paradigm · 1962–present

Paradigm (Kuhn)

패러다임 (쿤)

A concept used by the American historian and philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962): the model achievements that a community of scientists accepts in common for a time and that settle what counts as a problem and how it is to be solved. Kuhn held that science does not develop by piling up facts one on another, but changes through "normal science" under one paradigm, a crisis brought on by accumulating anomalies, and a "scientific revolution" in which the community switches to a new paradigm. He argued that successive paradigms differ so much that no common measure can be applied to both, and so dealt a heavy blow to the picture of science held by falsificationism and logical positivism.

In depth

Does science develop by piling up facts one on another?

School textbooks usually draw the history of science as a single line: people of old did not know much, and as observation and experiment grew, errors were corrected one by one until we reached today's knowledge. Before The Structure of Scientific Revolutions appeared, the philosophy of science saw things much the same way. Scientific progress was "development-by-accumulation" of accepted facts and theories.

The American Thomas Kuhn came to doubt this picture. He dated the genesis of his book to 1947. As a graduate student at Harvard University he was asked to teach science to humanities undergraduates through historical case studies, and for the first time read old scientific documents. Aristotle's Physics was astonishingly unlike Newton's work in its concepts of matter and motion. At first Aristotle seemed a dreadfully bad physical scientist, but his reasoning only made sense once Kuhn knew the scientific conventions of the time. Kuhn concluded that Aristotle's concepts were not "bad Newton", just different.

The book that grew out of this insight was The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published by the University of Chicago Press in 1962. In it Kuhn argued that science moves between periods of "normal science", marked by conceptual continuity and cumulative progress, and periods of "revolutionary science" that interrupt them. The book was a landmark in the history, philosophy and sociology of science, and the word "paradigm" that he gave to its core concept spread into every field in the second half of the twentieth century.

What did Kuhn mean by a paradigm?

Kuhn wrote in his preface that he came to recognise the role of paradigms while wondering why natural scientists do not quarrel endlessly over fundamentals as psychologists or sociologists do. His definition runs: "These I take to be universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners."

These I take to be universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions for a community of practitioners.

A paradigm is not just one theory. It settles what to measure, which experiments are meaningful and what terms to use. According to Kuhn, the operations and measurements a scientist performs in the laboratory are not simply "the given" of experience; they are selected because they promise opportunity for the fruitful elaboration of an accepted paradigm. Scientists with different paradigms therefore carry out different experiments. Kuhn explained this point with Norwood Russell Hanson's concept of "theory-ladenness": the same phenomenon is interpreted differently depending on the prevailing theory.

Critics pointed out that Kuhn used the word paradigm in too many senses. Kuhn replied to them in the postscript he added to the second edition in 1969. In the early 1970s he called the paradigm in the broad sense a "disciplinary matrix" and the concrete solutions to problems "exemplars". Exemplars are the problems and solutions that students learn from the start: for a physicist, the inclined plane and Kepler's laws of planetary motion, or today the harmonic oscillator and the hydrogen atom.

What stages lead from normal science to a scientific revolution?

Kuhn divided scientific change into several phases. The first, which happens only once, is the pre-paradigm phase. Incompatible and incomplete theories compete, and since there is no common body of facts that can be taken for granted, research takes the form of lengthy books. When the field gravitates to one framework and reaches wide consensus on methods, terminology and promising experiments, the old schools disappear, and those unable to adapt are isolated.

The second phase is "normal science". Scientists solve puzzles within the dominant paradigm. Kuhn said that scientists spend most of their careers on such puzzle-solving. Because the past successes of the established paradigm give them confidence that a solution exists, they pursue even hard problems with great tenacity. But as research proceeds, "anomalies" that the existing framework struggles to explain come to light. Most are dismissed as errors of observation or resolved by small adjustments. Kuhn's example is Alexis Clairaut, who in 1750, after sixty years of failed attempts, accounted accurately for the precession of the Moon's orbit using Newtonian theory: a case where confidence in the established framework was eventually vindicated.

The third phase is crisis. When a paradigm proves chronically unable to account for anomalies, the community enters a crisis. Even then scientists do not abandon the established paradigm until a credible alternative is available, for, according to Kuhn, to lose faith in the solvability of the problems would in effect mean ceasing to be a scientist. A bold few in the community embark on "revolutionary science", questioning assumptions that had seemed obvious, and a candidate paradigm emerges. At first it is full of anomalies and the majority oppose it. Kuhn stressed that they should: a scientific community needs both bold and conservative individuals.

The fourth phase is the paradigm shift, the scientific revolution. The basic assumptions of the field are re-examined and a new paradigm is established. In the fifth phase normal science resumes under the new paradigm. Kuhn's examples include Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry replacing the phlogiston theory, Einstein's theory of relativity replacing classical Newtonian physics and, treated in most detail, the Copernican turn. Kuhn held that Copernicus's Sun-centred system at first gave no more accurate predictions than the Ptolemaic system, and that his contemporaries were right to reject it. What made it credible were Galileo's new ideas of motion and Kepler's elliptical orbits, and Newton completed the shift by uniting the two in a single theory of motion. After a revolution the textbooks are rewritten, and the history of science too is rewritten as an inevitable process leading to the current framework.

Why are different paradigms hard to compare?

Kuhn's most controversial claim is "incommensurability". The paradigms before and after a shift are so different that the new one cannot be proven or disproven by the rules of the old one, and vice versa. What changes is not one theory but the definitions of terms, the way the subject is seen, which questions count as valid and what is used to decide truth. Kuhn held that no impartial language can be constructed for a neutral comparison of competing paradigms, because the very words used have different meanings within each paradigm. Adherents of different paradigms therefore end up talking past one another.

Kuhn compared this with a "Gestalt switch", like a picture that can be seen as a duck or as a rabbit. Just as one sees a different figure in the same lines all at once, a paradigm shift happens all at once or not at all. He even wrote that the proponents of competing paradigms in some sense practise their trades "in different worlds". Another example he gave: Newtonian mass is conserved while Einstein's mass is convertible into energy, so the two words do not refer to the same thing.

The claim was aimed squarely at falsificationism. According to Kuhn, observations meant to falsify a theory themselves belong to one of the paradigms being compared and so cannot serve as the judge. In practice scientists consider a theory falsified only when a credible alternative is available; without one they keep to the established framework. Only after a shift do the textbooks write that the old theory was falsified.

The criticism was fierce. According to German Wikipedia, Kuhn's concept of paradigm was widely taken up, but the incommensurability hypothesis was practically not accepted. Carl Kordig argued that rival theories share a level of observation and so can be compared, and Hartry Field analysed in 1973 how the reference of terms like "mass" is indeterminate even within a single theory. Many cast Kuhn as a relativist. Kuhn rejected such readings. In the postscript to the second edition he said that even an observer who did not know the order of a series of theories could reconstruct it, because the later a theory, the better it is as an instrument for solving puzzles, and added: "That is not a relativist's position, and it displays the sense in which I am a convinced believer in scientific progress."

That is not a relativist's position, and it displays the sense in which I am a convinced believer in scientific progress.

Why did Popper and his colleagues object?

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was soon criticised by colleagues in the history and philosophy of science. In 1965 a special symposium on the book was held at an International Colloquium on the Philosophy of Science at Bedford College, London, chaired by Karl Popper. The papers, together with further essays that were mostly critical, appeared in 1970 as Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave. Kuhn replied that his critics' readings were so far from his own understanding that he was tempted to posit the existence of "two Thomas Kuhns".

Several essays in the volume questioned whether normal science exists at all. Paul Feyerabend remarked that Kuhn's normal science fitted organised crime as well as it fitted science. Popper wrote that the very idea of turning to sociology, psychology or the history of science to learn about the aims and progress of science was surprising and disappointing. Stephen Toulmin held that revisions in science happen much more often and much less dramatically than Kuhn's picture allows, and Hanson criticised Kuhn's theory as circular and therefore unfalsifiable.

Lakatos tried to bridge the conflict. He thought Kuhn had handed revolutions over to an irrational "psychology of discovery", and proposed the methodology of scientific research programmes, which keeps Popper's logic while explaining how science really does not give up theories easily in the face of anomalies. Feyerabend went the other way: arguing that no methodology could contain the history of science, he moved on to epistemological anarchism.

How far did the concept of paradigm spread?

As it happens, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions first appeared as a volume of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, published by the logical positivists. Kuhn had consulted the leading positivist Rudolf Carnap about the publication. Yet the book set off the "historical turn" in the philosophy of science against positivism: the movement that takes the history of science as data for the philosophy of science. The philosopher Robert Solomon noted that Kuhn's views have often been said to have an affinity with Hegel's, and they have often been compared with those of Michel Foucault.

The first field to claim descent from Kuhn's ideas was the sociology of scientific knowledge. Sociologists such as Harry Collins and Steven Shapin drew on Kuhn's emphasis on non-evidential community factors in scientific development to criticise logical empiricism, which had discouraged inquiry into the social side of scientific communities. They went further and argued that scientific judgement is determined by social factors such as professional interests and political ideologies. The idea had a forerunner. In a book of 1935 the Polish microbiologist Ludwik Fleck held that the exchange of ideas forms a "thought collective" and developed the first system of the sociology of scientific knowledge. Kuhn read the book in 1950 and wrote a foreword to its 1979 edition.

Economics and political science also described themselves in Kuhn's terms. Neoclassical economists claimed to have been at the stage of normal science for a very long time, and in the 1970s post-Keynesians denied the coherence of the neoclassical paradigm. In 1974 the book was the second most used in political science courses on scope and methods. In the Soviet Union too the book was translated, appearing in 1975 from Progress Publishers in Moscow in the series "Logic and Methodology of Science". In the late 1990s "paradigm shift" became a buzzword of marketing talk, so worn that it was sometimes seen as devoid of content.

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Sources

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