The East Prussian Offensive of 1945 and the Fall of Königsberg
How did the Red Army cut fortified East Prussia off from Germany between January and April 1945 and take Königsberg, Samland and Pillau? How did Vasilevsky direct the campaign after Chernyakhovsky was killed, what did East Prussia's civilians go through in the flight and under Soviet violence, and how was the land divided after the war?
After a failed first incursion in October 1944, the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts attacked East Prussia on 13-14 January 1945. On 26 January Soviet troops reached the sea north of Elbing, and the Germans were trapped in three pockets cut off from Germany. When Chernyakhovsky was killed on 18 February, Vasilevsky took command, destroyed the Heiligenbeil pocket in March, took Königsberg in the assault of 6-9 April and captured Pillau on the 25th. Amid a belated evacuation and Soviet violence, huge numbers of civilians died or fled, and the Potsdam Conference gave the north to the Soviet Union (Kaliningrad Oblast) and the south to Poland.


What was East Prussia, and why did it become a battlefield in 1945?
East Prussia was the easternmost province of Germany, on the south-eastern shore of the Baltic between present-day northern Poland and Lithuania. In the thirteenth century the Teutonic Knights conquered the Baltic Prussians who lived there and set up a monastic state; in 1525 Grand Master Albert converted to Lutheranism and turned it into the Duchy of Prussia, a vassal of the Polish crown. The duchy later passed to the Electors of Brandenburg, and when Elector Frederick III crowned himself "King in Prussia" in 1701 the name Prussia came to stand for the whole large kingdom of northern Germany. East Prussia was the land where that kingdom began, and its capital Königsberg was the old seat where Prussian kings were crowned. 1
After the First World War the Treaty of Versailles gave most of West Prussia to the restored Polish state. East Prussia became an exclave cut off from the rest of Germany by the so-called Polish Corridor, and the Memel (Klaipėda) district in the far north went to Lithuania in 1923. In 1939 Germany pressured Lithuania into returning Memel, and after invading Poland it attached the Ciechanów region of northern Poland to East Prussia. In 1939 East Prussia had about 2.49 million inhabitants, 85 per cent of them Germans. In the March 1933 election the province had voted overwhelmingly for the Nazi Party. 1
For Russia and the Soviet Union East Prussia was bound up with the memory of invasion. In 1914 the Imperial Russian Army marched into it and was badly beaten at Tannenberg. In his memoir The Cause of My Whole Life (1978), Vasilevsky (then a Marshal of the Soviet Union and later commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front) called East Prussia "the citadel of German militarism" and wrote that the attack on Russia in 1914, the push towards Petrograd in 1918 and the invasion of 1941 had all been launched from there. Until the autumn of 1944 Hitler's field headquarters, the Wolf's Lair, also stood in the forest near Rastenburg. This is why Soviet accounts treated the province as a symbol. 2 1
There was also a plainer military calculation. After Operation Bagration destroyed the German Army Group Centre in the summer of 1944, the Red Army stood on the East Prussian border and on the Narew in Poland. In the winter of 1945 the main Soviet thrust would run straight from Warsaw to Berlin, and the large German force holding East Prussia could strike that advance in its northern flank. The winter plan that the Stavka (the Soviet Supreme High Command) and the Soviet General Staff drew up in November 1944 therefore aimed to cut this force off from the rest of Germany, press it against the sea, split it and destroy it piece by piece. Only then could Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front turn towards Berlin. 2 3

Why was East Prussia such a hard battlefield for the Red Army?
The first problem was the ground. East Prussia was full of lakes, marshes, rivers, canals and forests that funnelled large formations into narrow lanes, while its dense rail and road network and its solid brick and stone buildings favoured the defender. On this terrain the Germans built several defensive belts reaching 150 to 200 kilometres in depth. The main belt usually had two positions of three to five trench lines each, with a second belt 10 to 20 kilometres behind it. Towns such as Gumbinnen, Insterburg, Tilsit, Lötzen and Heilsberg were turned into centres of resistance. 3 2
Behind them lay concrete fortified districts. Three of them, Ilmenhorst, Lötzen and Heilsberg, covered the eastern, south-eastern and southern approaches to Königsberg; the strongest, Heilsberg, alone had 911 permanent firing points, up to 10 or 12 per kilometre in places. Königsberg itself was a fortress city built at the end of the nineteenth century. Outer and inner rings of forts surrounded it, each fort held by a garrison of 250 to 300 men, and the forts were joined by underground passages so that they could cover one another with fire. 3 4
In mid-January 1945 East Prussia and northern Poland were held by the 3rd Panzer, 4th and 2nd Armies of Army Group Centre (renamed Army Group North on 26 January): about 580,000 soldiers plus 200,000 men of the Volkssturm, 8,200 guns and mortars, 700 tanks and assault guns and 775 aircraft. Against them stood the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front and the Baltic Fleet, in all about 1.67 million men, 25,426 guns and mortars, 3,859 tanks and self-propelled guns and 3,097 combat aircraft. A "front" was the Soviet equivalent of an army group, combining several armies. Vasilevsky reckoned in his memoir that the Soviet side was 2.1 times stronger in men, 3.1 times in artillery, 5.5 times in tanks and 4 times in aircraft. 2 5 3
Numbers did not mean an easy victory. Vasilevsky wrote that the fortified districts and defence lines of East Prussia were no weaker than the Siegfried Line in western Germany and in places stronger. Because the Germans had their backs to the sea and the lagoons, they could be supplied and could shift troops by ship even when surrounded, so the Red Army had to rely on frontal blows rather than encirclement. The operation lasted 103 days, the longest Soviet operation of the last year of the war, and its Soviet casualties were correspondingly heavy. 2 3

What happened during the first incursion in autumn 1944 and at Nemmersdorf?
The Red Army reached the threshold of East Prussia in the autumn of 1944. Vasilevsky was then coordinating the Baltic fronts as a representative of the Stavka. According to his memoir, when reconnaissance showed that the German 3rd Panzer Army in the Memel sector had been thinned to no more than eight divisions, the Stavka decided to shift the main blow from Riga towards Memel. On 5 October the forces of Bagramyan (commander of the 1st Baltic Front) attacked west of Šiauliai and within days reached the Baltic north and south of Memel. Army Group North in western Latvia was now cut off from Germany for good, and three German divisions were shut up in Memel, where they held out until January 1945. 6 7
On the 16th of the same month Chernyakhovsky's 3rd Belorussian Front crossed the eastern border of East Prussia in the Gumbinnen-Goldap operation. Galitsky's 11th Guards Army and Krylov's 5th Army led, but the Germans met them with layered positions and hastily committed reserves. The Soviet troops pushed up to several dozen kilometres inside the border and held a belt about 130 kilometres wide from Schirwindt to the Rominten forest, but they did not reach Gumbinnen or Insterburg and went over to the defensive on 30 October. Their losses in fourteen days were 79,527 men, 16,819 of them killed or missing. Russian Wikipedia sums the operation up as the first attempt to destroy the German force in East Prussia, which went deep but did not break the enemy. 8 5
During this short incursion a massacre of civilians took place at Nemmersdorf, a village with a bridge over the Angerapp. A tank brigade of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps took the village on 21 October, and the Germans retook it on the 23rd. According to the research summarised by German Wikipedia today, between 19 and 30 people were killed; at the core of the events, 13 local civilians who had taken refuge in a bunker from the fighting were shot by Soviet soldiers. Others were taken out of refugee columns and shot. Historians such as Ian Kershaw agree that a massacre took place, but its details and numbers are still disputed. 9 10
Nemmersdorf became widely known through Nazi propaganda. Goebbels's ministry spread the story through the newsreels and the Völkischer Beobachter and assembled an international commission of figures from neutral countries. In 1946 Erich Dethleffsen, formerly chief of staff of the German 4th Army, testified that people had been nailed to barn doors and that about fifty French prisoners of war had also been shot; but after the fall of the Soviet Union researchers such as Bernhard Fisch showed embellishment and manipulation, including photographs taken in other villages and "crucifixion" barn doors that were not in Nemmersdorf at all. The Soviet Union and East Germany, for their part, denied the events as a mere Nazi propaganda stunt, and Russian history books have largely kept that position. The propaganda worked in two directions: more men volunteered for the Volkssturm, but more civilians panicked and began to leave, and that fear fed the great flight three months later. 10 9 11
On 5 November the Germans drove the Soviet troops out of Goldap. According to Vasilevsky's memoir, that same day the 3rd Belorussian Front was ordered to go over to a firm defence in southern Lithuania because its attempts to break into East Prussia had failed. This autumn failure was why the next offensive was prepared on a much larger scale and by two fronts together. 2 8


How did two fronts cut East Prussia off from Germany in January 1945?
The plan for the winter offensive was drawn up in the General Staff and the Stavka in November 1944. On 12 November Zhukov became commander of the 1st Belorussian Front and Rokossovsky of the 2nd, and Stalin (the Soviet Supreme Commander) took personal charge of the three Belorussian fronts. Vasilevsky wrote in his memoir that he was in the Baltic at the time and did not attend Stalin's meetings with the front commanders. Under the plan Chernyakhovsky's 3rd Belorussian Front would drive from the east through Insterburg towards Königsberg, while Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front would strike from its Narew bridgeheads in the south through Mława towards the sea near Marienburg, trapping the Germans; the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts would then destroy the trapped enemy in turn. 2
Zhukov's memoir, Reminiscences and Reflections, presents the change of command as the outcome of a conversation with Stalin in early October. The day after their dispute over halting the offensive north of Warsaw, Stalin asked him how he would view the Stavka taking direct command of the fronts, and that evening told him he would be given the 1st Belorussian Front on the Berlin axis while Rokossovsky moved to the 2nd. Zhukov writes that he received the formal order in Lublin on 15 November and took command on the 16th. In a passage restored in the later uncut edition, Rokossovsky asked Stalin what he had done to deserve such disfavour, and Zhukov writes that the warm comradeship of many years between them was gone after that; if Rokossovsky believed Zhukov had asked for the post, he says, that was a deep misapprehension.
Zhukov regarded East Prussia as the weak point of the offensive. In July 1944 he had proposed reinforcing the 2nd Belorussian Front heavily so as to exploit the Byelorussian success and take East Prussia, or at least cut it off from Germany, but Stalin refused. Zhukov called this "a serious mistake by the Supreme Commander" that later made necessary "the extremely difficult and bloody East Prussian operation". In early November he and Antonov again proposed strengthening the 2nd Belorussian Front with at least two armies taken from the Baltic fronts, and again Stalin did not agree. 24
The 3rd Belorussian Front attacked on 13 January. Expecting the Soviet barrage, the Germans had left only outposts in the first trench and pulled their main forces back, and they shelled the Soviet assembly areas in a counter-preparation. Fog and low cloud kept the air force from helping. The first day brought an advance of only a few kilometres, and the first day's objective took three days to reach. Only on 18 January was a breach 65 kilometres wide and 20 to 30 kilometres deep opened north of Gumbinnen, and the front committed its second echelon, Galitsky's 11th Guards Army. On 20 January Beloborodov's 43rd Army entered Tilsit, and Insterburg fell on 22 January (German Wikipedia gives the 21st). Vasilevsky wrote that the two fronts received 13.3 million shells and mortar bombs for this operation, more than any operation in the history of war. 3 4 2 5
Delayed a day by the weather, the 2nd Belorussian Front attacked on 14 January from its Różan and Serock bridgeheads on the Narew. For two days it advanced only seven or eight kilometres, but when the sky cleared on the 16th the 4th Air Army flew more than 2,500 sorties to help the breakthrough and Volsky's 5th Guards Tank Army went through the gap. Mława fell on 19 January. On 20 January the Stavka ordered Rokossovsky to swing his advance north towards Elbing, and on the 22nd the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps took Allenstein. Around this time the retreating Germans blew up their own Tannenberg memorial to the victory of 1914 and shipped out the remains of Hindenburg and his wife. On the evening of 23 January the vanguard of the 5th Guards Tank Army burst into Elbing, and by the 26th Soviet troops had reached the shore of the Vistula Lagoon (Frisches Haff) north of Elbing, so that the Germans in East Prussia lost their overland connection with the rest of the Reich. 3 5
Facing encirclement, Friedrich Hossbach, commander of the German 4th Army, disobeyed Hitler's orders, abandoned the fortress town of Lötzen in the Masurian lakes on 24-25 January and marched west by forced stages. Accompanied by thousands of refugees he tried to break through towards Elbing, and an attack on the night of the 26th briefly brought some of his lead units into the town. Rokossovsky turned the 48th Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army and other forces against the attempt and by 8 February had thrown the Germans back. For defying orders the army group commander Reinhardt and Hossbach were dismissed, and Hitler renamed the remaining forces Army Group North and gave them to Rendulic. In the north Bagramyan's 1st Baltic Front took Memel on 28 January; its three German divisions were moved by sea and along the spit to the Samland peninsula. 12 5 3
By the end of January the 3rd Belorussian Front had reached the coast north and south of Königsberg and enveloped the city from three sides. Vasilevsky's memoir sums up the result: the Germans were split into three groups, four divisions pinned on the Samland peninsula, five divisions with fortress units blockaded in Königsberg, and some twenty divisions surrounded around Heilsberg south-west of the city. But Soviet losses were heavy too. By late January the rifle divisions of the two fronts had shrunk from 6,000-6,500 men to 2,500-3,500, and most replacements were going to the Berlin axis. 2 3
In his memoir Vasilevsky answers criticism of this January phase. He admits that the Stavka and the General Staff were at fault for failing to stop the main body of the German 2nd Army from escaping across the Vistula into Eastern Pomerania. But he writes that the Stavka's directives refute the charges that the 2nd Belorussian Front was abruptly and harmfully turned north around 20 January, or that East Prussia had from the start been left to the 3rd Belorussian Front alone. Zhukov saw the turn as a problem for his own right flank: on 31 January, he writes, he reported to Stalin that the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front had fallen so far behind that his front now stretched 500 kilometres, and asked for Rokossovsky's 70th Army to advance west, but got no quick answer. The passage is also a planner's self-defence. In early February, while Stalin and Antonov (First Deputy Chief of the General Staff) were at the Yalta Conference, Vasilevsky again ran the General Staff, and on 8 February, with Stalin's consent given by telephone from Yalta, he issued Rokossovsky the directive to attack into Pomerania. The 2nd Belorussian Front handed four armies to the 3rd and turned west from 10 February. 2 24
How was Chernyakhovsky killed, and how did the command change?
From 10 February the 3rd Belorussian Front set about destroying the largest German group, around Heilsberg. The Stavka wanted it finished by 20-25 February, but the more than 900 concrete works of the Heilsberg fortified district, worn-out troops and worsening weather made the fighting slow and drawn out. Each time a gap opened, the German command plugged it by shifting reserves. 2 3
On 18 February the front commander, General of the Army Ivan Chernyakhovsky, was hit by a shell fragment on the outskirts of Mehlsack (now Pieniężno in Poland) and died the same day. At 37 he was the youngest of all Soviet front commanders and a twice Hero of the Soviet Union. Because the fragment is recorded as coming from behind, Russian Wikipedia notes that it is unknown whether it came from a stray long-range German shell. He was buried in a square of Vilnius, the city he had liberated, and after the war Insterburg was renamed Chernyakhovsk in his honour. Vasilevsky remembers him in his memoir as an "exceptionally talented" young commander whom he first met in January 1943 during the Voronezh operation and grew close to during the Belorussian operation of 1944. 13 2
Vasilevsky recalls the night before as follows. During the night of 17 to 18 February, after he reported on the situation in East Prussia, Stalin suggested that he go there to help the troops: finishing off the enemy in East Prussia quickly would free forces to strengthen the Berlin axis and to send some to the Far East. Stalin also warned him in advance that two or three months after Germany's surrender he might be sent to direct operations in the Far East. Vasilevsky asked to be relieved as Chief of the General Staff, since he spent most of his time at the front, and to hand the post to Antonov, who was already doing the job, keeping only his post as deputy People's Commissar of Defence. As he remembered it, Stalin asked in surprise, "Won't such a decision offend you?", and Antonov, who was present, said he did not share the proposal. Stalin promised to think it over and meanwhile signed a directive making Vasilevsky, as Stavka representative, responsible from 22 February for the operations of the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic Fronts. Vasilevsky is the only witness for this conversation. 2
News of Chernyakhovsky's death came that day. Vasilevsky writes that he was at a performance at the Bolshoi Theatre when Stalin telephoned with the news and told him the Stavka meant to put him at the head of the 3rd Belorussian Front. A Stavka order of 18 February appointed him commander and left the front's chief of staff, Colonel General Pokrovsky, in temporary command until he arrived. The same day the State Defence Committee made him a member of the Stavka. Antonov was appointed Chief of the General Staff on 19 February. According to the memoir, Vasilevsky reached front headquarters on 20 February and took command on the 21st (Russian Wikipedia dates his command from the 20th). 2 14 3
Meanwhile the Germans counter-attacked at Königsberg. On 19 February the Samland force, reinforced by sea from Courland, and the Königsberg garrison struck from both sides at once; a unit led by a captured Soviet T-34 retook Metgethen and reopened the corridor between Königsberg and the port of Pillau (the German operation "Westwind"). Through it supplies came in and wounded and refugees went out until April. The Stavka decided to unify command and abolished the 1st Baltic Front at midnight on 24 February. Its troops became the Zemland Group and joined the 3rd Belorussian Front, with Bagramyan as group commander and deputy front commander. All Soviet forces in East Prussia were now under Vasilevsky alone. 2 4 5

How was the Heiligenbeil pocket destroyed?
Once in command, Vasilevsky set an order of priorities. According to his memoir, at the end of February the German Army Group North still had about thirty divisions (eleven on Samland and in Königsberg, nineteen to the south and south-west), while the Soviet troops had suffered heavy losses, were short of replacements and fuel, and had left their rear services far behind. So he halted the attacks on Samland and decided to crush the largest group, around Heilsberg, first, then Königsberg, and Samland last. "The operation was dragging on," he wrote, "but the front command had no other way out." For twenty days, from 22 February to 12 March, the troops were brought up to strength, ammunition was stockpiled and reconnaissance carried out. 2
The Heiligenbeil pocket held fifteen or sixteen divisions of the German 4th Army and part of the 2nd, their backs to the southern shore of the Vistula Lagoon. The German cruisers Admiral Scheer and Lützow supported them with gunfire from the sea beyond the lagoon, and at night the Germans moved wounded out and supplies in along the Frische Nehrung (the Vistula Spit). Trapped refugees fled across the frozen lagoon to the spit along ice roads marked with lamps. The Red Army resumed its attack on 13 March with seven armies. The 48th Army took Braunsberg on 20 March, Heiligenbeil fell on the 25th and Soviet troops reached the lagoon on the 26th. At the end of March the last German troops and refugees were crowded on a narrow strip of coast at the tip of the Balga peninsula under Soviet fire. The 4th Army commander, Müller, had himself ferried to Pillau but demanded that the remaining troops hold on so that as many refugees as possible could be evacuated by sea. The pocket ceased to exist on 29 March. 12 5 3
By Soviet count the Germans lost 93,000 killed and 46,000 captured in these two-odd weeks. In his memoir Vasilevsky writes that he would "never forget" the fighting on that coast, where the spring flood had turned the whole area into a swamp, and he says that the fleeing Germans blew a dyke and thousands drowned. That scene is his recollection alone and is not confirmed elsewhere. Russian Wikipedia gives as one reason why the Germans could hold on so long the Baltic Fleet's failure to impose a reliable blockade, which let them move troops by sea. 2 3

How was the assault on Königsberg prepared?
When Königsberg was surrounded at the end of January, about 200,000 civilians were trapped in it along with the remnants of the German 3rd Panzer Army. The bread ration fell to 180 grams a day, and the inhabitants had to choose between starving in the city, crossing the front line into Soviet hands, or crossing the frozen lagoon to wait for a ship at Pillau; some 2,000 women and children a day walked across the ice. Königsberg was declared a "fortress" and was defended by General of Infantry Otto Lasch, its commandant since November 1944. The garrison of four infantry divisions, several independent regiments, fortress troops and Volkssturm came to about 130,000 men with some 4,000 guns and mortars (Soviet estimate). 4 2
The city's defences were three-layered. The first position, 6 to 8 kilometres from the centre, contained some fifteen old but still very strong forts; the second, on the outskirts, consisted of stone buildings, barricades and concrete firing points; the third, round the centre, was made up of old bastions, towers and solid buildings. In the very middle stood an old citadel that could hold several thousand men, and the commandant even had an airstrip built inside the city. Winston Churchill called Königsberg "a modernised heavily defended fortress". 2 4
The assault plan was drawn up by the headquarters of Bagramyan's Zemland Group; Vasilevsky adopted it in mid-March and sent it to Stalin in a report of 16 March signed with Makarov, member of the front's Military Council, and Pokrovsky, his chief of staff. It had three stages, reconnaissance and preparation, a one-day breach of the outer defences and a four-day storming of the city, and called for artillery and aircraft to spend the four days before the attack destroying the fortifications. According to Vasilevsky, the Stavka approved the plan the next day but ordered the Heilsberg group finished by 22 March and the Königsberg attack begun by 28 March. He recalls telling Stalin by telephone on the night of 18 March that these deadlines were unrealistic and asking to open the artillery and air offensive in early April; Stalin agreed and promised to send the Chief Marshals of Aviation Novikov, commander of the air force, and Golovanov, commander of long-range aviation. 2
The 39th, 43rd, 50th and 11th Guards Armies carried out the assault, about 187,000 men with some 5,200 guns and mortars, 538 tanks and self-propelled guns and about 2,500 aircraft. Forty-seven per cent of the guns were heavy pieces of 203 to 305 millimetres, and more than 45 per cent of the aircraft were bombers, a force built for breaking fortifications. The 43rd and 50th Armies would strike into the city from the north and the 11th Guards Army from the south, while the 39th Army pushed west to cut Königsberg off from Samland and Pillau. Vasilevsky writes that commanders rehearsed the assault step by step on an exact model of the city, and that the troops practised street fighting in captured German pillboxes and trenches. From late March combat groups of the National Committee for a Free Germany, formed from German prisoners of war, went into the lines in Wehrmacht uniform for reconnaissance, taking prisoners and propaganda. 3 2 4

How did the assault of 6-9 April unfold, and why did Lasch surrender?
After four days of bombardment the infantry and tanks went in around midday on 6 April. On the first day the 39th Army cut the railway between Königsberg and Pillau, and the other armies took fifteen villages around the city and broke into it. Fort Five, reputed the strongest, was surrounded and bypassed, and in the south a deep moat kept the attackers from Fort Eight until evening. Accounts of the weather differ: Vasilevsky writes that 6 April was clear and that the aircraft went into action in full force in the afternoon, while Russian and English Wikipedia say bad weather limited the bombing on the first day and during the preparation. 3 4 2
The clear days of 7 and 8 April decided the battle. On the 7th alone Soviet aircraft flew 4,758 sorties and dropped 1,658 tonnes of bombs; on the 8th they flew more than 6,000 sorties and dropped 2,100 tonnes. Fort Eight fell to an assault behind smoke screens and flamethrowers, and at the main railway station, where almost every carriage had been made into a firing point, the attackers had to advance behind tanks and guns. On the evening of the 7th Lasch radioed Hitler's headquarters for permission to surrender and was told to "fight to the last soldier". On the 8th the 11th Guards Army crossed the Pregel and linked up with the 43rd Army coming down from the north, cutting the city garrison off completely from the Germans on Samland. 3 4
On the afternoon of the 8th Vasilevsky, as front commander, called on the German soldiers of Königsberg to lay down their arms, but the garrison refused. On the German side Lasch asked to be allowed to break out to the west, but the 4th Army commander, Müller, forbade a breakout that would take the civilians along. On the morning of the 9th the 5th Panzer Division attacked from Samland to relieve the city and was stopped; about 1,500 aircraft and the artillery pounded the remaining strongpoints, and the 11th Guards Army attacked the centre. The defence fell apart, and Lasch decided on his own initiative to send emissaries to negotiate a surrender. They reached the Soviet lines at 6 p.m., and according to the Soviet announcement the garrison laid down its arms at 9.30 p.m. 2 4 5 15
By Soviet count about 42,000 German soldiers were killed in the Königsberg operation and 93,853 taken prisoner; the Kaliningrad historian Gennady Kretinin holds that 25,000 to 30,000 of those prisoners were civilians gathered in the same collection points. Soviet losses were never officially published, and estimates vary widely: Gennady Kudiya gives 9,230 killed and 34,250 wounded over the four days, Kretinin 3,700 killed between 1 and 10 April. On the night of 10 April Moscow fired a salute of 24 salvos from 324 guns, and a medal "For the Capture of Königsberg" was instituted. Between the RAF raids of August 1944 and the April bombardment, almost 80 per cent of the city was destroyed. 15 5 4
Vasilevsky's memoir reproduces Lasch's words under interrogation at front headquarters. Lasch reportedly said that the artillery and aircraft the Soviets had secretly massed had shattered the fortress and broken the men's morale, and that he had completely lost control of his troops. One sentence reads: "It was quite impossible to imagine that a fortress like Königsberg would fall so quickly." Hitler sentenced Lasch to death by hanging in absentia for the surrender and had his family in Berlin arrested. Lasch was sentenced in the Soviet Union to twenty-five years as a war criminal, was released in 1955 and in 1958 published his memoir So fiel Königsberg ("Thus Fell Königsberg"). 2 16

How did the fighting end on Samland and at Pillau?
After Königsberg fell, the only German force left in East Prussia was some 65,000 men on the Samland peninsula. Vasilevsky reproduces in his memoir the full text of the second surrender appeal he issued on 11 April. Pointing out that Königsberg had fallen in three days, that the German front was 450 kilometres away at Stettin and that Soviet submarines had cut the sea lanes, he promised those who laid down their arms within 24 hours their lives, adequate food, return home after the war and immediate medical care for the wounded. The appeal warned that further resistance would cost many lives among the civilians crowded around Pillau, and promised that "civilians will be allowed to return to their towns and villages, to peaceful work". No answer came. 2 3
On 13 April the 2nd Guards, 11th Guards, 5th, 39th and 43rd Armies attacked shoulder to shoulder, from north to south. Although the Soviet armies were down to 111,500 men, they had the Germans retreating by the second day and on 17 April took Fischhausen (now Primorsk), the main strongpoint of the peninsula. Vasilevsky notes with scorn that Erich Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia, escaped to Denmark on an icebreaker he had kept ready all winter, after ordering his soldiers to fight to the last. The remaining 20,000 or so Germans held up the 2nd Guards Army on the narrow ground before Pillau, and only after committing the 11th Guards Army as well, with help from the Baltic Fleet, did the Soviet forces take the fortress and ice-free port of Pillau (now Baltiysk) on 25 April. 2 3 17
Even afterwards the Germans held out on the Vistula Spit (Frische Nehrung) until the end of the war, and on 9 May more than 22,000 soldiers laid down their arms. For the East Prussian operation as a whole, Soviet figures give 25 German divisions destroyed, 12 more reduced by 50 to 70 per cent and more than 220,000 prisoners. The Red Army and the Baltic Fleet lost 126,500 killed and missing and more than 458,000 wounded or sick, some 584,000 in all, together with 3,525 tanks and self-propelled guns and 1,450 aircraft. Some of the Soviet forces freed by the capture of Königsberg were moved to the Berlin operation. 3 5
Vasilevsky presents the operation as evidence of the maturity of Soviet military art. He sums it up as a campaign in which an enemy pinned against sea and lagoons forced the Red Army to rely on frontal blows rather than encirclement, and in which powerful artillery and bomber aviation were decisive, and he pays separate tribute to the railway troops who hurriedly relaid the wrecked lines to the Soviet gauge so that trains arrived in Königsberg three days after its fall. While he celebrates the fall of the "East Prussian citadel" at length, the chapter says nothing of what the civilians of the same land went through; civilians appear only once, in the surrender appeal to Samland. 2

How did the people of East Prussia flee?
The flight began far too late. Evacuation plans had been drawn up in the second half of 1944, but Gauleiter Koch forbade civilians to leave until 20 January 1945 and ordered that anyone leaving without permission be shot on the spot; any preparation to leave was treated as defeatism and "undermining of military morale". Nazi propaganda kept the population in the dark with talk of final victory, while Koch and many other Nazi functionaries were among the first to flee. The West German Schieder commission counted 2,653,000 civilians in East Prussia at the beginning of 1944 and estimated that about two million left before the end of the war, 500,000 in late 1944 and 1.5 million after January 1945. 11 1
When the Soviet army burst in in January, people set out in the depths of winter with farm wagons. The army had long since taken the motor vehicles and fuel, and the roads and bridges were jammed with retreating troops. The last refugee train left Königsberg on 22 January, and some trains were sent towards Allenstein, which the Soviets had already taken. Once the land route was cut at the end of January, the only way out was across the frozen Vistula Lagoon and along the spit to Danzig or Gotenhafen (Gdynia). Mingled with the troops and without cover, the columns were attacked by Soviet aircraft, wagons broke through ice shattered by bombs, and many children froze to death. Men aged 16 to 60 were drafted into the Volkssturm. 11 12
Escape by sea was organised by Operation Hannibal, launched on 21 January on the orders of the German naval commander Dönitz. Over fifteen weeks hundreds of merchant ships and warships carried 800,000 to 900,000 refugees and 350,000 soldiers from Courland, East and West Prussia and Pomerania to western Germany and Denmark. The price was high. On 30 January the transport Wilhelm Gustloff, which had left Gotenhafen, was hit by torpedoes from the Soviet submarine S-13 under Captain Marinesko and sank in under 45 minutes; estimates of the dead range from 5,348 to over 9,000, making it the deadliest single sinking in history. The Steuben, sailing from Pillau, was sunk on 10 February and the Goya on 16 April. In early April some 400,000 civilians were still in the areas the Wehrmacht held, most of them at Pillau; the transports from Pillau ended on 25 April. 18 11 19 5
Amid the chaos of the flight came one of the last massacres of Nazi Germany. In January the SS cleared the East Prussian sub-camps of the Stutthof concentration camp and drove some 7,000 prisoners, most of them Jewish women from Poland and Hungary, through Königsberg to Palmnicken on the Samland coast. About 5,000 survived the death march to arrive on 27 January; some 2,000 of them were shot beside a pit at the amber mine, and on the night of 31 January the remaining 3,000 or so were driven onto the ice of the Baltic shore and mown down with submachine guns. At most 200 of the 7,000 survived. As the Soviet army entered East Prussia it freed many people from such camps and from forced labour; Vasilevsky writes that in the January phase alone up to 68,000 citizens of European countries were freed from East Prussian camps, and as the suffering of the Ostarbeiter, Eastern workers deported to Germany, became known, the hostility of Soviet soldiers hardened. 20 2 11

What violence did Soviet troops commit against East Prussian civilians, and how great was the toll?
East Prussia was the first German territory the Red Army entered in force, and Soviet soldiers committed widespread violence against its civilians there. Firing on refugee columns, the murder of whole families and the burning of their homes, looting and mass rape are recorded in many sources. The playwright Zakhar Agranenko, a marine infantry officer in East Prussia, wrote in his diary that Red Army soldiers raped German women "on a collective basis". Even Soviet women freed from forced labour were assaulted. Antony Beevor writes that after the surrender on 9 April "the rape of women and girls went unchecked in the ruined city" of Königsberg. When German troops retook Metgethen on 19 February, German military reports recorded the bodies of women and children who had been raped and killed, and the security police made a photo album of them; these are wartime German records and should be read as such. 11 21
This violence was driven by the desire for revenge for the crimes committed by the German invasion and occupation on Soviet soil, and by Soviet propaganda that fed it. Yet some on the Soviet side tried to stop it. Lev Kopelev, an officer in the advance into East Prussia, sharply criticised the atrocities against civilians and was arrested in 1945 and sentenced to ten years in the Gulag for "bourgeois humanism" and "pity for the enemy". Solzhenitsyn, who fought in East Prussia at the same time as an artillery officer, was arrested for criticising Stalin in letters to a friend and later described the advance in his poem Prussian Nights. Cases of soldiers punished by Soviet military tribunals for killing prisoners and civilians are also on record. English Wikipedia concludes that Stalin moved to check the Red Army's behaviour only when he judged it to be in Soviet interests. 11
The number of civilian victims is not known precisely, and estimates differ widely depending on what is counted. In 1953 the West German Schieder commission put civilian deaths in East Prussia during the 1945 campaign at about 30,000. In 1958 the West German Federal Statistical Office put East Prussian civilian losses at 299,200, of whom 25,000 died during the war and 274,200 in the expulsions after May 1945. The final report of the West German search service counted 31,940 confirmed deaths during the flight and separately over 390,000 people whose fate could not be established; the historian Rüdiger Overmans considers the statistical basis of that report unreliable. German Wikipedia cites an estimate that some 300,000 died in the flight between January and April 1945. Beevor wrote that a population of 2.2 million in 1940 had been reduced to 193,000 by the end of May 1945. 11 5
The Red Army's conduct also shaped the last phase of the war. What happened to civilians in East Prussia, on top of years of Nazi propaganda, led many German soldiers to believe there could be no purpose in surviving a Soviet victory, and to fight on even though they thought the war was lost; this was one reason for the high Soviet losses in East Prussia. Official Soviet and Russian accounts long passed over this violence in silence, and Vasilevsky's memoir is no exception. 11


How was East Prussia divided after the war, and how did Kaliningrad Oblast come about?
The Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945 redrew Germany's eastern border. In Section V of its protocol, "City of Koenigsberg and the adjacent area", the conference agreed in principle to the Soviet proposal that Königsberg and its surroundings pass to the Soviet Union pending the final settlement of territorial questions in a peace treaty, and the American President and British Prime Minister declared that they would support the proposal at the coming peace conference. The southern two-thirds of East Prussia came under Polish administration, and the northern third was divided between the Russian republic (today's Kaliningrad Oblast) and the Lithuanian republic (the Memel district). Because a peace conference with Germany never took place, the partition became final in practice. The conference's border decisions as a whole are covered under the Oder-Neisse line. 11 1
On 7 April 1946 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet created Königsberg Oblast within the Russian republic on this territory, and on 4 July renamed the oblast and its capital Kaliningrad, after the Soviet head of state Kalinin, who had died a month earlier and had no connection with the city. Vasilevsky writes in his memoir that the city now bears the name of Kalinin, "a glorious veteran of the Leninist guard", and records the unanimous adoption on 25 February 1947 by the Allied Control Council of a law abolishing the Prussian state itself as the end of "an outpost of German aggression". Many East Prussian towns took the names of fallen Soviet soldiers: Insterburg became Chernyakhovsk, Gumbinnen Gusev, Heiligenbeil Mamonovo, Neuhausen Guryevsk after the corps commander Guryev killed before Pillau, and Pillau became Baltiysk. 22 23 2
In the summer of 1945 some 800,000 Germans were still living in East Prussia. At Potsdam the Allies sanctioned the removal of Germans from east of the Oder-Neisse line; Churchill had earlier said that expulsion was "the method which ... will be the most satisfactory and lasting" and that "a clean sweep will be made". The Germans and Prussian Lithuanians who remained in the Soviet north were deported to Germany in 1947-48 and replaced, from 1946, by settlers from 27 Russian oblasts and from Belarus, Ukraine and elsewhere. Most Germans were expelled from the Polish south as well. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Kaliningrad Oblast remained a Russian exclave surrounded by Poland and Lithuania. 1 23 22 11
Consequences
The German forces in East Prussia collapsed after 103 days. By Soviet count 25 German divisions were destroyed and more than 220,000 men captured, while the Red Army and Baltic Fleet lost more than 580,000 men, including 126,500 killed and missing. Most of East Prussia's German inhabitants fled or died, and those who remained were expelled by 1947-48. Under the Potsdam Agreement Königsberg and the north went to the Soviet Union as Kaliningrad Oblast and to the Lithuanian republic, the south to Poland, and in 1947 the Allies abolished the Prussian state.
Timeline & Map
- 11944.10.05Memel offensive opens
Bagramyan's 1st Baltic Front attacked from west of Šiauliai towards Memel. Within days it reached the Baltic north and south of the town, cutting Army Group North off from Germany.
- 21944.10.16Gumbinnen-Goldap operation
Chernyakhovsky's 3rd Belorussian Front attacked across the East Prussian border for the first time. In two weeks it advanced several dozen kilometres but did not reach Gumbinnen, and went over to the defensive on the 30th.
- 31944.10.21Nemmersdorf massacre
Units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps took Nemmersdorf, a village at a bridge over the Angerapp, and civilians including 13 villagers sheltering in a bunker were shot. The German authorities, who retook the village on the 23rd, made heavy propaganda use of the killings.
- 41945.01.13The 3rd Belorussian Front attacks
The 3rd Belorussian Front opened its attack north of Gumbinnen towards Insterburg and Königsberg. Held up by the deep German defences, it reached its first-day objectives only after three days.
- 51945.01.14The 2nd Belorussian Front attacks
Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front attacked north-west from its Różan and Serock bridgeheads on the Narew. It broke through with air support when the weather cleared on the 16th and took Mława on the 19th.
- 61945.01.21Operation Hannibal begins
On the orders of the German naval commander Dönitz, Operation Hannibal began evacuating soldiers and refugees by sea from East Prussia, Courland and elsewhere. The day before, Gauleiter Koch had lifted his ban on civilian evacuation.
- 71945.01.22Insterburg falls
The 3rd Belorussian Front took Insterburg, the main town of eastern East Prussia. The last refugee train left Königsberg the same day.
- 81945.01.26East Prussia cut off
North of Elbing the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the shore of the Vistula Lagoon. The German forces in East Prussia lost their overland link with Germany, and Hitler renamed them Army Group North.
- 91945.01.28Memel falls
Bagramyan's 1st Baltic Front took Memel after a siege of more than three months. The German garrison withdrew to the Samland peninsula.
- 101945.01.30Sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff
The transport Wilhelm Gustloff, which had left Gotenhafen, was sunk by torpedoes from the Soviet submarine S-13. Thousands died, among them refugees from East Prussia.
- 111945.01.31Palmnicken massacre
The SS drove some 3,000 Jewish prisoners of the Stutthof camp, brought to Palmnicken on a death march, onto the ice of the shore and shot them.
- 121945.02.18Chernyakhovsky killed
Chernyakhovsky, commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, was killed by a shell fragment on the outskirts of Mehlsack. The Stavka appointed Vasilevsky to succeed him the same day.
- 131945.02.19Königsberg-Pillau corridor reopened
German forces attacking from Königsberg and from Samland retook Metgethen and reopened the corridor to the port of Pillau.
- 1945.02.21Vasilevsky takes command
Vasilevsky took command of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The same day the Stavka decided to abolish the 1st Baltic Front and place its troops under his front.
- 141945.03.13Attack on the Heilsberg group resumes
After twenty days of preparation the 3rd Belorussian Front resumed its attack on the German 4th Army in the Heiligenbeil pocket.
- 151945.03.29Heiligenbeil pocket destroyed
The last units of the German 4th Army, pushed to the tip of the Balga peninsula, ceased fighting. Soviet figures give 93,000 killed and 46,000 captured.
- 161945.04.06Assault on Königsberg begins
After four days of bombardment the 39th, 43rd, 50th and 11th Guards Armies stormed Königsberg. On the first day the railway between Königsberg and Pillau was cut.
- 171945.04.09Lasch surrenders
The fortress commandant Otto Lasch sent emissaries to surrender, and in the evening the garrison laid down its arms. Hitler sentenced him to death in absentia.
- 181945.04.13Samland offensive
When his surrender appeal of the 11th went unanswered, Vasilevsky sent five armies against the Germans on the Samland peninsula. They took Fischhausen on the 17th.
- 191945.04.25Pillau falls
The 11th Guards Army, with the Baltic Fleet, took the fortress and port of Pillau. This ended the East Prussian offensive and the evacuations by sea from there.
- 201945.05.09Surrender on the Frische Nehrung
More than 22,000 German soldiers holding out on the Vistula Spit laid down their arms.
- 211945.08.02Potsdam Agreement
The Potsdam Conference agreed in principle to the Soviet proposal to transfer Königsberg and its surroundings to the Soviet Union, and placed southern East Prussia under Polish administration.
- 221946.07.04Renamed Kaliningrad
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet renamed Königsberg Oblast, created in April, and its capital Kaliningrad.
Related people 14
Soviet Union (Red Army and Baltic Fleet)11
Leadership2
Took over the front after Chernyakhovsky's death and directed the destruction of the Heiligenbeil pocket, the storming of Königsberg and the Samland operation. Recorded the campaign in chapter 26 of his memoir The Cause of My Whole Life.
Soviet Supreme CommanderJoseph Stalin1878–1953Directed the Belorussian fronts himself and planned the winter offensive. According to Vasilevsky's memoir he sent him to East Prussia on the night of 18 February and accepted his request to postpone the Königsberg assault to early April.
Implementers & commanders4
Led the first incursion of October 1944 and the January 1945 offensive that enveloped Königsberg from three sides. Killed by a shell fragment outside Mehlsack on 18 February.
Commander of the 2nd Belorussian FrontKonstantin Rokossovsky1896–1968Attacked from the Narew bridgeheads and reached the sea north of Elbing on 26 January, cutting East Prussia off from Germany. After stopping Hossbach's breakout attempt he turned into Pomerania in February.
Commander of the 1st Baltic Front, then of the Zemland GroupIvan Bagramyan1897–1982Reached the Baltic in the Memel offensive of October 1944 and took Memel on 28 January 1945. From late February he led the Zemland Group, whose staff drew up the plan for storming Königsberg.
Commander of the 11th Guards ArmyKuzma Galitsky1897–1973Led the first incursion in October 1944; in April 1945 his army stormed into central Königsberg from the south, forcing the garrison's surrender on the 9th, and took Pillau on the 25th.
Participants4
Commanded one of the main assault armies in January 1945, cut the link between Königsberg and the Heiligenbeil pocket in March and took part in the Samland offensive in April.
Commander of the Soviet Air ForceAlexander Novikov1900–1976As Stavka representative he coordinated all air formations in the assault on Königsberg.
Commander of Long-Range AviationAlexander Golovanov1904–1975Heavy bombers of his 18th Air Army flew a massed daylight raid on the Königsberg fortress on 7 April.
Commander of the Baltic FleetVladimir Tributs1900–1977Supported the armies advancing along the coast, attacked German shipping and took part in the capture of Pillau; the incomplete sea blockade is also blamed for letting the Germans hold out so long.
Germany (Wehrmacht and Volkssturm)3
Participants2
Forbade civilian evacuation until 20 January 1945, leaving many inhabitants in the path of the fighting. He stayed in Pillau rather than return to Königsberg and in the end escaped to Denmark on an icebreaker.
Commander-in-Chief of the German NavyKarl Dönitz1891–1980Ordered Operation Hannibal on 21 January to evacuate refugees and soldiers from East Prussia and elsewhere by sea.
Related terms
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24