He opened the coffin lid, and became the first leader to die in bed
On 18 November 1956, at a reception at the Polish embassy in Moscow, he told Western ambassadors: "Whether you like it or not, history is on our side. We will bury you!" Envoys of twelve NATO nations and Israel walked out.
He rose through the party apparatus in Stalin's shadow, and after Stalin's death won the power struggle of 1953 to become First Secretary. On 25 February 1956 his Secret Speech to a closed session of the 20th Party Congress denounced Stalin's purges and launched de-Stalinization. He crushed the 1956 Hungarian uprising with Soviet troops, and in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis withdrew the missiles in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. His colleagues voted him out on 14 October 1964; in retirement he wrote memoirs, and he died in Moscow on 11 September 1971.
Activities and affiliations
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1934–1964
Soviet Communist Party and BolsheviksParty leadershipMain
Political and party leadership- First Secretary of the Central Committee1953–1964
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1958–1964
Soviet Union state institutionsHeads of government
Government and administration- Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR1958–1964
Career Timeline
- 1935–1938Moscow First Secretary; the Metro
- 1938–1949First Secretary of Ukraine
- 1942–1943Military council member at Stalingrad
- 1953–1964First Secretary of the party
- 1954–1956The Virgin Lands; the Secret Speech
- 1957Defeats the Anti-Party Group
- 1958.03.27–1964.10.15Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
- 1961The 22nd Congress; Stalin’s body moved out of the mausoleum
- 1964Voted out; retirement on a pension
The Soviet Politburo
- Candidate 1938.01–1939.03
- Full member 1939.03–1964.10
1964.10 removed
The Central Committee Secretariat
- Secretary 1949.12–1964.10
1964.10 removed · First Secretary 1953.09–1964.10
Related historical events
- 1928–1937The Five-Year Plans and the Soviet TransformationFirst Secretary of Moscow Party Committee · Metro construction
- 1937–1938The Great PurgeFirst Secretary of the Moscow partyAs Moscow party first secretary he registered 41,305 people and listed 8,500 of them for execution.
- 1939.11–1940.03The Winter WarThe Soviet leader who in his memoirs called the Winter War a 'moral defeat'In his memoirs he wrote that 'a victory at such a cost was actually a moral defeat. Our people never knew the truth.' His account confirms that even within the Soviet leadership the Winter War was understood as a catastrophe.
- 1941–1945The Great Patriotic WarFront military council memberAs a member of the Stalingrad Front military council he took part in the defense and the counteroffensive.
- 1941.07.07–09.26Battle of Kiev (1941)Member of the Military Council of the Southwestern DirectionAs a member of the Southwestern Direction command was outside the ring and got clear of the danger zone.
- 1943.07.05–08.23The Battle of KurskMember of the Voronezh Front Military CouncilSent a report on the tank battle at Prokhorovka personally to Stalin on 24 July.
- 1943.08.26–12.23The Battle of the DnieperMember of the military council, Voronezh (1st Ukrainian) FrontAccording to what Stalin told Rokossovsky, insisted with Zhukov that Kiev be assigned to the Voronezh Front.
- 1944.08.29–10.28The Slovak National Uprising and the Carpathian–Dukla OperationFirst Secretary, Ukrainian Communist PartyReached the agreement with Gottwald on the Czechoslovak partisan movement.
- 1948–1955The Tito-Stalin SplitArchitect of the 1955 reconciliationCame to Belgrade and normalised relations
- 1949–1956From New Democracy to socialist transformationSoviet leader whose secret speech denounced StalinHis speech of February 1956 pressed the Chinese leadership to reconsider the Soviet model.
- 1952.07–1953.07The East German uprising of 1953Secretary of the CPSU Central CommitteeBacked Ulbricht after Beria’s arrest, helping him survive.
- 1953The Fall of BeriaOrganizer of the takedownThe key figure who organized Beria’s removal within the Presidium.
- 1953Hungary's New CourseSecretary of the CPSU Central CommitteeBlamed Rákosi for the mistakes as a whole and said he could not work collectively.
- 1953–1956Eastern Europe after Stalin: the crises of 1953–1956First Secretary of the CPSUOpened de-Stalinisation with the Secret Speech, compromised with Poland and decided on intervention in Hungary.
- 1955The Founding of the Warsaw PactFirst Secretary of the CPSU, 1953–1964After ousting Malenkov, Khrushchev pressed the hard line of standing on the German status quo, drafted the alliance treaty that became the Pact, and conceived it as a lever for collective-security bargaining.
- 1956The Hungarian RevolutionOrdered the interventionSeeing the uprising as the collapse of the bloc, he made the final decision to intervene militarily.
- 1956–1957From the Hundred Flowers to the Anti-Rightist CampaignWhose secret speech set off the debateHis denunciation of Stalin opened the Chinese discussion of the cult and the Soviet model.
- 1956–1969The Sino-Soviet SplitThe Soviet principalHis demotion of Stalin and line of peaceful coexistence opened the quarrel; in 1960 he withdrew the advisers.
- 1956.02The Twentieth Party Congress and the Secret SpeechThe first secretary who read the speechHe read "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences" to the closed session on the final day.
- 1957The Anti-Party GroupThe victorious First SecretaryHe turned the tables on the majority by taking the question to the Central Committee.
- 1957–1965The Soviet Space ProgramPolitical patronAs First Secretary he gave the space program top-priority resources and political backing, presenting its achievements to the world as achievements of socialism.
- 1958–1962The Great Leap Forward and the Great FamineCriticised the communes and withdrew the expertsHis withdrawal of Soviet technicians in July 1960 halted industrial projects.
- 1961The Building of the Berlin WallSoviet First Secretary and Premier, who issued the 1958 and 1961 Berlin ultimatumsKhrushchev issued the six-month Berlin ultimatum to the three Western powers in November 1958 and renewed it at the 1961 Vienna summit.
- 1962The Cuban Missile CrisisSoviet leader in the standoffHe made the decision to place missiles in Cuba, then chose withdrawal at the edge of nuclear war.
- 1966–1976The Cultural RevolutionSymbol of “revisionism” invoked by the May 16 NotificationThe Notification warned that “persons like Khrushchev” were being trained as successors inside the party.
- 1978–1979The Sino-Vietnamese WarSoviet leaderHis Secret Speech and peaceful coexistence line began the Sino-Soviet split.
How did a Donbas metalworker become a Bolshevik official and head of the Moscow party?
Nikita Khrushchev was born in April 1894 into a poor Russian peasant family in the village of Kalinovka, Kursk Governorate. His father went back and forth to the Donbas, the coal-mining and industrial region of eastern Ukraine, working as a railwayman and miner. Nikita herded livestock from an early age and had only about four years of schooling in all. "I learned to count to thirty," he recalled, "and my father decided that was enough." In 1908 the family moved to the mining town of Yuzovka (now Donetsk), where he was apprenticed at an engineering works and from 1912 worked as a fitter at a mine. As a skilled worker he was not called up in 1914.
In March 1915 he was one of the leaders of a strike at Rutchenkovo mine No. 31, and after the February Revolution of 1917 he joined the Rutchenkovo workers' soviet and sided with the Bolsheviks. In 1918 he led a Red Guard battalion of miners against Cossack forces and joined the Bolshevik party. During the Civil War he served as a political commissar, among other places on the Tsaritsyn front; a commissar was the party's representative beside the commander, responsible for the soldiers' political education and loyalty. After the war he went back to the Donbas as deputy manager of a mine, entered a workers' faculty (rabfak), a preparatory school for workers, and was elected its party secretary.
His rise was helped by Lazar Kaganovich, general secretary of the Ukrainian party in 1925-1928. Khrushchev became a county party secretary in 1925 and then an instructor in the Ukrainian Central Committee's organisation department and head of the organisation department in Kiev. In autumn 1929 he entered the Industrial Academy in Moscow, where he studied alongside Stalin's wife, Nadezhda Alliluyeva. Elected party secretary of the academy in 1930, he purged it of the "right deviation" in line with the policy of the day. He had briefly sympathised with the Trotskyists in the 1920s, but Kaganovich shielded him, reporting to Stalin that he was now "sincerely fighting" the Trotskyists.
From then on his promotion was rapid: first secretary of Moscow's Bauman and then Krasnaya Presnya districts in 1931, second secretary of the Moscow city party in 1932, and early in 1934 first secretary of the Moscow city party and a member of the Central Committee. In the party purge of 1933 he and Kaganovich expelled 11.9 per cent of Moscow's members. In these years he also oversaw the building of the Moscow Metro. A miner with four years of schooling who became party boss of the capital in little more than a decade, he was a model of the new generation of worker-born officials the Stalin system raised. The Metro opened in May 1935, and he received the Order of Lenin for his part in it.
What did Khrushchev do during the Great Purge and the war?
In March 1935 Khrushchev also became first secretary of the Moscow regional party. In 1937, at the height of the Great Purge, he was named to the NKVD "troika" for Moscow region, a body that sentenced arrested people to death or the camps without trial. Twenty days later he was replaced on it by the second secretary, Alexei Volkov, and no troika documents bearing his signature have been found in the archives. But KGB archive material shows that he personally approved and proposed the arrest of officials of the Moscow city and regional leadership. In summer 1937 he asked the Central Committee to approve a quota of 8,500 people in Moscow city and region under the "first category", execution, more than the 5,000 that Yezhov's NKVD had initially planned. In 1936-1937, 55,741 people were repressed in Moscow city and region. At the February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937 he argued for putting Bukharin and Rykov on trial at once.
In 1938 he succeeded Stanisław Kosior as first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and in 1939 he became a full member of the Politburo. In Ukraine he kept the purge going: in summer 1938 many senior officials, including deputy chairmen of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars, people's commissars and regional party secretaries, were arrested with his sanction, and 167,565 people were arrested in Ukraine in 1938-1940, as a 1988 CPSU Central Committee report set out in detail. That the man who would later denounce Stalin had been an active executor of the Great Purge is the heaviest fact of his life. When the Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland in 1939 he also directed the Sovietisation of Western Ukraine.
During the German-Soviet war, as a Politburo member and Ukrainian first secretary, he sat on the military councils of the South-Western Direction and of the Stalingrad, Voronezh and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, among others. A military council member signed operational orders alongside the commander and was the party's link between Stalin and the generals. In May 1942 he joined Timoshenko and Bagramyan in pressing for the Kharkov offensive, which ended in disaster when a German counter-stroke encircled the Soviet forces (the Second Battle of Kharkov) and opened the way for the German drive to the Volga and the Caucasus. As a military council member of the Stalingrad Front he then made frequent visits to the city's defences, and in February 1943 he was made a lieutenant general. All his life he took great pride in having been at Stalingrad.
In November 1943 he entered liberated Kiev with the leading units of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and in February 1944 he also became chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars (from 1946 the Council of Ministers). In December 1949 Stalin brought him back to Moscow as a Central Committee secretary and first secretary of the Moscow regional and city party. After the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 he joined Stalin, Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin in the informal "five" in which real power was concentrated. Just before Stalin's death he stood at the centre of power.
1953–1958: the struggle for power after Stalin, from Beria's removal to the "Anti-Party Group"
Stalin died on 5 March 1953. The new leadership announced on 6 March made Malenkov Chairman of the Council of Ministers, with Beria, Kaganovich, Bulganin and Molotov as first vice-chairmen; Khrushchev was relieved of his Moscow party post and appeared last in the ten-man Presidium. When Malenkov resigned from the Central Committee secretariat on 14 March, Khrushchev's name stood at the top of the list of secretaries, and in September 1953 the Central Committee formally elected him First Secretary.
The first target of the struggle was Beria. Allied with Malenkov, Khrushchev blocked Beria's reform proposals, then lured away his deputies Kruglov and Serov and had him arrested at a Presidium meeting on 26 June 1953. Beria was tried in secret and executed in December 1953 together with five close associates.
Malenkov was next. In January 1955 a Central Committee meeting accused him of involvement in the Leningrad case and of having helped Beria rise, and the following month Bulganin replaced him as premier. Malenkov retained a Presidium seat as Minister of Electric Power Stations. According to his biographer William Tompson, Khrushchev's position as first among the collective leadership was by then beyond reasonable doubt.
Through the first half of 1957 Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich quietly built support to dismiss Khrushchev, joined by Bulganin and Shepilov. At a Presidium meeting on 18 June 1957, with two of his supporters absent, they moved to demote him. Khrushchev objected that not all Presidium members had been notified, and he held firm control of the military through Marshal Zhukov and of the security departments. Central Committee members under his control were flown to Moscow and forced a Central Committee session that dubbed the three main conspirators the "Anti-Party Group" and expelled them from the Central Committee and the Presidium. Molotov was sent as ambassador to Mongolia; the others were posted to industrial and research posts far from Moscow.
Zhukov was rewarded with full Presidium membership, but Khrushchev feared his popularity and power: in October 1957 Zhukov was sent on a Balkans tour while a Presidium meeting arranged his dismissal, and at a Central Committee meeting weeks later no one spoke in his defence. Khrushchev completed the consolidation of power in March 1958, arranging Bulganin's dismissal as premier in favour of himself and creating a USSR Defense Council that he led.
How did Khrushchev's domestic reforms change Soviet lives, and where did they fail?
Khrushchev's years are often called "the Thaw". As Stalin-era terror eased, most political prisoners were released from the camps and cases were reviewed. In 1957 the autonomous republics of peoples deported en masse during the war, such as the Chechens and Ingush, Kalmyks and Kabardians and Balkars, were restored, though the Crimean Tatars, Germans and Koreans were left out of this rehabilitation. In 1961 Stalin's body was removed from the Lenin Mausoleum and Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd. Control over literature and the arts loosened, but the persecution of Pasternak showed its limits.
The weight of economic policy shifted towards ordinary living standards. State purchase prices for collective-farm produce tripled in 1953-1956, and in 1956 the 1940 law that made absenteeism and lateness criminal offences and forbade quitting a job was repealed. The same year a new pension law more than doubled the average pension (extended to collective farmers in 1964), and in 1960 the working day was cut to seven hours. The most visible change was housing: from 1957 four- and five-storey prefabricated blocks, the "khrushchyovkas", went up in huge numbers, nearly doubling living space between 1957 and 1963 and moving more than fifty million people into new homes. Abortion was legalised again in 1955, and in 1956 tuition fees for upper secondary and higher education were abolished.
In agriculture he was bold but hasty. The Virgin Lands campaign launched in 1954 sent hundreds of thousands of young volunteers to plough the untilled steppes of western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan for grain; it succeeded at first but later collapsed under soil erosion and drought. The maize campaign, inspired by the Iowa farmer Roswell Garst, was pushed even into Siberia, whose climate did not suit it: in 1962 maize was sown on 37 million hectares but ripened on only 7 million. He later admitted that "as a result corn was discredited as a silage crop, and so was I." The hasty abolition of the machine-tractor stations, which saddled collective farms with machinery, and limits on private livestock that led to mass slaughter, also hurt the countryside. In 1957 he abolished central ministries and handed economic management to regional economic councils (sovnarkhozes), which bred localism and confusion.
In 1961 the Twenty-Second Party Congress adopted a new party programme promising to build the foundations of communist society by 1980. Sputnik (1957) and Gagarin's first manned spaceflight (1961) raised Soviet prestige. But reality fell short of the promises. When retail prices of meat and butter were raised by 25-35 per cent in June 1962, workers at the electric locomotive plant in Novocherkassk went on strike; troops fired on the demonstrators, killing 26 and wounding 87, seven were later sentenced to death, and the events were kept secret until 1991. After the poor harvest of 1963 the Soviet Union had to spend much of its gold reserve buying 12 million tonnes of grain, mostly from Canada. A serious effort to raise living standards and the failures of an improvised, top-down style are both stamped on his domestic record.
Why did Khrushchev, who preached peaceful coexistence, preside over the most dangerous moments of the Cold War?
Khrushchev's foreign policy swung between reconciliation and threat. In May 1955 he went to Belgrade in person to restore relations with Yugoslavia, broken since 1948, and signed the Belgrade Declaration recognising that there could be different roads to socialism. The same year Soviet troops left Austria, relations were established with West Germany, and he met Eisenhower for the first time at Geneva. At the Twentieth Congress in 1956 he made peaceful coexistence between states with different systems the basic line of Soviet foreign policy and declared that war was not fatally inevitable.
De-Stalinisation, however, shook Eastern Europe. When a rising in Hungary in October 1956 brought Imre Nagy's government to announce withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet leadership sent a large army in November to crush it. The line that the socialist camp must stay within the Soviet sphere was plain. Relations with China cracked too. Mao Zedong was angered that the Secret Speech had been given without consulting him, and regarded de-Stalinisation and détente with the United States as revisionism. In 1959 the Soviets destroyed the prototype atomic bomb and documentation they had promised China, and in 1960 they withdrew their experts from China. Albania's Hoxha sided with China and broke with Moscow.
Relations with the United States rose and fell dramatically. In September 1959 he became the first Soviet leader to make an official visit to the United States, proposing general disarmament at the United Nations. But when an American U-2 spy plane was shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960, the Paris summit collapsed. He met Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961 without agreement on West Berlin, and as East Germans kept fleeing in large numbers the Berlin Wall went up in August. Convinced that missiles would decide future wars, he made deep cuts in conventional forces and created the Strategic Rocket Forces.
In autumn 1962, citing the need to deter a US invasion of Cuba and to answer American missiles in Turkey, he secretly placed nuclear missiles in Cuba. When the United States discovered them in October and imposed a naval quarantine, the world came to the brink of nuclear war. In the end he withdrew the missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba and an unpublicised removal of the missiles in Turkey. Avoiding nuclear war was his decision, but at home it looked like a retreat, and Castro was furious at being left out of the bargaining. In 1963 the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain signed a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. For a leader who preached peaceful coexistence yet did not shrink from brinkmanship, judgements range from one who opened a realistic path to coexistence in the nuclear age to one whose reckless gambles put the world in danger.
What did the Secret Speech of 25 February 1956 reveal, and what shock waves did it send out?
Shortly after midnight on 25 February 1956, at a closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress, Nikita Khrushchev spoke for four hours. The congress's public sessions had ended the day before, and delegates were called back to the Great Kremlin Hall without journalists or foreign party delegations; a hundred former party members recently released from the camps were given seats as well. The delegates listened in shock and silence, and several were taken ill and carried out. There were no questions, no debate and no stenographic record.
Titled "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences", the speech quoted Lenin's testament on Stalin officially for the first time, exposed the illegality of the Great Purge and charged Stalin with incompetence on the eve of the war. It drew on the findings of the Pospelov Commission that Khrushchev had set up at the end of 1955. He revealed that of the 1,966 delegates to the Seventeenth Congress in 1934, 1,108 had been arrested as "counter-revolutionaries" and 848 shot. The notion of the "enemy of the people", he said, had become a weapon for physically destroying opponents, and loyal communists had been tortured into false confessions. He accused Stalin of ignoring warnings before the Nazi invasion, mocked him for planning wartime operations on a globe, and condemned the deportation of entire nationalities and the "Doctors' Plot".
What the speech left out was just as clear. Collectivisation and dekulakisation, the Ukrainian famine and the Katyn massacre, things for which the whole system bore responsibility, were omitted, and the victims named were mainly party members. Every wrong was put down to Stalin's personal character and the "cult of personality". The Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski later objected that the speech offered no clue as to how a bloodthirsty paranoiac could wield unlimited power for twenty-five years, and left the system and the party spotless. Nor did it mention the responsibility of Khrushchev himself, who had carried out purges under Stalin.
The speech was "secret", but not for long. On 5 March its classification was lowered from "top secret" to "not for publication", and it was read out at party and Komsomol meetings across the country to more than 25 million people. The Polish party printed thousands of copies, copies reached the West, and on 5 June The New York Times printed the full text; the Soviet press officially published it only in 1989. In Georgia, demonstrations in defence of Stalin's good name broke out in Tbilisi in March and were put down by the army. Many members left the Western communist parties; in Eastern Europe the speech was an indirect trigger of the Polish October and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956; and Mao Zedong and Hoxha saw it as the beginning of "revisionism" and broke with Moscow. Khrushchev had opened Stalin's coffin, but the forces he released were beyond even his control.
How was Khrushchev removed, and what did he leave behind in retirement?
By the early 1960s Khrushchev's position had visibly weakened. Agricultural failure and food price rises, the retreat over Cuba, generals' resentment of the troop cuts, and local officials' anger at the 1962 reorganisation that split the party apparatus into industrial and agricultural branches all piled up. Leonid Brezhnev, whom he had promoted, and other colleagues quietly gathered support among Central Committee members.
On 12 October 1964 Brezhnev telephoned Khrushchev, who was on holiday at Pitsunda on the Black Sea, and asked him to attend a Presidium meeting the next day. At the meeting on 13-14 October he was harshly criticised for many blunders, for a cult of his own personality and for rudeness to colleagues; only Anastas Mikoyan defended him. On the 14th he signed a resignation statement, and that evening a Central Committee plenum relieved him as First Secretary and removed him from the Presidium "for reasons of health". The next day the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet dismissed him as chairman of the Council of Ministers. The Ukrainian party chief Petro Shelest later claimed that Brezhnev had at first raised with KGB chairman Semichastny the idea of disposing of Khrushchev physically, while another party official insisted that every rule had been followed and called it the first time in Soviet history that the leadership had lawfully replaced a leader. For the first time since Stalin, the top leader was voted out without execution or prison.
In retirement he lived on a pension at a dacha at Petrovo-Dalneye outside Moscow. Deeply depressed at first, he gradually took to gardening and photography. He strongly opposed moves to rehabilitate Stalin, criticised the trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel, and privately called the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia "a big mistake". He also spoke warmly of the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny and the physicist Andrei Sakharov, with whom he had once clashed.
He dictated his memoirs into a tape recorder, and with the tacit consent of KGB chairman Andropov the tapes reached the West through Victor Louis, a journalist with KGB links, and were published in the United States in 1970 and 1974. At the party leadership's demand he signed a statement in November 1970 disowning their publication abroad. He died of a heart attack on 11 September 1971 and was buried at Novodevichy Cemetery in an all but closed funeral. As he had asked, his headstone was made by Neizvestny; its interlocking white marble and black granite is often read as the light and dark of his life. Throughout the Brezhnev years his name all but vanished from the official press, and the Great Soviet Encyclopedia said only that his work had shown "elements of subjectivism and voluntarism". His life came back into open discussion only under perestroika, when the Thaw was presented as a forerunner of reform and his part in the purges as a past that could not be forgotten.