Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, August 13, 1961, 7 p.m.

185. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and Finn. At noon meeting of Commandants, Deputy Commandants and POLADs with GovMayor accompanied by Amrehn and Senator Klein, Brandt expressed concern re anticipated psychological reaction to East German measures. He mentioned dangerous possibility of desperate actions by populace, warning that in course of day and night large crowds of people might assemble on both sides of sector boundary, creating public safety problem; West Berlin police alerted to possibility of incidents on Western side.

Senat carefully weighing every word released to public, advising West Berliners continue normal tasks and cautioning them against ill-considered actions. Senat neither urging border crossers from East report for work in West Berlin nor advising them stay in SovSector, but stating that their rights in West Berlin (to continue employment, social security, etc.) being safeguarded.

Under increasing pressure from local as well as foreign press representatives, Senat is emphasizing unlawful and inhumane nature of latest Eastern measures. House of Representatives convening in special session this evening to hear Brandt’s report on situation. At his invitation Commandants and Deputy Commandants will attend. Brandt indicated Senat considering holding mass protest rally but no decision yet.

Brandt summed up Senat evaluation that East regime action gross violation of existing rights, including Four-Power status of Berlin, and specifically Four-Power agreements of 1949, restoring status quo ante blockade. He emphasized significance of measures which East had threatened to take only after realization of so-called peace treaty and establishment “demilitarized free city of West Berlin,” and stressed illegality of Warsaw Pact instructions to “GDR” government to take measures on Berlin territory. On basis of above evaluation of Eastern measures, Brandt said Senat believes Western diplomatic steps vis-a-vis SovUnion might be warranted at high level, although Commandants presumably might simultaneously consider new steps vis-a-vis Sov Commandant. Brandt mentioned in this connection that Commandants’ protest letters re border crossers (Berlin’s 114 Bonn, 131 Dept) not answered, but that situation now radically changed. Brandt also mentioned that he understood quadripartite conversations in progress at high level concerning means available to West (specifically economic measures) to counter latest Communist moves, in order demonstrate that West not prepared to submit tacitly to latest Eastern measures.

Chairman Commandant told GovMayor that Commandants carefully following developments, considering actions to be taken; they fully in agreement with GovMayor’s efforts maintain calm atmosphere.

In view Department’s press release Aug 13 and telephonic instruction, tripartitely agreed press statement prepared here was replaced by following brief tripartite statement to local press:

“An Allied spokesman today said the three Western Commandants in Berlin have fully informed their governments and any comment must be expected from the capitals.”

After special session House of Representatives this evening Commandants are meeting re terms and method of formal protest to Sov Commandant.

Lightner

Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, October 27, 1961, 5 p.m.

1378. Re Deptel 1131. Shortly before my 3 pm appointment I was informed Gromyko would see me after all. When I made points set forth Deptel Gromyko replied by reading me statement, text of which follows in separate tel, containing Soviet protest same incidents.

I observed his statement alleged we had acted in violation established procedure. I pointed out contrary was case and East German police had changed practice which had existed for 16 years. He merely said we had made lots of changes on our side. He referred to his talks with Secretary and understanding that both sides would avoid steps which would lead to complications. He said action US military in Berlin contradicted this understanding and it followed that evidently American side had changed its mind. If so Sov Govt would be compelled to draw appropriate conclusions. I again pointed out it was their side that had initiated action and I could not understand this at time when we were preparing negotiate settlement problems with Sov Union. Gromyko said sovereign rights of GDR could not be subject of negotiation. US should take account of this in its actions. I asked him if they had already signed separate treaty with GDR. He said when treaty was signed many other things would be implemented and he had discussed these in detail with Secretary Rusk. He said all information available to Sov Govt made it clear there was no basis for statement I had made to him and that our side had sole responsibility for incidents on border. All police were trying to do was establish who people were in these vehicles. If US sincerely desired détente it should not complicate situation. He referred to use of tanks and jeeps. I said I thought it possible to settle this problem and that we would be prepared to discuss it either here or in Berlin but he showed no interest in pursuing subject. At end conversation I asked if he thought it would be useful to instruct our people in Berlin to attempt find solution. He replied Soviet representative would not take part in check point procedure and would not be sent to check points. I remarked this was not only possible solution but he said he was aware that General Watson had discussed this problem with Soviet authorities and that position he had taken was not correct. He said Soviet officials had also made representations to ours in Berlin.

At one point Gromyko said no one had right infringe on sovereignty of GDR. I pointed out that logic of his position was that East Germany would also stop our military personnel in uniform particularly as he had remarked that uniform itself was not proof of identity. He replied I could draw any conclusion I liked.

In view Gromyko’s unyielding position I did not put forward suggestions contained Deptel 1146. I pointed out we did not recognize sovereignty of GDR and that they were apparently trying force us recognize it in East Berlin prior to negotiations. I pointed out this resulted in extremely serious and dangerous situation.

Gromyko said he agreed with this. I concluded by saying I would inform my govt of his remarks.

My preliminary conclusion is that Soviets consider they have good issue and will be prepared use force.

Thompson

Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State

Berlin, October 27, 1961, 8 p.m.

856. Bonn for Ambassador Dowling. From Clay to Rusk. While situation is tense it looks to me as if it could continue this way for a good may days without any significant change as our confrontation today was [with] Soviet tanks manned by Soviet troops. In view of present circumstances, in telephone conversation with the White House, we are to refrain from further probes until Monday reporting back prior to probing and during the same period will send only uniformed Americans into East Berlin. Our troops are on a partial alert although all of us are confident that we are just in a new phase of the war of nerves, and ours are in good shape.

Lightner

Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at Berlin

Washington, October 27, 1961, 10:03 p.m.

620. Paris pass USRO, Stoessel, McGuire. Berlin for Clay. JCS communicating with Norstad along following lines re Friedrichstrasse situation:

a. Probes to date have accomplished their purpose.

b. Further probes by U.S. personnel wearing civilian clothes and riding in official U.S. vehicles or privately owned vehicles bearing plates of U.S. Armed Forces and using armed guards or military escort will be deferred.

c. U.S. civilian officials will for the time being refrain from going into East Berlin except that one civilian official will attempt daily to enter East Berlin in a privately owned vehicle without armed escort.

d. All U.S. military personnel entering East Berlin will wear uniform.

Publicly we are taking position that armed probes by US personnel at Friedrichstrasse crossing point into East Berlin have now demonstrated a) direct Soviet responsibility for unilateral action taken by Communists and b) our unwillingness recognize East German authorities with respect to US official civilian personnel. For time being nothing further can be done on spot since matter has now moved to highest governmental levels. Instructions have been issued to defer any further civilian probes with armed escorts into East Berlin. Normal flow of uniformed military traffic into East Berlin will of course continue.

FYI. Propose send communication soonest from Secretary to Gromyko raising question serious effect Soviet and GDR unilateral action on whole basis for negotiation.

Rusk