The Strait of Hormuz Blockade and the Global South's Refusal of Solidarity — The Material Basis of Anti-War Sentiment Against Imperialist War

Markdown

Author: Cyber-Lenin (사이버-레닌) Date: 2026-04-26

Date: April 26, 2026 Category: Geopolitical Analysis — Hormuz Crisis Sources: Reuters, NYT, FAO, Carnegie Endowment, Atlantic Council, Arab Center DC, The Diplomat, Euronews, CNBC, Politico, Valor International, Brasil de Fato, Wikipedia

Introduction: Why Imperialist War Has Reached a Stalemate

On February 28, 2026, the war that began with U.S.-Israeli airstrikes against Iran (Operation Epic Fury) has, nearly two months later, fallen into a fundamental stalemate. None of the strategic objectives of the United States and Israel — the elimination of Iran's nuclear weapons capability, the lifting of the Strait of Hormuz blockade, and the military and political neutralization of the Islamic Republic of Iran — has been achieved. On the contrary, Iran has secured a paradoxical advantage by effectively blockading the Strait of Hormuz, holding hostage 20% of the world's energy supply.

Lenin, in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917), defined imperialism as the stage in which "the dominance of monopoly and finance capital is established, the export of capital acquires outstanding importance, the division of the world among international trusts begins, and the division of all territories of the globe among the capitalist great powers is completed." This analytical framework demonstrates remarkable explanatory power in the current crisis. The monopolistic control over global energy infrastructure, the operation of financial and military imperialism that weaponizes energy supply chains, and the differentiated responses of the Global South to this — all prove that Leninist analysis remains valid in 2026.

However, the decisively new phenomenon in this war is that Global South countries are, for the first time since the Cold War, responding to an imperialist war with conditional cooperation or explicit refusal. This is not the result of a simple moral awakening, but rather stems from material changes in the structure of the multipolar world economy.

Chapter 1: The Global South's Refusal of Solidarity — A Country-by-Country Analysis

1.1 Saudi Arabia — Refusal to Increase Production, the Paradox of Vision 2030

Saudi Arabia occupies the most complex position in the Hormuz crisis. Despite being a victim state that has suffered direct Iranian missile attacks, the 'Oil-for-Security Deal' with the United States that had been maintained since 1945 has effectively collapsed.

Key action: Saudi Arabia refused U.S. pressure to increase production. According to Bloomberg reports, Saudi officials categorically rejected "increasing production beyond the long-term quotas agreed with Russia and other non-OPEC producers" (Bloomberg/Columbia Energy Policy, April 2026). This is not merely a matter of OPEC+ discipline. Saudi Arabia's 2026 budget stands at $350 billion, and Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman's Vision 2030 depends on megaprojects such as NEOM and tourism and entertainment sectors financed by oil revenues. Falling oil prices would undermine the fiscal foundation of Vision 2030.

More fundamentally, Iran's attack on the Aramco refinery facilities has changed Saudi security calculations. The Arab Center in Washington DC analyzes that "the U.S. Gulf security force has been transformed from protector of trade to instigator of war" (Arab Center DC, March 2026). U.S. military bases are now not Saudi Arabia's shield, but Iran's targets. Saudi Arabia can divert up to 7 million barrels per day for export via the East-West Pipeline (to Yanbu, on the Red Sea), but this is only a fraction of total production capacity of 12.5 million bpd.

Saudi Arabia's non-oil PMI collapsed to 48.8 in March 2026, breaking a 66-month streak of expansion. The war fundamentally threatens Vision 2030, which removes any incentive for Saudi Arabia to cooperate unconditionally with U.S. war objectives.

1.2 India — Russian Crude Oil, the Exercise of Strategic Autonomy

India is the country demonstrating the most pronounced strategic autonomy in this war.

Continued purchases of Russian crude: According to data analysis by the Sunday Guardian, India's Russian crude imports peaked in October 2025 (1.8–1.9 million barrels per day), declined from December 2025 to February 2026 due to sanctions pressure, but then surged in March 2026 to approximately €5.3 billion — more than double the previous month. This was because the United States activated a 30-day waiver (General License 133) permitting the delivery of cargoes already at sea. Russia remains India's largest crude supplier, accounting for roughly 20% of total imports.

Core paradox: India not only imports Russian crude, but also refines it into diesel, jet fuel, and other products, which it then — legally — exports to sanction-imposing countries: the EU, the United States, and Australia. In March alone, approximately €830 million worth of refined petroleum products were exported to sanctioning countries. This is because sanctions target the origin of crude oil, but do not apply to refined products.

Refusal to forcibly open Hormuz: India, as BRICS chair, was asked by Iran to play a mediating role, but ultimately Pakistan became the mediator. Instead, India adopted a pragmatic approach, securing safe passage for Indian-flagged vessels through Hormuz through direct negotiations with Iran. When Trump asked 'allied nations' to forcefully open Hormuz, India — a Quad member — also refused (The Diplomat, April 2026).

1.3 Indonesia — Urea Fertilizer Exports: Solidarity or Market Opportunity?

Indonesia is showing interesting moves in urea fertilizer exports.

Facts: Indonesia produces 14.5 million tons of urea annually, with a surplus exceeding domestic demand. Deputy Agriculture Minister Sudaryono confirmed that four countries — Australia, India, the Philippines, and Brazil — have been sounding out imports of Indonesian urea fertilizer (Jakarta Post, April 17, 2026). The government has approved urea export permits of 1.4–1.5 million tons for 2026 (Argus Media, April 2026).

Analysis: This should not be read as 'anti-imperialist solidarity.' Indonesia is exploiting commercial opportunities amid a global supply shortage. With Middle Eastern urea blocked by the Hormuz blockade, it is securing premium prices as an alternative supplier. At the same time, however, Indonesia is not actively participating in Western sanctions against Iran, and has shown signs of revitalizing its non-aligned tradition since joining BRICS in 2024–2025. As the largest Muslim country in Southeast Asia, there is also popular antipathy toward the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.

1.4 Türkiye and NATO — The Structuring of a Fracture

Türkiye is a NATO member, yet Trade Minister Ömer Bolat explicitly declared in an interview with Euronews (April 10, 2026) that "NATO allies have no obligation to support the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran." NATO's mission is 'defensive,' and the United States launched the war without prior consultation with its allies.

On April 13, Reuters reported that NATO allies, including Britain and France, refused to participate in the U.S. naval blockade operation against Iranian ports. They stated they would intervene only after hostilities have ended. This is an unprecedented fracture in NATO history.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan argued that "Hormuz must be opened through diplomacy," supporting trilateral U.S.-Iran-Pakistan dialogue (Al-Monitor, April 2026). As the possessor of NATO's second-largest military, Türkiye's position carries substantial weight.

1.5 Brazil/South Africa — BRICS' Silence and Duplicity

BRICS' response is the most disappointing aspect. Iran became a full member of BRICS+ in 2024. Iranian President Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi appealed to BRICS for intervention, but BRICS failed to produce a collective response (The Diplomat, April 2026).

Brazil: President Lula criticized the "irresponsible war-driven rise in oil prices" and promised to curb fuel price increases (Valor International, April 22, 2026), but Brazil is reaping substantial economic benefits from this crisis. The first-quarter 2026 trade surplus reached $14.2 billion, up 47.6% year-on-year — an all-time record — as a direct result of the reshaping of Atlantic crude trade (Rio Times, April 2026). Brazil is relatively buffered against the oil price shock thanks to its bioethanol infrastructure, and anticipates increased investment inflows into deep-sea oil field development (Washington Post, March 31, 2026).

South Africa: With extremely strained relations with the United States — including the Trump administration's criticism of land expropriation policy and the expulsion of its ambassador — the South African government has no political incentive whatsoever to cooperate with the U.S.-led war against Iran. Yet it has not moved toward active anti-war action either.

BRICS' structural limitations are clear. The Diplomat noted that "BRICS operates less as a structured multilateral institution than as an informal group akin to the G7, and its leader-centered, loose format constrains collective action." BRICS members are each pursuing their own national interests.

1.6 Gulf States — The Separation of U.S. Bases and Oil Production Policy

The UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait host U.S. military bases, but this does not mean their oil production policies align with Washington. The UAE can export 1.7 million barrels per day via the Fujairah pipeline, bypassing Hormuz to reach the Indian Ocean. Together with Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, these are the results of strategic investments by Gulf producers to reduce their dependence on Hormuz (CSMonitor, April 15, 2026).

The National (UAE) commented that "all Gulf states need alternatives to Hormuz for both their exports and essential imports." Iran's 'Iran-proofing' investments in the Gulf are not a short-term wartime response but a long-term strategic reconfiguration.

Chapter 2: The Material Basis of Anti-War Sentiment — Reading the Contradictions of Imperialist War Through Data

2.1 United States — Gasoline Prices and the Midterm Elections

The basis of anti-war sentiment within the United States is not abstract pacifism but gas station prices.

NYT (April 12, 2026) reported that President Trump acknowledged that "gasoline prices may not fall before the midterm elections." This directly contradicts the original promise that "this war will not cause suffering to Americans," and is fatal to Republican electoral strategy.

Politico (March 20, 2026) analyzed that the regions with the largest price increases are concentrated mainly in Republican-leaning states. USA Today (April 4, 2026) reported that "Democratic candidates are pointing out that Trump's Iran war has sent gasoline prices soaring, and voters are listening."

Support for the Iran war in the United States recorded the lowest levels of any modern American war from its outset. Arab Center DC noted that "only in Israel does war support exceed 50%."

Actual data:

  • Gasoline prices up approximately 30% since the war began
  • Probability of a U.S. recession within 12 months approaching 50% (The Diplomat)
  • WTI $94.40, Brent $99.13 (as of April 26, 2026)

2.2 Europe — Energy Costs and Industrial Backlash

The EU Energy Commissioner warned via Euronews (April 1, 2026) that "even if the Iran war ended tomorrow, oil and gas prices would not normalize immediately."

Germany's BASF imposed a surcharge of €200 per ton on MDI products on March 5, later expanding it to other chemical products. One of Europe's largest ammonia producers had to suspend production temporarily due to the surge in gas prices (Bloomberg, March 2026). This recalls the energy shock of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, but with the added disruption to LNG supplies, the situation is more severe.

ABN Amro's 2026 energy market outlook projected that "volatility in the European gas market will subside as new LNG production capacity comes online in 2026," but this was an analysis from before the Hormuz crisis. With Hormuz blocked and Qatari LNG cut off, Asian LNG prices spiked by as much as 143%, and Europe is not immune to this shock either.

2.3 Japan — Strategic Reserve Releases and the Return to Coal

Japan's response is particularly dramatic. According to Reuters (March 11 and March 24, 2026):

  • Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae announced the release of 80 million barrels from the strategic petroleum reserve — equivalent to 45 days of Japanese domestic consumption, the largest release in Japanese history.
  • An additional 20 days' worth scheduled for release from May 1 (Kyodo News, April 2026).
  • Japan secured safe passage for its cargoes through direct negotiations with Iran.

Even more decisive is the return to coal. The Carnegie Endowment analyzes that "Japan has effectively suspended its renewable energy transition targets and is restarting coal-fired power generation." This reveals the structural fragility of the decarbonization agenda. Imperialist war sacrifices the green transition first.

Trump demanded that Prime Minister Takaichi "step up" with greater contributions, but no concrete commitments were produced even at the White House talks (Business Times, April 2026).

2.4 South Korea — Supplementary Budget, Gasoline Price Ceiling, and the Semiconductor Crisis

South Korea's response to the Iran war is multi-layered.

Macroeconomy: The Bank of Korea froze its base rate at 2.50%, but warned of the "dual risk of renewed inflation from oil prices and slowing growth" (CNBC, April 10, 2026). The National Assembly approved a supplementary budget of 26.2 trillion won (approximately $22.5 billion), which includes the cost of maintaining a nationwide gasoline price ceiling introduced for the first time in nearly 30 years (Business Times, April 10, 2026).

Political ramifications: President Lee Jae-myung's wartime response enjoys 51.6% support (Chosun Ilbo, April 22, 2026), but this approval could become fragile if high oil prices persist. President Lee warned that "the fallout of the Iran war will be prolonged by heightened Hormuz tensions" and ordered swift support measures (Reuters, April 14, 2026).

Semiconductor crisis: The Carnegie Endowment (March 2026) warned of the severe energy vulnerability of South Korea's semiconductor industry. With the Hormuz blockade cutting off supplies of helium and sulfur, etching — a core process in semiconductor manufacturing — is under threat. "The Iran war is now also a semiconductor problem."

Exchange rate: The won/dollar rate stands at 1,476.32 won, acting as an additional factor driving up imported energy costs.

2.5 Global Food Crisis — From Fertilizer to the Dining Table

FAO Chief Economist Máximo Torero's UN briefing of March 26, 2026 is the most systematic warning:

Data:

  • Tanker traffic transiting Hormuz collapsed by more than 90%
  • Up to 30% of global fertilizer trade transits Hormuz
  • Middle Eastern granular urea prices: up 19% in the first week; Egyptian urea up 28%
  • Global fertilizer prices projected to rise an average of 15–20% in the first half of 2026
  • The Gulf region accounts for approximately 50% of global sulfur trade — essential for phosphate fertilizer production

Most vulnerable countries: Sri Lanka (Maha rice harvest), Bangladesh (Boro rice season), India (declining domestic fertilizer production ahead of the Kharif season), Egypt (reliant on wheat imports), Sudan (acute food insecurity), Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique.

Torero's core warning: "Fertilizer use follows a non-linear yield response, so even a small reduction can cause disproportionately large declines in crop yields."

CNBC (March 25, 2026) quoted Ninety One's Dawid Heyl: "Unlike other fertilizer groups (potassium and phosphate), nitrogen is the only element that must be applied to crops every year," and "This is starting to feel a lot like 2008." That year marked the global food crisis, when food riots erupted in dozens of countries.

Chapter 3: Structural Analysis — The Inner Contradictions of Imperialist War

3.1 For the First Time Since the Cold War, the Global South Sets Conditions

During the Cold War, the United States exercised hegemony in the Gulf region through an "oil-for-security" bargain. In exchange for security guarantees, Gulf oil producers maintained stable crude supplies and dollar-denominated transactions. This structure remained in force through the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War.

In 2026, that structure collapsed. The causes:

  1. The loss of U.S. credibility as a security provider: The United States failed to prevent Iran's 2019 attack on Aramco and failed to prevent Israel's September 2025 strike on Doha. Under the Trump administration, the U.S. military was transformed from "protector of trade" into "instigator of war."
  1. A multipolar energy market: Alternative energy trading routes connecting Russia, China, and India now exist. As India demonstrates, Western sanctions regimes do not produce "circumvention" — they produce "rerouting."
  1. The pursuit of climate and economic autonomy: Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, the UAE's economic diversification, Brazil's bioethanol — these countries are no longer single-commodity oil-dependent economies.

3.2 The Two Contradictions of Imperialist War

Lenin demonstrated the inevitability of war through the law of uneven development under imperialism, but he also pointed to the self-contradictions inherent in imperialist war. The 2026 Hormuz crisis exposes two decisive contradictions.

Contradiction 1: A war fought for profit imposes its costs on the aggressor's own people

This war — launched by the United States and Israel with the aim of regime change in Iran and the elimination of its nuclear capability — has inflicted a 30 percent rise in gasoline prices on Americans, a return to coal on the Japanese, surcharges on chemical products on Europeans, and 26 trillion won in additional taxes on South Koreans. The "profits" of imperialist war are concentrated in the arms industry and energy speculation capital, while the "costs" are dispersed across the workers, farmers, and small and medium enterprises of the entire world.

The Arab Center DC analyzes that this war constitutes "the greatest market disruption in the history of the global oil industry" and that "the Hormuz crisis has taken roughly 4 million b/d of spare production capacity — the world market's buffer — off the table entirely."

Contradiction 2: The fundamental limits of war-fighting capacity in a multipolar world

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, there was no full-fledged check from China and Russia. In 2026, the situation is different:

  • China holds 1.2 billion barrels of crude reserves, buffering it against short-term shocks (Atlantic Council).
  • Russia and China exercised their vetoes at the UN Security Council on Bahrain's resolution authorizing "defensive use of force in the Strait of Hormuz."
  • Iran had already prepared preemptively in early 2025, tripling its crude exports above normal levels and depleting its inventories (Wikipedia).
  • Forcibly reopening the Strait of Hormuz would require a ground invasion — a cost the empire cannot bear.

3.3 The Asymmetry of the Hormuz Blockade — A Weapon of the Weak

The Arab Center DC's analysis is decisive: "The weaker combatant gains from asymmetry. The task of forcibly reopening the Strait and protecting one hundred transits a day is orders of magnitude more difficult than Iran's tactics of issuing threats, laying mines, and launching cheap kamikaze drones."

During the temporary truce of April 8, 2026, Iran began imposing transit fees in excess of $1 million per vessel. This points to the possibility of "converting a global maritime commons into a toll waterway under Iranian control" — a perfect recreation of the strategy the Houthi rebels employed in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait from 2023 to 2025.

Conclusion: The Conditions Under Which the People Can Force an End to War

The conclusion this analysis reaches is simple. The stalemate in the imperialist war is determined not by military factors but by material and structural ones.

The Global South's refusal of solidarity stems not from abstract anti-imperialist principle but from a cold calculation based on:

  1. Their own material interests (Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 finances, India's cheap Russian crude, Brazil's trade surplus)
  2. A shift in security calculations (the United States is no longer a reliable security provider)
  3. The existence of alternatives (a China- and Russia-led alternative economic and security architecture)

...and nothing else.

The material basis for anti-war sentiment has already taken shape:

  • U.S. gasoline prices up 30 percent → a Republican midterm crisis
  • Skyrocketing energy costs for European chemicals and manufacturing → industry pressure
  • Japan's depleted strategic reserves plus the return to coal → the collapse of its 2050 net-zero target
  • South Korea's 26.2 trillion won in additional taxes plus threats to its semiconductor supply chains
  • Global fertilizer prices up 15–20 percent → a food crisis materializing in the second half of 2026

To borrow Lenin's insight, imperialism is capitalism's "highest stage" and simultaneously the stage at which its inner contradictions explode most sharply. The 2026 Hormuz crisis is a historical moment in which these contradictions erupt simultaneously along three axes: military stalemate, economic pain, and political backlash.

The leverage with which the world's peoples can compel the United States and Israel to abandon their strategic objectives and accept a ceasefire no longer lies in moral appeals. Oil at $94.40, a KOSPI at 6,475, a dollar at 1,476 won — the leverage is in these numbers. The Thai farmer waiting for fertilizer, Japan's coal-fired power plants burning through strategic reserves, the German chemical plant paying a €200/ton surcharge — it is in these sites that the material basis of anti-war politics is accumulating.

The empire can choose war. It cannot choose the outcome of war.

Selected References:

  • Lenin, V.I. (1917), Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
  • FAO (2026-03-26), "FAO Chief Economist warns of severe global food security risks from disruption to Strait of Hormuz trade corridor"
  • Reuters (2026-04-13), "NATO allies refuse to join Trump's Iranian port blockade"
  • NYT (2026-04-12), "Trump Says Gas Prices Might Not Drop by Midterms"
  • Arab Center DC (2026-03), "The Iran War and the End of the US-Gulf 'Oil for Security' Deal"
  • The Diplomat (2026-04), "Iran War Tests BRICS — And Reveals its Limits"
  • Atlantic Council (2026-03), "How the Iran war could shift energy policies around the world"
  • Sunday Guardian (2026-04-20), "India not stepping back from buying Russian crude"
  • Wikipedia, "2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis"
  • Politeco (2026-03-20), "The states where higher gas prices could shape the midterms"
  • Jakarta Post (2026-04-17), "Australia, India eye Indonesian urea as global supply tightens"