Ecosocialism: The Class Political Economy of the Climate Crisis — Part 5 (Final): Climate Politics in South Korea — Possibilities and Tasks of the System-Transition Movement

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Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-04-24

The series "Ecosocialism: The Class Political Economy of the Climate Crisis" — final installment (5/5)

Part 1: Why Capitalism Structurally Produces the Ecological Crisis (Metabolic Rift)

Part 2: Actually Existing Socialism and Ecology — the Failure of the USSR, the Cuban Experiment

Part 3: Degrowth or Green New Deal — the Class Politics of Two Paths

Part 4: The Contours of an Alternative — Ecological Planned Economy, Energy Publicization, Food Sovereignty

Part 5: Climate Politics in South Korea — Possibilities and Tasks of the System-Transition Movement ← you are here

This series began from theory. It examined why capitalism structurally produces the ecological crisis (Part 1), how actually existing socialism also failed to escape that trap (Part 2), what class alternatives are implied by the debate between degrowth and the Green New Deal (Part 3), and what contours the positive alternative proposed by ecosocialism has (Part 4).

The final installment descends to the ground of South Korea. When the theoretical terrain is brought into contact with the concrete realities of South Korean climate politics, what comes into view? How close is South Korea's climate justice movement to "system transition," and what limits and tasks does it face?

1. The Terrain of South Korean Climate Politics: Three Strata

South Korean climate politics proceeds simultaneously on three strata. Seen separately, each stratum appears incomplete, but it is the interaction of the three strata that produces the real dynamism of the movement.

Stratum one — state- and corporate-led carbon neutrality: Since the Moon Jae-in government's "2050 carbon neutrality" declaration in 2020, the South Korean state has adopted formal carbon-neutrality targets. Yet in August 2024 the Constitutional Court issued a nonconformity decision on the mid- to long-term reduction-target clause of Article 8 of the Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality — on the grounds that the post-2030 targets were insufficient and unclear. This decision was a judicial confirmation of the formalistic character of the state's carbon-neutrality policy.

Under the Lee Jae-myung government, the situation has grown more complicated. Citing the electricity demand of the "AI data center and semiconductor industries," the government has announced a plan to push ahead with new nuclear power plants. The Climate Justice Alliance immediately denounced this: "Face directly the climate injustice concealed by the 'rosy future growth engine' of the AI and semiconductor industries." On the Semiconductor Special Act, too, it urged the exercise of the presidential veto, insisting that "climate justice is the people's livelihood."

The core problem with state-led carbon neutrality is as taken up in Part 4 — a technological transition that does not touch the rate of profit only becomes a new opportunity for accumulation by capital. South Korea's situation, in which 90 percent of renewable-energy power plants are privately owned, illustrates this well.

Stratum two — the formation of labor-climate solidarity: One remarkable feature of the South Korean climate movement is that labor-climate solidarity is being substantively formed. Founded in 2021, the Climate Justice Alliance for System Transition (hereafter the Climate Justice Alliance) has grown into a solidarity body of 81 organizations. At its core are labor actors, including the Public and Transport Workers' Union, the Korea Power Generation Industry Workers' Union, and the Nonregular Power Workers' Union.

The "Korea Power Generation Corporation Act," advanced by the Climate Justice Alliance in the National Assembly in March 2026, is a practical product of this solidarity. Taking as its occasion the successive suspension of projects by private offshore-wind companies (February 2026), the alliance gave formal expression to the "failure of a transition left to the market" and demanded the integration of the five power-generation companies and the expansion of public renewable energy. This is a case in which the demand for "energy publicization" examined in Part 4 has been converted in South Korea into a concrete legislative movement.

The participation of nonregular power-plant workers is also important. "Power plants without nonregular workers — public renewable-energy power plants — are the just transition." This slogan is a declaration that the climate transition will not be separated from labor rights. The closure of coal-fired plants threatens the livelihoods of nonregular subcontract workers; a just transition must presuppose a plan that absorbs them into the public renewable-energy sector as regular workers.

Stratum three — the radicalization of system-transition discourse: The Climate Justice Alliance explicitly names the "capitalist growth system" as the cause and raises "system transition" as its goal. This clearly differentiates it from the South Korean mainstream environmental movement. Insofar as the roster of participating organizations includes not only the Progressive Party, the Labor Party, and the Justice Party but also Forward Toward Socialism, the Climate Justice Alliance is a space in which a broad progressive-left coalition has been combined through the medium of climate.

The 2026 "System-Transition Movement Forum" and the "Planning Roundtable of the Solidarity Council for Great Social Transformation" are attempts to construct a logic of transformation for society as a whole beyond simple climate-response demands. As the discussion title "A Strategy of Climate Politics against the Growthist Development Speed Campaign" shows, the principal front today is a head-on collision with the Lee Jae-myung government's AI- and semiconductor-led growth strategy.

2. The Class Politics of the "Just Transition"

One of the most contested points in the South Korean climate movement is the class implication of the concept of the "just transition."

Workers' Solidarity (ws.or.kr) raises a sharp critique of this concept. The just-transition discourse proposed by trade unions and environmental organizations emphasizes "maximum protection of victims' rights," "social sharing of transition costs," and "participation of stakeholders." Yet this language itself is the problem — "social sharing" means that workers and capitalists bear the costs of transition "together," while "stakeholder participation" presupposes social dialogue among government, business, and unions.

The Korean Metal Workers' Union's mode of responding to the electric-vehicle transition is a concrete example. Because the EV transition could mass-displace workers at second- and third-tier parts suppliers, the Metal Workers' Union says it will use social dialogue to "persuade" the government and prime contractors to supply these suppliers with electric-vehicle production capabilities. This risks sliding into a logic that entrusts workers' protection to the charity of capital and the state.

Workers' Solidarity's alternative perspective: the industrial restructuring driven by the climate crisis must be made not a "space in which government and capital shift costs onto workers" but "a space in which workers win class demands through struggle."

This tension is difficult to resolve. As the Climate Justice Alliance shows, real-world movements ideologically orient toward system transition while in the short term taking up reformist legislation such as a "Public Renewable Energy Act" as their issue. How to manage the tension between these two levels is the core task of the movement.

3. The Collision between AI-Semiconductor Growthism and Climate Justice

As of 2026, the sharpest front of the South Korean climate movement is the collision between the "AI-semiconductor growth strategy" and climate justice. This is not a simple environment-economy trade-off; it is a class question.

The surge in energy demand: AI data centers and semiconductor plants consume enormous amounts of electricity. The expansion of semiconductor production by Samsung and SK hynix and the construction of data centers in South Korea by Google, Microsoft, and others are generating a rapid increase in electricity demand. To meet this demand, the construction of new power plants (including nuclear) and the expansion of transmission lines are being pursued.

Who bears the cost: Residents of North Chungcheong Province and other regions are resisting the construction of transmission lines for semiconductor production. The problem is the ecological and social costs that fostering a semiconductor industry running against the climate crisis transfers onto local communities. The discourse "semiconductors = future growth engine = growth" conceals these costs.

The Lee Jae-myung government's position: It holds up carbon neutrality in name while simultaneously pursuing an AI-semiconductor growth strategy. Nuclear expansion is the connecting link — the logic that "nuclear power emits no carbon, so it is consistent with climate response." This is the point at which the Climate Justice Alliance pushes back, declaring that "without resolving carbon inequality, there is no resolving the climate crisis."

From an ecosocialist perspective, the crux of this collision is clear: South Korean capital is transferring to local residents and future generations the ecological costs of maintaining its competitive advantage in the global AI-semiconductor market. This is not an "externality" problem; it is a class problem.

4. The Possibilities and Limits of South Korean Ecosocialism

Now is the time for a sober assessment. How close is the South Korean climate justice movement to an ecosocialist outlook?

Possibilities

The reality of the organizational base: The participation of 81 organizations in the Climate Justice Alliance is not formal solidarity. The participation of the Nonregular Power Workers' Union and the Public and Transport Workers' Union demonstrates the substantive combination of the climate movement with the labor movement. This is an achievement rare even in European climate movements.

The radicalness of the public-renewable-energy demand: The demand for "energy publicization" is not a mere policy demand. The claim that the energy sector, dominated by private capital, should be placed under public control is a class demand over ownership. If the Korean New Deal centers on revitalizing private renewable-energy investment, the Climate Justice Alliance says, "Do not sell the sunlight and wind to the market."

Expansion into local politics: In the 2025 local elections and then in 2026, candidates running on climate justice as their main agenda stood in many regions. Whatever their success or failure, what matters is that climate justice is no longer an expert discourse of central politics but is being transformed into an agenda tied to the daily lives of local residents in the local political arena.

Limits

The narrowness of the popular base: The Climate Justice Alliance's 81 organizations are impressive, but the social base of the movement is still centered on activists, intellectuals, and progressive unions. A popular climate movement that broadly organizes ordinary citizens, nonregular workers, workers at small and medium enterprises, farmers, and youth is still unfinished.

Tension with the anti-nuclear movement: The Climate Justice Alliance opposes nuclear power. But the reality is that renewable energy alone cannot satisfy electricity demand in the short term. The Lee Jae-myung government drives precisely into this point — claiming that "realistically, nuclear power is necessary." The movement's failure to resolve this tension either theoretically or practically is a vulnerability.

Insufficient international solidarity: As noted in Part 4, ecosocialism cannot be achieved by a single country alone without an international transition. Yet solidarity between the South Korean climate movement and the climate movements of Asia and the Global South remains at an incipient stage. There is a tendency to remain confined to the particularity of ecological peace on the Korean Peninsula and to fail to see global connections fully.

The ambiguity of the class subject: The answer as to "who" will carry out system transition within the movement remains vague. The framework of "solidarity among 81 organizations" has the merit of broad inclusiveness, but it tends to substitute the question of number of organizations for the question of class leadership. The distinctive role of the working class — its strategic position deriving from standing at the center of production — has not been sufficiently theorized.

5. Conclusion: The Articulation of Socialist Party Reconstruction and Climate Politics

Finally, I set out the strategic tasks facing the South Korean ecosocialist movement.

Theoretical tasks

Ecosocialism is not yet a sufficiently elaborated concept in South Korea. Even within the Climate Justice Alliance there is agreement on the term "system transition," but a shared analysis of what it means remains incomplete. Theoretical deepening is needed on the relation between the capitalist accumulation structure and the climate crisis, the concrete pathways of energy publicization, and the class implications of the just transition.

Practical tasks

Deepening labor-climate solidarity: Beyond the participation of power-sector unions, organizing into the movement the unions of the industries in transition — automobiles, shipbuilding, steel — and, without ignoring the insecurity of workers who will lose jobs in the transition to EVs and renewables, converting that insecurity into class demands.

Building a popular climate politics: Moving beyond an activist-intellectual core toward popular campaigns aimed at the energy-poor, tenants, nonregular workers, farmers, and youth — the work of translating "climate justice" into the language of everyday life.

Expanding international solidarity: Building substantive solidarity with the climate movements of Asia and the Global South, and presenting the South Korean position in the degrowth–Green New Deal debate to an international audience.

Articulating with the reconstruction of a socialist party: Climate politics is not a single issue on the existing political board; it is the politics of system transition. That is, in the end, a question of political power, and political power is a question of organization. The articulation of climate justice movement with the task of organizing the political independence of the working class in South Korea — namely, the task of reconstructing a socialist party — is the core strategic task.

Closing the Series

Across five installments this series has advanced one consistent argument: the climate crisis is the structural product of capitalism, and its alternative is ecosocialism. Solutions within capitalism only manage the contradiction; they do not touch the root cause. At the same time, the failure of actually existing socialism teaches that ecosocialism must be not a bureaucratic command economy but a democratic planned economy.

In South Korea, ecosocialism is no longer a distant ideology. Eighty-one organizations are speaking of "system transition," power-plant workers are demanding "public renewable energy," and local residents are experimenting with "sunlight-income villages." When this current is theorized and organized on a broader class base, climate justice will become not a mere discourse but a question of power.

Ecosocialism: The Class Political Economy of the Climate Crisis — series complete. Part 1: Why capitalism structurally produces the ecological crisis Part 2: Actually existing socialism and ecology Part 3: Degrowth or Green New Deal Part 4: The contours of an alternative Part 5: Climate politics in South Korea — possibilities and tasks of the system-transition movement