1944.08.29–10.28

The Slovak National Uprising and the Carpathian–Dukla Operation

Why did the Slovak army and resistance rise, unready, when German troops entered Slovakia in August 1944; why did the Red Army try to force the Dukla Pass in the Carpathians head-on and in haste, at heavy cost; and how was the uprising driven into the mountains within two months?

The Slovak National Council, formed by the "Christmas Agreement" of 1943 between Communists and the civic camp, and Lieutenant Colonel Golian's Military Headquarters prepared a rising in which two eastern divisions would open the Carpathian passes to the Red Army. But after partisan attacks and the Martin incident German troops entered on 29 August, and the uprising began early, centred on Banská Bystrica. The two eastern divisions were disarmed without a fight. From 8 September Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front and the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps attacked the Dukla Pass in haste and crossed it on 6 October, but when Banská Bystrica fell on 27 October the insurgent army withdrew into the mountains.

What kind of state was Tiso's Slovakia, and why was it shaken in 1944?

On 14 March 1939, under heavy pressure from Nazi Germany, the Slovak parliament declared independence from Czechoslovakia. The "Protection Treaty" of 23 March bound the new Slovak State to conduct its foreign policy and build its army "in close agreement" with Germany and to place a "protection zone" in the west at the Wehrmacht's disposal. The country was a one-party dictatorship of Hlinka's Slovak People's Party (the "Ludaks"), led by the Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. Historians variously call the regime fascist, clerical-fascist or authoritarian. In 1942 Tiso broke the power of the Nazi-admiring Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and his radical wing and set up a presidential dictatorship. 1

Slovakia joined the Axis in November 1940 and declared war on the Soviet Union in June 1941 and on Britain and the United States in December. An army of some 60,000 men went to the Eastern Front. The Jewish Code of September 1941 was among the harshest anti-Jewish laws in Europe, and between March and October 1942 about 58,000 Jews, two-thirds of Slovakia's Jewish population, were deported to German extermination camps; only a few hundred survived. Yet Slovakia, which German troops did not occupy, profited from the war economy and was better off than its neighbours until the summer of 1944, and the regime long enjoyed the tolerance or support of most of the population. 1

After Stalingrad the mood changed. From early 1943 Slovak soldiers on the Eastern Front went over to the Red Army and the partisans in growing numbers, and after two mass desertions in October 1943 the Slovak units were useless at the front. Once the Allies had made the restoration of Czechoslovakia a war aim in 1941, an independent Slovakia had little chance of surviving the war. The question was on what terms Slovakia would rejoin Czechoslovakia. 1

Who prepared the uprising, and why were there several strands?

At first resistance ran in two strands. The Communist Party, the first party banned in 1938, worked on as a separate Communist Party of Slovakia, while its leadership went into exile in Moscow. On the other side were civil servants, officers and Agrarian politicians loyal to the exiled president Edvard Beneš in London. In 1943 young Communists led by Gustáv Husák and young Agrarians led by Ján Ursíny negotiated a common programme, and in December the "Christmas Agreement" was concluded. It provided for an uprising, a "Slovak National Council" as the highest body of the underground, and a restored Czechoslovakia as a federation of Czechs and Slovaks as equals. The council was made up of the Communists Husák, Ladislav Novomeský and Karol Šmidke and the non-Communists Ursíny, Jozef Lettrich and Matej Josko. 1

But an uprising was unthinkable without the army. Lieutenant Colonel Ján Golian, who became chief of staff of the field army command at Banská Bystrica in January 1944, built a conspiratorial network among the officers, and in March Beneš entrusted him with command of military action in Slovakia. The National Council soon won him over, and on 27 April a "Military Council" of the council and a "Military Headquarters", the supreme command of an illegal insurgent army, were set up. The headquarters quietly gathered troops, fuel, food and money in the mountain triangle of Banská Bystrica, Brezno and Zvolen in central Slovakia. The key to the plan was the "Eastern Slovak Army" of two elite infantry divisions (about 24,000 men) in the east, which was to open the Carpathian passes and let the Red Army in. 1 2

There was a third strand as well. The regime's defence minister, Ferdinand Čatloš, had been thinking of changing sides since 1943; having set up the Eastern Slovak Army, he meant to overthrow the Tiso government at the right moment and take Slovakia over to the Soviet side as a military dictatorship. He did not recognise the government-in-exile. The two centres abroad also disagreed. In his memoirs Konev quotes a letter Golian sent to London on 15 June 1944, "We do not want to go over to the Russians", asking that the Slovak army be recognised as an allied army, and he criticises the London leadership for planning an action of the army alone, without the people, the Communists or the Red Army. Shtemenko likewise wrote that London feared an armed rising of the masses. That is the Soviet account of the 1970s; English and Czech Wikipedia stress the opposite, that the Slovak Communists and Moscow acted behind the government-in-exile's back. 1 3 4 5 6

How much did Moscow and London know of the plans?

In his memoirs Sergei Shtemenko, head of the Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, writes that early in 1944 the Beneš government reported the possibility of armed resistance in Slovakia and asked for 50,000 sets of small arms, the Czechoslovak parachute brigade formed in the USSR and two Soviet rifle divisions to be delivered when the uprising began. Czech Wikipedia likewise records that the exile defence ministry asked for arms for 50,000 to 70,000 men within five days of a rising. According to Shtemenko, the plan was to hold the Tatra passes in the north and the river lines in the west and to stop an invasion across the open Hungarian border by American and British bombing. Reckoning that 170 transport aircraft would each need five or six trips to fly in two divisions, and that Slovakia had no suitable airfields, he wrote that "the plan of Beneš's generals proceeded mainly from what they would have liked to do, not from what could actually be done". The General Staff proposed instead to treat Slovakia as a base for a large partisan struggle. 5 6

Shtemenko admits that "the General Staff had no objective and sufficiently accurate information on the situation in Slovakia". The letters of General Heliodor Píka, head of the Czechoslovak military mission in Moscow, spoke only of the Slovak army's readiness and never mentioned the National Council. The picture changed on 4 August. When Čatloš tried to send a secret message to the Soviet Union in his own aircraft, the underground council put Šmidke and Lieutenant Colonel Mikuláš Ferjenčík on board. Shtemenko writes that the aircraft landed near Lvov and that only when the General Staff, with Stalin's permission, received the council's documents and Šmidke's report did it learn that a popular uprising was ripening. 5 3

The sources differ on how the delegation was treated. According to English Wikipedia the two men were interrogated at the headquarters of Ivan Petrov, commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, sent on to Moscow and allowed home only on 5 September, without any word of Soviet operational plans or a promise of support. Czech Wikipedia writes that the delegation was isolated under NKVD guard and that Stalin hid its presence from Beneš's representatives for two weeks. Slovak Wikipedia, on the other hand, records that the two came back with a promise to send the 2nd Czechoslovak Parachute Brigade and a fighter regiment. Meanwhile neither London nor Moscow agreed a date for the rising with the Slovaks; English Wikipedia writes that for more than three weeks "Moscow remained silent". 1 6 7

Why did the uprising break out before it was ready?

The spark came from the partisans. In May 1944 Klement Gottwald, chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in Moscow, agreed with Nikita Khrushchev, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communists, to place the Czechoslovak partisan movement under the Ukrainian Partisan Staff in Kiev, headed by Timofei Strokach. On the night of 25–26 July the first group of organisers under Lieutenant Pyotr Velichko parachuted in. Konev writes of 24 organising groups; Shtemenko writes that 53 groups went in during the second half of 1944 alone. Partisan numbers differ too: Konev gives about 5,000 on the eve of the rising, the West German historian Wolfgang Venohr about 2,000 growing to 7,000, and other research up to 12,000 to 18,000 at the peak. 1 4 5

The National Council and the Military Headquarters repeatedly warned the partisans not to cut the routes the rising would need, but they went on wrecking roads, railways and bridges and attacking ethnic Germans and Ludak officials. On the night of 27 August in Martin, in central Slovakia, Velichko's partisans and the mutinous local garrison, without the headquarters' knowledge, stopped a train carrying the German military mission home from Romania. All 22 German officers were shot the next morning on Velichko's orders. Whether the partisans acted on the Soviet command's orders or of their own accord is still disputed; Slovak Wikipedia notes that no archival evidence has been found that the Soviet side deliberately provoked the occupation. 1 7

Romania's change of sides on 23 August had left Berlin fearful that its satellites would defect. Straight after the Martin incident, on Ribbentrop's instructions, the German envoy Hanns Ludin pressed Tiso to consent to an occupation, and after much hesitation Tiso agreed. On 29 August German troops crossed the north-eastern border. That evening Čatloš, on Tiso's orders, said on Bratislava radio that the government had called in the Wehrmacht to fight the partisans and that the army should not resist. Forty-five minutes later Golian's Military Headquarters telephoned the garrisons to resist the Germans. So the uprising began, unready, as a response to the German invasion. 1

The heaviest blow came on the first day. The Eastern Slovak Army, meant to be the main force of the rising, had already been placed under the German Army Group North Ukraine on 1 August, and the Germans disarmed it in two days, by 31 August. Of its 25,000 men half were interned, some scattered to their homes or the partisans, and only about 2,000 reached the insurgent area in central Slovakia. Its commander, General Augustín Malár, did not join the rising and on 30 August told the soldiers on the radio to return to barracks because "our time has not come yet". His deputy, Colonel Viliam Talský, did not take command but flew some two dozen aircraft over to the Soviet lines. Shtemenko wrote that Malár betrayed the plans to the enemy and fled to the Germans, but according to English and Czech Wikipedia Malár returned to Prešov, was arrested by the German security services and died in Sachsenhausen in 1945. 1 8 6 5

How did the sixty days of Banská Bystrica unfold?

In the first days of the rising the insurgents held about 22,000 square kilometres, more than half of Slovakia's territory at the time, with 1.7 million inhabitants. On 30 August the Military Headquarters renamed itself the Command of the Czechoslovak Army, and the insurgent force became the "1st Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia". Starting at 18,000 men, it grew to 47,000 after the mobilisation of 5 September and then to about 60,000. In Banská Bystrica the National Council came out of hiding on 1 September and took legislative and executive power, with the Communist Šmidke and the non-Communist Vavro Šrobár as joint chairmen. The council repealed all anti-Jewish laws and banned the parties of the Ludak system, though no parties other than the Democrats and Communists were allowed. On 16 September a partisan headquarters was formed under Šmidke, with Rudolf Slánský representing the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Colonel Alexei Asmolov sent from the Ukrainian Partisan Staff. 1 4 6

At first the Germans saw it as a "pacification" that would soon be over. SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger, German commander in Slovakia from 1 September, expected to finish within four days with improvised battle groups of fewer than 9,000 men, but he was halted near Žilina. On 14 September Hermann Höfle replaced him and tightened the ring methodically, taking Martin on 21 September. By the end of September the insurgent area had shrunk to 6,800 square kilometres with 340,000 inhabitants. German forces committed numbered nearly 50,000 according to English Wikipedia and about 30,000 according to Russian Wikipedia. On 7 October Divisional General Rudolf Viest, flown in from London, took command, with Golian as his deputy. 1 9 10

After the Arrow Cross regime took power in Hungary in mid-October, the Germans could come in from the south as well. Joined by Oskar Dirlewanger's SS special regiment, which had also been used to crush the Warsaw Uprising, and the SS "Horst Wessel" division, they opened the final offensive on 18 October. Banská Bystrica fell on 27 October, and in the early hours of the next day Viest issued his last order: to stop regular fighting, withdraw into the mountains and turn to partisan warfare. The insurgent army did not surrender. The remaining soldiers and partisans wintered in the Low Tatras and other ranges and fought on until the Red Army arrived in the spring of 1945. 1 7

Civilians died in the insurgent area too. According to English Wikipedia partisans and insurgents killed 1,000 to 1,500 people, most of them ethnic Germans; the largest single crime was the shooting of 187 German men from the village of Sklené by partisans on 21 September. Czech Wikipedia adds that Velichko's unit killed Germans, Hlinka Guardsmen and Slovaks accused of collaboration at Sklabiňa in late August, by one count as many as 146 (figures differ). In the same area at least 1,566 Jews have been identified among the insurgents' soldiers and partisans. 1 6

Why did the Soviets decide to cross the Carpathians head-on?

The Soviet command had no intention of crossing the Carpathians head-on. According to Shtemenko the mountains were to be bypassed; Ivan Petrov's 4th Ukrainian Front had been re-formed on 30 July, but its two armies of eighteen divisions had under 4,500 men each and only 0.2 to 0.3 of a standard load of ammunition. When the Jassy–Kishinev offensive broke Romania from 20 August, the Stavka decided to go round through Romania and strike the rear of the enemy in the Carpathians, and on 26 August it ordered the 4th Ukrainian Front onto the defensive. The main forces of Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front were fighting off German counter-attacks on the Sandomierz bridgehead beyond the Vistula. In his memoirs Konev wrote that "it was perfectly clear to me that fighting in the mountains could be justified only by the harshest, iron necessity". 5 4 11

On 30–31 August the news crowded in on the General Staff. Píka reported that the exile government had called for the rising on the night of the 30th and that Ružomberok and the Tri Duby airfield, among other places, were in insurgent hands, and he asked for the parachute brigade and arms to be sent quickly. On the afternoon of 31 August the ambassador in Moscow, Zdeněk Fierlinger, and Píka called on Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Andrei Vyshinsky to ask for air support and arms drops. Earlier that morning aircraft carrying Slovak officers had landed in the sectors of both fronts, and on 1 September Konev met Talský, who said that if the Soviets attacked, the two Eastern Slovak divisions could advance towards Krosno to meet them. But the news of 1 September was that the Germans had already taken the Slovak headquarters at Prešov. Konev himself writes that he learned of the Eastern Slovak Army's disarmament only after the operation had begun. 5 4

According to Shtemenko, Stalin said "Prepare a directive for Comrade Konev", and on the night of 2 September, after a brief discussion with members of the Politburo, ordered arms supplies and an offensive. The Stavka directive signed that day by Aleksei Antonov, first deputy chief of the General Staff, ordered a thrust from Krosno and Sanok towards Prešov at the junction of the 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts to link up with the Slovak troops. Konev had reported early on 2 September that he could attack in a week; in the plan he submitted on the 3rd he promised readiness in five days, the border on the third day and Prešov on the fifth. The Stavka approved the plan that day and ordered the attack to begin no later than 8 September. Czech Wikipedia writes that it was Stalin who cut the preparation time from seven days to five. 5 4 6

Shtemenko writes that the General Staff's position was "very delicate". Because the directive went to the 1st Ukrainian Front alone, leaving its southern flank exposed, Konev telephoned Antonov and complained of the General Staff's "not very great quick-wittedness". At the end of his plan Konev asked for the right wing of the 4th Ukrainian Front to attack too, and Stalin ordered Petrov to strike towards Komańcza with Andrei Grechko's 1st Guards Army. On 5 September the Stavka turned the main forces of Rodion Malinovsky's 2nd Ukrainian Front towards Debrecen to threaten the enemy in the Carpathians from the south. In Shtemenko's words, "the preparation of the operation proceeded in the most abbreviated form". 5 4

What happened at the Dukla Pass?

The Dukla Pass is one of the lowest and narrowest crossings of the Carpathians between Poland and Slovakia; the Russian 8th Army had been held up there for months in 1915. Kirill Moskalenko's 38th Army, with six rifle divisions, cavalry and tank corps and the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps formed in the Soviet Union, was to attack from north of Krosno along the road through Dukla to Prešov. Facing it was Gotthard Heinrici's "Army Group Heinrici" (the German 1st Panzer Army and the Hungarian 1st Army); Konev writes that on 8 September it had ten German and eight Hungarian divisions, about 300,000 men. The Germans guarded this direction with particular care, with deep defences and the works of the "Árpád Line". 4 12 11

The offensive opened on 8 September (the 1st Guards Army on the 9th) in rain and mud. The Germans had noticed the preparations and moved forces from the first day. On 9 September the Czechoslovak corps was counter-attacked near Wrocanka and Bóbrka and lost 611 men killed, wounded and missing in a single day. Konev wrote that the corps commander, General Jan Kratochvíl, "did not organise the command of the corps' troops at the moment it was committed to battle", removed him and early on the 10th put Ludvík Svoboda, commander of the 1st Brigade, in charge of the corps. Stalin approved, but according to Shtemenko he said that since a foreign commander was involved the change must be put on a legal footing, and the London government later confirmed it. Shtemenko even writes that Kratochvíl stayed 25 kilometres from the front and indulged in the British whisky he had brought; that is the Soviet memoir account. 13 4 5 14

When a narrow gap was opened on 10–11 September, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps went in by night, but on the 14th the Germans closed the corridor; the corps was cut off behind enemy lines and had to be supplied from the air. Hill 534 north-east of Dukla changed hands more than twenty times between 10 and 20 September. The town of Dukla fell on 20 September according to Shtemenko and Slovak Wikipedia, on the 21st according to English Wikipedia. As progress stalled, Stalin sent Georgy Zhukov to visit Konev on the 19th and Petrov on the 20th; Zhukov reported that "Moskalenko has few rifle divisions, and those in action are worn out and under strength". On the same 20th the 1st Guards Army crossed the Łupków Pass onto Czechoslovak soil. 5 13 12

On 27 September Konev reported to the Stavka that "during the operation the army has lost about 20,000 men", that its divisions were down to 3,000 to 3,500, and that its three tank corps, filled up with repaired tanks, had lost about 150 in the mountains; either the operation should stop or he needed more troops and tanks. The operation continued. On the morning of 6 October Svoboda's corps and the 67th Rifle Corps took the Dukla Pass, and Czechoslovak soldiers set foot on their own soil; the day later became Czechoslovak People's Army Day. But the fighting went on south of the pass. In the valley near Kapišová known as the "Valley of Death" tanks fought tanks, and Soviet and Czechoslovak troops entered Svidník only on 28 October. Prešov, planned for the fifth day, was reached four months later. 4 5 12 13

Casualty figures vary with scope and count. English Wikipedia gives 21,000 Soviet dead and 89,000 wounded for the whole East Carpathian operation; Slovak Wikipedia gives about 19,000 to 21,000 Soviet and 1,800 Czechoslovak corps dead and about 88,000 wounded for the Carpathian–Dukla operation. The English article on the corps records 1,630 dead and 4,069 wounded out of 14,900 men. German and Hungarian losses by the Soviet count were about 52,000. English Wikipedia puts the casualties of both sides together at over 70,000. 1 13 14 12

Why did the Soviets not help sooner: could they not, or would they not?

This question has no single answer. Soviet accounts stress the limits of capability. Shtemenko and Konev write that the rising broke out early without coordination with the Soviets, that the Carpathian defences were strong, that the Red Army was exhausted from its summer offensives, and that the Eastern Slovak Army collapsed without a fight, so the passes were never opened. Russian Wikipedia writes that the Stavka decided to strike in the Carpathians to help Czechoslovakia "contrary to operational expediency". Shtemenko records that in 1944 the insurgents were sent more than 10,000 rifles, sub-machine guns and pistols, about 1,000 machine guns and several million rounds. 5 4 11

Others see political calculation. English Wikipedia writes that the Soviets were interested in the rising militarily but politically suspicious of it, because its leadership was a coalition of Communists and democrats whom Marxists regarded as hostile "bourgeois nationalists". Czech Wikipedia argues that Stalin set out to undermine Beneš's plan for restoring a democratic Czechoslovakia and to turn the rising to his own advantage. The pace of the airlift is also cited. According to Czech Wikipedia the airlift of the 2nd Czechoslovak Parachute Brigade was released only on 25 September and went on piecemeal until mid-October (1,739 men by 15 October), so the brigade never fought as a unit. Soviet transport aircraft flew 1,065 sorties between 3 September and 27 October, 701 of them successful, delivering 604 tonnes to the ground forces. A Czechoslovak fighter regiment of 21 aircraft also moved into the insurgent area. 1 6

Comparison with the Warsaw Uprising is common. The two risings happened in the same month, and Dirlewanger's unit was used in both. English Wikipedia writes that the Red Army reached the Vistula at Warsaw at the end of July but advanced no further, allowing the Germans to crush the Warsaw Uprising, and Venohr judged Allied support for Slovakia "just as insignificant and insufficient as in the case of the Warsaw Uprising". Unlike at Warsaw, however, in Slovakia the Soviets launched a costly offensive within ten days of the rising. The Western Allies held back too. When Jan Masaryk, foreign minister of the government-in-exile, asked on 31 August for bombing and for belligerent status, the United States and Britain issued statements on 7 September recognising the insurgents as a fighting force, but on 22 September the American military leadership decided that support for Slovakia "would not constitute a reasonably feasible operation". The Soviet Union issued a similar statement the same day. Elsewhere English Wikipedia says all three powers gave recognition on 7 September, so the date of the Soviet statement differs even within that source. 1 4

Responsibility for the haste of the Dukla operation is also laid in several places. It was Stalin and the Stavka who decided the offensive on political grounds and shortened the preparation. In his 1972 book Konev called it "an 'unplanned' and difficult operation in the mountains", blaming the short preparation, tired troops and unfamiliar mountains, and also wrote that the commanders should have identified and corrected the causes of the slow advance in time. Czech Wikipedia writes that Konev judged the Germans at the pass weak and reckoned on reaching Prešov on the fifth day together with the two Slovak divisions. And both fronts' plans rested on the assumption that the two Eastern Slovak divisions would open the passes, an assumption that had collapsed before the offensive began. 15 4 6 5

What happened in Slovakia after the uprising was crushed?

Germany used the uprising to complete the destruction of Slovakia's Jews. This time German agencies, above all Josef Witiska's Einsatzgruppe H, ran the arrests and deportations from the start, often helped by Slovaks and ethnic Germans; at the end of September 1,600 people were seized in Bratislava alone. Those arrested went to the Sereď camp, where Alois Brunner, one of Adolf Eichmann's closest aides, kept the transports running until March 1945. On top of the 58,000 of 1942, more than 14,000 Jews were deported or murdered on Slovak soil. About 10,000 survived with the help of Slovaks. 1

After Banská Bystrica fell, Jews, Roma and suspected partisans were held in its prison and then trucked to Kremnička and Nemecká to be shot: massacres committed between 5 November 1944 and 19 February 1945 by Einsatzkommando 14 and the Hlinka Guard Emergency Divisions. The victims at Kremnička number 743 (280 women, 99 children) according to English Wikipedia's article on the uprising and 747 (211 women, 58 children) according to its article on the massacres. At Nemecká, where the bodies were burned in lime kilns, the uprising article estimates "at least 400" and the massacre article about 900. Haviva Reik, a Palestinian Jew parachuted in with a British mission, was among those killed at Kremnička. 16 1

The two generals of the uprising did not return either. Retreating into the mountains, Viest and Golian were captured by Einsatzkommando 14 at Pohronský Bukovec on 3 November and taken to Berlin. Their fate thereafter is uncertain; the Czech historian Lenka Šindelářová thinks it most likely that they were shot in the Flossenbürg camp in February 1945. By the count of the Museum of the Slovak National Uprising in 2009, 5,305 people were murdered and buried in 211 mass graves between September 1944 and the end of April 1945, and 102 villages were wholly or partly burned. About 30,000 people were taken to German prisons, labour camps and concentration camps. The insurgents lost about 3,000 men during the rising; for German losses a 1985 Czechoslovak book gives 4,200 killed and Russian Wikipedia 10,350 killed. 1 2 9

In 1947 the National Court in Bratislava sentenced the German envoy Ludin and the commander Höfle to death; both were executed on 9 December. Tiso was sentenced to death on 15 April 1947 and hanged three days later. Čatloš received five years in prison. Of the SS officers of Einsatzgruppe H, almost none were punished for what they did in Slovakia. 1 3

Who led the uprising, and how did its memory change?

Who the protagonist of the uprising was is still disputed. Those who put the army first point out that the rising began on an order of Golian's Military Headquarters, that the regular "1st Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia" carried the fighting for two months, and that most of its officers were Western-oriented men of the democratic tradition. Those who put the National Council first stress that the equal coalition of Communists and non-Communists formed by the Christmas Agreement provided the political framework; those who put the Communists first stress that the Slovak Communist Party, which had never won more than 10 per cent of the vote before 1938, first came to power through the rising. English Wikipedia states that "the uprising did not represent a 'communist coup'", since the civic side was the more important part in its preparation and course. Those who put the partisans first point to the organisers from the Soviet Union who built up the armed struggle, while others criticise those same partisans for setting off the rising too early. 1

The Communists themselves did not think alike. According to Czech Wikipedia, Husák wrote to Stalin some weeks before the uprising proposing that Slovakia be admitted as a Soviet union republic, and in December Moscow replied through Georgi Dimitrov that it did not want Czechoslovakia divided. After the war Husák said: "We fought on three fronts, against Tiso, Hitler and Beneš." The Slovak Communists pressed for Slovak self-government against Prague centralism, which brought them into conflict with the Moscow leadership in exile under Gottwald. 6

After the Communist seizure of power in February 1948 the memory of the uprising was rewritten. The non-Communist leaders who had taken part (Lettrich, Ursíny, Viliam Žingor and others) and Slovak generals were dismissed or imprisoned by 1949. At that year's fifth anniversary the party declared that it had been the "sole leading and organising force" of the uprising and that Gottwald had "personally prepared the uprising from Moscow and Kiev". Venohr summed up the official interpretation in six points: the uprising was the cause of the whole Slovak people led by the Communists; it was only part of the Czechoslovak resistance; it was prepared by Gottwald's group in Moscow; the partisans, not the army, did the fighting; it would have been impossible without Soviet help; and it failed because of the incompetence of Slovak officers and the intrigues of the "Beneš clique" in London. 1

The Communist leaders of the uprising became victims of this interpretation too. After the Tito–Stalin split of 1948 the campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" began, and the 1950 party congress charged the Communist leaders of 1944 with it. In April 1951 Husák and Novomeský were accused of having been ready to go over to the class enemy during the uprising and were put on trial, and Šmidke, chairman of the council during the rising, died in unexplained circumstances in December 1952. Husák and his comrades were released in 1960 and rehabilitated only at the end of 1963. In the late 1960s memory became plural again, but under the "normalisation" after 1968 only the interpretation Husák had set out in his 1964 memoirs was official. Konev's Soviet memoir of the same period also relied on Husák's book for its account of the rising. 1 4

After 1989 Slovak historians adopted the approach of the dissident historian Jozef Jablonický in "Uprising without Legends" (1990), re-emphasising the civic resistance and the army without denying the part of the Communists and partisans. 29 August is a public holiday in Slovakia today. A memorial and cemetery were built in 1949 at Vyšný Komárnik below the Dukla Pass, and the Prague army football club renamed itself Dukla Prague in 1956. Post-war Czechoslovak politics beyond the uprising are covered in "Czechoslovakia: from the Košice programme to February 1948". 1 12

Consequences

The uprising was crushed within two months, but the insurgents and partisans fought on in the mountains until the spring of 1945. Germany used it to deport or kill more than 14,000 Slovak Jews, carried out mass killings at Kremnička, Nemecká and elsewhere, and sent about 30,000 people to camps. Some 20,000 Soviet soldiers and about 1,800 men of the Czechoslovak corps died in the Dukla operation. The rising freed Slovakia from the burden of collaboration and gave it a voice in post-war Czechoslovakia, but after 1948 it was rewritten as the Communists' achievement and even its Communist leaders were purged. Post-war politics are covered in "Czechoslovakia: from the Košice programme to February 1948".

Timeline & Map

Banská Bystrica Moscow Krosno Dukla Dukla Pass Svidník Martin Prešov Nemecká Kremnička Zvolen Sereď Bratislava 9 Moscow 4 Lvov 10 Krosno 11 North of Dukla 13 Dukla 14 Dukla Pass 3 Martin 5 Martin 7 Prešov 18 Donovaly 19 Pohronský Bukovec 6 Banská Bystrica 8 Banská Bystrica 15 Banská Bystrica 16 Banská Bystrica 17 Banská Bystrica 20 Kremnička 1 Bratislava 2 Bratislava 12 Bratislava
  1. 11943.12Slovakia
    Christmas Agreement

    The Communist–Social Democrat bloc and the mainly Agrarian civic bloc agreed to prepare an uprising and form an underground Slovak National Council.

  2. 21944.04.27Slovakia
    Military Headquarters formed

    A meeting in Bratislava set up the National Council's Military Council and the Military Headquarters of the illegal insurgent army under Lieutenant Colonel Golian.

  3. 31944.07.25Soviet UnionSlovakia
    First Soviet partisan organisers dropped

    A group under Lieutenant Velichko, sent by the Ukrainian Partisan Staff, parachuted into Slovakia on the night of 25–26 July.

  4. 41944.08.04SlovakiaSoviet Union
    Šmidke delegation flies to the USSR

    Šmidke and Ferjenčík flew to the Soviet side in Čatloš's aircraft, carrying the uprising plan and Čatloš's memorandum.

  5. 51944.08.27SlovakiaGermany
    Martin incident

    Partisans and the mutinous garrison stopped the train of the German military mission returning from Romania; its 22 officers were shot the next morning.

  6. 61944.08.29SlovakiaGermany
    German invasion and outbreak of the uprising

    German troops crossed the north-eastern border; just after Čatloš told the army on the radio not to resist, Golian's headquarters ordered the garrisons to fight.

  7. 71944.08.31SlovakiaGermany
    Eastern Slovak Army disarmed

    The Germans completed the disarmament of the two Eastern Slovak divisions in two days; the deputy commander Talský flew a group of aircraft over to the Soviet lines.

  8. 81944.09.01Slovakia
    National Council goes public

    The Slovak National Council in Banská Bystrica declared the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic and assumed legislative and executive power.

  9. 91944.09.02Soviet Union
    Stavka directive

    The Stavka ordered the 1st Ukrainian Front to strike from Krosno and Sanok towards Prešov and link up with the Slovak troops.

  10. 101944.09.08Soviet UnionCzechoslovakiaGermanyHungaryPoland
    Carpathian–Dukla operation opens

    The 38th Army attacked from north of Krosno; the 1st Guards Army of the 4th Ukrainian Front followed the next day.

  11. 111944.09.10CzechoslovakiaSoviet Union
    Czechoslovak corps commander replaced

    Konev removed General Kratochvíl and gave command of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps to Svoboda.

  12. 121944.09.14GermanySlovakia
    German commander replaced

    With the suppression stalled, Höfle replaced Berger as German commander in Slovakia.

  13. 131944.09.20Soviet UnionCzechoslovakiaGermany
    Town of Dukla taken

    Soviet troops and the Czechoslovak corps took the town of Dukla (the 21st according to English Wikipedia); the same day the 1st Guards Army crossed the Łupków Pass.

  14. 141944.10.06CzechoslovakiaSoviet UnionGermany
    Dukla Pass taken

    Svoboda's corps and the 67th Rifle Corps took the Dukla Pass, and Czechoslovak soldiers entered their homeland.

  15. 151944.10.07Slovakia
    Viest takes command

    Divisional General Viest, arrived from London, took command of the insurgent army, with Golian as deputy.

  16. 161944.10.18GermanySlovakiaHungary
    German final offensive

    The Dirlewanger regiment and Kampfgruppe Schill attacked; the next day an SS division joined in from Hungarian territory in the south.

  17. 171944.10.27GermanySlovakia
    Fall of Banská Bystrica

    German troops captured Banská Bystrica, the centre of the uprising.

  18. 181944.10.28Slovakia
    Viest's last order

    Viest ordered his army to stop regular fighting, withdraw into the mountains and switch to partisan warfare; the same day Soviet and Czechoslovak troops entered Svidník.

  19. 191944.11.03SlovakiaGermany
    Viest and Golian captured

    Einsatzkommando 14 captured the two generals at Pohronský Bukovec.

  20. 201944.11.05GermanySlovakia
    Kremnička massacres begin

    Einsatzkommando 14 and the Hlinka Guard Emergency Divisions carried out the first mass shooting at Kremnička; the killings went on until February 1945.

Related people 29

Participants17

President in exile in LondonEdvard Beneš1884–1948

Entrusted Golian with military action in Slovakia in March 1944 and reproached Svoboda over the losses at Dukla.

Commander, 38th ArmyKirill Moskalenko1902–1985

Led the main thrust towards Dukla.

Commander, 1st Czechoslovak Army CorpsLudvík Svoboda1895–1979

Took over the corps on 10 September and captured the Dukla Pass on 6 October.

Commander, 4th Ukrainian FrontIvan Petrov1896–1958

Received the Šmidke delegation and attacked towards Komańcza with his right wing.

Commander, 1st Guards ArmyAndrei Grechko1903–1976

Attacked on 9 September and crossed the Łupków Pass on the 20th.

First Deputy Chief of the General StaffAleksei Antonov1896–1962

Signed the Stavka directive of 2 September.

Deputy Supreme CommanderGeorgy Zhukov1896–1974

Visited Konev's and Petrov's fronts on 19–20 September and reported to Stalin.

Chief of Staff, 1st Ukrainian FrontVasily Sokolovsky1897–1968

Co-signed the operation plan and reports with Konev.

Czechoslovak Communist chairman in MoscowKlement Gottwald1896–1953

Placed the partisan movement under the Ukrainian staff in May 1944 and urged Molotov for aid on 2 September.

First Secretary, Ukrainian Communist PartyNikita Khrushchev1894–1971

Reached the agreement with Gottwald on the Czechoslovak partisan movement.

Head of the Ukrainian Partisan StaffTimofei Strokach1903–1963

Sent the organising groups into Slovakia.

Communist representative at partisan headquartersRudolf Slánský1901–1952

Joined the partisan headquarters of 16 September as the Czechoslovak Communist Party's representative.

Czechoslovak ambassador in MoscowZdeněk Fierlinger1891–1976

Asked Vyshinsky for aid on 31 August.

Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign AffairsAndrey Vyshinsky1883–1954

Received Fierlinger's and Píka's request on 31 August and passed it to the government.

Foreign minister in exileJan Garrigue Masaryk1886–1948

Asked the Western Allies on 31 August for bombing and belligerent status.

Commander, Long-Range AviationAlexander Golovanov1904–1975

According to Czech Wikipedia, was charged with air supply to the insurgents.

Head of the Czechoslovak military mission in MoscowHeliodor Píka1897–1949

Passed news of the uprising to the General Staff and on 31 August asked Vyshinsky for air support together with Fierlinger.

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16