The man whose statecraft was not rocking the boat
On 7 October 1979, at the GDR's 30th-anniversary celebrations in East Berlin, photographer Régis Bossu captured Brezhnev and Erich Honecker in a socialist fraternal kiss. The photograph became the basis of Dmitri Vrubel's 1990 Berlin Wall mural, 'My God, Help Me to Survive This Deadly Love'.
He took part in Khrushchev's removal and replaced him as First Secretary, consolidating power by the late 1960s. He was General Secretary from 1964 until his death in 1982, and twice Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 1960–1964 and 1977–1982. After the Khrushchev Thaw his rule brought increased repression and censorship: by the mid-1970s an estimated 10,000 political and religious prisoners were held. Hostile to reform, he presided over the 'Era of Stagnation' of corruption and shortages; after 1975 his health collapsed and he withdrew from governing while remaining the highest authority. Abroad he ordered the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and approved the 1979 intervention in Afghanistan, while pursuing détente and reaching nuclear parity with the United States. He was made a Hero of the Soviet Union four times; his 1978 Order of Victory was annulled in 1989.
Activities and affiliations
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1946–1982
Soviet Communist Party and BolsheviksParty leadershipMain
Political and party leadership- First Secretary of the Central Committee1964–1966
- General Secretary of the Central Committee1966–1982
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1960–1964
Soviet Union state institutionsFormal heads of state
Legislature and state representation- Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR1960–1964
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1977–1982
Soviet Union state institutionsFormal heads of state
Legislature and state representation- Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR1977–1982
Career Timeline
- 1950–1952First Secretary of Moldavia
- 1954–1956Runs the Virgin Lands campaign in Kazakhstan
- 1960.05.07–1964.07.15Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
- 1964.10Leads Khrushchev’s removal; becomes First Secretary
- 1966.04.08–1982.11.10General Secretary of the Central Committee
- 1968The invasion of Czechoslovakia; the Brezhnev Doctrine
- 1972–1979Détente: SALT I and II, the Helsinki Accords
- 1977The new constitution; head of state as well
- 1979Approves the Afghanistan intervention
The Soviet Politburo
- Candidate 1952.10–1953.03
- Candidate 1956.02–1957.06
- Full member 1957.06–1982.11
1982.11 died in office
The Central Committee Secretariat
- Secretary 1952.10–1953.03
- Secretary 1956.02–1960.07
- Secretary 1963.06–1982.11
1982.11 died in office · First Secretary 1964.10–1966.04, General Secretary 1966.04–1982.11
Related historical events
- 1941–1945The Great Patriotic WarServed as a political officer in the 18th Army, ending the war as a major general
- 1942.07.25–1943.10.09The Battle of the Caucasus (1942–1943)Head of the political department, 18th ArmyAs head of the 18th Army's political department from April 1943 crossed to Malaya Zemlya; the memoir Malaya Zemlya published under his name in 1978 greatly inflated the fight.
- 1956–1969The Sino-Soviet SplitSoviet leader after KhrushchevHe apologized for Malinovsky's remark in 1964, and signalled a thaw in his Tashkent speech of 1982.
- 1957The Anti-Party GroupKhrushchev protégéA Khrushchev supporter who rose after the affair.
- 1957–1965The Soviet Space ProgramParty supervisorAs a Central Committee secretary in the late 1950s he supervised the defense and space industries and supported the early launches.
- 1965–1970The Kosygin ReformCurbed the reformWary of the political risk, he narrowed the scope of the reform.
- 1966–1976The Cultural RevolutionSoviet leader in the 1969 border clashesPressure after Zhenbao Island hastened China’s turn to America.
- 1968The Prague SpringOrdered the interventionHe defined the reforms as a break from the bloc and justified the invasion with the Brezhnev Doctrine.
- 1969–1979Détente and the SALT NegotiationsSoviet co-signatory to SALT and détenteIt was his side that first proposed renouncing nuclear use; at the 1973 Washington return visit he signed the Prevention of Nuclear War agreement and SALT II basic principles with Nixon.
- 1975The Helsinki Accordsdriving force in the Soviet leadershipDrove the conference project throughout the 1970s to win written recognition of inviolable postwar frontiers, pushing through the 1972 Dipoli preparatory talks and the 1973 Helsinki foreign ministers' meeting.
- 1978–1979The Sino-Vietnamese WarSoviet leaderAllied with Vietnam but limited Soviet help to supplies and airlift without direct intervention.
- 1979–1989The Soviet-Afghan WarOrdered the interventionAt the head of an ailing leadership, he approved the intervention in Afghanistan.
- 1980–1981Solidarity and Martial Law in PolandSoviet General SecretaryHe called Solidarity's congress appeal a dangerous, provocative document, yet the crisis showed the USSR would no longer intervene militarily in a satellite.
- 1983The War Scare of 1983General Secretary who launched Operation RYANAt the May 1981 KGB meeting he declared the US was preparing a nuclear surprise attack and ordered the largest peacetime intelligence operation in Soviet history.
How did a factory worker's son become a party official?
Leonid Brezhnev was born on 19 December 1906 in Kamenskoye (now Kamianske), an industrial town on the Dnieper in Ukraine, the son of the metalworker Ilya Brezhnev. His father came from Kursk Governorate, and Brezhnev's nationality was recorded as Ukrainian in some documents and Russian in others. During the famine of 1921–1923 that followed revolution and civil war the family moved to Kursk, where he worked as a porter in a factory.
In 1923 he joined the Komsomol, the Communist youth league, and entered a land-surveying college. After graduating he worked as a surveyor in Belorussia, Kursk and the Urals, where he saw the collectivisation of agriculture at first hand, and in 1929 he became a candidate member of the Communist Party. In 1930 he became head of the land registry in Sverdlovsk but left after half a year to study in Moscow; the German historian Susanne Schattenberg suggests he wanted to escape the violence of collectivisation. Unable to find housing in Moscow, he went home, worked at the Dnieper Metallurgical Combine and studied thermal engineering in an evening programme, qualifying as an engineer in 1935.
His rise coincided with the Great Purge of 1936–1938, in which Stalin's regime arrested and executed hundreds of thousands of party, state and military officials. The vacancies were filled quickly by young officials with technical training, Brezhnev among them. He became director of a technical college in 1936, deputy chairman of the city soviet in 1937, an official of the Dnepropetrovsk regional party committee in 1938 and its propaganda secretary in 1939. In these years he met Nikita Khrushchev, who had just taken over the Ukrainian party, and that relationship shaped the rest of his career. The colleagues he gathered in Dnepropetrovsk later became the network known as the "Dnepropetrovsk mafia".
When Germany invaded in 1941 he organised the evacuation of factories eastwards and mobilisation, then asked to be called up and was posted to the political organs of the Southern Front. After service on the North Caucasus Front he became head of the political department of the 18th Army in April 1943. A political department chief was responsible for morale, party organisation and political education, and shared the leadership of the army with its commander. The 18th Army advanced through Ukraine towards the Carpathians; he was made a major general in 1944, and at the end of the war he entered Prague as chief political officer of the 4th Ukrainian Front.
The war was both a political asset and later raw material for his personality cult. In the 1970s a memoir published under his name, Malaya Zemlya (The Little Land), presented the bridgehead fighting near Novorossiysk as a decisive theatre of the war and was awarded the Lenin Prize for literature. Historians regard it as greatly inflating his actual role. At the same time, scholars point out that his memory of the war underlay his later determination to avoid nuclear war and his pursuit of détente.
How did he climb to second place under Stalin and Khrushchev?
After the war Brezhnev left the army and returned to party work in Ukraine. In 1946 he became first secretary of the Zaporozhye regional party committee, directing the rebuilding of the wrecked dam and steelworks, and in 1947 he moved to the same post in Dnepropetrovsk. A regional first secretary in effect ran not only the party in his region but its administration and economy as well. In these years he brought on loyal associates such as Andrei Kirilenko and Nikolai Shchelokov.
In 1950 he was sent to Moldavia, the republic the Soviet Union had taken from Romania in 1940, as party first secretary, with the task of completing the collectivisation of its agriculture. There Konstantin Chernenko, then head of the propaganda department, became a lifelong associate. At the 19th Party Congress in 1952 he caught Stalin's eye and leapt to the posts of Central Committee secretary and candidate member of the Presidium, as the Politburo was then called.
When Stalin died in March 1953, however, the new leadership cut back the enlarged leading bodies Stalin had created at the end, and Brezhnev was demoted to first deputy head of the armed forces' Main Political Directorate. From that post he took part in the arrest of Lavrentiy Beria in June. In 1954 Khrushchev sent him to Kazakhstan as second secretary of the republic's party, and the following year he became first secretary. There he ran on the ground Khrushchev's flagship Virgin Lands campaign, the mass ploughing of unbroken steppe to raise grain output, and oversaw the building of the Baikonur launch site. It was his good fortune to be recalled to Moscow in 1956, before the campaign's results turned out to be disappointing.
In Moscow he became a candidate member of the Presidium and secretary for the defence industry, supervising the rocket and nuclear weapons programmes. In June 1957, when Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and the so-called Anti-Party Group tried to oust Khrushchev, he sided with Khrushchev and was rewarded with full membership of the Presidium. In May 1960 he became Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the nominal head of state. Real power lay with Khrushchev as party First Secretary and premier, but receiving foreign leaders and presenting decorations made Brezhnev's name known at home and abroad.
In 1963, when Frol Kozlov, Khrushchev's other likely successor, withdrew through illness, Brezhnev returned as a Central Committee secretary, and in 1964 he became Second Secretary, the party's de facto deputy leader. The man Khrushchev had promoted was now placed to remove him. Historians judge that his rise owed less to original policy ideas than to loyalty to his patron, careful management of his network, and a sense for standing on the winning side at decisive moments.
What kind of country did he try to build after ousting Khrushchev?
In October 1964 Brezhnev, together with Suslov, Shelepin and the KGB chairman Semichastny, had Khrushchev summoned back to Moscow from his Black Sea holiday. On 14 October the Presidium and Central Committee removed him, citing economic failures and "voluntarism", and the same day Brezhnev became First Secretary. It was the first time in Soviet history that a supreme leader had left office by a vote rather than through execution or death; Khrushchev retired on a pension. At the time many saw Brezhnev as a caretaker who would "keep the shop" until a real successor emerged.
The new leadership barred any one person from holding the top party and government posts together and proclaimed collective leadership: a "troika" of Brezhnev, premier Alexei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny, later head of state. Brezhnev, however, abolished Shelepin's power base, the Party-State Control Committee, in 1965, gradually removed Podgorny's protégés and in 1966 restored the Stalin-era title of General Secretary. By the mid-1970s he was clearly first among his colleagues, and in 1977 he pushed Podgorny aside and became head of state as well. Unlike Khrushchev, who decided things alone, he governed by consulting colleagues and building consensus.
The word that held his rule together was "stability". Where Khrushchev had unsettled officials with constant reorganisations, Brezhnev promised "trust in cadres" and secured them in their posts. As a result the leadership aged together and corruption accumulated. Ideologically, from 1971 he promoted the concept of "developed socialism": the Soviet Union had already built socialism and was now moving gradually towards communism. The idea explained why Khrushchev's promise of communism by 1980 could not be kept, and justified gradual management over radical reform. It was written into the 1977 Constitution.
The economy did relatively well in his early years. In 1965 Kosygin launched a reform that gave enterprises profit indicators and some autonomy, and industrial output rose strongly during the Eighth Five-Year Plan of 1966–1970. By the early 1970s the USSR led the world in steel, oil, cement and tractors. But the reform petered out amid resistance in the leadership, and after the mid-1970s growth fell to 1–2 percent a year. Military spending took a large share of output, and grain had to be imported. Gorbachev later called the period the "Era of Stagnation". Yet consumption per head rose substantially, and free education, health care and housing, full employment and a lower pension age gave many citizens a settled life. That is why Russian polls today rank the Brezhnev years as the best time of the twentieth century to have lived.
The other face of stability was repression. In 1966 the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel were tried in public and sent to the camps for publishing abroad, the first such writers' trial since Stalin. The KGB under Andropov watched dissidents and confined some in psychiatric hospitals; by the mid-1970s political and religious prisoners were estimated at about 10,000. There was, however, no return to the mass purges of the 1930s.
How did the invasion of Prague and détente coexist in one man's foreign policy?
The first foreign crisis of Brezhnev's rule was the Prague Spring of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. When the Czechoslovak Communist Party under Alexander Dubček abolished censorship and pursued democratisation within the party and market-oriented economic reform, the East German and Polish leaders and hardliners in Moscow saw the start of "counter-revolution". Declassified documents show that although Brezhnev publicly denounced the Czechoslovak leadership as "revisionist", he was not the strongest advocate of force in the Politburo and for a time sought a compromise. In the end he concluded that staying out would bring growing turmoil at home and across the bloc. On the night of 20 August hundreds of thousands of Warsaw Pact troops entered Czechoslovakia, and Dubček and his colleagues were taken to Moscow and made to sign the Moscow Protocol.
After the invasion the Soviet Union argued that a threat to socialism in one socialist country was the concern of all of them and justified intervention. The West called this the Brezhnev Doctrine; in practice it formalised a policy followed since the 1956 intervention in Hungary. The doctrine froze the prospects of reform in the Eastern bloc, but it also spurred Eurocommunism, as West European communist parties distanced themselves from Moscow. China too took it as a threat, and in 1969 Soviet and Chinese troops clashed on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in the Ussuri River.
The same leader led East–West détente in the 1970s. In 1974 Brezhnev told US President Ford that he did not want to "inflict that on the people once again", meaning war. At the same time he regarded military parity with the United States as the precondition for negotiation. Defence spending rose by 40 percent between 1965 and 1970, and the USSR reached nuclear parity with the United States for the first time. On that basis he and Nixon signed the SALT I agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty at the 1972 Moscow summit. With Willy Brandt's West German government the 1970 Moscow Treaty confirmed the postwar borders.
Détente peaked with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. The West recognised the inviolability of Europe's postwar frontiers, and in return the USSR signed provisions on human rights. Brezhnev saw it as a diplomatic victory that won international recognition for Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, but human rights activists inside and outside the Soviet Union began to hold the regime to precisely those provisions.
Détente collapsed in the late 1970s. Washington saw the spread of Soviet influence in the Third World, in Angola and Ethiopia, as a breach of détente, and the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range missiles and the 1979 intervention in Afghanistan were the final blows. When the independent trade union Solidarity in Poland grew to nearly ten million members in 1980–1981, East Germany pressed for military intervention. Yet in December 1981 Brezhnev's leadership told the Polish leaders that the USSR would intervene only if asked; Poland declared martial law on its own. Scholars see this as the moment the limits of the Brezhnev Doctrine became plain.
The 1969 shooting at the Borovitsky Gate
On 22 January 1969 a motorcade carrying Brezhnev was entering the Kremlin to welcome the Soyuz 4 and 5 cosmonauts. The shots were aimed at the second limousine, which the gunman believed carried Brezhnev. Brezhnev was unhurt, but the driver Ilya Zharkov was killed and a guard and cosmonauts were wounded. It was the first direct attempt on a Soviet leader since Fanny Kaplan's attempt on Lenin in August 1918.
The shooter was Viktor Ilyin, born in 1947 in Leningrad. He resented conscription and was distressed by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. He stole two Makarov pistols, deserted, put on a stolen Militsiya uniform, and fired at the second limousine, carrying Leonov, Tereshkova, Beregovoy and Nikolayev. To his KGB interrogator Yuri Andropov he said he acted to have Brezhnev replaced by Mikhail Suslov, whom he called 'the most outstanding person in the party at the moment'; whether this was genuine or an attempt to provoke Politburo infighting is unknown.
Ilyin was charged with attempted murder, terrorism and desertion but pronounced insane and held in a psychiatric hospital: the Kazan Psychiatric Hospital, then one near Leningrad. He was released in 1990, and knowledge of the attack became public only after the USSR dissolved in 1991. The incident was suppressed: an official statement two days later did not say whether the shooter was a man or a woman.
The attempt belongs to the crackdown that followed the Prague Spring. On 25 August 1968 eight demonstrators protested the invasion at Red Square, holding a Czechoslovak flag and slogans such as 'For your freedom and ours', and were beaten and arrested by KGB men. At the October 1968 trial seven received terms of penal colony, exile or psychiatric imprisonment, with Fainberg and later Gorbanevskaya sent to psychiatric prisons.
What did an ailing leader and a cult of medals leave to Soviet politics?
Brezhnev's health declined sharply from the mid-1970s. Years of heavy smoking and dependence on sleeping pills and tranquillisers led to a deterioration of his central nervous system from about 1973, and in 1975 he suffered his first heart attack and a stroke. In 1976 doctors revived him from clinical death. Afterwards his speech was slurred and his gait unsteady, and the Ministry of Health kept doctors at his side at all times.
As the leader became unable to work, real decisions passed to a circle of colleagues. KGB chairman Andropov, foreign minister Gromyko and defence minister Grechko (from 1976 Ustinov) in effect ran foreign and security policy. Yet the leadership did not retire him. More and more officials were unhappy with his policies, but nobody wanted the power struggle and turmoil his departure would bring. The German historian Schattenberg argues that by the time of the 1979 decision to intervene in Afghanistan Brezhnev no longer led foreign policy and was led by his colleagues.
Precisely as his health failed, his personality cult grew. He was made Hero of the Soviet Union on his birthdays, four times in all, Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1976, and in 1978 he received the Order of Victory, previously given only to commanders who had turned the course of the war; the award was revoked in 1989 as not meeting the statute. A memoir trilogy published under his name became required reading in schools. His appetite for decorations fuelled countless political jokes; when Podgorny warned him about them, he is said to have replied, "If they are poking fun at me, it means they like me."
When the party ideologist Suslov died in January 1982, Andropov took over his post and entered the succession race. In March Brezhnev broke his collarbone when a balustrade collapsed on him during a visit to an aircraft factory in Tashkent. On 7 November he watched the parade for the 65th anniversary of the revolution from the top of Lenin's Mausoleum, and three days later, on 10 November, he died of a heart attack. After three days of national mourning and a state funeral he was buried in his marshal's uniform by the Kremlin Wall; Cuba, India, Afghanistan and other countries also declared mourning. Andropov succeeded him.
He ruled the Soviet Union longer than anyone except Stalin. Under Gorbachev his years were defined as the "Era of Stagnation", when reform was shunned and the system aged, and Western scholarship largely accepts that judgement. In Russia, on the other hand, polls in 1999, 2007 and 2013 named him the best leader of the twentieth century or the leader of the era people would most like to have lived in. The memory of a peaceful time that avoided nuclear war and raised living standards stands alongside the verdict that by postponing reform he laid the conditions for the Soviet collapse.
December 1979 — the Afghanistan decision
On 12 December 1979, a handful of Politburo members met in Brezhnev's Kremlin office. One item on the agenda: should the USSR send troops into Afghanistan?
As late as that spring the Soviet leadership had refused. The People's Democratic Party, which had seized power in a coup in April 1978, provoked rebellion with its coercive rule, and after the Herat uprising of March 1979 Nur Muhammad Taraki repeatedly asked Moscow for direct military intervention. Brezhnev opposed it and only agreed to send more military and civilian specialists. In September he urged Taraki, visiting Moscow, to reconcile with Hafizullah Amin, warning that their feud could damage the revolution. Soon afterwards Taraki was killed on Amin's orders.
KGB chairman Andropov and Foreign Minister Gromyko pressed Brezhnev: the Amin regime was unstable, the CIA was meddling. A Soviet intervention could be swift and limited. The KGB report that Amin was a CIA agent was unsubstantiated. Brezhnev reluctantly agreed. On 25 December, Soviet troops crossed the border and transport planes began landing in Kabul. On 27 December, special forces stormed the presidential palace and killed Amin.
Brezhnev probably thought this was a short 'internationalist duty.' In February 1980 the leadership began to consider withdrawal, and Brezhnev agreed it would take a year or two. Instead, it became the Soviet Vietnam: a decade of war, 1.5 million Afghans dead, 15,000 Soviet soldiers killed, and the USSR's moral and fiscal ruin. Some six years after Brezhnev's death, Soviet forces withdrew. His last major decision hastened the empire's end.