, care for the sick and wounded, retention of personal belongings, normal rations and repatriation after the war to any country they wished.

On the morning of 8 January the envoy Major A. M. Smyslov and the interpreter Captain N. D. Dyatlenko went toward the German lines with a trumpeter and a white flag, but were fired on and had to turn back. In a second attempt on the morning of 9 January the envoys reached a German command post, but the German command refused to accept the ultimatum, saying it already knew its contents from the radio broadcasts. Paulus asked Hitler for permission to surrender and was refused.

How did the offensive proceed?

On the morning of 10 January the Soviets attacked after the largest bombardment of the war up to that point, fired by nearly 7,000 guns, mortars and launchers. The main blow fell to Pavel Batov's 65th Army, and Rokossovsky and Voronov watched the opening from Batov's observation post. The Germans counter-attacked hard with tanks and infantry, and according to English Wikipedia the Soviets lost 26,000 men and over half their tanks in the first three days. Still the pocket shrank. In mid-January the Germans lost Pitomnik, their main airfield, narrowing the route for evacuating wounded and for air supply, and by about 17 January the western half of the pocket was gone.

From 17 to 22 January the Soviets paused to regroup. Meanwhile, on 19 January, Paulus asked permission for an organised breakout to the south, and Hitler reserved the decision for himself. When the attack resumed on 22 January the Gumrak airfield fell, after which supplies came only by parachute. The same day Rokossovsky again offered surrender, and Hitler ordered the army to fight on. On 25 January LI Corps commander Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach told his division commanders to decide for themselves whether to surrender and was relieved by Paulus.

On the morning of 26 January units of Ivan Chistyakov's 21st Army, attacking from the west, met the 13th Guards Rifle Division of Vasily Chuikov's 62nd Army north of the Mamayev Kurgan, and the pocket was split into a northern and a southern part. The Don Front staff then reckoned the remaining Germans at 110,000 to 120,000 and their losses from 10 to 25 January at more than 100,000. On 28 January the southern part was split again.

How did Paulus surrender?

On 30 January Hitler promoted Paulus to field marshal, reminding him that no German field marshal had ever been taken prisoner. On 31 January Soviet troops reached the Sixth Army headquarters in the basement of the Univermag department store in the city centre and negotiated terms with the chief of staff, Schmidt. Paulus took no direct part; in captivity he denied having surrendered, claiming he had been taken by surprise, and said he had no authority to order the northern pocket to give up. That evening he was brought to Don Front headquarters to face Rokossovsky and Voronov. According to Vasilevsky, when they asked why he had not laid down his arms earlier, Paulus answered that Germany's strategic calculations required it.

The Soviets then concentrated their fire on the northern pocket around the tractor factory. Early on 2 February the XI Corps commander Karl Strecker ordered all fighting to cease and weapons to be destroyed, and organised resistance ended.

What were the prisoners and losses?

According to Russian Wikipedia, about 140,000 Germans were killed and 91,545 taken prisoner, among them 24 generals and over 2,500 officers. Twenty German divisions capitulated, along with two Romanian divisions. The Don Front reported capturing 5,762 guns, 744 aircraft, 166 tanks and more than 80,000 motor vehicles between 10 January and 2 February. On Soviet losses, Krivosheev's statistics give the Don Front 25,727 irrecoverable losses (killed, missing and the like) and 78,240 medical casualties (wounded and sick) from 1 January to 15 February 1943, weeks in which nearly all the fighting took place during Operation Ring.

Many of the prisoners had already spent two and a half months starving in the pocket and suffered from frostbite and typhus. Of the roughly 91,000 held around Beketovka, 27,078 had died by 10 June 1943; in March the Soviet leadership sent a special commission from Moscow, which moved healthy prisoners to other regions and set up seven hospitals. English-language sources put the number of Stalingrad prisoners who returned alive to Germany after the war at about 5,000.

Operation Ring ended the Battle of Stalingrad. The seven Soviet armies that had been tied down round the pocket were freed for other fronts.

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Sources

  1. Wikipedia (RU)
  2. britannica.com
  3. Wikipedia (RU)
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  7. Wikipedia (RU)
  8. Wikipedia (EN)
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