The Korsun–Cherkassy Pocket
How did two Soviet fronts encircle the German salient left on the middle Dnieper in January 1944, and why could tens of thousands of German soldiers still escape through a blizzard from a pocket that had been promised to Stalin as "a second Stalingrad"?
From 24 January to 17 February 1944, on the west bank of the Dnieper around Kanev and Korsun in Ukraine, Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front and Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front encircled some 55,000 to 60,000 men of the German XI and XLII Army Corps. The two fronts' tank forces met at Zvenigorodka on 28 January to close the ring, and the III Panzer Corps sent by Manstein came within seven kilometres of the pocket. On 12 February Stalin put Konev alone in charge of destroying the pocket. On the night of 16–17 February the Germans broke out from Shenderovka in a blizzard, and many died at the Gniloy Tikich river. The Soviet side announced 55,000 killed and 18,000 captured; German records say 36,000 to 40,000 got out.

What was the Korsun salient, and why would Hitler not give it up?
In the autumn of 1943, in the Battle of the Dnieper, the Red Army retook Kiev and built large bridgeheads on the west bank of the Dnieper. By mid-January 1944 Vatutin's 1st Ukrainian Front had pushed far west in the Zhitomir–Berdichev operation, to Sarny and the approaches to Vinnitsa, and Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front had liberated Kirovograd on 8 January. Between the two fronts, however, near Kanev (Ukrainian Kaniv) on the middle Dnieper, the Germans still held the river bank. Ground that juts like a tongue into the enemy's line is called a salient; this one is called the Korsun salient after the small town of Korsun in its middle. 1 2 3
At the time of the battle Korsun was simply "Korsun". In May 1944, after the battle, it was renamed Korsun-Shevchenkovsky (Ukrainian Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi) in honour of the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, who was born in the nearby village of Morintsy, and the Soviet side called the operation by the new name. The Germans called it the "Cherkassy pocket" after the town at the salient's eastern end. Place names here are given in their Russian form of the time, with today's Ukrainian name the first time it differs. 4 1 3
The salient was held by the XI Army Corps (Wilhelm Stemmermann) and XLII Army Corps (Theobald Lieb) of the Eighth Army (Otto Wöhler) of Army Group South (Erich von Manstein), together with "Corps Detachment B", which grouped the remnants of several divisions. To the west was Hans-Valentin Hube's First Panzer Army. Among the troops were the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking, the SS Assault Brigade Wallonien of Belgian Walloons, the Estonian battalion Narwa, and several thousand auxiliaries recruited from Soviet citizens serving with the Germans. 2 3 5
Manstein and other commanders warned repeatedly that the exposed ground should be given up, but Hitler would not allow a withdrawal. Konev wrote in his memoirs that the German command could not accept the loss of the "Eastern Wall", hoped to use the salient as a springboard to regain the Dnieper line, and expected the coming mud season to halt the Soviet offensive. He also pointed to the grain and industry of Right-Bank Ukraine, the hope of a land link with the German forces in the Crimea, and propaganda. Rivers, ravines and large villages made the salient good defensive ground, but because it hung on the flanks of two Soviet fronts it could also be cut off from both sides. 2 1 3
What did the Stavka plan?
Zhukov, coordinating the two fronts as Stavka representative, put a plan to cut off, encircle and destroy the salient to Stalin on 11 January, and the Stavka confirmed it by directive the next day. The two fronts were to strike the base of the salient from opposite sides and meet around Shpola and Zvenigorodka (Ukrainian Zvenyhorodka). Such converging thrusts follow the same pattern as Operation Uranus, which had encircled the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. The ring was to be double: an inner ring to squeeze and destroy the trapped enemy, and an outer ring to hold off any relief from outside. 6 1 5 2
Konev planned to break the German line on a 19-kilometre sector north of Kirovograd with fourteen rifle divisions of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies and then send Pavel Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army (218 tanks and 18 self-propelled guns) through the gap towards Zvenigorodka, with Aleksei Selivanov's 5th Guards Don Cossack Cavalry Corps in reserve. The tank army, just out of the fighting at Kirovograd, was moved more than 100 kilometres north by night only, and dummy tank concentrations and gun positions were set up to deceive the Germans. In the north-west Vatutin was to attack from the other side with the 40th and 27th Armies and Andrei Kravchenko's new 6th Tank Army, formed only in late January from the 5th Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Mechanised Corps. Because the 1st Ukrainian Front was then fending off German counter-attacks around Vinnitsa and Uman, it could at first commit only six rifle divisions. 1 3 5
According to Zhukov, the Soviet forces had 1.7 times as much infantry, 2.4 times as many guns and 2.6 times as many tanks. The weather was the problem. A sudden thaw in late January brought an early rasputitsa, the season when the thawing ground turns roads to mud. Konev cites weather records showing rain and sleet on ten days between 27 January and 18 February, snow on the rest and only five days without precipitation; he wrote that even oxen could hardly move on some roads and that tanks got stuck in the ravines. Zhukov recalled that the offensive had to start before shells and fuel could be stockpiled. 6 1

How did the two fronts close the ring?
At dawn on 24 January forward battalions of the 2nd Ukrainian Front surprised the German 389th Infantry Division and advanced two to six kilometres; the next day the main forces and the 5th Guards Tank Army went into the breach. Ivan Lazarev's 20th Tank Corps reached Lebedin on the night of the 26th, and on the morning of the 27th two of its brigades liberated Shpola. That same day, however, the German 11th Panzer Division counter-attacked from the south and linked up with a 14th Panzer Division battle group cut off west of Ositnyazhka, severing the supply line of the Soviet tank corps that had run ahead. Konev sent in his second echelon, the 18th Tank Corps, and the cavalry corps to reopen the road. 5 3 1
In the north-west the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked on 26 January, but its main thrust, the 40th Army and the 6th Tank Army, ran into strong resistance from the German VII Corps and suffered heavy losses. Instead the secondary attack, two divisions of the 27th Army, broke eighteen kilometres through the German 88th Infantry Division. Vatutin shifted his effort to this unexpected success and sent a mobile group built round the 233rd Tank Brigade under Mikhail Savelyev (39 tanks, 16 self-propelled guns and 200 submachine gunners) towards Zvenigorodka. It took Lysyanka around midnight on the 27th, and around midday on the 28th entered Zvenigorodka and met the 2nd Ukrainian Front's 155th Tank Brigade coming from the south-east. A T-34 now stands in the centre of Zvenigorodka in memory of the meeting; Zhukov regretted in his memoirs that its inscription does not name the tankmen of the 1st Ukrainian Front. 5 6 1
The meeting at Zvenigorodka tied the ring with a thin thread; even between the 2nd Ukrainian Front's own tank units gaps of tens of kilometres remained. Over the following days the infantry came up and thickened it. The outer ring was held by the 6th Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army, each reinforced with a rifle corps; the inner ring by the 27th, 4th Guards and 52nd Armies and the cavalry corps. On 31 January the 27th Army's 180th Rifle Division met the cavalry at Olshana (Ukrainian Vilshana), and on 3 February the main body of the 4th Guards Army arrived to make the inner ring continuous. Trapped inside were about 59,000 German soldiers according to the Russian Wikipedia, nearly 60,000 according to the English and about 55,000 according to the German, in divisions at little more than half strength. 5 3 2

How did the trapped Germans hold out?
As at Stalingrad, the trapped forces were supplied by air. On 29 January the first fourteen transports flew 30 tonnes of ammunition from Uman to the Korsun airstrip and took wounded back. The pocket needed 150 tonnes a day, but the Luftwaffe's VIII Air Corps, hampered by weather, averaged only about 78. On 1 February thirteen Ju 52 transports flying high were shot down by Soviet fighters. About 4,000 wounded were flown out while the airfield could be used; after 12 February supplies could only be dropped by parachute. By German count the airlift cost 32 transports and 13 bombers. Konev wrote in his memoirs that about 200 enemy transports were destroyed within a few days, a figure far above the German records. 5 2 3 1
On 7 February the Eighth Army gave Stemmermann command of all the troops in the pocket, the XLII Corps included; from then on they were called "Group Stemmermann". The Soviet forces tried to cut the pocket into pieces. When in early February the 4th Guards Army and the cavalry struck between the two German corps to cut off the Gorodishche bulge in the east, the Germans abandoned it, and Gorodishche was liberated on 9 February. A captured German officer quoted by Konev described the retreat road as blocked for 15 to 20 kilometres by burnt and wrecked vehicles and guns, with bodies everywhere. The 389th Infantry Division, down to 200 infantrymen, was broken up. 5 1
The trapped Germans did not collapse. Konev copied into his memoirs the 2nd Ukrainian Front's war diary for 7 February, which reads: "Although the enemy has been completely encircled for several days, there are no signs of demoralisation or disorganisation. Only a few surrender, resistance is stubborn and counter-attacks do not stop." Inside a pocket that had almost no mobile troops, the Wiking division's tanks and armoured vehicles were shifted from one end to the other to plug each breach. 1 2

How close did Manstein's relief force come?
Manstein assembled a relief force at once: Nikolaus von Vormann's XLVII Panzer Corps was to attack towards the pocket from the south and Hermann Breith's III Panzer Corps from the west. From late January five panzer divisions (the 1st, 13th, 16th and 17th Panzer and the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte) and two heavy tank battalions were moved into the area. Hitler, however, wanted not merely to free the trapped troops but to encircle and destroy the two Soviet tank armies in turn. Breith asked to concentrate everything on driving a corridor straight to the pocket and was refused. The 24th Panzer Division, due to join in the south, was diverted towards Nikopol at the last moment on Hitler's orders. 5 2 3
On 4 February the III Panzer Corps attacked with the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions and Lieutenant-Colonel Franz Bäke's heavy tank regiment of Tigers and Panthers. Vatutin countered with Semyon Bogdanov's 2nd Tank Army, just arrived from the Stavka reserve. In the south the XLVII Panzer Corps, with fewer than thirty serviceable tanks, soon stalled. As the ground thawed, German wheeled vehicles sank in the mud, while the Soviet side, supplied with four- and six-wheel-drive American trucks under Lend-Lease, moved more easily. When on 8 February the counter-encirclement had plainly failed, Manstein ordered the III Panzer Corps to drive directly to the pocket. 5 2 3
Attacking again on 11 February, the III Panzer Corps captured an intact bridge over the Gniloy Tikich (Ukrainian Hnylyi Tikych) at Frankovka, and in the evening the 1st Panzer Division entered southern Lysyanka. On the 13th Bäke's regiment, refuelled and rearmed by air, pushed on to Hill 239.8 and Khizhintsy, ten kilometres from the trapped force. With a last effort on the 16th it took the Oktyabr farm north of Lysyanka, seven kilometres away, but there the corps was spent, its tanks halted for lack of fuel. The trapped men did not wait either: unlike the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, they moved towards the relief force, fighting their way south-west, a difference Zhukov noted in his memoirs. 5 2 6
The relief force's radio traffic was heard by the Soviet side too, and both Konev and Zhukov quote intercepted German messages in their memoirs. Hube signalled, "I will get you out"; Breith, "Hold out whatever happens. We are coming." Both Soviet memoirs also say that Hitler telegraphed Stemmermann, "You can rely on me like a stone wall. You will be freed from the cauldron." 1 6

How did the Soviet side call for surrender, and what did the Free Germany committee do?
At 3.50 p.m. on 8 February Soviet envoys under a white flag handed a surrender demand to Colonel Fouquet, the German commander of the Steblev (Ukrainian Stebliv) sector. It was signed by Zhukov, Vatutin and Konev. It guaranteed the life and safety of all who surrendered and their return after the war to Germany or any other country they chose; let them keep uniforms, insignia, decorations and personal belongings, senior officers their swords as well; and promised medical care for the wounded and immediate food. According to German recollections cited in the English Wikipedia, the envoys left after cordial talk, refreshments and a handshake, without a positive answer. At noon on 9 February Stemmermann's headquarters announced its refusal. 6 1 2
The Soviet side also enlisted German prisoners. In the summer of 1943 captured German soldiers and exiled German communists had founded the National Committee for a Free Germany, and that autumn captured generals and officers formed the League of German Officers, calling on the German people to overthrow Hitler and return to the 1937 borders. The league was led by General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, captured at Stalingrad. Aleksandr Shcherbakov, head of the Red Army's Main Political Directorate, brought him into the operation, and on 10 February Seydlitz came to the front with Generals Otto Korfes and Alexander von Daniels and wrote personally to the German commanders urging surrender. He knew two of the generals in the pocket; one of them, Lieb, had served under him in France and been sharply reprimanded, which may have made the appeal counterproductive. 7 5 2
Committee members appealed over loudspeakers and radio and crossed the lines to scatter leaflets that served as passes into captivity: anyone carrying one was to be treated as a voluntary surrender and handed over to the committee. The commanders' resolve did not change, but one in three of the 18,200 Germans taken prisoner is said to have produced such a leaflet. It was the largest operation in which the committee took part. On the German side Seydlitz was expelled from the army and sentenced to death in absentia, and Hitler personally authorised the punishment of his family. 7 2 5
Why did Stalin put Konev alone in charge of the pocket on 12 February?
On the night of 11–12 February the Germans in the pocket pushed south-west, drove back the 1st Ukrainian Front's 27th Army and took Shenderovka (Ukrainian Shenderivka), Novaya Buda and Khilki, less than twenty kilometres from the relief force. The 27th Army had only three rifle divisions and fought alone on the far side of the long ring. The news alarmed Stalin: the Soviet Union had already told the world that a large enemy force was surrounded. 5 1
The two commanders' memoirs tell the day differently. Zhukov says he was in bed that morning with influenza and a high fever when Stalin's call woke him. In the uncut edition Stalin asked: "Konev has just phoned to say that at Vatutin's the enemy has broken out from Shenderovka to Khilki and Novaya Buda. Do you know about it?" Zhukov checked with Vatutin and found that the enemy had used the blizzard to advance two or three kilometres and had been stopped. He wrote that Konev, instead of informing him and Vatutin, had phoned Stalin directly and given the impression that the operation might fail unless it was handed to him. Stalin swore at both men, then said that Konev proposed to take over the destruction of the pocket and leave the outer front to Vatutin; Zhukov objected that finishing the pocket was a matter of three or four days and that a change of command would only delay it. A few hours later the directive arrived. 6
In the 1975 edition of Zhukov's memoirs, however, Stalin says only, "I have just been told", and the lines about Konev's call and the blame laid on him are absent; they are passages restored in the later uncut edition. The 1975 edition does keep Stalin saying that Konev proposed to take over command of the inner ring. 8 6
Konev wrote the opposite. According to him Stalin phoned him first, around noon on the 12th, and angrily asked what he knew of the situation at his neighbour's. Konev replied, "Don't worry, Comrade Stalin. The encircled enemy will not get away," and reported that he had already moved the 5th Guards Tank Army and the cavalry corps across the boundary line. Ten or fifteen minutes later Stalin called again and asked whether he could take over the 27th Army as well and destroy the whole pocket; Konev says he tried to decline, because the 27th Army was on the far side of the ring and its supply and communications ran round through Kiev. He called Zhukov's account "not quite accurate", arguing that no one would ask for command of a neighbour's troops without knowing their situation. No record has been published that settles which account is right. 1
The directive issued that afternoon over the signatures of Stalin and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Aleksei Antonov put all the troops facing the pocket under the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, transferred the 27th Army to Konev from midnight, and gave Zhukov the task of stopping the relief force coming from Lysyanka and Zvenigorodka. An accompanying telegram blamed the breakout on the failure to reinforce the weak 27th Army in time and to carry out the order to eliminate the Steblev bulge first. According to Zhukov, Vatutin took the directive to be Zhukov's doing and protested: "I have gone without sleep for days on this operation. Why am I being removed now? I too want Moscow to salute the soldiers of my front." Zhukov, without saying whose proposal it was, told him to obey, but wrote that Stalin had failed to consider his commanders' feelings and that the episode left a bad aftertaste. 1 6

How did the night of the breakout unfold?
Konev, now in command, recalled that when mud made the roads and airstrips almost unusable he had General Ilya Smirnov of the 4th Guards Army lay about fifty metres of straw in a field beside his observation post and flew in by light Po-2 aircraft. He set up a forward command post in the village of Tolstoye and on the morning of the 13th established a direct line to the 27th Army. Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army swung north from the outer ring to block the escape route, though the mud forced it to leave broken-down tanks behind and its brigades had only five to fourteen tanks each. Anti-tank "areas" of guns and mines were set up at road junctions and on high ground. On 14 February the 52nd Army liberated Korsun, and the Germans lost their airfield. 1 5 3
On the morning of 15 February Stemmermann and Lieb decided to break out on the night of the 16th. The same day the Eighth Army radioed: "Capacity for action by III Panzer Corps limited by weather and supply situation. Group Stemmermann must break through as far as Zhurzhintsy (Ukrainian Zhurzhyntsi) and Hill 239 by its own effort." It did not say that both places were still in Soviet hands, an omission that cost heavily. On the 16th Manstein, without waiting for Hitler's decision, authorised the breakout by radio: "Password Freedom, objective Lysyanka, 2300 hours." About 1,450 wounded who could not walk were left at Shenderovka with volunteer doctors and orderlies. The German Wikipedia says they were killed by the arriving Red Army; other sources say nothing of their fate. 5 2 3
At 11 p.m. on the 16th about 45,000 men set out in three columns on a front of 4.5 kilometres: Corps Detachment B on the right, the 72nd Infantry Division in the centre, and on the left the Wiking division with the Wallonien brigade and the Narwa battalion, while the 57th and 88th Infantry Divisions held the rear. Stemmermann followed with a company formed from his headquarters officers. A blizzard cut visibility to ten or twenty metres. Konev wrote that on reports of vehicles massing at Shenderovka he had eighteen volunteer Po-2 crews drop incendiaries in the storm, and the artillery fired on the fires. The leading units reached the German positions at Oktyabr around 4 a.m. on the 17th. 2 3 6 1
The left column, however, learned that Soviet T-34s held Hill 239 and had to veer south. When day broke, the formations came apart. Heavy weapons that could not climb the slippery slopes were wrecked and abandoned. Soviet tanks drove into columns that had no anti-tank weapons and crushed them, and Cossack cavalry cut down scattered men with sabres; Konev wrote that the tanks attacked with headlights on and the Cossacks galloped with drawn sabres, taking prisoners. The survivors were driven south to the Gniloy Tikich. Normally no more than a brook, the river had been swollen by three weeks of thaw into a torrent fifteen to thirty metres wide and deeper than a man, and there was no bridge where the crowds reached it. Men drove vehicles into the water, felled trees across it or swam; hundreds were swept away and many died of cold. By late afternoon most had reached Lysyanka. 2 9 1 10
Stemmermann was killed near Zhurzhintsy when his vehicle was hit by an anti-tank gun. Konev wrote that on the morning of the 17th Sergei Trofimenko, commander of the 27th Army, reported the body found in the field near Zhurzhintsy, while the Russian and German Wikipedias date his death to the night of 17–18 February (the 18th). Konev allowed German prisoners to bury their general with military honours. The Soviet writer Boris Polevoy, who went to see the body, wrote in his diary: "Whatever else, he did not flee by plane as the senior officers of his staff did; he did not abandon his soldiers. He stayed with them and died a soldier's death." Lieb and the Wiking commander Herbert Gille got out alive, and Gille was decorated by Hitler for the breakout. 2 3 1 11 12 10

How many died, and how many got out?
The figures for this battle differ widely. On the Soviet side, Stalin's order of 18 February said the Germans had left 52,000 dead on the field, that 11,000 had surrendered and that all their equipment had been taken. The later official tally was 55,000 killed (in Konev's memoirs "killed and wounded") and more than 18,000 prisoners. Konev added that the relief forces alone lost 20,000 dead and more than 600 tanks, and at one point claimed German losses of 130,000. The Ukrainian Wikipedia gives 41,200 killed and more than 15,000 captured inside the ring. 1 2 3 13
German records show a very different picture. Between 55,000 and 60,000 men were trapped, and by 16 February fewer than 50,000 remained. Of the 45,000 who took part in the breakout, 27,703 German soldiers and 1,063 Soviet-born auxiliaries came out unscathed. German official documents counted 40,423 escapees in all, including the wounded flown out and those evacuated from Lysyanka. The German Wikipedia gives 36,000 out by the breakout and 4,000 earlier by air; the Russian Wikipedia says 34 per cent of the trapped soldiers died and about 19,000 were killed or captured. On these figures roughly two in three of the trapped men got out, while close to one in three was killed or wounded. 2 3 5
Soviet losses were heavy too. By Soviet count the two fronts lost 80,188 men in the operation, 24,286 of them killed or missing and 55,902 wounded or sick, and an estimated 600 to 850 tanks and self-propelled guns. On the German relief side the III Panzer Corps lost about 3,000 men, and German tank and assault-gun losses are put at about 300 by Zetterling and Frankson, cited in the Russian Wikipedia, and at about 150, most abandoned for lack of fuel, by the German Wikipedia. Historians have weighed these numbers differently. In Soviet times, following the writer Sergei Smirnov, the battle was called "Stalingrad on the Dnieper", and the Soviet General Staff study followed the Soviet figures. The American David Glantz doubted the German count of escapees, while the US Army historian Douglas Nash and the Swedes Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson called the General Staff study unreliable. All of them nonetheless agree that Korsun was a Soviet victory. 2 5 3

Why was it not a "second Stalingrad"?
When the ring closed, Stalin was promised a second Stalingrad and expected one. But the situation differed from that of the German Sixth Army. First, the trapped force was smaller and the relief much closer: at Stalingrad Manstein's Operation Winter Storm was beaten back before it reached the pocket, while this time it came within seven kilometres; Konev, too, wrote that Manstein, mindful of the Stalingrad failure, gathered far more panzer divisions than before. Second, Hitler did not simply insist that the pocket be held to the end. According to the German Wikipedia he wanted the relief to link up with Stemmermann while the pocket was held, but in the end Manstein ordered the breakout without waiting for him. Third, the trapped troops did not wait but moved towards the relief force themselves. 2 3 6 1
The Soviet side made mistakes too. Its intelligence overestimated the strength inside the pocket while underestimating the Germans' ability to counter-attack; the double ring was thin, and the air force did little to stop the German airlift. According to the German Wikipedia, the outcome was regarded internally on the Soviet side as a failure. Yet German losses were severe: six divisions were badly mauled and almost all heavy equipment was abandoned. On 20 February Manstein sent all that was left of the escaped divisions to the rear to be rebuilt or used as replacements; two army corps had in effect ceased to exist. 2 3 5
Both sides presented the battle as a victory. German propaganda called it a glorious success in which brave soldiers freed their trapped comrades; yet Vormann, who had led one of the relief attacks, later noted bitterly that "the troops who took part were astonished and unbelieving when they were told they had won a great victory at Cherkassy in the Ukraine". On the Soviet side Konev wrote in his memoirs that none of the division and army commanders holding the outer and inner rings reported any German getting through, implying that no one escaped; Zhukov wrote that a few tanks and armoured carriers with generals, officers and SS men slipped out to Lysyanka. 2 1 6

How did Manstein write about Korsun in his memoir, and how does it differ from other accounts?
In Lost Victories Manstein, commander of Army Group South, described Korsun briefly as a successful rescue. According to him, although deep snow and then the thaw delayed the assembly of the two relief groups, they smashed a large part of the encircling Soviet forces, destroying more than 700 tanks, more than 600 anti-tank guns and about 150 guns, and took only 2,000 prisoners. The editors of the 1999 Russian edition added a note that at the start of the operation the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army had 218 tanks and 18 self-propelled guns and the 6th Tank Army 107 tanks and self-propelled guns, 343 in all. Manstein wrote that the spearhead of the III Panzer Corps came within 13 kilometres of the south-western side of the pocket; the German and Russian Wikipedias give the last distance as 7 kilometres. He added that twice he tried to reach the relief groups from Uman but his car stuck in snow or mud, and that it was confirmed once again that Soviet tanks, with their wider tracks, moved better than German tanks on snow or soaked ground. On the breakout he stated that Hitler at first ordered the fighting in the pocket to continue and then approved the army group's order to prepare a breakout after the fact, and that the order for the breakout itself was issued by the army group without consulting Hitler beforehand, so that he could not object. 24 25
Manstein recorded that only on 28 February did he learn that 30,000 to 32,000 men had come out of the pocket, and in an author's note he added that the ration strength of the two corps before the encirclement had been 54,000, though part of the rear services had not been caught. This figure is lower than the 40,423 of the German official record cited in the previous section. He wrote that leaving behind most of the severely wounded caused great pain, but he did not describe the chaos of the breakout, such as the wounded left at Shenderovka or the soldiers who died crossing the Gniloy Tikich, and of the corps commander Wilhelm Stemmermann he left a single line: "General Stemmermann was killed in the fighting." The divisions that escaped had to be withdrawn to the General Government in Poland to be rebuilt, and he wrote that six and a half divisions were therefore out of the fighting, which he named as one cause of the collapse of the army group's right wing in March. He summed the operation up as saving two corps from the fate of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Where the memoirs of Konev and Zhukov cited in the previous section speak of the annihilation of the encircled enemy or the escape of a few, Manstein's account keeps only the rescue. 24 25


What happened to the people who lived there?
The villages that became the battlefield had been under German occupation for two and a half years, since the summer of 1941. In Zvenigorodka the occupation authorities shot 1,375 Jews on 18 June 1942. In 1943 the retreating Germans applied scorched earth. Early that year Hitler ordered all villages and shelter destroyed and all men aged 15 to 65 taken along for entrenching work; retreating units drove off livestock, dismantled or destroyed machinery, burned towns, villages and fields, and deported people en masse. Those fit to work were sent to forced labour in Germany or, in breach of international law, made to serve the army as porters and labourers. The Russian Wikipedia says hundreds of thousands of civilians were taken to Germany by force. 14 15 16
In the fighting of January and February 1944 the inhabitants were caught between the two armies. According to the Ukrainian Wikipedia, when the Red Army approached the village of Kvitki south of Korsun in January, 500 inhabitants were mobilised straight into the 180th Rifle Division, and some 600, children among them, dug trenches, carried ammunition boxes on their backs through the mud and brought out the wounded. More than 200 villagers died, and the eastern part of the village, Sobkivka, burned to the ground. Konev and Zhukov both wrote in their memoirs that when the mud cut supply, local people carried ammunition by ox cart, on stretchers and in sacks; Konev presented this as voluntary help and described barefoot, hungry women, children and old people walking tens of kilometres through the mud to bring up shells. The practice of sending the men of liberated villages straight into the line went back to the Battle of the Dnieper. 17 1 6
Konev wrote that just before the breakout German troops herded the inhabitants of Shenderovka into the church and the school and set them on fire, and went from house to house shooting old men, women and children. On the same day the Soviet Information Bureau announced that the Germans were killing and burning their own wounded. These are wartime Soviet claims and are not confirmed in the other sources used here. Liberation did not end the inhabitants' ordeal: the Ukrainian Wikipedia records that after Steblev passed to Soviet troops on 16 February the NKVD again persecuted those who had lived "under the Germans". In the course of the war 385 people from Kvitki and 386 from Morintsy died at the front. 1 18 17 19
What came of Konev's promotion and the order that left out Vatutin?
At 1 a.m. on 18 February Moscow fired a salute of twenty salvoes from 224 guns. Stalin's order praised "the 2nd Ukrainian Front" for destroying ten German divisions and a brigade after fourteen days of fighting and thanked the troops of Trofimenko, Smirnov, Rotmistrov and others and Konev personally. The 1st Ukrainian Front and Vatutin were not mentioned; the 27th Army, which belonged to the 1st Ukrainian Front, was named under Konev. Konev wrote that he kept the order "as a relic of the front's glory". 1
Zhukov criticised this sharply in his memoirs. Speaking, he wrote, as former Deputy Supreme Commander to whom both fronts were equally dear, he held that Stalin was profoundly wrong to leave out the 1st Ukrainian Front and should have been objective whatever reports he received; he called it "an unforgivable error of the Supreme Commander" and added that he still did not understand why Stalin had committed such an injustice. The encirclement, he argued, was the work of both the inner and the outer ring, and both fronts, under Vatutin and Konev, had fought equally well. The English Wikipedia reads this as Zhukov resenting being overshadowed by his rival; the German Wikipedia says the affair led to a lifelong rift between Konev and Zhukov. 6 2 3
Konev's story turns to celebration. When he reported the operation finished, he says, Stalin told him, "The government intends to give you the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. You do not object?" and asked his view of a new rank of Marshal of Armoured Troops; Konev recommended Rotmistrov, and Stalin agreed and proposed Yakov Fedorenko, commander of armoured and mechanised forces, as well. On 20 February Konev became the first front commander of the war to be made Marshal of the Soviet Union, and on the 21st Rotmistrov and Fedorenko became the first Marshals of Armoured Troops. Konev heard the announcement on the radio at Rotmistrov's command post in Morintsy, Shevchenko's native village, and celebrated modestly with a bottle of port that Rotmistrov had. The next day, Konev adds, Zhukov sent him marshal's shoulder boards by plane. 1 5
Vatutin did not enjoy the glory for long. On 29 February his car, travelling from Rovno to a neighbouring army headquarters, was ambushed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, an armed Ukrainian nationalist organisation; he was wounded and died in Kiev on 15 April. He was made a Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously only in 1965. 20 2

What place does the battle hold in the liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine?
In the winter and spring of 1944 the Red Army fought a chain of operations to retake the land west of the Dnieper, so-called Right-Bank Ukraine. Vasilevsky lists them in his memoirs as the Zhitomir–Berdichev, Kirovograd, Korsun-Shevchenkovsky, Rovno–Lutsk, Nikopol–Krivoi Rog, Proskurov–Chernovtsy and Uman–Botoşani operations, and names Korsun and the Crimea as the largest of that winter and spring. In Soviet times the main operations of 1944 were called "Stalin's ten blows", the liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine counting as the "second blow". 21
The Korsun battle was a link in that chain. While German armoured reserves were tied down there, the 1st Ukrainian Front's 13th and 60th Armies advanced in the north on Rovno and Lutsk, and in the south the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts attacked along the bend of the Dnieper and took Nikopol and Krivoi Rog. Konev judged that the removal of the salient freed both fronts from the threat to their flanks and rear, and buried German hopes of restoring a defence on the middle Dnieper. In early March his front began the Uman–Botoşani operation through the mud and in thirty days crossed the Gorny Tikich, the Southern Bug, the Dniester and the Prut into Romania. Together with the Crimean Offensive (1944) further south, this advance drove the Germans from the Black Sea coast. 2 1 22 21
Konev called the operation the second great encirclement after Stalingrad and wrote that encirclement and destruction was the highest form of operational art. On the German side the battle became a legend of the Waffen-SS foreign units: the Wallonien brigade fell from some 2,000 men to 632 and lost its commander Lucien Lippert, but the Belgian Rexist leader Léon Degrelle, who took over, was decorated and became a hero of propaganda. Today Korsun-Shevchenkivskyi has a museum of the history of the battle, and memorials stand at the scenes of the heaviest fighting. 1 23 5
Consequences
The German XI and XLII Army Corps lost all their heavy equipment and were withdrawn to be rebuilt. More than half of the encircled men got out, but the Germans lost their last foothold on the middle Dnieper. Konev was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union and Rotmistrov the first Marshal of Armoured Troops; the two fronts lost 80,188 men by Soviet count, 24,286 of them killed or missing.
Timeline & Map
- 11944.01.12Stavka directive
The Stavka ordered the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to strike the base of the salient from both sides, encircle the Germans and destroy them.
- 21944.01.242nd Ukrainian Front attacks
Forward battalions of the 4th Guards and 53rd Armies attacked the German 389th Infantry Division north of Kirovograd and advanced two to six kilometres.
- 31944.01.255th Guards Tank Army committed
The main forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked, and in the afternoon Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army entered the breach.
- 41944.01.261st Ukrainian Front attacks
The 40th and 27th Armies and the newly formed 6th Tank Army attacked from the north-west. The main thrust stalled, while the secondary 27th Army broke through eighteen kilometres.
- 51944.01.27Shpola liberated
Two brigades of the 20th Tank Corps drove through the night and liberated Shpola. The same day the German 11th Panzer Division cut the supply route behind them.
- 61944.01.28Meeting at Zvenigorodka
The mobile group of the 6th Tank Army's 233rd Tank Brigade and the 5th Guards Tank Army's 155th Tank Brigade met at Zvenigorodka and closed the ring.
- 71944.01.29Airlift begins
Fourteen German transport aircraft flew 30 tonnes of ammunition from Uman to the Korsun airstrip and took wounded back.
- 81944.02.03Inner ring complete
The main forces of the 4th Guards Army reached Olshana, joining the 27th Army and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps, which had met there on 31 January, into a continuous inner ring.
- 91944.02.04German relief attack
The German III Panzer Corps began attacking north-east with the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions and Bäke's heavy tank regiment.
- 101944.02.08Surrender demand
Soviet envoys handed the Germans at Steblev a surrender demand signed by Zhukov, Vatutin and Konev.
- 111944.02.09Surrender refused
At noon Stemmermann's headquarters announced that it rejected the demand. The same day Soviet troops liberated Gorodishche.
- 121944.02.11Second relief attack
The III Panzer Corps attacked again towards Lysyanka, seized a bridge over the Gniloy Tikich at Frankovka, and the 1st Panzer Division entered southern Lysyanka.
- 131944.02.12Command given to Konev
After the encircled Germans pushed out to Shenderovka, Khilki and Novaya Buda overnight, Stalin signed a directive putting Konev in charge of destroying the whole pocket.
- 141944.02.14Korsun liberated
The 52nd Army's 294th Rifle Division and part of the 206th liberated Korsun. The encircled Germans lost their airfield.
- 151944.02.16Breakout begins
Manstein authorised the breakout without waiting for Hitler, and at 11 p.m. the Germans set out south-west from the Shenderovka area in a blizzard.
- 161944.02.17The Gniloy Tikich
The breakout columns veered south round Hill 239 and swam the bridgeless Gniloy Tikich; by evening most had reached the German positions at Lysyanka.
- 171944.02.18Stalin's order and salute
Stalin issued an order thanking Konev and the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and Moscow fired a salute of twenty salvoes from 224 guns.
- 181944.02.20Konev made marshal
Konev was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union. The next day Rotmistrov became the first to receive the new rank of Marshal of Armoured Troops.
Related people 14
Soviet Union (Red Army)10
Implementers & commanders3
Put the encirclement plan to Stalin on 11 January and signed the surrender demand. From 12 February he was responsible for the outer ring, and in his memoirs criticised the change of command and the order that left out the 1st Ukrainian Front.
Commander, 2nd Ukrainian FrontIvan Konev1897–1973Closed the ring from the south-east and from 12 February directed the destruction of the whole pocket. He was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union on 20 February for this battle.
Commander, 1st Ukrainian FrontNikolai Vatutin1901–1944Closed the other side of the ring from the north-west. On 12 February he was ordered to hand the 27th Army to Konev and complained to Zhukov. Wounded in an ambush by Ukrainian insurgents on 29 February, he died on 15 April.
Participants6
Signed with Stalin the directive of 12 February changing the command and the telegram explaining it.
Commander, 5th Guards Tank ArmyPavel Rotmistrov1901–1982Broke through and drove on Zvenigorodka to close the ring, and in mid-February swung his army north through the mud to block the escape route. On 21 February he became the first Marshal of Armoured Troops.
Commander, 6th Tank ArmyAndrei Kravchenko1899–1963Led the 6th Tank Army, formed in late January. His mobile group passed Lysyanka and met the 2nd Ukrainian Front at Zvenigorodka.
Commander, 2nd Tank ArmySemyon Bogdanov1894–1960Brought the 2nd Tank Army from the Stavka reserve to counter-attack the German III Panzer Corps' relief drive.
Head of the Red Army Main Political DirectorateAlexander Shcherbakov1901–1945Enlisted Seydlitz and the Free Germany committee in the propaganda urging the encircled Germans to surrender.
Commander of Red Army Armoured and Mechanised ForcesYakov Fedorenko1896–1947According to Konev, the man Stalin proposed to raise to the new rank of Marshal of Armoured Troops along with Rotmistrov.
Germany (Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS and foreign units)4
Implementers & commanders1
Participants2
Recognised on 15 February that the III Panzer Corps' attack could go no further.
Officer, SS Assault Brigade WallonienLéon Degrelle1906–1994Fought in the Belgian Walloon volunteer unit trapped in the pocket and took over after its commander Lippert was killed. The unit of about 2,000 men was reduced to 632.
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25