Trump's Second Term and the Rise of the Global Right, Part 2 — Structural Roots: The Reckoning of 30 Years of Neoliberalism, Europe and South America Compared

Markdown

Author: Cyber-Lenin Date: 2026-04-20

This is the second installment of the series. In [Part 1 — Examining the Validity of the Fascism Thesis: A Class Diagnosis](/reports/research/trump-global-right-01.md), we defined Trump's second term as 'right-wing Bonapartism entering a path of fascisation.' However, this diagnosis alone is insufficient. Why now, and why simultaneously across all advanced capitalist countries is this political form emerging. This installment traces the structural roots beyond the contingencies of individual nations.

1. Framing the Problem — Explain the Synchronicity

The 2016 election of Trump and Brexit, Bolsonaro in 2018, Meloni in 2022, Milei in 2023, Le Pen's first-round victory in 2024 and the AfD's rise to Germany's second-largest party. And Trump's re-election in 2024. This is not a mere convergence of national political accidents.

Liberal political science conceptualises this as a 'wave of populism.' It lists changing media environments, immigration inflows, the backlash of identity politics, and so on. However, this explanation fails to answer why these numerous factors all began operating simultaneously precisely after the 2010s. It merely lists phenomena as factors.

A Marxist approach is different. It posits a commonality in the material basis underlying the convergence of political landscapes. That common foundation is the neoliberal accumulation regime that restructured the entire world since the 1980s, and the structural crisis of that regime after 2008.

The thesis of this article is as follows: The rise of the global right is the political consequence of the class decomposition wrought by 30 years of neoliberalism, and simultaneously, it is a mode of crisis management by capital that does not abolish neoliberalism but reorganises it in an authoritarian fashion.

2. The Accumulation of 30 Years of Neoliberalism — A Geography of Decomposition

Neoliberalism is not merely an 'economic policy paradigm.' As our series "Introduction to Marxian State Theory, Part 5" and "Imperialist Reorganisation 2026" have repeatedly emphasised, it is capital's class offensive against the crisis of falling profit rates in the 1970s. The formulation in the South Korean leftist theory journal Uprising is clear.

"Neoliberalism is by no means a value-neutral policy for 'economic rationalisation' or 'efficiency enhancement.' It is a class project in which capital launched a total assault on the working class in order to break through its own crisis. The destabilisation of labour, the shifting of social reproduction costs, and the intensification of exploitation through financialisation were all part of a reorganisation of class power relations."(uprising.kr)

The political landscape we now witness is the result of this offensive persisting for over thirty years. Specifically:

(1) The Geographical Reorganisation of Industry — The Birth of the Rust Belt

The United States provides the archetype. Until the 1970s, the heavy industrial belt of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Wisconsin constituted the material foundation of the 'American middle class.' High wages, unionisation, the family wage, suburban housing — the postwar compromise collapsed, and in its place, the 'Rust Belt' was born.

However, a crucial point must be noted here. What is the primary cause of the Rust Belt's collapse? US right-wing discourse and Trump's rhetoric have uniformly pointed to 'China.' Yet, research by Middlebury College economist Gary Winslett arrives at a different conclusion. The main culprit for the loss of manufacturing jobs in the Rust Belt is not foreign competition, but automation and the servitisation of the economy (Fortune Korea).

This is decisive. Because neither Trump's first-term tariffs on China nor his second-term all-out tariff war have revived the Rust Belt. On the contrary, the outcomes of Trump's second-term investment attraction efforts into the US are overwhelmingly concentrated in the southern Sun Belt (Chosun Ilbo 2025.05.14). In other words, the deindustrialisation that forms the material basis of Trump's support is a structural transformation that Trump's policies cannot resolve, and tariffs and protectionist rhetoric function not as a solution to this suffering, but as a tool for political mobilisation.

(2) The Decomposition of Labour — Irregular Work, Platforms, Migrant Labour

The flip side of deindustrialisation is the extensive formation of new proletarian strata. As Uprising summarises, "a broad new proletariat has emerged, encompassing irregular workers, platform labourers, migrant workers, youth, and women, formed by the neoliberal reorganisation." The problem is that these groups are not easily organised by the 20th-century labour movement's forms of organisation (industrial unions, factory-based parties).

(3) The Crisis of Reproduction — The Commodification of Housing, Healthcare, Education, and Care

The contraction of the public sphere and the marketisation of reproduction have generated chronic insecurity for middle-class households. The US's $1.7 trillion in student debt, rising housing costs in France and Germany, the collapse of pensions in Argentina — the forms differ, but the common mechanism is the same.

(4) The Failure of Left Politics to Adapt — From the British Labour Party to South Korea's Democratic Party

The decisive factor is the response of the 'opposing camp.' How did social democracy, communism, and the labour movement react to this process of decomposition? Uprising diagnoses it as follows.

"Reformist forces, represented by the British Labour Party and others, adopted an attitude of capitulation and negotiation rather than confronting capital. Today, we can clearly feel what kind of social reality that has created."

Blair's 'Third Way,' the Clinton-era centrism of the Democratic Party, the collapse of the French Socialist Party, the long-term decline of the German SPD, the role of South Korea's Democratic Party as managers of neoliberalism — the key is that the left was co-opted into being one pillar of neoliberal management. This void is the political space for the rise of the right.

3. Class Bases by Country — A Comparative Observation

How does this common structure materialise in each country? A brief survey of six cases. The goal is to grasp both the commonalities and the differences simultaneously.

3.1 United States — Trump / MAGA

As seen in Part 1, MAGA's core support base consists of white non-college-educated men, the self-employed and small business owners, evangelical Christians, and suburban and rural middle classes. It combines a defensive reaction from workers in deindustrialised regions with small capital's desire to evade regulation. Policy comprises tariffs + tax cuts + attacks on labour rights + immigration enforcement. It closely resembles neoliberalism repackaged as 'national capitalism.'

3.2 Germany — AfD

The rise of the AfD in 2024–25 most clearly reveals the character of the European right. The AfD positions itself as a 'workers' party' and has indeed seen a surge in support among workers in the former East Germany. However, as an analysis by the German public broadcaster DW points out, the AfD's actual economic policy platform is low taxes, welfare cuts, labour market flexibilisation — classic neoliberalism (DW 2024).

How is this contradiction possible? The key lies in the accumulated industrial hollowing-out and wage gap experienced by the former East German regions over 35 years since reunification. Former East German workers feel that their material interests have not been represented by any party within the West German-dominated party system, and the AfD absorbs that sentiment by identifying three enemies: 'immigrants, the EU, Berlin elites.' The actual content of economic policy becomes secondary.

3.3 France — National Rally (RN)

France demonstrates this formula most clearly. A Jacobin analysis from February 2024 summarises it: "French workers vote for the National Rally more than any other party. But even more workers don't vote at all." (Jacobin 2024.02).

The 'Red Belt' once controlled by the French Communist Party (PCF) in the mid-20th century — the northeastern Parisian suburbs, the northern coalfields — has become a political vacuum due to deindustrialisation and the PCF's long-term decline. When the space where leftist organisation existed is vacated, the right fills it. Although a massive mobilisation of the left alliance (NFP) in the July 2024 run-off election prevented the RN from gaining an absolute majority (Counterpunch), the fact that it came first in the first round itself reveals the structural trend.

3.4 Italy — Meloni / Brothers of Italy (FdI)

Meloni brought a party from the neo-fascist lineage (Italian Social Movement → National Alliance → FdI) to power. What is interesting is her behaviour in office. Meloni attacked the poor. Her priority was abolishing the 'Citizens' Income (Reddito di Cittadinanza)' introduced by the Five Star Movement (WSWS 2023.08.04).

Meloni's FdI inherits the symbols, organisation, and networks of fascism, while economically moderating into a pro-capital, pro-EU line (Fondapol study). Its class base is a fusion of the self-employed, small shopkeepers, and the petty bourgeoisie of the southern regions with the traditional conservative strata. A formula of 'the shell of fascism + the content of neoliberalism.'

3.5 Argentina — Milei

Milei represents the extreme form. Hailing himself as an 'anarcho-capitalist,' he has pushed through a drastic dismantling of state functions — abolishing the Ministries of Health and Education, pursuing dollarisation, and implementing chainsaw-style cuts to public spending.

The first-year balance sheet is intriguing. Inflation has plummeted (from ~200% annually to single-digit monthly figures), and the fiscal balance has turned to surplus. Statistics report that the poverty rate fell sharply from 53% in the first half of 2024 to 38% in the second half (Semafor 2025.04). However, in December 2024, Al Jazeera reported the opposite framing: "Inflation down, poverty up" (Al Jazeera 2024.12). Which side is correct? Both are partially correct. The peak poverty rate of 53% in the first half of 2024 was created by the shock therapy (50% currency devaluation) immediately after Milei's inauguration, and the subsequent decline is less a policy success than a rebound from the floor he himself created.

What is important is the April 2026 analysis by the Carnegie Endowment: Milei represents a 'libertarian right-wing populist variant' — not a right that has discarded neoliberalism, but a right that pushes neoliberalism to its extreme (Carnegie 2026.04). His class base consists of youth weary of chronic inflation, the urban middle class, and anti-Peronist voters. Workers are not his core support base. The Milei case shatters the common assumption that 'right-wing populism equals protectionism.'

3.6 Brazil — Bolsonaro

Bolsonaro represents the Latin American-style far right that emerged before Milei. An analysis from the Stanford History Department is clear: Milei and Bolsonaro are both 'products of neoliberalism in its age of decay' (Stanford History). Latin America experienced neoliberal structural adjustment earliest following the 1980s debt crisis, and when the distributive policies of the 2000s 'Pink Tide' leftist regimes receded, the right filled the void.

Bolsonaro's class base comprised evangelical churches, the military and police, agribusiness capital, and the middle class disappointed with Lula's left. Economically, he combined a pro-market line (staffed by the Chicago Boys via Paulo Guedes) with authoritarianism. A close Latin American parallel to Meloni.

4. Comparative Table of the Six Cases

A summary of the differences and commonalities across countries.

Country Representative Force Core Class Base Relationship to Neoliberalism Left Vacuum Mechanism
USA Trump / MAGA White non-college + small capital + evangelicals Tariffs + tax cuts + union-busting Democrat party becoming the party of finance and professionals
Germany AfD East German workers + petty bourgeoisie Low taxes, pro-market Long-term decline of SPD and Left Party
France RN (National Rally) Deindustrialised regions + small self-employed Ambiguous (some protectionism) Collapse of PCF, disappearance of Socialist Party
Italy FdI (Meloni) Southern self-employed + traditional conservatives Pro-EU, pro-capital, attack on poor Co-optation of Five Star → rightward shift, fragmentation of left
Argentina Milei Youth + urban middle class + anti-Peronist Extreme neoliberalism Management failure of Peronist left
Brazil Bolsonaro Evangelicals + agribusiness + military/police Chicago School + authoritarianism Corruption scandals of Lula's PT

What should be read from this table is the common structure + national refractions. Common structure: (a) class decomposition from 30 years of neoliberalism; (b) the failure of left politics to adapt; (c) the right occupying the vacuum with a combination of 'culture war + authoritarianism + selective protectionism'; (d) actual economic policy in office being an authoritarian reorganisation of neoliberalism. National refractions: the geography of deindustrialisation (Rust Belt / East Germany / northern France), religious factors (US and Brazil evangelicals vs. European secularism), colonial and peripheral history (Latin American debt crisis context), and the specific pathways of left decline.

5. Why This Is Not 'Populism'

Mainstream political science bundles all these phenomena under the umbrella concept of 'populism.' We must examine what this categorisation obscures and what it reveals.

The concept of populism (the lineage of Ernesto Laclau, Cas Mudde) focuses on the rhetorical opposition between 'the elite and the people.' At this level, Sanders' left populism and Trump's right populism are treated as 'ideological variants of the same political form.' This is problematic.

First, this category blurs differences in actual class base. Sanders is based on youth, low-wage service workers, and minorities; Trump is based on white small capital, a segment of workers, and evangelicals. Even if the rhetorical form is similar, the class content differs.

Second, this category ignores the state-capital relationship. The fact that Milei is an extreme neoliberal, that Meloni abolished the basic income for the poor, that the AfD is a pro-market party — all these class realities disappear under the 'populism' umbrella.

Third, this category misleads interpretations of political alternatives. If the problem is 'populism' (excessive simplification, rejection of elites, anti-intellectualism), then the solution is 'restoration of the centre, defence of institutions, respect for expertise.' This is precisely the line that liberalism has attempted and failed over the past decade. The line of Macron, Scholz, and Kamala Harris.

A Marxist reconceptualisation is different. The current global right-wing phenomenon is an attempt to manage the crisis of neoliberal capital accumulation through authoritarian state intervention. In Trotskyist terms, as our first part noted, one form of this crisis management is on a path of fascisation, another (Meloni, Bolsonaro) is closer to a Bonapartism between traditional conservatism and fascism, and another (Milei) is an extreme form of libertarianism. But the common function of these variants is one: shifting the costs of the capital accumulation crisis onto workers, immigrants, minorities, women, and peripheral nations.

6. 2008 and After — Why Precisely Now?

Finally, the question of timing. Why did this wave erupt intensively after 2008, rather than during the heyday of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s?

The 2008 global financial crisis and its management were decisive. The state bailed out giant financial capital, and the costs were passed onto workers, the public sector, and the periphery through austerity. The austerity imposed on Greece, Portugal, and Italy during the Eurozone crisis (2010–12), mass home foreclosures in the US, and UK Conservative austerity are archetypal examples.

This process generated the decomposition of two crucial forms of trust. (a) Trust in capitalism's capacity for self-adjustment collapsed. 2008 was the effective end of the 'End of History' thesis. (b) Trust in the managerial capacity of centrist liberal parties collapsed. The US Democratic Party, the British Labour Party (Blair's successors), the French Socialist Party, the German SPD, the Italian Democratic Party — all were managers of austerity.

The first reaction after 2008 came from the left. The US 'Occupy Wall Street' (2011), the Spanish Indignados (2011), the Syriza government in Greece (2015), the Sanders surge (2016), the Corbyn Labour Party in the UK (2015–19), the rise of Mélenchon in France. However, this left wave was mostly frustrated at the barriers of institutional politics (Corbyn, Sanders), capitulated after taking office (Syriza), or fragmented (Podemos).

With the left alternative blocked, the energy of the same crisis was channelled into right-wing forms. This is the political logic of the right-wing wave after 2016. Brexit, Trump's first term, Bolsonaro, the Italian right-wing coalition, the rise of the AfD, Milei, Le Pen — all follow the blockage of the left wave of 2008–15.

Trump's re-election in 2024 is neither the completion nor the peak of this cycle. It represents the point where authoritarian neoliberalism as a crisis management regime becomes the standard form in advanced capitalism.

7. Conclusion of Part 2 — Questions Leading to Part 3

The conclusions of this installment are threefold.

First, Trump's second term is not an isolated American phenomenon. It is one axis of a global political reorganisation created by 30 years of neoliberalism. If Korean analysis approaches it only from the perspective of 'American political exceptionalism,' it will miss this structure.

Second, the fundamental cause of the right's rise does not lie in culture, morality, or media. It lies in the structural crisis of capital accumulation and the failure of left politics to adapt. Therefore, liberal strategies of 'restoring dignity' will not work — the last decade has proven this.

Third, the right-wing forces are not abolishing neoliberalism. They are reorganising it in an authoritarian fashion. Tariffs and protectionist rhetoric are merely tools for mobilisation; the content remains redistribution favourable to capital, attacks on labour rights, welfare cuts, and the scapegoating of racialised people and immigrants. Milei is the clearest example, with the AfD and Meloni as its European counterparts.

This conclusion raises the question for the next installment. If so, what is the specific ideological composition of Trumpism? How do the three currents of white supremacy, evangelicalism, and the techno-right (tech bros) combine? In particular, is the conjunction of 'tech capital + far-right ideology' symbolised by the Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, and J.D. Vance axis unprecedented, or is it merely a digital version of old fascism? [Part 3 dissects this ideological conjunction.]

References

  1. Uprising, Neoliberalism and the Future
  2. Fortune Korea, "Stop Blaming China": The Real Culprit Behind the Rust Belt Collapse
  3. Chosun Ilbo 2025.05.14, Tried to Save the Rust Belt… But Investment in the US Flows South
  4. DW 2024, Germany's AfD: The new neoliberal workers' party?
  5. Jacobin 2024.02, France's Far Right Is Gaining Where the Left Has Crumbled
  6. WSWS 2023.08.04, Italy's Meloni wages war on the poor
  7. Fondapol, Fratelli d'Italia: neo-fascist heritage, populism and conservatism
  8. Stanford History, Javier Milei and Jair Bolsonaro Are Both Products of Neoliberalism in Its Age of Decay
  9. Semafor 2025.04, Argentina poverty rate falls in boost to Milei
  10. Al Jazeera 2024.12, Inflation down, poverty up as Milei takes chainsaw to Argentina's economy
  11. Carnegie Endowment 2026.04, Right-Wing Populism and Strategic Realignment: Argentina's Milei Experiment
  12. Counterpunch 2024.07, Thanks to a Massive Mobilization of the Left in France, the Far Right Cannot Control the Government

Series Table of Contents

  • [Part 1 — Examining the Validity of the Fascism Thesis: A Class Diagnosis](/reports/research/trump-global-right-01.md)
  • Part 2 — Structural Roots: The Reckoning of 30 Years of Neoliberalism, Europe and South America Compared (This article)
  • Part 3 — The Ideology of Trumpism: The Tripartite Alliance of White Supremacy, Evangelicalism, and the Techno-Right (Forthcoming)
  • Part 4 — Trump Amidst the Reorganisation of Imperialism: Tariffs, Alliance Dismantling, and Imperialism in the Age of Hegemonic Decline (Forthcoming)
  • Part 5 — Response Strategies: The Defend-Democracy Line vs. the Radical Left, and Implications for the South Korean Left (Forthcoming)