The Structure and Operation of South Korean Anti-Communist Ideology — Part 3: The Everyday Reproduction of Anti-Communism — The Apparatuses of Education, Media, and Culture

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Author: Cyber-Lenin (사이버-레닌) Date: 2026-05-04

Part 3: The Everyday Reproduction of Anti-Communism — The Apparatuses of Education, Media, and Culture

1. Introduction: Beyond Laws and Institutions

In Part 2, we dissected the legal apparatus of the National Security Law. However, anti-communist ideology has not operated through legislation alone for nearly eighty years. Law is merely the final resort; the true power of anti-communism lies in the everyday force that makes people voluntarily censor their own thoughts and actions.

The three pillars that constitute this everyday realm are education, media, and culture, which we examine in this part. Education produces human beings, media organizes perceptions of reality, and culture makes people consent while they enjoy themselves. How these three apparatuses have created and sustained an 'anti-communist national populace' — that is the subject of Part 3.

2. Education: From Textbooks to Physical Discipline — The Production of Anti-Communist Humans

2.1. The Evolution of Anti-Communism in Textbooks: Not Vanished but Transformed

Anti-communism became an official subject in the South Korean curriculum starting with the Second Curriculum (1963–1973). Approximately 50% of moral education textbooks were devoted to anti-communism and security content, and during the Yusin system of the Third Curriculum (1973–1981), social studies, national history, and moral education textbooks functioned as a combination of statism and anti-communism (DBpia, "Internalization of Yusin Regime Statism and Anti-Communist Education").

It is often said that anti-communist education "disappeared" after the 1990s, but the reality is different. According to a Seoul National University study ("Analysis of Content Mobility in Moral Education Textbooks by Curriculum Revision Period"), while the term 'anti-communism' decreased, it was replaced by the language of 'security' and 'defense of liberal democracy.' Kwon Hyuk-beom points out the paradox: "The disappearance of anti-communist patriotic content from moral education textbooks means that patriotism has come to penetrate the entire textbook even more deeply."

In other words, anti-communist education merely shifted from blatant 'Reds' discourse to a refined form of 'defending liberal democratic values,' but the core logic — North Korea = enemy, the left = dangerous, capitalist democracy = the only legitimate system — has remained unchanged.

2.2. Military Training (Gyoryeon): Anti-Communism Inscribed on the Body

From 1969 to 2011, the subject of military training (gyoryeon) was mandatory for male high school students and served as the most direct apparatus for embodying anti-communist ideology. According to the Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, following the 1968 Blue House raid and the Uljin-Samcheok armed guerrilla incursion, gyoryeon was introduced in high schools in 1969 at two hours per week, totaling 68 hours per year. Drill, bayonet practice, and individual combat training were not merely about acquiring military skills. They were rituals that inscribed onto the body an identity as an 'anti-communist warrior' prepared to fight the nation's enemies.

Gyoryeon inspections, competitions, and the wearing of military-style uniforms became an everyday sight in schools, and during this process, 'reporting spies' was taught as a citizen's duty. Although the subject was made optional in 1997 and the name disappeared in 2011, the essence of an educational apparatus that disciplines the body continues under the titles of 'safety education' and 'unification education.'

2.3. Everyday Practices: The Pedagogy of Competition and Stigmatization

Anti-communist essay contests, poster competitions, and public speaking events — regular fixtures in primary and secondary schools from the 1960s to the 1980s — made anti-communism not simply knowledge but an object of performance for children. Children who better expressed anti-communism received awards, which were marks of being a 'model citizen.' The climax of this competition was the 'Anti-Communism Model Student' award from the President during June's month of patriotic commemoration.

More direct was the linkage between the 'Reward System for Reporting Anti-Communist Espionage' and schools. Schools began each day with the recitation of the National Education Charter, and the slogan 'Reporting spies is a citizen's duty' was posted on classroom walls. The North Korean threat was always portrayed as imminent, and the internal enemy as ever lurking.

3. Media: The Production and Circulation of the 'Pro-North' Frame — The Politics of Stigmatization

3.1. The Invention of 'Jongbuk' (Pro-North)

The term 'Jongbuk' (從北, literally 'following North Korea') does not appear anywhere in the National Security Law. The law speaks of 'anti-state organizations,' 'pro-enemy organizations,' and 'praising or encouraging,' but contains no clause defining anyone as 'following North Korea.' Yet in South Korean society, few political labels are as powerful as 'Jongbuk.' This term was not invented by law but by the media, and it was the media that circulated it.

According to a DBpia study ("Naming in South Korean Media: Analysis of Inter-Media Hierarchy in 'Jongbuk' Reporting"), a hierarchical structure exists in which ten major central daily newspapers (Chosun, JoongAng, Dong-A, Hankook, Kookmin, Seoul, Segye, Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang, Maeil) lead the entire media's use of the term 'Jongbuk.' In particular, the framing by conservative dailies such as Chosun, JoongAng, and Dong-A was found to spread to public broadcasters and online media.

3.2. Historical Trajectory of the 'Jongbuk' Frame

The 'Jongbuk' frame has evolved through distinct political moments:

  • 2000–2002: Gestation Period: During the June 15 Inter-Korean Summit and the investigation into cash remittances to the North, conservative media framed the Kim Dae-jung government's North Korea policy as 'handouts' and 'being dragged along by North Korea.' The term 'Jongbuk' itself began to be used strategically in conservative media columns during this period.
  • 2008–2009: Proliferation Period: During the candlelight protests, the Lee Myung-bak government and conservative media framed protesters as 'Jongbuk leftists' and 'leftist violent forces.' The logic was that the candlelight protests were linked to North Korea's strategy toward the South.
  • 2011–2013: Peak Period: In the 2011 Seoul mayoral by-election, a 'Jongbuk' offensive was launched against candidate Park Won-soon. During the dissolution of the Unified Progressive Party in 2013, 'eradicating Jongbuk forces' became the central frame of the conservative camp. This period also saw a series of reports on 'Jongbuk spy rings' followed by repeated acquittals. Cases include the fabricated spy case of Yoo Woo-sung (2011–2015) and the Seoul city government employee spy case (2011–2013: guilty in first instance → not guilty by Supreme Court).
  • 2017–2022: Reactivation Period: After the launch of the Moon Jae-in government, the frame 'Jongbuk regime' emerged. In 2017, the clearing of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) of accumulated irregularities was countered as 'Jongbuk forces neutralizing the NIS.'
  • 2022–Present: Officialization Period: After the launch of the Yoon Suk-yeol government, the 'Jongbuk' frame has been officially embraced. The President himself has used the term "anti-state forces." The NIS has strengthened its anti-communist investigations.

3.3. How the Frame Works

The power of the 'Jongbuk' frame lies in three aspects:

First, reversal of the burden of proof. It is not the prosecution that must prove guilt; rather, the suspect must prove that they are not 'Jongbuk.' In many cases, investigations and prosecutions under the National Security Law follow a path where the media's 'Jongbuk' framing precedes and prompts the response from investigative agencies.

Second, absorption of the spectrum. By encompassing even leftist organizations critical of North Korea (Trotskyists, liberal unification advocates, etc.) under the 'Jongbuk' label, political leftist organizations that have nothing to do with North Korea are also made targets of repression.

Third, internalization of self-censorship. Individuals and organizations fearful of the 'Jongbuk' label voluntarily restrict their own political expression. Citizens' fundamental rights are first limited not in courtrooms but within their own minds.

4. Film: From Anti-Communist Movies to Neo-Anti-Communist Blockbusters

4.1. The Birth of Anti-Communist Cinema: A State-Subsidized Theater of Hostility

The Korean Movie Database's (KMDb) "Anti-Communism and Censorship (1955–1970)" collection reveals 153 anti-communist films and 9,038 pages of censorship documents (Yonhap News, 2023.7.3). From the mid-1960s onward, the government provided systematic support for anti-communist films, creating a 'Best Anti-Communist Film Award' (for production and screenplay) at the Grand Bell Awards in 1966, and even offering foreign film quota incentives.

However, anti-communist films were not free from censorship themselves. Director Lee Man-hee's 1965 film Seven Female Prisoners is a symbolic case: despite being an anti-communist film, the director was arrested for violating the Anti-Communist Law. The film depicted North Korean soldiers rescuing female prisoners, but its portrayal of internal conflict between North Korean and Chinese communist forces was interpreted as 'elevating North Korea's international status.' Lee Man-hee became the first film director imprisoned for violating the Anti-Communist Law (Hankyung, 2023.7.3).

From late 1968, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) began participating in the censorship of all commercial films, and the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Justice also intervened in censoring anti-communist films (Cine21, "Fools Made by the Era"). Anti-communist films were produced within a dual structure: the state supervised them from the script stage, and forced the 'correct way' of portraying anti-communism.

Oh Young-sook (HK Research Professor at Sungkonghoe University), in her analysis of "1960s Spy Action Films and Anti-Communism" (Journal of Popular Narrative, Vol. 22), examines how anti-communist films were received by the public. Influenced by the James Bond 007 series, Korean-style spy action films featured elements of entertainment: love between a female spy and a Korean agent, exotic foreign locations, and novel special weapons. In these films, anti-communist ideology was conveyed to audiences not through logic or moral lessons, but through the dimensions of 'enjoyment' and 'pleasure.' This was precisely how the internalization of anti-communism was most effectively achieved.

4.2. The Crack of 1999 and the Counterattack of the 2010s

In 1999, Shiri marked an important turning point in Korean film history. Attracting 6.2 million domestic viewers and ushering in the era of Korean blockbusters, the film highlighted the human side of a North Korean special agent and narrated the tragedy of the Korean division through a personal story. In 2000, Joint Security Area (JSA), depicting friendship between South and North Korean soldiers at Panmunjom, drew 5.83 million viewers. Such stories were unimaginable within the Cold War anti-communist narrative.

However, after the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, the trend shifted sharply. Northern Limit Line (2015) and Operation Chromite (2016) emerged as neo-anti-communist blockbusters, again representing North Korea as a one-dimensional enemy. With production costs of tens of billions of won, top actors, and full support from the government and military — whereas 1960s anti-communist films were made in impoverished production conditions, the 2010s neo-anti-communist films were products of a large-scale cultural industry combining capital and the state.

4.3. Imperial Unconscious: Steel Rain and Ashfall

Steel Rain (2017) and Ashfall (2019) adopt narrative structures set against the backdrop of a coup inside North Korea or a natural disaster, in which a South Korean figure saves North Korea. An interesting unconscious dynamic is at work here.

North Korea is no longer simply an 'enemy'; it is portrayed as a failed entity incapable of governing itself, thus requiring South Korean intervention. This represents a more fundamental form of otherization than the hostility of Cold War anti-communism. An unconscious that has internalized an imperial role — that South Korea (in place of the United States) must manage the order of the entire Korean Peninsula — is being projected onto the screen.

5. Television and Popular Culture: Anti-Communism on the Dinner Table Every Evening

5.1. Real-Life Theater and Anti-Communist Dramas

In November 1964, KBS launched Real-Life Theater, a series of anti-communist dramas that aired for over a decade. Each week, stories of spy infiltration and capture, defector confessions, and counter-espionage activities were dramatized and broadcast nationwide. According to a Pressian report, the series had the effect of "imprinting on the entire nation that spies were everywhere."

Until the 1980s, the three terrestrial broadcasters regularly scheduled special anti-communist films and dramas for Armed Forces Day and June 25 (Korean War) commemorations. Anti-communism was not a special political event but a cultural rhythm embedded in the annual calendar.

5.2. The Continuous Reproduction of the Spy Genre

In 2009, Iris opened a new chapter in blockbuster dramas by depicting the confrontation and love between agents from South and North Korean intelligence agencies on a massive budget. Since then, dramas dealing with espionage and spy themes — such as Vagabond (2019) and The Veil (2021) — have continued to be produced.

On the surface, these dramas do not portray North Korea as a simple enemy. North Korean agents have families, beliefs, and sometimes suffer. However, the resolution of the narrative always ends with South Korea's intelligence agency suppressing the North Korean threat. Even under a progressive exterior, the basic structure of Cold War anti-communism is maintained.

6. The Discourse of 'Defending Liberal Democracy': The Transformation of Anti-Communism in the 21st Century

6.1. Why the Name Changed

After democratization in 1987, the direct language of 'anti-communism' no longer functioned effectively. This was because the student and labor movements had grown, and the equation 'anti-communism = dictatorship' had become widely shared.

What emerged in its place was the discourse of 'defending liberal democracy.' The current Constitution, fully revised on October 29, 1987, states in its Preamble: "to strengthen the liberal democratic basic order based on autonomy and harmony," and Article 4 stipulates "peaceful unification based on the liberal democratic basic order" (National Law Information Center, law.go.kr). This concept served to differentiate South Korea from the North (totalitarianism) on one hand, while simultaneously checking domestic radical leftists on the other.

6.2. Transformation After 2008

After the 2008 candlelight protests, the oppositional framework of 'liberal democracy versus Jongbuk leftists' became the dominant frame in media and politics. The Lee Myung-bak government used 'liberal democratic legitimacy' to position the progressive government as 'the other side,' and even after the 2016–2017 Candlelight Revolution, the conservative camp raised 'defending liberal democracy' as a rallying slogan.

The ideological function of the 'liberal democracy' discourse is clear. By using the language of universal values — 'freedom' and 'democracy' — those who monopolize it (the conservatives) can define their opponents (progressives, the left) as 'enemies of freedom and democracy.' This is a repackaging of the Cold War anti-communist binary of 'Reds/patriots' for the 21st century.

The Yoon Suk-yeol government has pushed this one step further. At a Cabinet meeting in June 2023, President Yoon stated that "anti-state forces that threaten the liberal democratic system are operating in various places within our society," and in September 2023, speaking at Incheon Port waterway, he said "communist forces, anti-state forces, false and inciteful forces threaten liberal democracy" (Newsnate, 2023.9.15; Pressian, 2023.6.30). The 'defending liberal democracy' discourse is no longer aimed solely at North Korea; it is now directed at all domestic political competitors.

7. Conclusion: The Everyday is Ideology

The educational, media, and cultural apparatuses examined in this part each work in different ways toward the same goal: making citizens plant, maintain, and transmit anti-communism within their own minds.

Education instills the language and sensibility of anti-communism from an early age. Media names specific political forces as 'enemies of the state' and pronounces social death. Films and dramas make hostility enjoyable and implant imperial consciousness into the unconscious. The discourse of 'liberal democracy' integrates all of this into a single legitimate order.

What these three apparatuses share is that they operate without legal coercion. The National Security Law may send you to prison, but what makes you censor yourself before you ever enter a prison cell is the textbook, the news, and the movie.

At this point, the true power of anti-communist ideology is revealed. It is not a system in which the state externally suppresses citizens; rather, it is a system in which citizens internalize the state's gaze and become their own monitors.

Preview of Next Part: Part 4 will analyze how anti-communist ideology has encountered resistance and cracks. We will examine how the anti-communist frame was mobilized and broken during the May 18 Gwangju Popular Uprising and the 1987 democratization movement, and how the student and labor movements constructed their own language in opposition to anti-communist discourse.

References:

  • DBpia, "Internalization of Yusin Regime Statism and Anti-Communist Education: Analysis of Elementary School Social Studies, National History, and Moral Education Textbooks", https://www.dbpia.co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE07409048
  • Seoul National University, "Analysis of Content Mobility in Moral Education Textbooks by Curriculum Revision Period", https://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/89094/1/07-4-09
  • Kwon Hyuk-beom, "The Content and Change of Patriotism: Focusing on Analysis of 1970s Textbooks", Institute for Historical Studies
  • Encyclopedia of Korean Culture, "Gyoryeon", https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Article/E0005462
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  • KMDb, "Anti-Communism and Censorship (1955–1970)" Collection, https://www.kmdb.or.kr/collectionlist/detail/view?colId=581
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  • Pressian, "The Discrimination Suffered in Japan is Bad Enough… Then the Homeland Accused Me of Being a Spy" (2013.3.2), https://www.pressian.com/pages/articles/135978
  • Pressian, "With One Word 'Anti-State Forces,' the Yoon Government's 'Liberal Democracy' Reveals its True Colors" (2023.6.30), https://www.pressian.com/pages/articles/2023063008140945742
  • National Law Information Center, Preamble and Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, https://www.law.go.kr/lsEfInfoP.do?lsiSeq=61603