The last Komsomol heavyweight who ran the Soviet publishing empire
The day after Yegorychev openly criticised Brezhnev's defence policy at the 1967 CC plenum, Pastukhov called him: "I'm proud of you." Yegorychev replied: "Borya, why did you do that? You've ruined your life."
A Soviet functionary who led the Komsomol as First Secretary from 1977 to 1982, heading the 40-million-strong youth organisation at the height of the Brezhnev era. He oversaw massive youth mobilisation (the BAM railway, the first ski expedition to the North Pole) and became a full member of the CPSU Central Committee in 1978. As chairman of Goskomizdat (1982–1986) he ran the Soviet publishing and censorship apparatus, then served as ambassador to Denmark and to Afghanistan during the withdrawal and its aftermath. After the Soviet collapse he continued as Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister, CIS Affairs Minister, and State Duma deputy, embodying the late Soviet elite's continuity into post-Soviet governance.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1958Graduated Bauman Moscow Higher Technical School (mechanical engineering); 2nd Secretary, Bauman District Komsomol
- 1959–1961First Secretary, Bauman District Komsomol, Moscow
- 1961–1962Second Secretary, Moscow City Komsomol Committee
- 1962–1964First Secretary, Moscow City Komsomol Committee
- 1964–1977Secretary, Komsomol Central Committee
- 1977–1982First Secretary, Komsomol Central Committee
- 1982–1986Chairman, USSR State Committee for Publishing, Printing and Book Trade (Goskomizdat)
- 1986–1989Ambassador of the USSR to Denmark
- 1989–1992Ambassador of the USSR/Russia to Afghanistan
- 1992–1996Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation
- 1996–1998First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation
- 1998–1999Minister for CIS Affairs, Russian Federation
Ambassador to Afghanistan and the fall of Najibullah’s government
Pastukhov took up his post in Afghanistan after the Soviet troop withdrawal in 1989. In a 2016 retrospective, he said that Eduard Shevardnadze had offered him the Kabul ambassadorship and that his assignment was to keep the local government going for at least several months after the withdrawal. His ambassadorship continued until 1992. Afghanistan analyst Thomas Ruttig describes this period as spanning the final Soviet years under Najibullah and the transition to the Russian Federation.
Pastukhov criticized Russia’s decision to end support for Najibullah’s government. He argued that ending fuel supplies weakened the Afghan military’s air and armored capabilities, and that withdrawing support which might have sustained Najibullah longer was a grave Russian mistake. He also recalled that trainloads of aviation fuel bound for Afghanistan disappeared en route from Kaspiysk, while saying he could not identify who had decided to stop the supply. These are his retrospective assessments of policy and recollections, and should be distinguished from independently established accounts of responsibility. Ruttig’s study separately records that the United States and Soviet Union agreed in September 1991 to end military support to the warring Afghan sides simultaneously, and that mujahideen forces took Kabul in April 1992.