The Lee Jae-myung Administration’s First 10 Months ③: Diplomacy and Security – Structuring the “Transactional Alliance” and Deepening Militarization
Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-04-19
「The Lee Jae-myung Administration’s First 10 Months: A Progressive Interim Assessment」 Part 3 | April 2026
Introduction: The Frame of a “National Interest–Centered, Pragmatic Alliance”
The Lee Jae-myung administration defines its diplomacy toward the United States as a shift “from a values-based alliance to a national interest–centered, pragmatic alliance.” This was an expression President Lee himself used in his inaugural speech at CSIS in Washington. On the surface, it sounds progressive. But tracking the trajectory over ten months reveals a different picture. The content of “pragmatism” is a massive expansion of alliance burdens, the bearer of “national interest” is the chaebol and the defense–industrial complex, and the space for independent diplomacy has actually narrowed.
1. Dissecting the ROK–U.S. Joint Fact Sheet – November 14, 2025
On November 14, 2025, on the occasion of the Gyeongju APEC summit, a “Joint Fact Sheet” was released as the outcome of the ROK–U.S. summit. It is the document that the Lee Jae-myung administration touted as its first major diplomatic achievement. Below we break down the key figures.
$25 Billion in U.S. Military Equipment Purchases
It was confirmed that South Korea would purchase $25 billion (approximately 35 trillion won) worth of U.S.-made military equipment – including F-35A stealth fighters, Apache helicopters, and Global Hawk drones – by 2030. The government explained this as “the sum of ongoing acquisition projects and new projects,” but it is the first time this scale has been stated in an official document. The interlocking of armaments between South Korea and the United States has been institutionalized to the level of a treaty.
$33 Billion in “Comprehensive Support” – Controversy Over Poison Pill Clauses
The fact sheet includes the phrase: “South Korea shared its plan for comprehensive support to US Forces Korea totaling $33 billion.” In response, National Security Office Director Wi Sung-lac explained that “it is an accounting of existing costs over ten years (defense cost-sharing + land-use fees + electricity rate reductions, etc.).”
However, the fact sheet text does not specify a support period of “10 years.” While the same document specifies “by 2030” for weapons purchases, there is no time period for the $33 billion support. If interpreted as 2030 (5 years), that amounts to $6.6 billion per year – 6.6 times the current defense cost-sharing (approximately $1 billion). Even if taken as the government’s explanation of 10 years, it is $3.3 billion per year, or 3.3 times the current amount.
“The ambiguous expression ‘comprehensive support’ could become a poison pill that contains the possibility of South Korea bearing the costs of military exercises and the deployment of strategic weapons that President Trump has been demanding.”
— Former senior diplomatic official (Hankyoreh, November 16, 2025)
Approval for Nuclear-Powered Submarines and Uranium Enrichment
The fact sheet includes U.S. approval for South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines and U.S. support for South Korea’s uranium enrichment. The Lee Jae-myung administration promotes this as “a new milestone for self-reliant defense.”
But nuclear-powered submarines are not self-reliant defense; they are a deepening of military dependency on the United States. It is a licensing approach, not technology transfer, and U.S. dependency will be prolonged in operations and maintenance. Even concerning nuclear fuel, the supply source of enriched uranium will ultimately be the United States. This is not an independent nuclear capability but an expansion of the hardware of the U.S. nuclear umbrella structure.
2. Defense Export Offensive – Incorporation into the Weapons Economy
In the period after the Lee Jae-myung administration took office (June–December 2025), defense contracts with foreign countries reached $14.2 billion, accounting for more than 90% of total contracts for the year ($15.2 billion). At the “First Defense Industry Day” event in July, President Lee declared, “The defense industry is not only about security; it is also about our daily bread. The government will actively support defense exports.” The ruling party has formalized the goal of making South Korea one of the top four K-defense powerhouses.
From an economic perspective, defense exports are a high-value-added industry. But the questions that must be raised from a progressive viewpoint are different.
First, the issue of involvement in conflicts of destination countries. South Korea has already exported large quantities of K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers, and FA-50 fighter jets to Poland, Romania, Estonia, and other countries adjacent to NATO. This is linked to the European rearmament trend. It means that the South Korean military industry is being incorporated into the global conflict supply chain.
Second, the logic of defense as “daily bread” justifies militarization through economic reasoning. The higher the dependence on the defense industry, the more the peace process becomes structurally burdened with economic costs.
Third, the $25 billion U.S. weapons purchase and the expansion of defense exports are not contradictory but interlocked. The structure is to buy finished products from the United States and then sell semi-finished products with transferred U.S. technology to third countries – this is a path by which South Korea becomes a subcontracting hub in the U.S. defense industry production network.
3. Pragmatic Diplomacy with China – Limits of Restoration
The Lee Jae-myung administration has rapidly patched up the ROK–China relations that the Yoon Suk-yeol administration had wrecked. A summit in November 2025, a second summit in Beijing in January 2026, the extension of a 70 trillion won (400 billion yuan) won–yuan currency swap, and MOUs in six areas. President Lee declared, “2026 will be the first year of the full restoration of ROK–China relations.”
The achievements are real. But the fundamental problems have only been patched over.
- THAAD Issue: THAAD, which caused the economic retaliation, remains under the operation of US Forces Korea. The Hallyu ban (Hanryu jeongchaek) has only been informally eased; it has not been officially lifted by China.
- Dual Pressure on Semiconductor Supply Chains: Caught between the U.S. export controls on semiconductors to China (BIS regulations) and China’s export restrictions on rare earths, South Korea has chosen to deepen the ROK–U.S. technology alliance. The ROK–China MOUs are about restoring economic exchanges, not restructuring structural dependence.
- Limits of the Principle of Separating Politics and Economics: The strategy of “separating politics and economics” recommended by Chung Sung-jang of the Sejong Institute is an approach of “responding separately to security issues and economic exchanges.” In reality, China does not accept this separation. As long as THAAD exists, the ROK–China economic relationship can at any time become a political leverage for China.
4. Structuring the Transactional Alliance – A Progressive Overall Assessment
The logic that runs through the Lee Jae-myung administration’s first ten months of diplomacy and security is the active acceptance of a “transactional alliance.”
When Trump’s America said, “If you don’t pay, we won’t defend the alliance,” the Lee Jae-myung administration chose two responses. First, negotiate the bill as low as possible. Second, offset that bill through military expansion—defense exports, weapons purchases, and nuclear submarines. “Restructuring the relationship itself” was not an option.
The class basis of this strategy is clear. The defense and heavy industry chaebol (Hanwha, Hyundai Rotem, LIG Nex1) are the beneficiaries, while the opportunity costs of military expansion (welfare, education, conversion industries) are borne by the working class. The geopolitical adventurism of the ROK–U.S. military alliance is borne by the entire Korean Peninsula.
For a “progressive government,” the question that must be asked is this: What could have been done instead of the $33 billion in military spending? Wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer, negotiations to reduce USFK, and resumption of the Korean Peninsula peace treaty – these agenda items appear nowhere in the fact sheet.
Conclusion
| Area | Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Moves | Progressive Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Defense Cost-Sharing | Pledged $33 billion in “comprehensive support” | Implicit poisoning through effectively a 3–6 times increase in defense cost-sharing |
| Weapons Purchases | Confirmed $25 billion in U.S.-made armaments | Institutionalization of military dependency on the U.S. |
| Nuclear Submarines | Promoted nuclear submarine approval as “self-reliant defense” | Hardware expansion of the U.S. nuclear umbrella |
| Defense Exports | $14.2 billion annually, goal of top four powerhouses | Incorporation into the weapons economy, entanglement in conflict supply chains |
| ROK–China Relations | Pragmatic restoration, extension of currency swap | THAAD unresolved, structural dependence continues |
| Wartime OPCON | Discussion absent | Gap in self-reliant defense |
The diplomacy and security of the Lee Jae-myung administration have internalized the rules of the transactional alliance of the Trump era. The rhetoric of “national interest–centered” functions to package the interests of the chaebol–defense complex as national interest. The agenda of progressive diplomacy – a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, wartime OPCON transfer, and arms reduction – are structurally excluded from this administration’s foreign policy agenda.
Next installment (Part 4): Economy – Declaration of the “Year of the Great Leap,” Growthism Without Chaebol Reform