번역

Theses of the E.C.C.I. on Japan

인물블라디미르 레닌, 장제스 용어27년 테제, 코민테른, 일본 공산당, 후쿠모토주의, 야마카와주의, 노동농민당, 일본노농당, 일본노동조합평의회, 일본노동총동맹, 일본농민조합, 입헌정우회, 헌정회 사건일본공산당의 창당과 탄압, 전향

VI. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE TRADE UNIONS. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE MASS LABOUR ORGANISATIONS. THE UNITED FRONT PROBLEM

It has already been pointed out that the development of the Communist Party as an independent organisation is a decisive factor in the development of the Japanese revolutionary movement. In this connection, the necessity for a rapid and decisive liquidation of the old mistakes of the leaders of the Communist Party, particularly the deviation represented by Comrade Hoski was emphasised. Lately, however, another, a counter-deviation, has gained much influence in the Party. The leader of this tendency is Comrade Kuroki.

The Communist Party of Japan will be in a position to solve its historical tasks only as a mass party. There is no doubt that the Communist Party of Japan must work energetically in raising its ideological level. It must definitely realise that without "revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement". But it must just as definitely realise that without a revolutionary mass struggle, without actual and strong connections with the masses, theory is futile. The Communist Party of Japan must become a workers' party not only in aim but also in composition. Its proletarian kernel must first of all be greatly strengthened.

If it is erroneous and disastrous to adopt the course of dissolving the Communist Party in the Left wing of the trade union movement, it is no less erroneous to be isolated from the mass organisations of the proletariat. The "split and unity theory" advanced by Comrade Kuroki is nothing but the substantiation of such policy and differs most radically and decisively from Leninism. Instead of analysing the concrete tasks facing the Communist Party of Japan, and the methods of their solution given by history, Comrade Kuroki proceeds from artificially and arbitrarily formulated abstractions and is occupying himself with the development and application of principles of logic instead of trying to understand the actual relationship.

Mass organisations are on the one hand the reservoir from which the Communist Party gathers new forces and on the other hand a transmission belt which connects the vanguard with its class, with the whole mass of the workers. The larger the proletarian mass organisations, the greater are the possibilities of the Communist Party's reservoir, the broader is the audience which the Communists can address. The policy of splitting the mass organisations is therefore a policy of breaking up the reservoirs, limiting the radius of its activity, weakening of connection with the masses and self-isolation from the masses. It is hardly necessary to prove that such policy has nothing in common with Bolshevism.

At the same time, the policy of splitting the mass organisations practically means nothing but the abandonment of the struggle for the Social Democratic workers, the abandonment of the struggle for the conquest of the centrist workers, an abandonment of the exposition of the avowed reformism of the Rights and the tacit reformism of the "Lefts" concealed by "Left" Social Democratic phrases. Such abandonment would undoubtedly be of service to the Social Democrats, but it has nothing to do with Bolshevism.

The labour movement of Japan is still very young and poorly organised, in spite of the fact that the most advanced section of the Japanese proletariat is rapidly developing ideologically, having passed through the state of pure syndicalism and trade unionism, towards the adoption of the ideas of the political class struggle — ideas which are lately being adopted by the vanguard of the Japanese proletariat. The Japanese proletariat has no revolutionary traditions. It has no great experience in the class struggle. Out of the 4.5 million factory and transport workers of Japan, there are only about 300,000 in the trade unions and political parties which are broken up into several competing organisations. It is the task of the Communists to fight against this situation and for the creation of mass organisations of the Japanese proletariat. The policy of the Japanese Communists by splitting such organisations as the Rodo Sodomei, Nomin Kumiai, etc., was therefore radically wrong. The presence of mass proletarian organisations is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for the normal and healthy development of the Communist Party. The struggle against the opportunist and reformist leaders must be carried on in such a way as not to estrange the Left elements of the trade unions and mass parties but to fight within these organisations by exposing the leaders and winning over the masses from them. Otherwise the Communists take the risk of becoming isolated from the mass labour movement. Communists must take active part in the everyday struggles of the working class and by doing so assume leadership in those struggles. They must prove to the workers that they are really the only staunch and consistent fighters for the interests of the proletariat. This is particularly necessary now when the bourgeoisie is waging an extensive and energetic offensive against the workers.

Broad mass organisations of the proletariat are the only possible basis for the Communist Parties. Not to understand this would be a most dangerous error for the young Communist movement of Japan.

The policy of mechanically politicising the trade unions as advocated by Comrade Kuroki must therefore be considered absolutely wrong. It has as its basis the absolute misunderstanding of the distinctions between a political party and a trade union, and the substitution of one by the other. In reality this leads to self-isolation from the mass movement, to the abandonment of the struggle against the reformists for the conquest of the mass proletarian organisations. What is necessary is not the mechanical politisation of the trade unions but the strengthening of the Left fractions within them, the strengthening of the influence of Hiogikai in them, and the consolidation and organisational strengthening of the Hiogikai itself.

The policy of strengthening and consolidating the trade unions and of winning them from within must be also extended in relation to the broad workers' and peasants' parties. The Communist Party must especially try in due course, to merge the workers and peasants' party — the Ronoto — which is largely under Communist influence, with the Nichiroto which is now under centrist influence. The desperate opposition shown by the latter to such unity must be broken by the workers. This is one of the immediate tasks of the Japanese Communists.

Comrade Kuroki's point of view leading to the tactical isolation of the party from the masses, leads also to the actual ruin of the Communist Party as a mass Party. This "split and unity theory" is not accidentally linked up with the exceeding and un-called for emphasis merely on the purely ideological aspect and the complete ignoring of the economical, political and organisational aspects. This, in turn, leads to the inadmissible overestimation of the intellectuals, to the isolation from the working masses, to sectarianism, to the idea that the Party is a group of "Marxian minded people" — primarily, of course, intellectual people — and not a militant organisation of the working class. The Communist Party must decisively put an end to this caricature on Leninism, which Kuroki himself has already rejected.

To win the Social Democratic and centrist workers, to conquer the trade unions and mass parties from within by means of the proposed united front tactic, meet, of course, with certain difficulties. Here particularly, big mistakes may be made by a young party which has not much experience in the class struggle. From this point of view the Japanese Communists must study especially the mistakes committed by the Communist Party of China in the Kuomintang. It stands to reason that the differences between the conditions in China and Japan must be taken into consideration. By adopting the united front tactic, the Communist Party must by no means lose its identity. By no means must it submit to the influence of those whom it is combating; it must preserve its absolute independence both ideologically and organisationally. It stands to reason that in speaking of a united front, it is necessary to have in mind not only a united front of the small illegal Communist Party with legal mass organisations such as the Ronoto and Toitsu Domai, but also a united front of mass organisations (the Ronoto Party for instance), under the influence of the Communist Party, with the mass Social Democratic and centrist organisations.

It goes without saying that the united front shall be effected strictly upon working class issues and fought for along class lines and, furthermore, no concessions of an ideological character given.

By organising the working class for the struggle against capitalism, the Communist Party must at the same time not fold its arms, but work for the creation of a revolutionary workers' and peasants' bloc and for guaranteeing to the working class the hegemony in that bloc. The Communist Party must support and organise the struggle of the peasantry for restricting taxation and for reducing rent. It must utilise the revolutionary activity of the peasants in the struggle against the war menace. It must lead the struggle of all toilers of Japan for the democratisation of the Japanese State for the liquidation of its feudal elements without at the same time forgetting the general perspectives of the transformation of the bourgeois democratic revolution into a Socialist revolution. The Communist Party must get into close contact with the liberation movement of the Japanese colonies and lend it all possible ideological and organisational support.

The Communist Party must energetically overcome that which was hitherto the greatest misfortune and shortcoming in its leadership, namely, the sectarian spirit. The slogan "closer to the masses" is very acute today in Japan.

Particularly, in this connection, the complete absence of work among the youth must be considered as a most serious error which must be overcome as soon as possible. This work will be of extraordinary importance in connection with the imminent war danger.

Finally, the Communist Party must fulfil with all its energy, its foremost duty at the present time as an organisation of international revolutionaries, namely, it must fight against Japanese intervention in China and against the preparation of war against the U.S.S.R.

Based on this, the Communist Party of Japan must advance the following programme of action and issue the following slogans:

  1. Fight against the menace of imperialist war.
  2. Hands off the Chinese revolution.
  3. To the defence of the U.S.S.R.
  4. Absolute independence for the colonies.
  5. Dissolution of parliament.
  6. Abolition of the monarchy.
  7. Universal suffrage for both sexes from the age of 18.
  8. Right of assembly, association, coalition, etc., freedom of speech and of the press.
  9. The eight hour working day.
  10. Insurance of the unemployed.
  11. Annulment of anti-labour laws.
  12. Confiscation of the estates of the Mikado, landlords, governments and church.
  13. Establishment of a progressive income tax.

These partial demands and slogans must be linked up with the slogan of the workers and peasants' government and the slogan of the proletarian dictatorship. Only with the help of systematic propaganda of these slogans will progress be made in the political education of the proletarian masses, in the organisation of the workers' and peasants' bloc, and in the preparation of a real revolutionary mass struggle.

The struggle for these demands leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat. But this struggle will be successful only if there will be a sound and ideologically consistent Leninist discipline, a centralised and mass Communist Party, fighting jointly with the world Communist Party marching shoulder to shoulder with the entire Communist International.

The admission by the Japanese delegation of its mistakes and its adoption of all directives and decisions of the Communist International, serve as a guarantee that the Communist Party of Japan will be able to overcome the deviations existing within it, will be able to take a correct political and organisational course in its work, will be able to cope with the great tasks raised before it by history.