The Jassy–Kishinev Offensive and Romania's 23 August
How did the Soviet army encircle and destroy German Army Group South Ukraine between Jassy and Kishinev within ten days in August 1944, and how, at the same moment, was Antonescu arrested in the royal palace in Bucharest and Romania brought over to the other side?
On 20 August 1944 Malinovsky's 2nd and Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Fronts broke through the Romanian-held flanks and swung towards Huși, encircling the main body of the German 6th Army on the 24th. A first offensive had been stopped at Târgu Frumos that spring, and in the summer the Germans had sent their armour to Belorussia. On 23 August King Michael I and the National Democratic Bloc arrested Antonescu in the palace and declared an armistice. Romanian troops beat off a German attack on Bucharest, the Red Army entered the capital on the 31st, and the armistice was signed in Moscow on 12 September.
Why did the Soviets strike between Jassy and Kishinev in the summer of 1944?
In the summer of 1940 Romania gave up Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to a Soviet ultimatum, and the Second Vienna Award of the same year handed Northern Transylvania to Hungary. Marshal Ion Antonescu, who took full power that September, joined the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, recovered the lost provinces and occupied Transnistria beyond the Dniester, where Jews and Roma were deported and killed in large numbers. After two Romanian armies were destroyed at Stalingrad the front moved west, and in the spring of 1944 the Red Army crossed the Prut, the Soviet–Romanian border of 1940, into northern Moldavia. For the next four months the front stood on a line from Kishinev (today Chișinău, capital of Moldova) through Jassy (Iași) to Târgu Frumos. 1 2 3
The sector mattered for its oil and its roads. The Ploiești oilfield, some 60 kilometres north of Bucharest, supplied oil the Axis badly needed, and from 4 April 1944 American and British bombers raided Bucharest seventeen times over four months, killing 5,524 inhabitants. As for roads, beyond the so-called Focșani Gate between the Siret and the Danube lay the Wallachian plain and then the Danube, the borders of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary. Sergei Shtemenko, then head of the Soviet General Staff's Operations Directorate, writes in his memoirs that in planning the operation the staff also weighed the "Balkan variant" Churchill had raised at Tehran, a Western Allied landing in the Balkans that would put the Western armies in charge there, and the chance that the Romanian government would strike a separate deal with the West behind the Soviets' backs. 3 4 5
On the Soviet side were Army General Rodion Malinovsky's 2nd Ukrainian Front and Army General Fyodor Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front, coordinated by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko as Stavka representative; Admiral Filipp Oktyabrsky's Black Sea Fleet and Rear Admiral Sergei Gorshkov's Danube Flotilla covered the sea and the river. Facing them was Colonel General Johannes Friessner's German Army Group South Ukraine, made up of the German 6th Army, rebuilt after Stalingrad, the German 8th Army and the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies. Russian Wikipedia counts 25 German and 22 Romanian divisions; German Wikipedia sets 1,250,000 Red Army soldiers with 16,000 guns, 1,870 tanks and 2,200 aircraft against some 900,000 German and Romanian soldiers with 7,600 guns, 400 tanks and 810 aircraft. 3 6 7
Why did the first offensive of spring 1944 fail, and why was it long forgotten?
On 2 April 1944, just after the Red Army crossed the Prut, the Soviet government announced at a press conference that it had no aim of acquiring any part of Romanian territory or changing the country's social order, and that the entry of Soviet troops was "dictated exclusively by military necessity and the continued resistance of the enemy's troops". On 10 April the State Defence Committee laid down how Soviet troops were to behave on Romanian soil: Romanian authorities were not to be broken up and property rights were to be protected, but a Soviet military administration was introduced, with Ivan Susaikov, member of the 2nd Ukrainian Front's military council, personally responsible. On 12 April, Shtemenko writes, the Soviet Union put six armistice conditions to Antonescu: a break with Germany and a joint war against it, restoration of the 1940 border and compensation, return of prisoners, support for Soviet and Allied operations, and the cancellation of the Transylvanian question with help to free that region; Antonescu's government rejected them. 8 3
Meanwhile the fighting went on. Marshal Ivan Konev, commanding the 2nd Ukrainian Front, sent the Stavka a plan for the 40th and 27th Armies to strike towards Târgu Frumos, Roman and Bacău from 8 April while his left wing went for Kishinev. By Konev's account, the 2nd Tank Army driving on Kishinev had only twenty tanks, and because the 3rd Ukrainian Front lagged far behind the enemy shifted forces against him. From a command post near Târgu Frumos he reported to Stalin that his troops were exhausted and their supply lines overstretched, saying "a breathing space is needed", and a Stavka directive of 6 May confirmed the switch to the defensive. Konev closes the chapter by saying that the bridgehead won in northern Romania contributed greatly to the later Jassy–Kishinev operation; the battles lost at Târgu Frumos in late April and early May get no account of their own. 9
German records remember this fighting separately. From 9 to 12 April Soviet troops took Târgu Frumos and were thrown out again, and in the second battle of 2–8 May the Grossdeutschland Division and 24th Panzer Division of the German LVII Panzer Corps held off the Soviet 2nd Tank Army's attack, claiming more than 350 Soviet tanks. Hasso von Manteuffel, commander of Grossdeutschland, recalled meeting the Soviet IS tank there for the first time, and the battle was later taught in the US Army as an example of mobile defence. Critics note, however, that the two German commanders' accounts largely leave out the Romanian troops who fought beside them. 10 11
In Red Storm over the Balkans (2007) the American military historian David Glantz grouped the fighting of 8 April to 6 June as the "first Jassy–Kishinev offensive". In his view the Stavka meant the two fronts to break the defences of northern Romania, take Jassy and Kishinev and, if possible, push on to Ploiești and Bucharest, and Soviet and Russian military historians "have carefully erased from the historical record any mention" of it for nearly sixty years. The German Military History Research Office holds instead that the Soviet offensive threatened in early April never materialised and that the later fighting was local action to straighten the line, and Glantz himself had earlier treated Târgu Frumos as a deception meant to cover the Belorussian offensive. The four-volume war history published by the Russian defence ministry in 1998 now lists the Târgu Frumos operation separately as a failed attempt by the 2nd Ukrainian Front to break through in depth. Shtemenko's memoir passes over it in a single sentence: "the attempts at an immediate offensive that we made from the bridgehead beyond the Prut back in April were unsuccessful." 11 10 3
How was the August offensive prepared?
In May the commanders changed. Malinovsky moved from the 3rd to the 2nd Ukrainian Front, Tolbukhin came from the 4th Ukrainian Front to take his place, and Konev went to the 1st Ukrainian Front. Shtemenko notes that Malinovsky and Matvei Zakharov, chief of staff of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, had begun the war in this very region in 1941 and knew it in detail. But the summer's decisive battle was fought in Belorussia. By early July the Stavka had taken the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 2nd Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army from the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the 8th Guards Army from the 3rd and sent them north. The Germans did the same: after the collapse of Army Group Centre the Army High Command stripped several divisions from Army Group South Ukraine by 13 July, among them the XXXX Panzer Corps with the 14th and 23rd Panzer Divisions, so that on the eve of the offensive the only armour left in the sector was the Romanian 1st Armoured Division, the German 13th Panzer Division and the 10th Panzergrenadier Division. 3 7 5
Army Group South Ukraine also changed hands. In late July Hitler sent Friessner, who had asked to withdraw Army Group North, south and swapped him with Ferdinand Schörner, until then in command of Army Group South Ukraine. Friessner's orders were to keep the Romanian army on Germany's side and to hold the Ploiești oilfields. The Romanians feared a rerun of Stalingrad. According to English Wikipedia, the German command dismissed as "alarmist" Romanian warnings of major attacks on the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies and an encirclement of the German 6th Army, and Friessner would not consider Antonescu's proposal to fall back to the fortified line from the Carpathians through Focșani and Nămoloasa to Brăila. 7 5 3
What Shtemenko calls the "two opinions" concerned the main thrust of the 3rd Ukrainian Front. For the 2nd Ukrainian Front there was no disagreement: the main blow would go from north-west of Jassy towards Huși. The 3rd Ukrainian Front's command, however, wanted to strike towards Huși from the Kitskany (Chițcani) bridgehead on the right bank of the Dniester south of Tiraspol, since no great river or other natural obstacle lay ahead. The General Staff objected that the enemy expected an attack exactly there, so surprise would be lost, and proposed the Kishinev axis even though it meant crossing the Dniester. When fresh intelligence in late July showed that the enemy expected the main blow towards Kishinev and was not counting on one from Kitskany, the General Staff dropped its view and agreed with the front command. 3
On 31 July the Stavka met with Timoshenko, the two front commanders and the military council members Susaikov and Aleksei Zheltov. What Shtemenko calls the "highlight" of the plan was the enemy's deployment: the Germans had massed their strongest divisions on the Kishinev axis, while both flanks were held by Romanian troops who were worse armed and less willing to fight. The fronts would therefore break through on the two flanks and swing in towards Huși, Vaslui and Comrat to encircle the Germans around Kishinev. "Not the capture of the capital but the encirclement and destruction of the German troops in the Kishinev area was the first operational and strategic task of the Soviet troops," Shtemenko writes. The timing was tight: to escape, the enemy had to cover 60 to 80 kilometres to the Prut crossings at Huși, the Soviets about 100, so they had to advance at least 25 kilometres a day. 3
By Shtemenko's figures the 3rd Ukrainian Front's overall superiority was a mere 1.2 to 1 in men and 1.4 to 1 in tanks; by stripping the secondary sectors it reached 6 to 1 in men and 5.4 to 1 in tanks on the main axis. When Malinovsky reported that he could mass 220 guns of 76 mm and above per kilometre on a 22-kilometre breakthrough front, Stalin said even that was too little, and the frontage was cut to 16 kilometres to give over 240 guns per kilometre. Stalin, Shtemenko relates, expected heavy blows against the Romanian positions to sway the royal government's policy and take Romania out of the war. The Stavka's joint directive to the two fronts was signed at 11 p.m. on 2 August. 3
The deception was thorough. Lieutenant General Nikolai Berzarin's 5th Shock Army made a show of preparing an attack at Șerpeni, radio traffic simulated a new army of several corps arriving for the 3rd Ukrainian Front, and columns of vehicles raised clouds of dust while dummy tanks and guns stood in the old positions. The German command read the Soviet movements as transfers to the north, and according to Romanian Wikipedia Friessner said as late as 18 August that he expected no major attack. When the two fronts made a reconnaissance in force on a broad front on 19 August, Friessner called that evening the commanders of the German 6th and 8th Armies and of the 4th Air Fleet; the Romanian commanders were not invited. Quoting Friessner's own memoir, Shtemenko notes that the same evening the Germans looked over a plan to withdraw the army group, "just in case". 3 5 12
How were the breakthrough and the encirclement carried out?
The bombardment opened at dawn on 20 August. Shtemenko gives 6.10 a.m. for the 2nd Ukrainian Front's artillery preparation and 8 a.m. for the 3rd; German Wikipedia says the 3rd Ukrainian Front fired for fifty minutes from about 4 a.m. and again from 7.45 to 9.30, with some 16,000 guns firing on the two fronts. North-west of Jassy Lieutenant General Sergei Trofimenko's 27th Army had broken 16 kilometres deep and crossed the Bahlui by noon, and Major General Andrei Kravchenko's 6th Tank Army entered the gap a day earlier than planned. In the south the 66th Rifle Corps overran the positions of the German 306th Infantry and Romanian 4th Mountain Divisions and beat off a counter-attack by the German 13th Panzer Division. By the end of the first day little was left of the Romanian 4th Mountain and 21st Infantry Divisions. 3 7 5
The 2nd Ukrainian Front was held up for a day before the third defence line on the wooded Mare ridge, because, Shtemenko writes, three divisions including the Romanian "Greater Romania" armoured division counter-attacked. Ion S. Dumitru, a tank commander in that division, recalled destroying sixty Soviet tanks for a loss of thirty near Podu Iloaiei on 20 August. At 3 p.m. on 21 August, when Shtemenko and Deputy Chief of the General Staff Aleksei Antonov reported in the Kremlin, Stalin studied the map and dictated a directive: "Now the main task of the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts is to close the ring of encirclement around the enemy in the Huși area as quickly as possible by the combined efforts of the two fronts." Of some 44 enemy divisions, he said, six were already beaten, while the fronts had 87, and they were not to scatter in pursuit of the Romanians towards Roman or Galați. Jassy fell at about that hour. 3 5
The Mare ridge gave way on the evening of 21 August. According to Russian Wikipedia, Friessner ordered a withdrawal behind the Prut that day without Hitler's consent; the Army High Command approved it only the next day, too late. On the night of 22 August the Danube Flotilla and a landing force of the 46th Army crossed the eleven-kilometre-wide Dniester estuary and took Akkerman (today Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi). That night Stalin signed the order for a victory salute but had it read on the radio at once and fired the next day; Shtemenko remembered this as "the only case in the whole war" when the announcement and the salute were almost a day apart. On 23 August the 18th Tank Corps reached Huși, the 7th Mechanised Corps the Prut crossings at Leușeni, and the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps Leova. 6 7 3
On 24 August the two fronts met, closing the ring round the German VII, XXXXIV, LII and XXX Corps, and Berzarin's 5th Shock Army took Kishinev (German Wikipedia gives 23 August). On 25 and 26 August the bulk of the German 6th Army, trapped between Kishinev and Lopușna, dissolved under constant shelling and air attack, and thousands tried to swim the Prut, whose bridges had been taken or destroyed. Two infantry division commanders fell trying to break out, and Georg-Wilhelm Postel, commanding XXX Corps, was captured. The pocket east of the Prut was cleared by 27 August and the groups that had crossed it by 29 August; most of some 10,000 men who slipped away to the south-west were caught by 4 September. Shtemenko writes that 18 of the 25 German divisions of Army Group South Ukraine were destroyed; Georgy Zhukov puts the figure at about 22 enemy divisions. 7 6 3 13
On the German side the defeat was long blamed on Romanian "betrayal", as in Heinz Guderian's 1952 memoir and Friessner's Betrayed Battles of 1956. The Soviet military historian Viktor Matsulenko's study of the fighting and the British researcher Mark Axworthy, however, find that Romanian units resisted in many places but lacked the anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to hold, and there are no Soviet reports of Romanian collaboration before 24 August. The greater reason why the German 6th Army and the Romanian 4th Army collapsed together was that horse-drawn infantry divisions could not withdraw in order under pursuit by mechanised forces; the only Romanian unit that kept its cohesion was the 1st Armoured Division, which had the mobility and anti-tank weapons to do so. Franz Josef Strauss, later a German politician, who served with the 13th Panzer Division, recalled that by the third day the division had ceased to exist as a tactical unit: "The enemy was everywhere." 5 12
What was being prepared in the royal palace in Bucharest?
Romania had been looking for a way out of the war since 1943. Antonescu let his diplomats sound out the Western Allies in Portugal and Switzerland, but when told that there could be no armistice without one with the Soviet Union first, he rejected the condition. Iuliu Maniu of the National Peasant Party and Dinu Brătianu of the National Liberal Party negotiated on their own, and Maniu's emissary Barbu Știrbey went to Cairo in March 1944. In Stockholm the Soviet envoy Alexandra Kollontai met the Romanian diplomat Frederic Nanu; according to Romanian Wikipedia, the Soviets threatened to resume the offensive in September if Romania went on fighting, and at Stalin's request the Allies made it a condition that the Communists be included in any new government. On 13 May the Soviet, British and American governments jointly warned Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Finland that unless they left the war now they would not escape responsibility. 14 1 3
In June the National Peasant, National Liberal, Social Democratic and Communist parties formed the National Democratic Bloc (Shtemenko dates it 20 June). The Communist Party was a small underground party, but it carried weight as the only group Stalin favoured; its two principal figures in the plot were Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu and Emil Bodnăraș. According to Silviu Brucan's memoir, cited by English Wikipedia, on the night of 13–14 June the two met General Constantin Sănătescu, General Gheorghe Mihail, Colonel Dumitru Dămăceanu and the king's advisers at a Communist safe house at 103 Calea Moșilor in Bucharest. The king's side proposed that he ask the German ambassador to replace Antonescu with a cabinet under Ion Gigurtu; the Communists proposed that the king summon Antonescu to the palace, demand an armistice and arrest him on the spot if he refused, and this plan was adopted. Shtemenko writes that the king's aide Colonel Emilian Ionescu had been working on the arrest since April, that the Communists gained the leading role in the military committee preparing the rising, and that the armed forces in Bucharest numbered a little over 8,000, including fifty patriotic combat detachments with 2,000 fighters. On 10 August the party got Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej out of the internment camp. 15 14 3
Hearing of the offensive on its first day, 20 August, King Michael I returned to Bucharest. At a meeting with officers in the palace's Casa Nouă, Dămăceanu, commanding the capital's garrison, said he needed five days to gather troops to seize key points, and 26 August was fixed as the date. On the evening of 21 August Maniu, Brătianu, the Social Democrat Titel Petrescu and Pătrășcanu agreed to the plan and approved a telegram asking the Allied command in Cairo to bomb German units north of the capital and the railway junctions on the borders at the same time. Meanwhile, Shtemenko writes, Antonescu twice visited Friessner's command post on 21 and 22 August, agreed on a withdrawal from Jassy and Kishinev to a line from the Carpathians through Focșani, Nămoloasa and Galați to the Danube delta, and promised to hand over all reserves in Bucharest. When word came on 22 August that Antonescu would leave the capital the next day, the king brought the date forward to the 23rd without time to consult the party leaders. 1 3
On 23 August the foreign minister Mihai Antonescu saw the king at 3.30 p.m. and Ion Antonescu at 4. After briefing on the front for more than an hour, Antonescu refused to take Romania out of the war, citing his "word as an officer" to Hitler. When the king spoke the agreed phrase, "If that is how things are, there is nothing more we can do," Colonel Ionescu and four soldiers came in and arrested both Antonescus. They were locked in the palace strongroom, and the ministers of war and the interior, the inspector-general of the gendarmerie and the capital's police prefect were summoned by telephone and arrested too. Sănătescu became prime minister, with each of the four parties supplying one minister without portfolio. The king recorded a speech before 8 p.m., and at 10 p.m. the radio announced the armistice and the change of sides. To the German ambassador Manfred von Killinger, who arrived at the palace about 9 p.m., the king said, to gain time, that Antonescu was free. After midnight the king and the queen mother left for Dobrița in Oltenia. The prisoners were handed to the Communist armed squad led by Bodnăraș and taken to a safe house in the Vatra Luminoasă quarter (shortly after 5 p.m. according to Shtemenko, towards morning according to Romanian Wikipedia). 1 15 3
Who had been the protagonist of 23 August later became a political question. Shtemenko's book follows the official Soviet and Romanian Communist narrative, presenting the day as a "popular armed uprising" led by the Communists, with the king and court following along to save the throne. Under the Communist regime 23 August became the national day, and under Nicolae Ceaușescu it was called the "Revolution of Social and National Liberation, Anti-Fascist and Anti-Imperialist". Romanian historians after 1989 conclude that the party was then a small illegal organisation whose chief contribution was to supply, at the right moment, the militia that guarded the prisoners, because the guards prepared by the king and Maniu could not be assembled in time, and that the party's exaggeration began in its newspapers of 24 August. Ana Pauker, back from Moscow, actually disliked the coup, according to the party leader Gheorghe Apostol: "Why was 23 August carried out? Without it the country would have been occupied by Soviet troops and the dictatorship of the proletariat installed from the start." Romanian politics after these days is followed in the event "Romania: From 23 August to the People's Republic". 3 1
How did the Germans strike back, and how did the Romanian army change sides?
Hitler ordered the "putsch" crushed, the king arrested and a pro-German government installed. General Alfred Gerstenberg, commanding the Luftwaffe air defences of the Ploiești oilfields, had already sent a motorised column towards Bucharest on the night of the 23rd, and fighting between German and Romanian troops began in the capital's northern outskirts on the morning of the 24th. The Luftwaffe bombed Bucharest from 23 to 26 August, wrecking part of the palace and the Casa Nouă. The Germans took Otopeni airfield but got no further; at the request of Romanian ground troops American bombers struck the Băneasa forest, by mistake hitting a company of Romanian paratroopers. Brandenburg special forces dropped on Boteni and Țăndărei airfields were overpowered, and a plan to rescue Antonescu entrusted to Otto Skorzeny came to nothing because nobody knew where he was. Gerstenberg surrendered on the 28th. On 25 August Romania declared war on Germany. 5 4 1 14
The Romanians secured Brașov and the Predeal pass on the 25th, cutting the most direct line of retreat for the Germans to the south, and took 9,000 prisoners at Giurgiu on the 26th. At Ploiești there were some 25,000 German troops, mostly anti-aircraft units; Shtemenko and English Wikipedia give the same figure. Shtemenko writes that the oil workers had guarded the installations since the night of the 24th, helped by General Constantin Vasiliu-Rășcanu's Romanian 5th Territorial Corps, and that at 5 p.m. on the 27th Malinovsky ordered Kravchenko into Bucharest and Ploiești, so that on the 29th Soviet tank troops, with the Romanian 18th Infantry Division, routed the Germans. English Wikipedia says the Romanian 5th Territorial Corps, by then 40,000 strong, drove the Germans into a pocket around Păulești north of Ploiești on the 30th, and that they surrendered on the 31st after a failed breakout, only about 2,000 escaping across the Carpathians. Between the 23rd and 31st the Romanian army took 56,000 German prisoners, later handed to the Soviets; about 5,000 Germans were killed, and Romanian casualties came to 8,600. 5 3
To the Soviets Romania was still an enemy until an armistice was signed. Shtemenko criticises the Romanian General Staff for ordering its units, even after the king's cease-fire, to fall back to the Focșani–Nămoloasa–Brăila line and resist disarmament, and for promising to let German troops pass westward if they did not interfere; the Stavka, he writes, told the fronts to treat Romanian troops "according to how they behave". On 25 August the Soviet government declared again that it had no intention of taking Romanian territory or changing the social order and would restore Romania's independence "together with the Romanians", and that Romanian troops fighting the Germans would not be disarmed. Yet on the 26th alone five Romanian divisions surrendered whole to the 2nd Ukrainian Front, and according to English Wikipedia between 114,000 and 160,000 Romanian soldiers who offered no resistance after the cease-fire were taken prisoner and marched to distant camps in the Soviet Union; survivors interviewed in a 2004 documentary said up to a third died on the way. Looting and rapes by Soviet soldiers were recorded from the first weeks of the occupation. 3 2
Shtemenko writes that on 27 August the king and Sănătescu accepted all the conditions of 12 April, but that on the 29th and 30th Romanian government representatives proposed to Soviet army commanders at several points that the advance stop on the line of the Eastern Carpathians and the Danube, and that Sănătescu asked the Western Allies to drop paratroopers on the capital. The Soviet advance did not stop. Soviet forward units reached Bucharest on 30 August, and on the 31st the 6th Tank Army and 53rd Army entered the city with the Tudor Vladimirescu Division, a volunteer division formed in the Soviet Union from Romanian prisoners, which English Wikipedia says marched in on the 29th. Antonescu and his ministers were handed over to the Soviets on Malinovsky's orders, on 31 August according to Romanian Wikipedia and on 1 September according to the English article on the coup. 3 2 16 1 15
What were the losses, and why do the figures differ?
The official Soviet count for 20–29 August is 13,197 killed and missing and 53,933 wounded and sick; Romanian Wikipedia adds 75 tanks and self-propelled guns, 108 guns and 111 aircraft lost. German Wikipedia cautions that these are only the figures that can be documented from official military records. The figure Shtemenko gives at the end of his chapter covers a different span: in all the fighting to liberate Romania in the summer and autumn of 1944, he writes, 69,000 Soviet soldiers died and more than 286,000 were wounded. 7 12 3
The German and Romanian side is less certain. Russian Wikipedia says 18 divisions were destroyed and 208,600 German and Romanian soldiers captured; English Wikipedia gives more than 115,000 prisoners. German Wikipedia puts German prisoners at 115,000, of whom 55,000 died before being moved to the Soviet Union, a death rate exceeded only at Stalingrad. The German Red Cross received 80,000 tracing requests for soldiers last heard of in Romania, and the German War Graves Commission reckons that 150,000 German soldiers died on the territory of today's Moldova between 1941 and 1945. German Wikipedia estimates German and Romanian dead, missing, wounded and captured together at 650,000; Romanian Wikipedia gives at least 200,000 Germans killed and missing and, for the Romanians, 8,305 killed, 24,989 wounded and 153,883 missing or captured. 6 5 7 12
The figures diverge because sources count different periods (20–29 August, up to 4 September when the groups that broke out to the south-west were caught, or the whole autumn campaign in Romania), because some include the Romanians and some do not, and because some count as prisoners the Romanian soldiers disarmed and taken away after the king's cease-fire of 23 August. Many of the Romanian prisoners were taken not in battle but after the armistice was proclaimed. Civilian losses appear in none of these counts: the Allied and German bombing of Bucharest, the bridges and railways over the Dniester blown up by the retreating German and Romanian troops, and the mass famine of 1946–47 in Moldavia, where drought met compulsory grain procurement, have to be counted separately. 2 4 6
What did the armistice lay down, and what became of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina?
The armistice was signed in Moscow on 12 September 1944: for the Allies by Malinovsky as representative of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, authorised by the three governments, and for Romania by Pătrășcanu, Dămăceanu, Știrbey and Gheorghe Popp. Article 3 gave Soviet and Allied forces free movement across Romania; Article 11 set reparations of 300 million dollars payable over six years in oil, grain, timber, ships and machinery; under Article 14 People's Tribunals to try war criminals were set up in Bucharest and Cluj. Article 18 placed the Allied Control Commission, which was to supervise the terms until the peace, under the "general direction and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command". Article 19 returned "Transylvania or the greater part of it" to Romania and declared the Vienna Award null and void. Romania recognised the Soviet border of 1940. The politics that unfolded under the armistice are covered in the event "Romania: From 23 August to the People's Republic". 2 15 1
After the victory Stalin proposed making Malinovsky and Tolbukhin Marshals of the Soviet Union, adding, as Shtemenko remembers it, that "front commanders who restore the state border of the USSR should be given this rank". Malinovsky became a marshal on 10 September and Tolbukhin on 12 September. Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina went back to the Soviet Union as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and part of Ukraine, and the armistice and the 1947 peace treaty confirmed the frontier of 1 January 1941. According to Russian Wikipedia, 256,800 inhabitants of the republic went to the front with the Red Army after the operation. Anatol Petrencu, president of the Historians' Association of Moldova, contends that the Soviets rounded up more than 170,000 Romanian soldiers left in the region and that many of the 40,000 held in a camp at Bălți died of hunger, cold, disease or execution. 3 17 6 5
Memory, too, divided. In Moldova and the breakaway Transnistria 24 August is a public holiday, Liberation Day, and the Eternity memorial complex in Chișinău and the monument at Chițcani, a mass grave of 1,495 soldiers, honour the Soviet victory; for the 75th anniversary in 2019 the pro-Russian president Igor Dodon hosted Russia's defence minister at the ceremonies. In Romania 23 August was celebrated until 1990 as Liberation from Fascist Occupation Day but was dropped as a national holiday after the fall of the Communist regime. The same operation is remembered on one side as liberation and on the other as the moment the territory taken in 1940 was lost again. 5 1
What did the operation open up in the Balkans and in the war as a whole?
Soviet military history calls the operation the "Jassy–Kishinev Cannae" and counts it among "Stalin's ten blows". The offensive front was 590 kilometres wide and 300–320 kilometres deep, the advance starting at 25 kilometres a day and reaching 30–35 after the breakthrough. The road opened at once. The 3rd Ukrainian Front entered Bulgaria in early September, and on 20 October the Red Army, together with the Yugoslav Partisans and Bulgarian troops, liberated Belgrade. German Army Groups E and F hurried out of Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia to avoid being cut off. Fighting broke out at once between Romania and Hungary over Northern Transylvania, and on 15 October the Hungarian regent Miklós Horthy tried to follow Romania's example and seek an armistice, but failed. Within a month Bulgaria and Finland had also changed sides and the Slovak National Uprising had begun. 6 5 15
The economic blow was heavy too. Albert Speer, Hitler's armaments minister, regarded Romania's defection as decisive because it cut off not only Romanian oil but also the route to Turkish chromium, and by the end of 1944 the Wehrmacht was short of fuel. English Wikipedia says the loss of Romanian oil led to Hitler's first admission that the war was lost. The Hungarian-American historian John Lukacs wrote that "in August 1944, the Rumanians executed the most successful coup d'etat during World War II", and Romanian historians claimed the switch shortened the war by six months. Because the heart of the country never became a battlefield, its economy survived largely intact. But its oil now flowed to the Soviet Union through reparations and joint Soviet–Romanian companies, and English Wikipedia observes that Romania had less power of refusal under Stalin than under Hitler. 15 5
Shtemenko also records the moment in late August and early September when the Stavka had to decide how to treat the king. When he and Antonov proposed resolute measures on the grounds that the court would become the centre of anti-Soviet forces, Stalin lit his pipe and said, roughly: "A foreign king is not our business." Tolerance towards him would help relations with the Allies, and the Romanian people would make up their own minds about the monarchy. The king, a keen pilot, was presented with a Po-2 aircraft in Stalin's name, and in 1945 he received the Soviet Order of Victory; on 30 December 1947 the same king was forced to abdicate and leave the country. The Soviet account of the 1970s, when Shtemenko wrote, holds that the Soviet offensive brought about the rising in Romania and liberated the country with the help of local insurgents; Romanian accounts hold that internal factors were decisive and external ones only gave support. 3 15 5
Consequences
Army Group South Ukraine lost 18 of its 25 German divisions (by Shtemenko's count), and Romania left the Axis to fight Germany and Hungary. The Soviet Union regained Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and the armistice brought 300 million dollars in reparations and an Allied Control Commission run by the Soviet command. The Red Army gained the road to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Hungary, and Germany lost Romanian oil. The politics that followed inside Romania are covered in "Romania: From 23 August to the People's Republic".
Timeline & Map
- 11944.04.02Soviet statement on Romania
At a press conference the Soviet government announced that the Red Army had crossed the Prut and declared that it had no aim of taking Romanian territory or changing the country's social order.
- 21944.04.08Attack towards Târgu Frumos
The 40th and 27th Armies of Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked towards Târgu Frumos; Soviet troops took the town on the 9th but were soon thrown out.
- 31944.05.02Second battle of Târgu Frumos
After an hour's bombardment two Soviet armies attacked again but were stopped by counter-attacks of the German Grossdeutschland and 24th Panzer Divisions.
- 41944.05.06Order to go over to the defensive
A Stavka directive confirmed the 2nd Ukrainian Front's switch to the defensive.
- 51944.06.20National Democratic Bloc formed
The National Peasant, National Liberal, Social Democratic and Communist parties formed the National Democratic Bloc against the Antonescu regime.
- 61944.07.31Stavka conference
The Stavka met Timoshenko and the two front commanders to discuss the plan to encircle the Germans at Kishinev from both flanks.
- 71944.08.02Stavka joint directive
At 11 p.m. the directive to the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts for an operation to destroy the enemy around Jassy, Kishinev and Bendery was signed.
- 81944.08.20The offensive opens
After a bombardment the two fronts attacked north-west of Jassy and from the Kitskany bridgehead, and the 6th Tank Army entered the gap on the first day.
- 91944.08.21Jassy falls; Stalin's directive
Jassy fell in the afternoon, and Stalin dictated a directive ordering the two fronts to close the ring round the Huși area quickly.
- 101944.08.23Arrest at the palace
King Michael I had Ion Antonescu arrested at the palace after he refused an armistice, and at 10 p.m. announced on the radio the armistice and the change of sides.
- 111944.08.24Ring closed; Kishinev taken
The two fronts met, closing the ring round the main body of the German 6th Army, and the 5th Shock Army took Kishinev.
- 121944.08.24German attack on Bucharest
The Luftwaffe bombed Bucharest and Gerstenberg's troops pushed into the northern outskirts, where Romanian troops stopped them.
- 131944.08.25Romania declares war on Germany
Romania declared war on Germany. The same day the Soviet government declared it would restore Romania's independence together with the Romanians.
- 141944.08.29Pocket cleared; battle for Ploiești
The clearing of the German pocket west of the Prut was completed. Soviet tank troops and Romanian units attacked the Germans at Ploiești, and a Black Sea Fleet landing force took Constanța.
- 151944.08.31Entry into Bucharest
The 6th Tank Army, the 53rd Army and the Tudor Vladimirescu Division entered Bucharest. The Germans trapped north of Ploiești surrendered after a failed breakout.
- 161944.09.12Moscow armistice
Malinovsky and the Romanian delegation signed the armistice; Romania accepted the 1940 border, 300 million dollars in reparations and the Allied Control Commission.
Related people 25
Soviet Union (Red Army and Black Sea Fleet)14
Implementers & commanders3
Coordinated the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts and was ordered to see that the directive of 21 August was carried out.
Commander of the 2nd Ukrainian FrontRodion Malinovsky1898–1967Led the main thrust from north-west of Jassy round to Huși and signed the armistice for the Allies on 12 September; made Marshal of the Soviet Union on 10 September.
Commander of the 3rd Ukrainian FrontFyodor Tolbukhin1894–1949Broke through between the Romanian 3rd Army and the German 6th Army from the Kitskany bridgehead, forming the southern arm of the encirclement; made Marshal of the Soviet Union on 12 September.
Participants10
Coordinated the two fronts' plans; first argued for a main blow towards Kishinev, then accepted the Kitskany plan on fresh intelligence, and left a detailed account in his memoirs.
Deputy Chief of the General StaffAleksei Antonov1896–1962Briefed Stalin daily with Shtemenko and proposed firm measures against the king, which were not accepted.
Chief of staff of the 2nd Ukrainian FrontMatvei Zakharov1898–1972Had begun the war in this region in 1941, knew it well and drew up the front's operational plan.
Chief of staff of the 3rd Ukrainian FrontSergei Biryuzov1904/1905–1964Headed the front staff that proposed the main blow from the Kitskany bridgehead.
Member of the 3rd Ukrainian Front's military councilAleksei Zheltov1904–1991Was summoned to the Stavka conference of 31 July.
Commander of the 6th Tank ArmyAndrei Kravchenko1899–1963Entered the gap on the first day and drove deep to the south; on 27 August was ordered into Bucharest and Ploiești.
Commander of the Black Sea FleetFilipp Oktyabrsky1899–1969Supported the 3rd Ukrainian Front's coastal flank and attacked Constanța.
Commander of the Danube FlotillaSergei Gorshkov1910–1988Crossed the Dniester estuary with the 46th Army and took Akkerman.
Commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front (until May 1944)Ivan Konev1897–1973Led the April attack towards Târgu Frumos and proposed going over to the defensive for a breathing space; his memoir gives no account of the defeat there.
Soviet envoy in SwedenAlexandra Kollontai1872–1952Negotiated with the Romanian diplomat Nanu in Stockholm.
Germany and the Antonescu regime4
Romania of 23 August (the king and the National Democratic Bloc)7
Participants5
Sent Știrbey to negotiate with the Allies in Cairo and, as part of the National Democratic Bloc, agreed to the plan.
Emissary in the Cairo talksBarbu Știrbey1872–1946Contacted the Allies in Cairo in the spring of 1944 and signed the armistice on 12 September.
Communist Party representativeLucrețiu Pătrășcanu1900–1954Planned the arrest with the king's men together with Bodnăraș, was the only party leader to reach the palace on 23 August and became minister without portfolio; signed the armistice.
Commander of the Bucharest garrisonDumitru Dămăceanu1896–1978Said he needed five days to gather troops, so the coup was first set for the 26th; ran the military action in the capital on the 23rd and signed the armistice.
Communist leaderGheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej1901–1965Escaped from the internment camp with the party's help on 10 August.
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17