Ecosocialism: The Class Political Economy of the Climate Crisis — Part 5 (Final): Climate Politics in South Korea — Possibilities and Tasks of the System Transformation Movement
Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-04-24
Series 'Ecosocialism: The Class Political Economy of the Climate Crisis' — Final installment (5/5)
Part 1: Why Capitalism Structurally Produces Ecological Crisis (Metabolic Rift)
Part 2: Actually Existing Socialism and Ecology — The Soviet Failure, Cuba's Experiment
Part 3: Degrowth or Green New Deal — The Class Politics of Two Paths
Part 4: Contours of an Alternative — Ecological Planned Economy, Energy Public Ownership, Food Sovereignty
Part 5: Climate Politics in South Korea — Possibilities and Tasks of the System Transformation Movement ← You are here
This series began with theory. We examined why capitalism structurally produces ecological crisis (Part 1), that actually existing socialism also failed to escape this trap (Part 2), what class choices the debate between degrowth and Green New Deal implies (Part 3), and the contours of the positive alternative proposed by ecosocialism (Part 4).
The final installment descends to the ground of South Korea. When the theoretical terrain is applied to the concrete realities of climate politics in South Korea, what becomes visible? How close is the Korean climate justice movement to 'system transformation', and what limits and tasks does it face?
1. The Terrain of Korean Climate Politics: Three Levels
Climate politics in South Korea proceeds simultaneously on three levels. Viewed separately, each level appears incomplete, but the interaction among them produces the actual dynamics of the movement.
Level One — State- and Corporate-Led Carbon Neutrality: Following the Moon Jae-in government's declaration of '2050 Carbon Neutrality' in 2020, the South Korean government set formal carbon neutrality targets. However, in August 2024, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling of non-conformity with the Constitution regarding Article 8 of the 「Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality」 — because the mid- to long-term reduction targets after 2030 were deemed insufficient and unclear. This decision judicially confirmed the formalistic character of the state's carbon neutrality policy.
Under the Lee Jae-myung administration, the situation has grown more complicated. The government has announced plans to pursue new nuclear power plants, citing the electricity demand of 'AI data centers and the semiconductor industry'. The Climate Justice Alliance immediately condemned this: "Face the climate injustice that the 'rosy future growth engine' of the AI and semiconductor industry conceals." Regarding the Special Semiconductor Act, they urged the president to exercise his veto, asserting that "climate justice is the people's livelihood."
The core problem with state-led carbon neutrality is as addressed in Part 4 — a technological transition that does not touch the profit rate merely becomes a new opportunity for capital accumulation. In South Korea, the fact that 90% of renewable energy power plants are privately owned illustrates this clearly.
Level Two — Formation of Labor-Climate Solidarity: One notable characteristic of the Korean climate movement is that labor-climate solidarity is being substantively built. The Climate Justice Alliance for System Transformation (hereafter, Climate Justice Alliance), launched in 2021, has grown into a solidarity body with 81 participating organizations. This includes labor actors such as the Public and Social Service Workers' Union, the Korea Power Generation Industry Labor Union, and the Irregular Power Plant Workers' Union as core participants.
The 'Korea Power Generation Corporation Act' that the Climate Justice Alliance promoted in the National Assembly in March 2026 is a practical product of this solidarity. In the wake of successive business suspensions by private offshore wind power companies (February 2026), the Alliance formalized "the failure of a transition left to the market" and demanded the integration of the five power generation companies and the expansion of public renewable energy. This is a case where the 'energy public ownership' demand reviewed in Part 4 has been transformed into a concrete legislative movement in South Korea.
The participation of irregular power plant workers is also important. "Power plants without irregular workers, public renewable energy power plants — that is a just transition" — this slogan is a declaration not to separate climate transition from labor rights. The closure of coal-fired power plants poses a livelihood threat to irregular subcontracted workers; a just transition must presuppose a plan to absorb them as regular workers in the public renewable energy sector.
Level Three — Radicalization of System Transformation Discourse: The Climate Justice Alliance explicitly identifies "the capitalist growth system" as the cause and sets "system transformation" as its goal. This marks a clear differentiation from South Korea's mainstream environmental movement. The fact that the list of participating organizations includes not only the Progressive Party, the Labor Party, and the Justice Party but also the Advance Toward Socialism (사회주의를향한전진) shows that the Climate Justice Alliance is a space where a broad progressive-left coalition is conjoined through the medium of climate.
The 'System Transformation Movement Forum' and the 'Social Great Transformation Solidarity Conference Planning Discussion' in 2026 are attempts to construct a logic of social transformation that goes beyond simple climate response demands. As the discussion title "Climate politics strategy against the growthist development speed race" indicates, the head-on confrontation with the Lee Jae-myung government's AI and semiconductor-led growth strategy is the major front line at present.
2. The Class Politics of 'Just Transition'
One of the most contested points in the Korean climate movement is the class implications of the concept of 'Just Transition'.
The Workers' Solidarity Network (ws.or.kr) offers a sharp critique of this concept. The just transition discourse put forward by labor unions and environmental groups emphasizes "maximum protection of victims' rights", "social sharing of transition costs", and "participation of stakeholders." But the language itself is problematic — "social sharing" means that workers and capitalists 'together' bear the cost of transition, and "stakeholder participation" presupposes social dialogue among government, business, and unions.
The way the Korean Metal Workers' Union has responded to the electric vehicle transition is a concrete example. The EV transition could lead to mass layoffs of workers at second- and third-tier parts suppliers. The KMWU says it will "persuade" the government and primary contractors to supply EV production capacity to parts suppliers through social dialogue. This risks sliding into a logic that entrusts worker protection to the charity of capital and the state.
The Workers' Solidarity Network's alternative perspective: the industrial restructuring responding to the climate crisis should be made not into "a space where the government and capital shift costs onto workers" but into "a space where workers win class demands through struggle."
This tension is difficult to resolve. The actual movement — as the Climate Justice Alliance shows — ideologically aims for system transformation while in the short term taking up reformist legislative issues like the 'Public Renewable Energy Act'. How to manage the tension between these two levels is a core task for the movement.
3. The Clash Between AI-Semiconductor Growthism and Climate Justice
As of 2026, the sharpest front line for the Korean climate movement is the clash between the 'AI-semiconductor growth strategy versus climate justice'. This is not a simple environment-economy trade-off; it is a class issue.
Surging Energy Demand: AI data centers and semiconductor factories consume enormous amounts of electricity. The expansion of semiconductor production by Samsung and SK Hynix, along with the construction of data centers in South Korea by Google, Microsoft, and others, drives a sharp increase in power demand. New power plants (including nuclear) and transmission line expansions are being pushed to meet this demand.
Who Bears the Cost: Local residents in provinces like North Chungcheong are resisting the construction of transmission lines for semiconductor production. The problem is the ecological and social costs imposed on local communities by the fostering of a semiconductor industry that runs counter to addressing the climate crisis. The discourse that 'semiconductors = future growth engine = growth' conceals these costs.
The Lee Jae-myung Government's Position: It professes carbon neutrality while simultaneously promoting the AI-semiconductor growth strategy. Nuclear power expansion is the link: the logic that "nuclear power emits no carbon and therefore is compatible with climate response." This is the point where the Climate Justice Alliance pushes back, saying, "Without resolving carbon inequality, there is no solution to the climate crisis."
From an ecosocialist perspective, the core of this clash is clear: Korean capital is offloading the ecological costs of maintaining its competitive advantage in the global AI and semiconductor market onto local residents and future generations. This is not an 'externality' problem — it is a class problem.
4. Possibilities and Limits of Korean Ecosocialism
Now it is time for a sober assessment. How close is the Korean climate justice movement to an ecosocialist perspective?
Possibilities
The Reality of an Organizational Base: The participation of 81 organizations in the Climate Justice Alliance is not a formal solidarity. The involvement of the Irregular Power Plant Workers' Union and the Public and Social Service Workers' Union shows a substantive fusion of the climate movement and the labor movement. This is an achievement rare even in European climate movements.
The Radicality of the Public Renewable Energy Demand: The 'energy public ownership' demand is not a simple policy proposal. The demand that the energy sector, dominated by private capital, must be placed under public control is directly connected to the ecosocialist thesis of the social appropriation of the means of production.
The Penetration of System Transformation Discourse: The fact that a movement that openly names the "capitalist growth system" as the cause and sets "system transformation" as its goal has formed a solidarity body of 81 organizations is itself a significant advance. Ten years ago in South Korea, an organization of this scale using such language would have been impossible.
Limits
Unresolved Relationship with Electoral Politics: The Climate Justice Alliance includes the Progressive Party, the Labor Party, and the Justice Party as participating organizations, but how these parties represent climate agendas within the legislature, and how the Alliance positions itself in relation to the Lee Jae-myung government and the Democratic Party, remain ongoing points of tension. There is a great distance between introducing a Public Renewable Energy Act in the National Assembly and actually passing it.
Lack of Concreteness in 'System Transformation' Discourse: While the goal of "system transformation" is proclaimed, there is weak consensus on what specific socioeconomic structure it refers to. Theoretical work that concretizes the content of the ecological planned economy examined in Part 4 under Korean conditions is lacking.
Absence of Agriculture and Food Sovereignty: In the agenda of the Climate Justice Alliance, agriculture and food sovereignty are relatively weak. The ecological destruction of chemical agriculture, the collapse of food self-sufficiency rates, and the disintegration of rural communities are among South Korea's core ecological crises, yet they are not placed at the forefront of the movement.
Organizational Weakness: Despite the number of 81 organizations, when the actual capacity and membership of each group are summed up, it still does not reach the level of exerting substantial pressure on mainstream Korean politics. Organizing the entire Korean Confederation of Trade Unions around the climate agenda remains a task.
5. Concluding the Series: Without Class, There Is No Climate
Over five installments, we have examined one thesis from multiple angles: The climate crisis is a structural product of the capitalist mode of production; therefore, solving the climate crisis is a class issue.
This thesis is itself contested within the climate movement. Many climate activists say, "If you talk about class, people run away," or "We should restrain systemic critique for the sake of broad solidarity." This is an understandable pragmatic judgment.
But there is a paradox of pragmatism. A climate movement that does not touch class and production relations ends up being absorbed by capital as a new accumulation opportunity. Carbon emissions trading markets, 'green' finance, greenwashing advertisements — these are capital's responses, using the climate crisis to generate profit. Pragmatic compromise becomes a pathway for co-opting the movement.
Ecosocialism's provocative assertion is this: What is truly pragmatic is to face the class question. Since the ecological crisis cannot be solved without transforming production relations, facing it and building a movement for that transformation — even if painful and slow — is the only effective path.
The Korean Climate Justice Alliance's proclamation of "system transformation" is an attempt to put this provocative assertion into practice. The attempt still carries many limits. But the direction is correct.
Series Summary
| Installment | Core Thesis |
|---|---|
| Part 1 | The climate crisis is a structural product of capitalism's metabolic rift |
| Part 2 | Actually existing socialism fell into the productivist trap; Cuba is experimenting with an incomplete alternative |
| Part 3 | Degrowth and Green New Deal each have limits — lack of practicality and structural invariance, respectively |
| Part 4 | Ecological planned economy, energy public ownership, and food sovereignty are the three axes of an alternative |
| Part 5 | The Korean climate justice movement has the right direction but faces organizational and theoretical tasks |
Unified Thesis: Resolving the climate crisis is impossible without transforming capitalist production relations, and the agent of that transformation is a class movement linking climate and labor.
[Series Complete] Ecosocialism: The Class Political Economy of the Climate Crisis — Parts 1–5 (April 2026)