The Strait of Hormuz Blockade and the Global South's Refusal of Solidarity — The Material Basis of Anti-War Public Opinion on Imperialist War

Markdown

Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-04-26

Date: April 26, 2026 Category: Geopolitical Analysis — Strait of Hormuz Crisis Sources: Reuters, NYT, FAO, Carnegie Endowment, Atlantic Council, Arab Center DC, The Diplomat, Euronews, CNBC, Politico, Valor International, Brasil de Fato, Wikipedia

Introduction: Why the Imperialist War Has Reached a Stalemate

The war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026 (Operation Epic Fury) has now been underway for nearly two months and has reached a fundamental stalemate. Not a single strategic objective of the US and Israel — eliminating Iran's nuclear weapons capability, lifting the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and militarily and politically neutralizing the Islamic Republic of Iran — has been achieved. On the contrary, Iran has secured a paradoxical advantage by effectively blockading the Strait of Hormuz, taking hostage 20% of the world's energy supply.

Lenin, in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917), defined imperialism as "that stage of capitalism in which the domination of monopolies and finance capital has established itself, in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance, in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun, and in which the partition of all the territory of the earth among the capitalist powers has been completed." This analytical framework demonstrates remarkable explanatory power regarding the current crisis. The monopoly control over global energy infrastructure, the operation of financial-military imperialism that weaponizes energy supply chains, and the differentiated responses of the Global South to this — all prove that the Leninist analysis remains valid in 2026.

However, the critically new phenomenon in this war is that countries of the Global South are responding for the first time since the Cold War with conditional cooperation or explicit refusal toward an imperialist war. This is not the result of a simple moral awakening, but stems from material changes in the multipolar world economy.

Chapter 1: The Global South's Refusal of Solidarity — Country-by-Country Analysis

1.1 Saudi Arabia — Refusing to Increase Production, the Paradox of Vision 2030

Saudi Arabia occupies the most complex position in the Strait of Hormuz crisis. It is a victim country directly hit by Iranian missile attacks, yet the 'Oil-for-Security Deal' maintained with the United States since 1945 has effectively collapsed.

Key Action: Saudi Arabia rejected US pressure to increase production. According to Bloomberg, Saudi officials flatly refused "to raise output beyond the long-term quotas agreed with Russia and other non-OPEC producers" (Bloomberg/Columbia Energy Policy, April 2026). This is not merely a matter of OPEC+ discipline. Saudi Arabia's 2026 budget is $350 billion, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030 depends on oil revenues to finance megaprojects like NEOM and tourism/entertainment. Lower oil prices would undermine the fiscal foundation of Vision 2030.

More fundamentally, Iran's attack on the Aramco refinery facilities changed Saudi security calculations. The Arab Center in Washington DC analyzes that "the US Gulf security force has transformed from a protector of trade to an instigator of war" (Arab Center DC, March 2026). US military bases are now not Saudi Arabia's shield but Iran's targets. Saudi Arabia can bypass up to 7 million barrels per day via the East-West Pipeline (toward Yanbu on the Red Sea), but this is only a fraction of its total production capacity of 12.5 million bpd.

Saudi Arabia's non-oil PMI collapsed to 48.8 in March 2026, breaking a 66-month expansion streak. The war fundamentally threatens Vision 2030, removing any incentive for Saudi Arabia to unconditionally cooperate with US war aims.

1.2 India — Russian Crude Oil, the Practice of Strategic Autonomy

India is the country that shows the most prominent strategic autonomy in this war.

Continued Purchase of Russian Crude: According to data analysis by the Sunday Guardian, India's imports of Russian crude oil peaked in October 2025 (1.8–1.9 million barrels per day), then declined from December 2025 to February 2026 under sanctions pressure, but surged more than twofold in March 2026 to approximately €5.3 billion compared to the previous month. This was because the US activated a 30-day waiver (General License 133) permitting delivery of cargo already at sea. Russia remains India's largest crude oil supplier, accounting for about 20% of total imports.

Key Paradox: India not only imports Russian crude but also refines it into diesel, jet fuel, etc., and then — legally — exports these refined petroleum products to the sanction-imposing countries: the EU, the US, and Australia. In March alone, approximately €830 million worth of refined products were exported to sanctioning countries. This is because sanctions target the origin of crude oil, not refined products.

Refusal to Force-Open the Strait of Hormuz: As BRICS chair, India was asked by Iran to play a mediator role, but ultimately Pakistan became the mediator. Instead, India took a pragmatic approach, securing safe passage for Indian-flagged vessels through the Strait of Hormuz via direct negotiations with Iran. When Trump asked 'allied countries' to forcibly open the Strait, India, a Quad member, refused (The Diplomat, April 2026).

1.3 Indonesia — Urea Fertilizer Exports: Solidarity or Market Opportunity?

Indonesia is showing an interesting trajectory in urea fertilizer exports.

Facts: Indonesia produces 14.5 million tons of urea annually, with a surplus beyond domestic demand. Agriculture Deputy Minister Sudaryono confirmed that four countries — Australia, India, the Philippines, and Brazil — have explored importing Indonesian urea (Jakarta Post, April 17, 2026). The government approved 1.4–1.5 million tons of urea export permits for 2026 (Argus Media, April 2026).

Analysis: This should not be read as 'anti-imperialist solidarity'. Indonesia is exploiting a commercial opportunity in a situation of global supply shortage. With Middle Eastern urea blocked by the Strait of Hormuz blockade, it secures premium prices as an alternative supplier. At the same time, however, Indonesia is not actively cooperating with Western sanctions against Iran, and since joining BRICS in 2024–2025, it shows signs of reviving its non-aligned tradition. As the largest Muslim-majority country in Southeast Asia, there is also popular antipathy toward the US-Israel war on Iran.

1.4 Turkey and NATO — The Structuring of a Rift

Although Turkey is a NATO member, Trade Minister Ömer Bolat stated explicitly in an interview with Euronews (April 10, 2026) that "NATO allies have no obligation to support the US and Israel's war on Iran." NATO's mission is 'defensive', and the US launched the war without prior consultation with allies.

On April 13, Reuters reported that NATO allies, including the UK and France, refused to participate in the US naval blockade of Iranian ports. They stated they would intervene only after hostilities have ended. This is an unprecedented rift in NATO history.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan argued that "the Strait of Hormuz must be opened through diplomacy" and supported a US-Iran-Pakistan trilateral dialogue (Al-Monitor, April 2026). As the country with NATO's second-largest army, this position carries substantive weight.

1.5 Brazil/South Africa — BRICS Silence and Ambivalence

The BRICS response is the most disappointing aspect. Iran is a full member of BRICS+ since 2024. Iranian President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi appealed to BRICS for intervention, but BRICS failed to produce a collective response (The Diplomat, April 2026).

Brazil: President Lula criticized "the rise in oil prices due to an irresponsible war" and promised to curb fuel price increases (Valor International, April 22, 2026), but Brazil is reaping real economic benefits from this crisis. The first quarter of 2026 saw a trade surplus of $14.2 billion, a 47.6% increase year-on-year and an all-time record, a direct result of the reorganization of Atlantic crude oil trade (Rio Times, April 2026). Thanks to its bioethanol infrastructure, Brazil is relatively buffered from the oil price shock and expects increased investment in deepwater oil field development (Washington Post, March 31, 2026).

South Africa: With extremely strained relations with the US — the Trump administration's criticism of land expropriation policies, expulsion of the ambassador, etc. — the South African government has no political incentive to cooperate with the US-led war on Iran. However, it is not actively stepping forward with an anti-war stance either.

The structural limits of BRICS are clear. The Diplomat notes that "BRICS operates not like a structured multilateral organization but more like an informal group like the G7, with a leader-centered loose format constraining collective action." BRICS member states each pursue their own national interests.

1.6 Gulf States — Separation of US Military Bases and Oil Output Policy

The UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait provide US military bases, but this does not imply alignment with the US on oil output policy. The UAE can export 1.7 million barrels per day to the Indian Ocean via the Fujairah pipeline bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, and together with Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, this is the result of strategic investment by Gulf oil producers to reduce dependence on the Strait (CSMonitor, April 15, 2026).

The National (UAE) commented that "all Gulf countries need alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, both for exports and for essential imports." Iran's 'Iran-proofing' investments by Gulf states are not short-term war responses but long-term strategic reorientation.

Chapter 2: The Material Basis of Anti-War Public Opinion — Reading the Contradictions of Imperialist War Through Data

2.1 The United States — Gasoline Prices and the Midterm Elections

The basis of anti-war sentiment within the US is not abstract pacifism but gas pump prices.

The NYT (April 12, 2026) reported that President Trump acknowledged that "gasoline prices might not drop before the midterm elections." This is in direct contradiction to the initial promise that "this war will not cause suffering for Americans" and is fatal to Republican electoral strategy.

Politico (March 20, 2026) analyzed that the largest price increases are concentrated in predominantly Republican-leaning states. USA Today (April 4, 2026) reported that "Democratic candidates are pointing out that Trump's Iran war has sent gasoline prices soaring, and voters are listening."

Support for the Iran war within the US has been the lowest for any modern American war since the outbreak. The Arab Center DC noted that "only in Israel does support for the war exceed 50%."

Real data:

Gasoline prices have risen approximately 30% since the outbreak.
The probability of a US recession within 12 months is near 50% (The Diplomat).
WTI $94.40, Brent $99.13 (as of April 26, 2026).

2.2 Europe — Energy Costs and Industry Backlash

The EU Energy Commissioner warned via Euronews (April 1, 2026) that "even if the Iran war ends tomorrow, oil and gas prices will not normalize immediately."

Germany's BASF imposed a surcharge of €200 per ton on MDI products on March 5, later expanded to other chemicals. One of Europe's largest ammonia producers had to temporarily halt production due to soaring gas prices (Bloomberg, March 2026). This echoes the energy shock of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, but with added LNG supply disruptions, the situation is more severe.

ABN Amro's 2026 energy market outlook had predicted that "new LNG production capacity expected in 2026 would calm volatility in the European gas market," but this analysis predates the Strait of Hormuz crisis. With the Strait blocked, cutting off Qatari LNG, Asian LNG prices surged up to 143%, and Europe is not immune to this shock.

2.3 Japan — Strategic Petroleum Reserve Release, Return to Coal

Japan's response is particularly dramatic. According to Reuters (March 11 and March 24, 2026):

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced the release of 80 million barrels from the strategic petroleum reserve — equivalent to 45 days of Japanese domestic consumption, the largest release in Japanese history.
An additional 20 days' supply is scheduled for release from May 1 (Kyodo News, April 2026).
Japan secured safe passage for its cargo via direct negotiations with Iran.

More decisive is the return to coal. The Carnegie Endowment analyzes that "Japan has effectively suspended its renewable energy transition targets and is restarting coal-fired power generation." This reveals the structural vulnerability of the decarbonization agenda. Imperialist war sacrifices the green transition first.

Trump demanded that Prime Minister Takaichi "step up," but even in White House talks, no concrete commitments were obtained (Business Times, April 2026).

2.4 South Korea — Supplementary Budget, Gasoline Price Cap, Semiconductor Crisis

South Korea's response to the Iran war is multi-layered.

Macroeconomy: The Bank of Korea held the benchmark interest rate at 2.50% but warned of "dual risks of inflation rekindling from oil prices and growth slowdown" (CNBC, April 10, 2026). The National Assembly approved a supplementary budget of 26.2 trillion won (approximately $22.5 billion), which includes funding to maintain a nationwide gasoline price cap — introduced for the first time in nearly 30 years (Business Times, April 10, 2026).

Political Fallout: President Lee Jae-myung's handling of the war enjoys 51.6% support (Chosun Ilbo, April 22, 2026), but if prolonged high oil prices persist, this approval may become fragile. President Lee warned that "the aftermath of the Iran war will be prolonged amid heightened tensions in the Strait of Hormuz" and ordered swift support (Reuters, April 14, 2026).

Semiconductor Crisis: The Carnegie Endowment (March 2026) warned of serious energy vulnerability in South Korea's semiconductor industry. The Strait of Hormuz blockade has cut off supplies of helium and sulfur, threatening the etching process, a core step in semiconductor manufacturing. "The Iran war is now also a semiconductor problem."

Exchange Rate: The won/dollar rate stands at 1,476.32 won, adding further upward pressure on imported energy costs.

2.5 Global Food Crisis — From Fertilizer to the Dinner Table

FAO Chief Economist Máximo Torero's March 26, 2026 UN briefing is the most systematic warning:

Data:

Tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has collapsed by more than 90%.
Up to 30% of global fertilizer trade transits the Strait.
Price of Middle Eastern granular urea: up 19% in the first week; Egyptian urea up 28%.
Global fertilizer prices expected to average 15–20% higher in the first half of 2026.
The Gulf region accounts for approximately 50% of global sulfur trade — essential for phosphate fertilizer production.

Most vulnerable countries: Sri Lanka (Maha rice harvest), Bangladesh (Boro rice season), India (domestic fertilizer production falls ahead of Kharif season), Egypt (dependent on wheat imports), Sudan (acute food insecurity), Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique.

Torero's key warning: "Fertilizer use follows a non-linear yield response, so even a small reduction can lead to a disproportionately large drop in crop yields."

CNBC (March 25, 2026) quoted Ninety One's Dawid Heyl: "Unlike other fertilizer groups (potash, phosphate), nitrogen is the only element that must be applied to plants every year... This is starting to feel like 2008." 2008 was the year of the global food crisis, with food riots in dozens of countries.

Chapter 3: Structural Analysis — The Inherent Contradictions of Imperialist War

3.1 For the First Time Since the Cold War, the Global South Sets Conditions

During the Cold War, the US exercised hegemony in the Gulf region through the 'Oil-for-Security Deal'. Gulf oil producers maintained stable crude supplies and dollar-denominated transactions in exchange for security guarantees. This structure remained effective through the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War.

In 2026, this structure has collapsed. Reasons:

Loss of credibility as a security provider: The US failed to prevent Iran's 2019 attack on Aramco, and failed to prevent Israel's attack on Doha in September 2025. Under the Trump administration, the US military transformed from 'protector of trade' to 'instigator of war'.

Multipolarized energy market: Alternative energy trade routes exist linking Russia, China, and India. As India demonstrates, the Western sanctions regime does not cause 'diversion' but only 'rerouting'.

Pursuit of climate and economic autonomy: Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, the UAE's economic diversification, Brazil's bioethanol — these countries are no longer single-commodity oil-dependent economies.

3.2 Two Contradictions of Imperialist War

Lenin demonstrated the inevitability of war through the law of uneven development of imperialism, but he also pointed out the self-contradictions inherent in imperialist war. The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis exposes two decisive contradictions.

Contradiction 1: War for profit passes the cost onto one's own people

This war, launched by the US and Israel to achieve regime change in Iran and eliminate its nuclear weapons capability, has imposed on Americans a 30% gasoline price increase, on Japanese a return to coal, on Europeans chemical product surcharges, and on Koreans an additional 26.2 trillion won in taxes. The 'profits' of imperialist war are concentrated in defense capital and energy speculators, while the 'costs' are distributed to workers, peasants, and small and medium-sized enterprises worldwide.

The Arab Center DC analyzes this war as "the biggest market disruption in the history of the global oil industry" and that "the Strait of Hormuz crisis has even blocked the spare production capacity of about 4 million b/d — the world market's buffer."

Contradiction 2: Fundamental limits on war-fighting capacity in a multipolar world

When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, there was no full-scale check from China and Russia. In 2026, the situation is different:

China holds 1.2 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, providing a buffer against short-term shocks (Atlantic Council).
Russia and China exercised their veto power in the UN Security Council on Bahrain's resolution 'authorizing defensive use of force in the Strait of Hormuz'.
Iran made preemptive preparations: as early as early 2025, it tripled crude oil exports and emptied inventories (Wikipedia).
Forcibly reopening the Strait of Hormuz would require a ground invasion, an unsustainable cost for the empire.

3.3 The Asymmetry of the Hormuz Blockade — The Weak's Weapon

The Arab Center DC's analysis is decisive: "The weaker combatant benefits from asymmetry. The task of forcibly reopening the Strait of Hormuz and protecting 100 transits per day is orders of magnitude more difficult than Iran's tactics of threatening, laying mines, and launching cheap kamikaze drones."

During the temporary ceasefire of April 8, 2026, Iran began imposing transit fees of over $1 million per vessel. This suggests the possibility of "converting a global maritime commons into a toll waterway under Iranian control." It is a perfect replication of the strategy used by the Houthis in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait from 2023 to 2025.

Conclusion: Conditions Under Which the People Can Force an End to War

The conclusion reached by this analysis is simple. The stalemate of the imperialist war is determined not by military factors but by material and structural factors.

The Global South's refusal of solidarity is not due to abstract anti-imperialist principles but to a cold calculation based on:

Their own material interests (Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 fiscal needs, India's cheap Russian crude, Brazil's trade surplus)
Changed security calculations (the US is no longer a reliable security provider)
Existence of alternatives (alternative economic and security architecture led by China and Russia)

The material basis for anti-war public opinion has already formed:

30% rise in US gasoline prices → crisis for Republicans in midterm elections
Soaring energy costs for European chemical and manufacturing industries → industry pressure
Depletion of Japan's strategic petroleum reserve + return to coal → collapse of 2050 net-zero target
South Korea's 26.2 trillion won additional tax + semiconductor supply chain threat
15–20% rise in global fertilizer prices → food crisis materializing in the second half of 2026

To borrow Lenin's insight, imperialism is the 'highest stage' of capitalism, and simultaneously the stage in which its inherent contradictions explode most sharply. The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis is a historical moment when these contradictions erupt simultaneously along three lines: military stalemate, economic pain, and political backlash.

The leverage by which the world's people can force the US and Israel to abandon strategic objectives and accept a ceasefire no longer lies in moral appeals. Oil at $94.40, KOSPI at 6,475, won/dollar at 1,476 — in these numbers lies the leverage. In the Thai farmer waiting for fertilizer, the Japanese coal-fired power plant burning strategic reserves, the German chemical factory paying €200/ton surcharges — in these sites, the material basis of anti-war sentiment is accumulating.

The empire can choose war, but it cannot choose the consequences of war.

References (Partial):

Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
FAO (2026-03-26), "FAO Chief Economist warns of severe global food security risks from disruption to Strait of Hormuz trade corridor"
Reuters (2026-04-13), "NATO allies refuse to join Trump's Iranian port blockade"
NYT (2026-04-12), "Trump Says Gas Prices Might Not Drop by Midterms"
Arab Center DC (2026-03), "The Iran War and the End of the US-Gulf 'Oil for Security' Deal"
The Diplomat (2026-04), "Iran War Tests BRICS — And Reveals its Limits"
Atlantic Council (2026-03), "How the Iran war could shift energy policies around the world"
Sunday Guardian (2026-04-20), "India not stepping back from buying Russian crude"
Wikipedia, "2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis"
Politico (2026-03-20), "The states where higher gas prices could shape the midterms"
Jakarta Post (2026-04-17), "Australia, India eye Indonesian urea as global supply tightens"