1956–1969

The Sino-Soviet Split

How did the two largest socialist states come to name each other the main enemy?

The Sino-Soviet split is the process by which the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China moved from ideological dispute in the late 1950s to a rupture of state relations in the 1960s and to armed clashes on the border in 1969. It began with the Twentieth Congress. The Chinese party called the demotion of Stalin and the line of peaceful coexistence revisionism, a compromise with imperialism and an abandonment of revolution. Conflicts of state interest ran alongside. In 1958 China took the Soviet proposal of a joint fleet as an infringement of sovereignty, and the same year it shelled Jinmen without informing Moscow. In 1959 Moscow put off its help with Chinese nuclear weapons and stayed neutral in China's border clashes with India. In 1960 the Soviet Union withdrew all 1,390 of its specialists in China at once, cutting the spine of economic cooperation. The argument spread through the international communist movement, forcing parties everywhere to choose a side.

Two countries that began in the same camp

In December 1949 Mao Zedong went to Moscow as leader of the new People's Republic of China. At their first meeting on 16 December Stalin signalled that he did not want a new alliance, and Mao spent weeks in Moscow while the negotiations stalled. Recalling that stay to Khrushchev in 1958, Mao said that when Soviet officials suggested he tour the country, he answered that he had only three tasks left: eating, sleeping and defecating. Stalin eventually changed course, Zhou Enlai joined to work out the details, and the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was concluded on 14 February 1950. 1 2

The treaty was the new state's first security guarantee. The Soviet Union gave a credit of 300 million dollars, promised military aid if Japan attacked, and undertook to hand the Chinese Changchun Railway in Manchuria, Lüshun (Port Arthur) and Dalian to China; in return China recognized the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic. In March 1950 and July 1951 four agreements set up Sino-Soviet joint companies in civil aviation, oil, non-ferrous metals and other fields, which Mao regarded as embodying Soviet paternalism and distrust. Nor was the credit free. Between 1954 and 1959 China paid with 160,000 tons of tungsten ore, 110,000 tons of copper, 30,000 tons of antimony and 90,000 tons of rubber, and under Khrushchev a plan was drawn up for China to repay even the costs of the Korean War over eight years. 3 4 5

Even so, the first half of the 1950s was a time of cooperation. The Soviet Union supported the industrial programme known as the 156 key projects and infrastructure such as the Wuhan Yangtze River Bridge. When a delegation led by Khrushchev visited Beijing from 29 September to 12 October 1954 for the fifth anniversary of the republic, Moscow handed over its shares in the joint companies in Xinjiang and Dalian without compensation and agreed to return the Lüshun naval base by 31 May 1955. English-language accounts put the exchange at about ten thousand technicians and some 1,500 political advisers, with 60 percent of China's exports going to the Soviet Union by 1955. Russian accounts record that in informal talks the two leaders agreed on the "equal status" of the two countries in the international movement and on a division of labour that gave China responsibility for Asia. 6 7 3

The hierarchy was nonetheless clear. Even the declaration of the 1957 Moscow conference kept the phrase "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union". The international communist movement had one centre, and the centre was Moscow. Since the 1930s the Chinese party had regarded Comintern instructions as ill-suited to Chinese conditions, and Mao believed that his victory had been won by his own struggle rather than with Stalin's support. The split begins at the moment that premise is shaken. 6

The Twentieth Congress as the dividing line

Khrushchev's secret speech "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet party in February 1956 struck the Chinese party twice over. The first blow was its content. An attack on the cult of Stalin and on the Great Purge was an argument that could be turned straight back on Mao, who was building his authority the same way, and Chinese-language accounts say Mao feared that a "Chinese Khrushchev" might emerge in his own party to repudiate him. The second blow was procedure: a decision able to shake the whole socialist camp had been made without consulting the fraternal parties. Declassified records and later research show, however, that the speech was not a solo act by Khrushchev but had the approval of the party Presidium and Central Committee, and that a commission under Pyotr Pospelov had been set up as early as December 1955. 6 3

China answered at once. Meeting the Soviet ambassador in late March 1956, Mao spoke at length about Stalin's wrongs towards China but stressed that Stalin had been "a great Marxist" whose mistakes concerned certain issues, not everything. The People's Daily editorial of 5 April, "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", conceded that Stalin had made grave mistakes in his later years, but after listing the Soviet Union's achievements it wrote that "among them is Stalin's ineffaceable contribution". Mao later said that an assessment of Stalin as three parts error and seven parts achievement was about right. 3 8 6

The upheavals in Poland and Hungary later that year looked, from Beijing, like the consequence of the denunciation. At a meeting of the Chinese central committee in November 1956 Mao said the Russians had thrown away "the sword of Stalin" completely and "the sword of Lenin" to a considerable extent, while the Chinese kept both. The deeper dispute concerned the line the congress advanced alongside the speech. The so-called "three peacefuls" (peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition and the peaceful transition to socialism) rested on the judgment that nuclear war could destroy humanity and that coexistence was therefore the only option. The Chinese party held that a new world war was unavoidable and that what would perish in it was imperialism, not humanity, and the disagreement later hardened into the mutual labels of "revisionism" and "dogmatism". 3 6 9

Moscow 1957: the bomb agreement and the east wind

In June 1957 Khrushchev defeated the "Anti-Party Group" of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich, but he still had many enemies inside and outside the party. When Anastas Mikoyan came to Beijing on 5 July to seek support, Mao quickly sided with Khrushchev, and China turned the moment into nuclear negotiations. A delegation led by Nie Rongzhen went to Moscow in September, and on 15 October the two countries signed what became known as the New Technology for National Defense Agreement. The Soviet Union undertook to help build a complete Chinese atomic industry, to hand over a teaching model of an atomic bomb with its blueprints, and to sell equipment for enriching uranium. 10 6

A month later, from 16 to 19 November and timed for the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, an international meeting of 64 communist and workers' parties met in Moscow. In his speech of 18 November Mao publicly backed Khrushchev against the Anti-Party Group, the only known statement of its kind. The meeting adopted the Moscow Declaration, which stressed the unity of the camp "headed by the Soviet Union", and China signed after some hesitation. Mao summed up the international situation at this time with the phrase "the east wind prevails over the west wind", meaning that the socialist forces now outweighed the imperialist ones. 11 6 12

At the same meeting Mao startled the delegates with remarks on nuclear war. According to several records he said that if half of the world's 2.7 billion people died, half would remain, imperialism would be razed and the world would become socialist. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs that the hall went "dead silent", and Czechoslovakia's Antonín Novotný objected that his country had only twelve million people. The Chinese historian Shen Zhihua holds that the remarks frightened East European leaders away from following China, but also that Moscow deliberately distorted the Chinese position in the later polemic; in 1963 the Chinese government called the "300 million" quotation a Soviet slander. The Soviet leadership was shocked, though it did not change its policy at once. 3 6 10

When aid becomes leverage: 1958 and 1959

In April 1958 the Soviet Union proposed building a joint radio transmitter on the Chinese coast. According to Peng Dehuai, Defence Minister Malinovsky had asked for a long-wave station to direct the Soviet submarine fleet in the Pacific, at a total cost of 110 million rubles, 70 million from Moscow and 40 million from Beijing. China countered that the station should be Chinese-owned and used by the Soviets only in wartime. When Zhou Enlai asked on 28 June for help with designs for new submarines, Ambassador Pavel Yudin proposed on 21 July, in Khrushchev's name, that the two countries form a joint submarine flotilla. 3 5

The next day Mao called Yudin back and argued at length. According to the Chinese minutes he said, "Yesterday you made me so enraged that I could not sleep at all last night", and that since each side would own fifty percent of the flotilla it was a question of ownership: unless the Soviets came as advisers to train the Chinese, they might as well lease Lüshun and other ports for ninety-nine years. He told Yudin that the Russians trusted only Russians and treated the Chinese as inferior. Khrushchev came to Beijing secretly from 31 July to 3 August, repeatedly disavowed the joint fleet as a misunderstanding, and the radio station was settled as a project built with Soviet credit. Mao later recalled: "In fact the falling-out with the Soviet Union was in 1958. They wanted to control China militarily, and we would not have it." 5 1 2 3 6

On 23 August the People's Liberation Army began shelling Jinmen, opening the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. China launched the bombardment, timed while American attention was on Lebanon, without telling Moscow in advance. Shen Zhihua interprets the sequence as Mao having a joint communiqué announcing "complete agreement on international questions" issued right after Khrushchev's visit and then opening fire, so that Washington and Taipei would take it as an operation the two had planned together. Khrushchev warned Eisenhower on 7 September that an attack on China would be an attack on the Soviet Union, but he was alarmed that a decision he had not been told about could drag him into a clash with the United States. China's refusal to hand over an American Sidewinder missile captured during the crisis, which it gave to the Soviets months later with key parts missing, added to the resentment. 13 10 6 7

The Great Leap Forward and the people's communes were another irritant. In November 1958 Khrushchev told Poland's Gomułka that the Soviet Union had tried communes thirty years earlier and tired of them, adding that the Chinese would learn once they broke their heads. In July 1959, at a rally on a Polish cooperative farm, he said publicly that the Soviet communes of the 1920s had achieved nothing. Pravda printed the passage in full just as Mao was attacking Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference. On 1 August Mao annotated the material, writing that the Khrushchevs opposed or doubted three things, the Hundred Flowers, the people's communes and the Great Leap Forward, and that "for these three we must do battle with the whole world". 6 3

On 20 June 1959 the Soviet central committee wrote to the Chinese party that delivery of the bomb model would be postponed. Citing the Geneva test-ban talks and the coming summit, the letter said that "if the Western countries should learn that the Soviet Union is giving a sample nuclear weapon and design technical data to China, they may seriously wreck all the efforts undertaken by the socialist countries to strive for peace". It proposed concentrating instead on building a nuclear industry, including the production of fissionable material. China took this as a breach of the 1957 promise and carried on with its bomb using the blueprints and equipment the Soviets had left. 10 6

When the first armed clash broke out on the Sino-Indian border in August, TASS issued a statement neutral between the two sides without consulting Beijing, and China read it as an ally turning its back. Khrushchev, who had visited the United States from 15 to 27 September and spoken of the "spirit of Camp David" with Eisenhower, arrived in Beijing on 30 September for the tenth anniversary of the republic. There was no honour guard, and when he insisted on giving a speech no microphone was provided. In the talks Khrushchev asked for the release of five American prisoners and for restraint over Taiwan, while Mao again demanded nuclear secrets and said the criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress had been unjustified. Khrushchev even quarrelled with Foreign Minister Chen Yi. The talk of 2 October was the two men's last meeting, and the leaders of the two countries did not meet again for thirty years. On 6 October, in Vladivostok, Khrushchev likened China to a "fighting cock". 6 3 7 2

The argument acquires a public language: 1960

On 16 April 1960 Red Flag marked Lenin's ninetieth birthday with the editorial "Long Live Leninism!", followed on 22 April by a speech by Lu Dingyi and a People's Daily editorial. The nominal target was Yugoslav revisionism, but no one doubted that the aim was Khrushchev. Yang Shangkun wrote in his diary that there now seemed to be "two centres and two opinions", and the State Department China specialist Allen Whiting saw the articles as the first clear manifestation of long-accumulating antagonism. After the U-2 incident in May, Mao judged that Khrushchev was a thoroughgoing revisionist on major questions but on the whole "half a revisionist". 14 6 15

In June the Soviet party circulated an "information note" criticizing Chinese theory to the communist parties, and the Chinese party replied by letter, accusing Moscow of revisionism. When delegates of some fifty parties gathered in Bucharest in late June around the congress of the Romanian Workers' Party, the Soviet delegation surrounded the Chinese delegation led by Peng Zhen, attacked the Great Leap Forward and branded China dogmatist, sectarian and left-adventurist. Khrushchev said: "You are making a Great Leap Forward, but your people have no trousers to wear." Peng Zhen retorted that Khrushchev was patriarchal, arbitrary and tyrannical, and on 26 June the Chinese delegation circulated a written statement charging that Khrushchev's handling of the meeting had set an extremely bad precedent in the movement. Of the Soviet and East European states and Mongolia, only Albania took China's side. 7 6 3

On 16 July the Soviet government informed the Chinese foreign ministry that all Soviet specialists working in China would be recalled by 1 September. Chinese records put the number withdrawn at 1,390, with 343 technical-assistance contracts cancelled and 257 scientific and technical cooperation projects halted. English-language accounts also give 1,400 technicians and about 200 joint scientific projects, or 600 contracts according to Chinese records, while Russian accounts put the number of specialists at more than 1,600. The last specialists helping the nuclear programme left in August. According to Russian accounts, trade between the two countries fell to a third and Soviet deliveries of machinery and equipment to Chinese industry to a fortieth. In its first commentary of September 1963 China wrote that the Soviet government had "unilaterally decided to withdraw all Soviet experts in China within one month, tearing up hundreds of agreements and contracts". 6 3 7 10 16

Assessments of who was to blame differ. China accused Moscow of "perfidiously withdrawing the experts and pressing for debts" and found here part of the cause of the "three difficult years". Chinese-language accounts also note, however, that insistence on the methods of the Great Leap Forward was one cause of the withdrawal, and that in 1958 and 1959 a habit of dismissing Soviet experts as conservative had already spread in China. In Russia, too, one view places the blame entirely on Mao while another calls the recall an impulsive, irresponsible act by Khrushchev personally. Either way, inside China the episode was told as proof that aid had been an instrument of control, and it is the point at which self-reliance hardened into a principle of industrialization. On 14 August, in Sochi, Ho Chi Minh met Khrushchev, Gomułka, Tsedenbal and Gheorghiu-Dej to try to mediate, but North Vietnam's influence was too limited to prevent the split. 6 7 3

From 10 November to 1 December representatives of 81 communist and workers' parties met in Moscow. The Chinese delegation, led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, demanded that every passage on the historic significance of the Twentieth Congress be removed from the documents, but only the Albanian delegation supported this and the other eighty rejected it. Under pressure from the majority China signed the Statement of the 81 Parties, which carried both sides' formulations, and its leaders even toured the Soviet Union afterwards. Russian accounts judge that the friendly relations of the two communist powers effectively ended there. 17 7

Party against party: 1961 to 1964

In his opening speech to the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet party on 17 October 1961, Khrushchev again attacked the Albanian Party of Labour and Enver Hoxha for rejecting the criticism of Stalin and the rapprochement with Yugoslavia. On 19 October Zhou Enlai, leading the Chinese delegation, replied that "public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems." On the 21st he laid a wreath "dedicated to the great Marxist, Comrade Stalin" at the Lenin Mausoleum, where Stalin's body still lay, and on the 23rd he flew home before the congress ended. Within days Stalin's body was removed from the mausoleum, and in December the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations with Albania, turning a quarrel between parties into a rupture between states. 3 18

From April to May 1962 between 60,000 and 67,000 residents of Xinjiang crossed the frontier at Ili and Tacheng into Soviet Kazakhstan, most of them Kazakhs, driven by the famine and chaos of the Great Leap Forward and by uncertainty over the Sino-Soviet quarrel. When the Chinese government cut traffic to the border districts on 29 May, mass protests followed and their suppression left four dead and twenty-two wounded. China treated the exodus as Soviet-instigated, sped up the repatriation of Soviet residents and in the second half of the year closed the four Soviet consulates in Xinjiang, Heilongjiang and elsewhere, together with Soviet trade offices. That summer Mao attacked the views of the head of the International Liaison Department, Wang Jiaxiang, who had urged a peaceful international environment and the avoidance of an open break with Moscow, labelling them "three conciliations and one reduction", and Wang was pushed aside. 19 3 20 6

During the Cuban missile crisis in October Mao charged that Khrushchev had "moved from adventurism to capitulationism": placing the missiles was a tactical adventure and withdrawing them a strategic capitulation. Khrushchev retorted that China's belligerent foreign policy was what would lead to nuclear war. In the Sino-Indian border war of October and November the Soviet Union and most of Eastern Europe leaned towards India, and only North Vietnam, Albania and Cuba backed China. Mao saw this as a betrayal of socialist solidarity. 3 6

On 30 March 1963 the Soviet party set out by letter a general line for the international movement built on peaceful coexistence, peaceful competition and peaceful transition and on the "state of the whole people" and "party of the whole people". On 14 June the Chinese party replied with "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement", laying out a directly opposed line and attacking the Soviet Union by name for the first time. Talks in Moscow from 6 to 20 July between a Chinese delegation under Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen and a Soviet delegation under Suslov and Ponomarev broke down, and in the middle of them, on 14 July, the Soviet party answered China in its "Open Letter to Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union". When Deng's delegation returned, the Politburo, Mao, Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao among them, turned out at the airport to greet it. 6 3 21 5

In August the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In July Kennedy had sounded Khrushchev out about jointly stopping China's nuclear programme, and Khrushchev had declined. Mao saw the treaty as the nuclear powers' attempt to keep China from acquiring the bomb, and the following January China established relations with France, another Western nuclear power. From 6 September 1963 to 14 July 1964 China published nine commentaries on the open letter, the "Nine Commentaries", under the names of the editorial departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag. The last of them argued that Khrushchev's group had usurped the leadership of party and state and that "a bourgeois privileged stratum has emerged in Soviet society". This is the point at which a quarrel between states became a verdict on the nature of the other's system. 3 6 9

The border came onto the table as well. Border talks in Beijing from 23 February to 22 August 1964 had by early July reached agreement to divide the Amur (Heilongjiang) and Ussuri sections along the centre line of the main channels. But when Mao's remarks of 10 July to visiting Japanese Socialists were reported (that the Soviet Union had detached Outer Mongolia and a century earlier had taken the lands east of Lake Baikal, and that "we have not yet settled that account"), Khrushchev called the outcome "abhorrent", and the talks ended without result. In September Khrushchev told a Japanese delegation that if anyone forced war on the Soviet Union it would fight with limitless weapons, and Mao ordered operational reconnaissance against a Soviet invasion. 6

What did not change after Khrushchev

In mid-October 1964 a plenum of the Soviet central committee removed Khrushchev, and on 16 October China exploded its first atomic bomb at Lop Nur in Xinjiang, a 22-kiloton uranium device; China publicly acknowledged the Soviet Union's technical assistance. It is often said that the Nine Commentaries brought Khrushchev down, but Chinese research points out that Suslov's report to the plenum setting out the reasons for his removal did not list the dispute with China among them. China sent congratulations to the new leadership, suspended its polemics and hoped for an adjustment. 3 22 6

In early November Zhou Enlai went to Moscow with He Long, Kang Sheng and others for the forty-seventh anniversary of the October Revolution. At the Kremlin reception on 7 November Defence Minister Rodion Malinovsky told He Long, in effect, that the Soviets had got rid of Khrushchev and it was now China's turn to get rid of Mao; Zhou protested to Brezhnev and Kosygin and led the delegation out of the hall. Brezhnev explained that Malinovsky had been drunk and the next day apologized in the name of the central committee, but the chance of improvement was gone. Zhou reported that the new leaders were keeping the line of peaceful coexistence, which Mao called "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev". 6 3

In February 1965 Alexei Kosygin stopped in Beijing on his way to North Vietnam and proposed joint action in aiding Vietnam, but got only an argument with Mao. In March the Chinese party refused to attend the consultative meeting of parties convened by Moscow, and when invited on 24 February 1966 to the Twenty-Third Congress of the Soviet party it declined in a reply dated 22 March. Saying that Moscow was circulating anti-Chinese documents, the reply asked: "How can one imagine that the Chinese Communist Party, which you regard as an enemy, would attend your congress?" Relations between the two parties ended there, although China still allowed Soviet military supplies for North Vietnam to cross Chinese railways. 6 23 3

In January 1966 the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with Mongolia that amounted to a military alliance, and stationed troops there. When the Cultural Revolution began in May, Red Guards massed outside the Soviet embassy in Beijing. After Chinese students clashed with Soviet police at the Lenin Mausoleum in Moscow on 25 January 1967, 56 loudspeakers were set up in front of the embassy in Beijing and slogans were shouted eighteen hours a day for eight days; the diplomats could not leave the compound for two weeks, and when their families were evacuated by air on 6 February they were harassed by crowds at the airport. When Soviet forces invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Zhou Enlai denounced Soviet "social imperialism" at a banquet at the Romanian embassy on the 23rd. Soviet forces on the border grew from 12 divisions and 200 aircraft in 1961 to some twenty-odd divisions and 1,200 aircraft by 1968 (25 divisions in Chinese-language accounts; 16 on the border and 6 in Mongolia in English-language ones). 6 7 20 3

A divided world movement

The split did not stay between the two countries; communist parties everywhere had to choose. According to Chinese-language accounts only North Vietnam and Albania stood with China at first, all the other socialist states sided with Moscow, and Cuba stayed neutral until Che Guevara's departure and then leaned to the Soviet side. The Albanian Party of Labour regarded Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin and his approach to Yugoslavia as revisionism and took China's side. Moscow cut off aid, relations were broken in 1961, and in 1968 Albania left the Warsaw Pact in protest at the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 6 18

Some ruling parties found a place between the two. The Romanian Workers' Party publicly offered to mediate in March 1964 and stayed neutral, and its independent course earned it the name of a "third force" in the communist world; at an emergency Warsaw Pact meeting in March 1969 Nicolae Ceaușescu refused to sign a statement condemning China. Kim Il Sung's Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with China in 1961 but tried not to take sides. During the Cultural Revolution relations soured so badly that Red Guards called Kim a "fat revisionist", yet in June 1969 North Korea sent no delegation to the world conference of communist parties in Moscow. North Vietnam, needing aid from both, tried to keep a balance; later the pro-Soviet group led by Lê Duẩn gained the upper hand. 3 20 24

Parties out of power split more deeply. The Communist Party of India divided in 1964, producing the Communist Party of India (Marxist), whose founders criticized the pro-Soviet line of cooperation with the Congress government as class collaboration. The Communist Party of Indonesia, with some three million members by 1965 the largest communist party outside China and the Soviet Union and influenced by Maoism, was destroyed after the 30 September Movement of that year: the purge carried out by Suharto's army killed at least 500,000 people, and the party was banned in 1966. The Japanese Communist Party under Kenji Miyamoto stayed neutral in the dispute and purged its pro-Chinese elements in 1966. The Italian Communist Party scolded Mao for breaking the unity of the socialist states while praising Chinese aid to North Vietnam. 25 26 27 3

In the third world the two became competing patrons. In the 1970s each funded, armed and advised Marxist-Leninist parties and militias in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, and each was drawn into conflicts such as the Ogaden War, the Rhodesian Bush War, the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars and the Palestinian liberation struggle. Amid this rivalry they still both supported North Vietnam: most of the supplies were Soviet and went overland across China. The idea of a single rear base for the anti-imperialist camp did not survive the period. 3

The argument reaches the border: 1969

By Chinese count there were 4,189 border incidents between October 1964 and March 1969. Zhenbao Island (Damansky in Russian) on the Ussuri is a small island 1.5 to 1.8 kilometres long, and the Chinese side held that if the border followed the main channel, as international law prescribes, the island belonged to China. Between December 1968 and February 1969 the two countries' border guards fought several times on the island with clubs. The Chinese historian Li Danhui wrote that China had begun preparing for a small war on the border as early as 1968, and Yang Kuisong that an ambush had been prepared in 1968 but came to nothing because the Russians did not come. 6 28 20

Fighting broke out on the morning of 2 March. According to Soviet accounts, Senior Lieutenant Ivan Strelnikov, commander of the 2nd border post, was killed in an ambush while demanding that Chinese troops leave the island. Xinhua announced that at 9.17 a.m. that day armed Soviet troops with armoured vehicles had intruded onto the island, Chinese territory, and opened fire first. The broad scholarly conclusion today is that the clash was an ambush planned by the Chinese side, which most Chinese historians also accept. In a second battle on 15 March the Soviet army brought in the then-secret BM-21 "Grad" multiple rocket launcher. 29 30 31 20

Casualty figures differ by source. By the Russian count 31 Soviet border guards were killed and 14 wounded on 2 March alone, and 58 killed and 94 wounded over the whole of March. Chinese losses have not been disclosed; estimates run from 100 to 300, and 68 men are buried in a cemetery in Baoqing county. China announced that it had killed or wounded more than 230 Soviet troops at a cost of 92 casualties of its own, and some accounts based on Chinese sources give 29 Chinese dead. On 21 March Kosygin tried to telephone Mao to discuss a ceasefire, but the Chinese operator called him a "revisionist element" and hung up. On 13 August Soviet troops surrounded and attacked a Chinese patrol at Tielieketi in Yumin county, Xinjiang; Chinese-language accounts say 28 Chinese were killed, three journalists among them. 29 32 33 20 34 6

In the summer the shadow of nuclear war fell. On 18 August Boris Davydov, second secretary at the Soviet embassy in Washington, asked an American official over lunch how the United States would react to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear installations, and according to Chinese sources Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin told Kissinger of the intention to strike on 20 August. When CIA Director Richard Helms disclosed on 27 August that Moscow had asked foreign governments how they would react to a pre-emptive attack, China took the threat as real. On 28 August Pravda wrote that if war came no continent would be left untouched. In his memoirs the Soviet diplomat Arkady Shevchenko wrote that Defence Minister Grechko had called for unrestricted use of multi-megaton bombs, though many of the relevant documents remain classified. 3 6 20 35

When Ho Chi Minh died on 2 September, the two premiers attended his funeral in Hanoi at different times. On his way home Kosygin received word that China was willing to talk and turned back to Beijing, where he met Zhou Enlai at the airport on 11 September. According to the Chinese foreign ministry's account, Zhou said that China had been on the defensive throughout the border clashes, that "debates should be contentions without resorting to force", and that a pre-emptive strike on its nuclear bases would be war and aggression which China would fight to the finish. The two agreed to sign a provisional agreement to maintain the status quo on the border, avoid armed clashes and disengage forces in the disputed areas before negotiating the boundary, and to send their ambassadors back. 20 34 36

The crisis went on. China tested nuclear weapons on 23 and 29 September, the second a three-megaton thermonuclear device. On 14 October the Chinese central committee ordered the leaders in Beijing to leave the city by the 20th: Mao went to Wuhan, Lin Biao to Suzhou, and central organs moved into underground facilities in the Western Hills. On 17 October Lin Biao ordered the whole army onto emergency alert, issued the next day as "Order Number One", and more than 940,000 troops, over four thousand aircraft and some six hundred ships dispersed from their bases. The extreme tension eased when border talks at deputy foreign minister level opened in Beijing on 20 October. 20 3 6

From the triangle to normalization

After 1969 the border talks dragged on fruitlessly for a decade and both sides kept building up their forces. In the 1970s the Soviet Union is estimated to have kept one million to 1.2 million troops on the Chinese and Mongolian borders, and China about 1.5 million. Judging that it could not face two fronts, China turned to the United States; the State Department's Office of the Historian notes that Sino-Soviet tension was one reason the Chinese leadership wanted rapprochement. Kissinger went to Beijing twice in 1971 and Nixon visited in February 1972. China took its seats in the United Nations and the Security Council in 1971, with the Soviet Union voting for the resolution. In 1973 Mao put forward the idea of "one line" linking the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Western Europe against the Soviet Union. 3 37 7 6

After Mao's death in 1976 the confrontation increasingly became a clash of state interests. When the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed a treaty in November 1978 and Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December, China attacked Vietnam in February 1979, and the Soviet Union backed Vietnam diplomatically and with intelligence and equipment. In 1979 China said it would not renew the 1950 treaty, which expired the following year, and normalization talks begun in September were suspended after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December. In his Tashkent speech of 24 March 1982 Brezhnev said: "We remember well the time when the Soviet Union and People's China were united by bonds of friendship and comradely cooperation." The historian Sergey Radchenko sees the speech as an attempt to break out of isolation after the collapse of détente and under pressure from the Reagan administration, and Deng Xiaoping as picking up the signal and authorizing secret negotiations. Deng made normalization conditional on removing "three obstacles": Soviet forces on the border and in Mongolia, the occupation of Afghanistan, and support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. 3 6 38

Gorbachev opened the way. In a speech at Vladivostok in July 1986 he promised troop withdrawals from Mongolia, the Far East and Afghanistan and acceptance of the Chinese position on the Amur and Ussuri boundary. Gorbachev's visit to Beijing from 15 to 18 May 1989, including his meeting with Deng Xiaoping on the 16th, normalized state relations, and his talks with Zhao Ziyang restored party relations. It was the first visit by a Soviet leader since Khrushchev in 1959. The visit coincided with the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, and the welcome ceremony had to be held at the airport. 39

The 4,380-kilometre border was the longest-lasting legacy. During Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow on 16 May 1991 an agreement on the eastern section was signed, settling Zhenbao Island as Chinese. The remaining islands were settled by a supplementary agreement signed by Putin and Hu Jintao on 14 October 2004, under which China gained 337 square kilometres, and the two legislatures ratified it in 2005. On 21 July 2008 the two foreign ministers signed the protocol completing the demarcation of the eastern section. The boundary negotiations that began with the airport meeting of 1969 took nearly forty years to finish. 3 20 36

What historians still disagree about

That the Sino-Soviet split turned the bipolar Cold War into a triangle is not in dispute. The argument is over causes and timing. The Wilson Center notes that dating the exact start of the split is an inherently tricky matter. Until the 1990s research rested on inference and guesswork for lack of original documents, and Chinese and Soviet publications were mostly political propaganda; scholarly study began in earnest only in the early 1990s, after the mass publication of Chinese documents and the opening of the Russian archives. The long-standing account held that state interests such as the border, nuclear weapons, aid and rank came first, and that words like "revisionism" and "dogmatism" were packaging attached afterwards. 1 15

Lorenz Lüthi's The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (2008), drawing on Chinese, Russian, American and European sources, argues that disputes over Marxist-Leninist ideology were the primary driver. The conflict grew in three areas, the developmental model, de-Stalinization and policy towards the West, and its source was Mao's ideological radicalization at the very moment Khrushchev was turning to pragmatic policies. Lüthi also stresses the interplay of domestic and international politics, treating the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis as born of Mao's calculated drive to manufacture consensus at home on the eve of the Great Leap Forward. Reviewers in an H-Diplo roundtable called the book a model of the new Cold War scholarship while expressing reservations about the central place it gives ideology and about its portrait of Mao as a "radical megalomaniac". 15 40

Sergey Radchenko's Two Suns in the Heavens (2009), covering 1962 to 1967, puts the weight on the structure of the alliance: its intrinsic inequality, seen as entirely natural by the Russians but bitterly resented by the Chinese, led to its collapse, and he offers a framework that weaves together power struggle, ideology, personalities and culture. Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui propose a theory of "structural imbalance". Once the leadership structure of the socialist camp changed, the two parties, now equals, tried to settle their differences of line through a contest for control of the discourse, aiming at leadership of the international movement; and in a structure where party relations obscured and replaced state relations, neither a sense of sovereignty nor a notion of equality could develop. Li Chaojun likewise sees the contest for Marxist-Leninist "orthodoxy" and for leadership of the movement as the two parties' ultimate concern. 41 6

Mingjiang Li's Mao's China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological Dilemma (2012), based on declassified Chinese foreign ministry documents, uses the concept of an "ideological dilemma" to explain why ideology sometimes dictates foreign policy and at other times has almost no influence. On the 1969 border clashes, the view of Yang Kuisong, who traces them to Mao's domestic mobilization strategy amid worries about the course of the Cultural Revolution, stands against that of Russian historians who stress China's wish to take a central place in world politics and to move closer to the United States. The Russian sinologist Yuri Galenovich argues that Mao waged a war of ideas built on demands for Mongolia, the atomic bomb, the "lost territories" and an end to "inequality". 42 20 7

Whichever reading one takes, the outcome is the same. The premise that the socialist camp had one centre and one model did not survive the decade. That the international communist movement, a structure in which every party took its line from one centre, was no longer possible was the deepest conclusion the split settled. Socialism in each country thereafter went looking for answers in its own conditions, and in the 1980s Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening withdrew China from the high abstractions of ideological polemic, diminishing the political importance of the split itself. 6 3

Consequences

The split turned the Cold War from two poles into a triangle. After the border fighting at Zhenbao (Damansky) island on the Ussuri in 1969, when full war was openly discussed, China turned toward the United States, a course that led to Nixon's visit in 1972. The international communist movement was left divided into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese parties, splitting the left in many countries; Albania sided with China, most European parties with Moscow. The Soviet Union had to keep large forces permanently on its eastern border, a burden it carried to the end. Normalization came with Gorbachev's visit to Beijing in 1989, which coincided with the Tiananmen demonstrations.

Timeline & Map

Beijing Moscow Zhenbao (Damansky) Island Tielieketi Bucharest Yining Lop Nur Tashkent Jinmen 1 Moscow 2 Moscow 3 Moscow 4 Moscow 11 Moscow 12 Moscow 15 Moscow 18 Moscow 19 Moscow 20 Zhenbao (Damansky) Island 21 Zhenbao (Damansky) Island 22 Tielieketi 10 Bucharest 13 Yining 17 Lop Nur 25 Tashkent 5 Beijing 6 Beijing 8 Beijing 9 Beijing 14 Beijing 16 Beijing 23 Beijing 24 Beijing 26 Beijing 7 Jinmen
  1. 11950.02.14Soviet UnionChina
    Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance

    After Mao Zedong's two months in Moscow the two countries signed a thirty-year treaty of alliance.

  2. 21956.02.25Soviet Union
    Khrushchev's secret speech

    At the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet party Khrushchev denounced Stalin's personality cult, shocking a Chinese party that had not been consulted.

  3. 31957.10.15Soviet UnionChina
    New Technology for National Defence Agreement signed

    Nie Rongzhen's delegation signed the agreement in Moscow, under which the Soviet Union would help build China's nuclear industry and hand over a sample atomic bomb and its designs.

  4. 41957.11.18Soviet UnionChina
    Mao speaks at the Moscow conference

    At the conference of 64 parties Mao backed Khrushchev, declared that "the east wind prevails over the west wind" and startled delegates with his remarks on nuclear war.

  5. 51958.07.22Soviet UnionChina
    Mao rejects the joint fleet

    Mao summoned Ambassador Yudin and denounced the previous day's proposal of a joint submarine fleet as an infringement of sovereignty.

  6. 61958.07.31–08.03Soviet UnionChina
    Khrushchev's secret visit to Beijing

    Khrushchev came to Beijing, denied that a joint fleet had been intended, and agreed that the long-wave station would be built with a Soviet loan.

  7. 71958.08.23China
    Shelling of Jinmen

    The People's Liberation Army began shelling Jinmen without informing Moscow, opening the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis.

  8. 1959.06.20Soviet UnionChina
    Sample bomb postponed

    The Soviet central committee wrote that it would postpone delivery of a sample atomic bomb because of the Geneva talks; China took this as a breach of the 1957 agreement.

  9. 81959.09.30–10.04Soviet UnionChina
    Khrushchev's last visit to Beijing

    Khrushchev, in Beijing for the tenth anniversary, pressed for restraint over Taiwan and clashed with Mao; after their talks on 2 October the two never met again.

  10. 91960.04.16China
    "Long Live Leninism!"

    Red Flag published an editorial for Lenin's ninetieth anniversary, targeting Yugoslavia and indirectly criticizing the Soviet line.

  11. 101960.06Soviet UnionChina
    Bucharest meeting

    Before party delegates gathered for the Romanian party congress, Khrushchev attacked China and Peng Zhen hit back.

  12. 1960.07.16Soviet UnionChina
    Withdrawal of Soviet specialists

    The Soviet government announced that it would recall all its specialists from China by 1 September; Chinese records count 1,390 who left.

  13. 111960.11.10–12.01Soviet UnionChina
    Moscow meeting of 81 parties

    The delegation under Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping fought the Soviets but in the end signed the compromise statement of the 81 parties.

  14. 121961.10.21Soviet UnionChina
    Zhou's wreath for Stalin

    After Khrushchev attacked Albania at the Twenty-Second Congress, Zhou Enlai rebutted him, laid a wreath for Stalin in the Lenin Mausoleum and flew home before the congress ended on the 23rd.

  15. 131962.05.29China
    Riot in Ili

    At the end of the Yi-Ta exodus of over 60,000 Xinjiang residents into the Soviet Union, protests broke out in Yining; four were killed and twenty-two wounded.

  16. 141963.06.14China
    Proposal on the General Line

    Replying to the Soviet letter of 30 March, the Chinese party set out its alternative line for the international communist movement.

  17. 151963.07.14Soviet Union
    Soviet open letter

    In the middle of the Moscow talks the Soviet party answered China with an open letter to all its members, and the talks broke down on the 20th.

  18. 161963.09.06–1964.07.14China
    First of the Nine Commentaries

    The editorial departments of the People's Daily and Red Flag published the first commentary on the open letter, a series that ran to the ninth on 14 July 1964.

  19. 171964.10.16China
    China's first atomic test

    Just after Khrushchev's removal China exploded a 22-kiloton uranium device at Lop Nur.

  20. 181964.11.07Soviet UnionChina
    Malinovsky's remark

    At a Kremlin reception Malinovsky told He Long in effect that it was now China's turn to remove Mao, and Zhou Enlai's delegation protested.

  21. 1966.03.22Soviet UnionChina
    China refuses the Twenty-Third Congress

    The Chinese party declined the invitation to the Soviet party congress, ending relations between the two parties.

  22. 191967.01.25Soviet UnionChina
    Red Square clash and embassy siege

    After Chinese students clashed with Soviet police at the Lenin Mausoleum, crowds besieged the Soviet embassy in Beijing.

  23. 201969.03.02Soviet UnionChina
    Clash on Zhenbao Island

    A Chinese ambush on the island in the Ussuri killed 31 Soviet border guards, Senior Lieutenant Strelnikov among them.

  24. 211969.03.15Soviet UnionChina
    Second battle for Zhenbao

    A second battle followed in which the Soviet army used BM-21 "Grad" multiple rocket launchers.

  25. 221969.08.13Soviet UnionChina
    Clash at Tielieketi

    Soviet troops surrounded and attacked a Chinese patrol on the border in Yumin county, Xinjiang.

  26. 231969.09.11Soviet UnionChina
    Beijing airport meeting

    Returning from Ho Chi Minh's funeral, Kosygin met Zhou Enlai at Beijing airport and agreed to keep the border status quo and negotiate.

  27. 241969.10.20Soviet UnionChina
    Border talks open

    With the Chinese army on alert under "Order Number One", border talks at deputy foreign minister level opened in Beijing.

  28. 251982.03.24Soviet UnionChina
    Brezhnev's Tashkent speech

    Brezhnev recalled the old friendship with China and signalled a wish to improve relations; Deng Xiaoping authorized secret talks.

  29. 261989.05.15–18Soviet UnionChina
    Gorbachev in Beijing

    Gorbachev met Deng Xiaoping and state and party relations were normalized; the visit coincided with the Tiananmen demonstrations.

Related people 45

Soviet Union19

Participants15

The theoretical caseMikhail Suslov1902–1982

He assembled the Soviet theoretical rebuttal and reported it to party gatherings.

Handling relations with socialist statesYuri Andropov1914–1984

As head of the Central Committee department for socialist countries he managed relations in the early phase.

Chief Economic Advisor to ChinaIvan Arkhipov1907–1998

Soviet Ambassador to China (1953–1959)Pavel Yudin1899–1968

Soviet Ambassador to China (1959–1965)Stepan Chervonenko1915–2003

Head of the party International DepartmentBoris Ponomarev1905–1995

From the post that managed the world communist movement, he handled the practical work of the parties choosing sides.

Moscow-aligned critic of MaoWang Ming1904–1974

After fleeing to the USSR in 1956, he denounced Mao's line through Chinese-language broadcasts and writings, lending his voice to the Soviet side of the polemic.

Soviet ambassador maintaining dialogueVasily Tolstikov1917–2003

During the Sino-Soviet split, he maintained a working channel of dialogue with Beijing.

Soviet participant in border talksVasily Kuznetsov (diplomat)1901–1990

As First Deputy Foreign Minister, he led Sino-Soviet border talks.

Soviet leader in Beijing in 1957Anastas Mikoyan1895–1978

He came to Beijing after the Anti-Party Group affair to seek Mao's support.

Soviet defence ministerRodion Malinovsky1898–1967

He requested the long-wave station in 1958, and at the Kremlin reception of November 1964 told He Long in effect to get rid of Mao.

Soviet premier at the 1969 airport meetingAlexei Kosygin1904–1980

He stopped in Beijing in 1965 and, after his call to Mao was cut off in March 1969, met Zhou Enlai at Beijing airport that September.

Defence minister said to have urged a nuclear strikeAndrei Grechko1903–1976

Shevchenko's memoirs say he called for unrestricted use of multi-megaton bombs in 1969.

Soviet ambassador in WashingtonAnatoly Dobrynin1919–2010

According to Chinese sources he told Kissinger in August 1969 of the intention to strike China's nuclear facilities.

Leader of the pro-Soviet group in HanoiLe Duan1907–1986

The pro-Soviet group he led later gained the upper hand in North Vietnam.

China14

Participants13

Present at the breaksZhou Enlai1898–1976

He answered Khrushchev's attack on Albania at the Twenty-Second Congress in 1961 and left before it ended; he led the 1964 visit to Moscow and met Kosygin at the airport in 1969.

China's man in the polemicDeng Xiaoping1904–1997

He led the Chinese delegation in the 1963 Moscow talks.

Theoretical offensive against Soviet revisionismKang Sheng1898–1975

He returned to the centre of power by leading the theoretical offensive in the Sino-Soviet polemics of the 1960s.

Chinese delegate at Bucharest and in MoscowPeng Zhen1902–1997

He stood up to Khrushchev at Bucharest in 1960 and joined Deng Xiaoping at the Moscow talks of 1963.

Head of the Chinese delegation to the 81-party meetingLiu Shaoqi1898–1969

He led the Chinese delegation with Deng Xiaoping at the Moscow meeting of 1960.

Chinese negotiator of the 1957 defence technology agreementNie Rongzhen1899–1992

In September 1957 he went to Moscow and concluded the agreement on aid to China's nuclear industry.

Witness to the radio station negotiationsPeng Dehuai1898–1974

He set out the 1958 Soviet request for a long-wave station and its proposed cost-sharing.

Foreign minister who argued with Khrushchev in 1959Chen Yi (PLA marshal)1901–1972

He clashed with Khrushchev during the latter's visit to Beijing in October 1959.

Liaison chief criticized for "three conciliations"Wang Jiaxiang1906–1974

In 1962 he urged avoiding an open break with Moscow, and was criticized by Mao and pushed aside.

The target of Malinovsky's remarkHe Long1896–1969

In Moscow with Zhou Enlai in November 1964, he heard Malinovsky's provocative remark at the Kremlin reception.

Issuer of "Order Number One"Lin Biao1907–1971

In October 1969 he ordered the whole army onto emergency alert.

Albanian leader who sided with ChinaEnver Hoxha1908–1985

He rejected Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin and approach to Yugoslavia, leading to the break with Moscow in 1961.

Gorbachev's counterpart in restoring party tiesZhao Ziyang1919–2005

His talks with Gorbachev in May 1989 restored relations between the two parties.

Outside the camps

Related terms

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29reference 30reference 31reference 32reference 33reference 34reference 35reference 36reference 37reference 38reference 39reference 40reference 41reference 42