Dwight D. Eisenhower

The five-star general who led D-Day and warned America against the military-industrial complex

There is only one thing to do when you go into this kind of thing. It must be a success.

A five-star general who served as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe during World War II, leading the D-Day invasion, and later became the 34th President of the United States. As president he pursued Cold War containment, backing coups in Iran and Guatemala, and in March 1960 authorized the CIA's covert program to overthrow Fidel Castro. After the Bay of Pigs failure, he told Kennedy that 'there is only one thing to do when you go into this kind of thing: it must be a success,' warning that hiding US involvement out of fear of emboldening the Soviets would only make them bolder. His farewell address warned against the 'military-industrial complex,' leaving a lasting caution about the machinery of permanent warfare.

Also known as: Ike

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How did a Kansas farm boy grow into an interwar staff officer, and what was his part in clearing the Bonus Army?

Dwight David Eisenhower was born on 14 October 1890 in Denison, Texas, the third of seven sons, and regarded Abilene, Kansas, where the family moved in 1892, as his hometown. The family was devout and of modest means. His parents belonged to the River Brethren, a Mennonite-related sect, and his mother later joined the International Bible Students Association, forerunner of the Jehovah's Witnesses. After finishing high school in 1909, he could not afford college; he let his brother Edgar go first and worked as a night supervisor at a creamery. A friend urged him to apply to a service academy, where no tuition was charged, and he entered West Point.

He graduated in the middle of the class of 1915, "the class the stars fell on" because 59 of its members became generals. In the First World War his request to serve in Europe was denied, and he commanded a unit training tank crews at home. After the war he stayed a major for sixteen years. In 1919 he joined a transcontinental Army convoy from Washington to San Francisco that averaged only 8 km an hour, an experience that later fed into the interstate highway programme of his presidency.

From 1920 he rose under a succession of generals: Fox Conner, John Pershing, Douglas MacArthur and George Marshall. As Conner's executive officer in the Panama Canal Zone he studied military history and theory, including Clausewitz's On War, and later said Conner had the greatest influence on his military thinking. During the Depression he worked on mobilisation plans for the next war and then became chief military aide to MacArthur, the Army Chief of Staff.

In summer 1932 First World War veterans camped in Washington to demand early payment of the compensation (the "bonus") the government had promised them: the Bonus March. MacArthur used troops to clear out the demonstrators, many of them jobless in the Depression, and Eisenhower took part in the operation. He opposed the action against the veterans and strongly advised MacArthur against taking a public role in it, yet he later wrote the Army's official report on the incident, endorsing MacArthur's conduct. The army's dispersal of jobless veterans left a lasting scar on Depression-era American politics.

In 1935 he followed MacArthur to the Philippines as assistant military adviser to the Philippine government, helping to build its army. Historians consider his years under the difficult MacArthur valuable preparation for handling strong personalities such as Churchill, Patton and Montgomery. In 1941, shortly before the United States entered the Second World War, he became a brigadier general.

Why did Supreme Commander Eisenhower leave Berlin to the Red Army, and how did he see the Soviets after the war?

In November 1942 Eisenhower became Allied commander-in-chief for Operation Torch, the landings in North Africa, and went on to direct the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy. In December 1943 Roosevelt chose him, rather than George Marshall, as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. In that post he planned and carried out the "second front" promised to Stalin at Tehran: the Normandy landings of 6 June 1944, Operation Overlord. He had never commanded in combat, but he won respect through his diplomatic skill in coordinating Allied leaders such as Churchill and Montgomery and abrasive commanders such as Patton, and in December 1944 he was promoted to General of the Army, the five-star rank equivalent to field marshal.

After the German Ardennes counteroffensive (the Battle of the Bulge) was repelled in December 1944, German defences were collapsing in early 1945 between the Red Army in the east and the Western Allies. The British wanted to take Berlin before the Soviets, but Eisenhower judged an attack on Berlin a military mistake and said that orders to make it would have to be explicit. The British backed down but then wanted his army sent into Czechoslovakia for political reasons. Washington refused to support Churchill's plan to use Eisenhower's army for political manoeuvres against Moscow. Germany was divided along the lines Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin had agreed earlier, and Berlin fell to the Red Army after a bloody battle. Germany surrendered on 7 May 1945.

In November 1945 he succeeded Marshall as Army Chief of Staff and oversaw the demobilisation of millions of soldiers. At this time he believed cooperation with the Soviets was possible. Even in 1946 he was convinced that the Soviet Union did not want war and that friendly relations could be kept; he strongly supported the new United Nations and favoured placing the atomic bomb under its control. He later wrote that he had opposed using the bomb on Japan: "First, the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing. Second, I hated to see our country be the first to use such a weapon." In 1945 he visited Warsaw at the invitation of Bolesław Bierut, received the highest Polish military decoration and was shocked by the destruction of the city. But on the bomb and Soviet policy Truman followed the State Department and ignored Eisenhower and the Pentagon.

By mid-1947, as East-West tensions over German economic recovery and the Greek Civil War escalated, Eisenhower came to agree with a policy of containing Soviet expansion. In 1948 he became president of Columbia University, published his war memoir Crusade in Europe, and led a Council on Foreign Relations study group on the political and military implications of the Marshall Plan. In December 1950 he became Supreme Commander of NATO, with operational command of its forces in Europe. He made the case for NATO in Congress more effectively than the Truman administration had, and by mid-1951 NATO was a genuine military power. Yet he expected it to become a truly European alliance, with the American and Canadian commitments ending after about ten years.

How did Eisenhower both accommodate and confront McCarthyism?

Eisenhower ran as a Republican in 1952 in large part to block Senator Robert Taft, an isolationist who opposed NATO and wanted to undo the New Deal. To win the nomination, however, he had to placate the party's right. He declared his opposition to Roosevelt's policy at Yalta and Truman's in Korea and China, matters in which he had himself taken part, and his campaign strategy, "K1C2", attacked the Truman administration's three failures: Korea, communism and corruption. His mentor George Marshall was being attacked by Senator Joseph McCarthy as the man who had "lost China", yet Eisenhower dropped a plan to criticise McCarthy in his home state of Wisconsin. Instead he denounced "wickedness in government", an allusion to gay government employees who were lumped together with communists under McCarthyism.

His first-year decisions show how far he accommodated the anti-communist climate. In April 1953 he issued Executive Order 10450, subjecting federal employees and even their friends and families to investigation as "security risks"; the order was used largely to dismiss gay and lesbian employees, feeding the persecution known as the Lavender Scare. When Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, sentenced to death for passing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union, became the subject of appeals for clemency from intellectuals abroad such as Picasso and from Pope Pius XII, he ignored them, backed by public opinion and the press at home. The couple were executed on 19 June 1953. Decoded Venona cables released after the Soviet collapse show that Julius was a courier and recruiter for Soviet intelligence, but Ethel's role and the justice of the death sentences are still debated.

Towards McCarthy himself he avoided direct confrontation. With Republicans holding the Senate by a single seat, and relations with Congress harder after Taft's death in July 1953, he decided to ignore McCarthy's controversies rather than give them more energy through White House involvement. The position drew criticism from many quarters. He particularly wanted to keep McCarthy away from the Atomic Energy Commission, whose work on the hydrogen bomb and other weapons an investigation might disrupt. When the physicist Robert Oppenheimer was accused in December 1953 of being a Soviet spy, Eisenhower did not believe the charge, yet in January 1954 he ordered "a blank wall" placed between Oppenheimer and all defence-related work. Oppenheimer lost his security clearance in a hearing later that year.

The turning point came in 1954. The Army-McCarthy hearings, in which McCarthy attacked the Army as a nest of communists while the Army accused McCarthy's staff of pressuring it to give special treatment to an aide's friend, were televised live for 36 days from April to June, and some 80 million people watched at least part of them. When McCarthy threatened in May to subpoena White House staff, a furious Eisenhower ordered that internal advice and documents within the executive branch could not be disclosed. This became the tradition of "executive privilege", and denied access to the president's staff, McCarthy's hearings dwindled into rants about trivial matters. The Army counsel Joseph Welch's retort, "Have you no sense of decency, sir?", was broadcast across the country, and in December McCarthy was censured by the Senate and his power collapsed. Historians credit Eisenhower with rescuing the Republican Party from isolationism and McCarthyism, while criticising him for prolonging the damage done to many people by refusing to confront McCarthy openly.

Why did Eisenhower, who spoke of "rollback", stay out of the Hungarian Revolution, and what did the U-2 incident destroy?

Eisenhower's Cold War strategy left a gap between words and deeds. In 1952 he campaigned for "liberation" of Eastern Europe rather than mere containment, and once in office the National Security Council paper NSC 174 made the "rollback" of Soviet influence a long-term goal. But the same policy held that NATO would not provoke war with the Soviet Union. Peace was to be kept by maintaining such superiority in nuclear weapons that the Soviets would never risk using their much larger army against Western Europe. This "New Look" cut expensive Army divisions in favour of relatively "inexpensive" nuclear deterrence. In Korea, after considering the use of nuclear weapons in 1953, he secured an armistice that July.

Instead of open war, his tools were covert action and propaganda. At the British government's request he authorised the CIA in 1953 to overthrow Iran's prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, which tightened American and British company control over Iranian oil, and in 1954 he backed a coup in Guatemala. In Eastern Europe the United States dropped more than 300,000 propaganda leaflets between 1951 and 1956 and used Radio Free Europe to stoke discontent with the communist regimes. The East German uprising of June 1953 briefly raised hopes of declining Soviet influence, but the Soviets quickly crushed it. In Indochina he refused to intervene when Dien Bien Phu fell in 1954, despite urging from the military and the vice-president, but he then formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), backed Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam and increased American military advisers there to 900.

The Hungarian Revolution of October 1956 tested the "liberation" policy. He condemned the Soviet invasion but took no action. A US Army study of January 1956 had recommended against military intervention on the side of Hungarian insurgents, and NSC policy was to encourage anti-communist discontent in the Eastern Bloc only through psychological warfare, sabotage and economic warfare. Accusations that Radio Free Europe urged Hungarians to fight or promised Western help persist; the researcher A. Ross Johnson concludes that it did not, but that its personally vituperative attacks on the reform leader Imre Nagy and its emotional bombast could easily be heard as signals of Western solidarity. The Hungarian diplomat Géza Jeszenszky later criticised Western inaction as disingenuous, and several studies conclude that fear that intervention inside the Soviet sphere would lead to nuclear war was decisive. At the same time, in the Suez Crisis, he used financial and diplomatic pressure to force Britain, France and Israel to withdraw from Egypt.

Stalin's death in 1953 also opened chances for détente. The Geneva summit of 1955 was the first US-Soviet summit since Potsdam in 1945, but it reached no agreement on Germany, and the Soviets rejected his "Open Skies" proposal for mutual aerial reconnaissance. After the shock of Sputnik in 1957 he created NASA and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and strengthened science education. In September 1959 Khrushchev toured the United States and met him at Camp David, creating a thaw known as the "Spirit of Camp David".

The U-2 incident ended it. On 1 May 1960 a CIA U-2 spy plane that had taken off from Peshawar in Pakistan was shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile over Sverdlovsk, and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, parachuted and was captured. Washington at first claimed it had lost a NASA civilian weather research aircraft, but had to admit the reconnaissance mission when the Soviets produced the living pilot and his equipment, including photographs of Soviet military bases. The Paris summit due two weeks later collapsed, and the United States was embarrassed internationally. Powers was sentenced for espionage to three years' imprisonment and seven years' hard labour, and in February 1962 he was exchanged for the Soviet intelligence officer Rudolf Abel. Eisenhower left office in January 1961 after a farewell address warning against the military-industrial complex, and died of congestive heart failure on 28 March 1969.

The Military-Industrial Complex Warning and the Cold War State

Eisenhower's final presidential address was a critical reflection on the Cold War security system he had helped build. He argued that the United States had created a permanent armaments industry and an immense military establishment after the Second World War, giving their conjunction economic, political, and social influence across the country. He called this conjunction the military-industrial complex and warned that it could acquire unwarranted influence in government beyond the legitimate needs of defense. He was not simply rejecting military preparedness, but insisting that security and liberty required an alert citizenry and political control.

The address treated the growing dependence of scientific research on the state as part of the same problem. Federal contracts and funding could shape the work of universities and scholars, while public policy could also become captive to a scientific-technological elite. Eisenhower's legacy therefore contains a central tension: a national leader who expanded the institutions of military power warned against their becoming autonomous centers of influence. The speech later became a recurring reference point in debates over US military spending, science policy, and democratic oversight.