10 Months of the Lee Jae-myung Government: A Progressive Interim Assessment — Part 1: Overview, What Kind of Government Is It?
Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: April 19, 2026
Series Note | "10 Months of the Lee Jae-myung Government: A Progressive Interim Assessment" in 5 Parts
Part 1: Overview — What Kind of Government Is It? ← Current
Part 2: Labor — The Reality of 'Real Growth with Labor'
Part 3: Foreign Policy & Security — ROK-U.S. Alliance Modernization and the Logic of Dependency
Part 4: Economy — Growthism Without Chaebol Reform
Part 5: Outlook — The June 25 Local Elections and the Tasks of the Progressive Movement
On June 4, 2025, Lee Jae-myung took office as the 21st President of South Korea. The path to power was unprecedented. The regime was born through an extraordinary course: Yoon Suk-yeol's December 3 martial law insurrection, his impeachment and removal by the Constitutional Court, and the June 3 early presidential election. Ten months after its launch, how should we evaluate this government? This series aims to answer that question systematically from a progressive perspective.
1. How It Came to Power — A Regime Born of Insurrection
The most important characteristic of the Lee Jae-myung government is that it was born not from its own popular mobilization capacity, but from the collapse of the previous administration. Vote share: 49.42%. Below a majority. And that, in a situation where it was the supreme beneficiary of the impeachment crisis.
This is by no means a trivial fact. In the early presidential election held after Yoon's removal, the Democratic Party automatically emerged as the beneficiary of the 'anti-insurrection front.' Workers, youth, women, and minorities went to the polls in anger at Yoon, and their votes were concentrated on Lee Jae-myung. But this support was not agreement with Lee's class program; it was rejection of the far-right insurrection.
If the structural conditions for taking power are thus, it is necessary to closely examine the class basis of the regime.
2. Whose Government Is It? — A Class-Based Analysis
The most important question for understanding the Lee Jae-myung government is: "For whom is this government designed to operate?"
Composition of the Support Coalition: In the early days of its launch, the government's approval rating stood in the 60% range. By class, support was strongest among those in their 40s and 50s and the white-collar middle class. In contrast, support among those in their 20s was weak at 36.3% (JoWon C&I, 2025). This reflects the perception that the structural anxieties of the youth generation (housing, employment) are not resolved by any party coming to power.
Relationship with Capital: The economic blueprint of the Lee Jae-myung government is clear. It includes fostering strategic industries centered on AI, semiconductors, bio, K-culture, defense, and shipbuilding ('ABCDE+2S'), recovering the potential growth rate to 3%, targeting a KOSPI of 5,000, and creating a 100 trillion won National Growth Fund (Samil PwC analysis, Sep. 2025). Of 123 national agenda tasks, 59 (46%) were related to the economy and industry.
There are no declarations to dismantle the chaebol structure. Amendments to the Commercial Act (expanding directors' fiduciary duty, the 3% rule for audit committee members) represent governance improvements at the level of minority shareholder protection, not a signal of chaebol dissolution. Rather, the direction is to raise chaebol stock prices through capital market advancement.
Relationship with Labor: The passage of the 'Yellow Envelope Act' appears as a positive signal. It expands the definition of employer and restricts damage claims against striking workers. But whether this signifies a class change will be analyzed in depth in Part 2. For now, one point should be noted: Left-wing organizations, including the Workers' Solidarity and the Bolshevik Group, have consistently warned: "The Democratic Party is not a party of the working people. There will be a period when it wants to seem nice, but the differences in class interests will inevitably reveal themselves" (Bolshevik Group, 2025).
3. Structural Conditions of Power — Three Constraints
The external environment in which the Lee Jae-myung government was launched is exceptionally harsh.
Constraint 1 — U.S. Tariff War: The ROK-U.S. tariff agreement concluded on July 22, 2025, set U.S. tariffs on South Korean exports at 15%. In return, South Korea promised to purchase $100 billion in U.S. energy and invest $350 billion in the United States. As the numbers show, this was not a negotiation but conditions close to capitulation. Wrapped in the rhetoric of 'ROK-U.S. alliance modernization,' its substance is capital outflow and energy subordination.
Constraint 2 — Low-Growth Structure: South Korea's potential growth rate fell from 7.8% in the 1990s to 2% in the 2020s, and if the current trend continues, it is projected to enter the 0% range in the 2040s (Bank of Korea). The Lee government's strategy of AI and energy transition is a capitalist response to this structural crisis. It envisions replacing labor reduction with AI and redistributing some of the profits through a mechanism called the 'National Growth Fund.' What this means for workers has not been sufficiently examined.
Constraint 3 — Double Dependency Structure: South Korea's trade structure is caught between the United States (military and technology alliance) and China (largest trading partner). In 2025, exports to China fell 1.7% year-on-year, and exports to the U.S. also fell 3.8% due to tariff impacts (KITA). The single-item dependence on semiconductors, which account for 24.7% of total exports, further amplifies this structural vulnerability.
4. A 'Progressive Government'? — The Problem of Positioning
How does the Lee Jae-myung government define itself?
National goal: "A nation where the people are the owners, a happy Republic of Korea together." Governing principles: "Listening and integration, fairness and trust, pragmatism and results." There is no class language anywhere. Workers, the popular masses, and redistribution appear only as auxiliary frames.
Calling the Lee Jae-myung government a 'progressive government' is inaccurate. A more precise designation is a reformist growthist regime. It maintains the chaebol-centered growth model while promoting a modernized capitalist management of protecting shareholder rights, AI transition, and expansion of renewable energy. Toward labor, it maintains a gesture of dialogue but does not change the structural power relations.
The pattern of the Moon Jae-in government repeats here. Just as the Moon government, which came to power by absorbing the energy of the 2016–17 candlelight protests, ended in labor rollbacks, chaebol pardons, and preservation of the prosecution, the Lee Jae-myung government, which came to power by absorbing the energy of the insurrection defeat, faces the same dynamic pressure.
5. A Snapshot of 10 Months — What Has Changed and What Has Stayed the Same
What Has Changed:
- Implementation of the Yellow Envelope Act (effective six months after promulgation, early 2026)
- Minor governance improvements through the amended Commercial Act
- Exclusion of the martial law/insurrection forces from institutional power
- 2026 R&D budget of 35.3 trillion won (+19.3% YoY) — AI sector increased by 106%
- Partial restoration of proportional labor administration
What Has Stayed the Same:
- The core chaebol governance structure (circular shareholding, absolute control by founding families)
- Dependent security structure under the ROK-U.S. alliance
- Rights vacuum for non-regular workers, special employment types, and platform workers
- Class reproduction mechanisms in housing and education
- Double dependency structure of trade on the U.S. and China
Conclusion — Between Hope and Awakening
The first 10 months of the Lee Jae-myung government have been a time of 'relief' and 'expectation.' The far-right insurrection ended, and a minimum of rule of law was restored. This was a substantive progress.
But relief must not be mistaken for analysis. Preventing the insurrection does not change the class nature of this government. We must ask now what will be revealed when "the period of wanting to seem nice" is over.
Part 2 will examine what the slogan 'Real Growth with Labor' actually means on the ground.
This article is Part 1 of the series "10 Months of the Lee Jae-myung Government: A Progressive Interim Assessment." Written from the perspective of an independent analyst, it does not represent the position of any specific party or faction.
References
- Samil PwC Management Research Institute, "The New Government's First 100 Days: Starting the Engine of Economic Recovery," Sep. 2025
- Bolshevik Group, "Beware of Excessive Expectations and Illusions of the Working-Class Camp Toward the Democratic Party and Representative Lee Jae-myung," 2025
- KITA Korea International Trade Association, 2025 export statistics
- JoWon C&I Opinion Poll, 2025
- Bank of Korea, "AI and the Korean Economy," Feb. 2025