1945.02.10–04.04

The East Pomeranian Offensive of 1945

Why did the Red Army attack Eastern Pomerania before Berlin in February–April 1945, and how did the fronts of Rokossovsky and Zhukov split German Army Group Vistula, reach the Baltic and take Kolberg, Gdynia and Danzig? What did refugees and the remaining inhabitants go through, and how did the land become Polish?

In February 1945 Pomerania, held by Himmler's Army Group Vistula, hung over the northern flank of Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front on the Oder. Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front attacked on 10 February but stalled for lack of troops, and the German Operation Solstice soon failed as well. The Stavka postponed the attack on Berlin and sent both fronts north to the sea. The offensives of 24 February and 1 March split the Germans at Köslin on 5 March; the Polish 1st Army took Kolberg on 18 March, Gdynia fell on 28 March and Danzig on the 30th. Hundreds of thousands fled by sea; the Germans who remained were expelled after the war, and the land became part of Poland.

GermanyPolandSoviet UnionWhere was Eastern Pomerania, and why did it matter in February 1945?

Pomerania (Polish: Pomorze) is the low country along the Baltic between the Oder and the Vistula. In 1945 it came in two parts. The larger western part had for centuries been the German (Prussian) Province of Pomerania, with towns such as Stettin (today Szczecin), Kolberg (Kołobrzeg), Köslin (Koszalin) and Stolp (Słupsk). The eastern end towards the Vistula mouth, called Pomerelia or Gdańsk Pomerania, became Poland's Pomeranian Voivodeship after the First World War. Between them the port of Danzig (today Gdańsk) was a Free City under League of Nations protection from 1920, and to avoid depending on it Poland built a new port at the fishing village of Gdynia in the 1920s. Gdynia received town rights in 1926 and by 1938 was the largest and most modern port on the Baltic. 1 2 3

After invading Poland in September 1939, Germany annexed the Free City of Danzig and Poland's Pomeranian Voivodeship on 8 October and joined them as the Reichsgau Danzig-West Prussia. Its Gauleiter, Albert Forster, held that Poles and Jews were not human and said, "We have to exterminate this nation, starting from the cradle." In the first months of occupation tens of thousands were killed in executions such as the massacres in the Piaśnica forest, and some 50,000 Poles were expelled from Gdynia alone. The Germans called Gdynia Gotenhafen and turned it into a naval base. Pomerania in 1945 therefore held both old German land and Polish land that Germany had seized in 1939 and emptied of Poles. 1 3 4

In the Vistula–Oder offensive of January 1945, the armies of Zhukov (commander of the 1st Belorussian Front) reached the Oder at the start of February and seized bridgeheads on its west bank near Küstrin (today Kostrzyn). Berlin was only 60 kilometres away. But the further Zhukov's armies stretched west, the more their northern flank lay open. On the map, German-held Pomerania hung over the right shoulder of Zhukov's armies on the Oder like a balcony, and a blow southward from it could cut off the Soviet forces in front of Berlin. Rokossovsky too wrote in his memoir that the main body of the 1st Belorussian Front, already fighting for the Oder bridgeheads, was only weakly screened to the north, towards Eastern Pomerania. The Soviet high command, the Stavka, noted with concern that while the Germans had placed thirteen divisions between the Soviet forces and Berlin, they had concentrated thirty-three in Pomerania. 5 6 7 8

To hold this ground Germany created Army Group Vistula on 24 January 1945. It took in the 2nd Army, cut off from East Prussia, the 9th Army, shattered in front of Warsaw, and the 11th (SS Panzer) Army newly assembled in Pomerania. The army chief of staff Heinz Guderian wanted an experienced field commander, but Hitler gave the army group to Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler. Himmler, who had no military experience, ran it from his special train at Schneidemühl (today Piła), which had a single telephone line and lacked proper maps and a signals detachment. 9 10 11

Soviet UnionGermanyWhy did Rokossovsky's front turn into East Prussia rather than Pomerania in January?

A Stavka directive of 28 November 1944 ordered Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front to advance from the Różan bridgehead on the Narew through Mława towards Marienburg (today Malbork). Rokossovsky stresses in his memoir that both this directive and Stalin's personal instructions aimed at close cooperation with the 1st Belorussian Front: his front's original task was to move west along the north side of the Vistula and guard the right of Zhukov's drive on Berlin. The attack opened on 14 January 1945, and three days later Vasily Volsky's 5th Guards Tank Army entered the breach. The January campaign as a whole is covered under the East Prussian Offensive of 1945 and the Fall of Königsberg. 7 12

On 20 January, as his troops neared the Vistula and prepared to cross, the Stavka ordered the 3rd, 48th, 2nd Shock and 5th Guards Tank Armies to turn north and north-east against the German forces in East Prussia, changing the plan because the 3rd Belorussian Front attacking East Prussia from the east had fallen behind. Rokossovsky wrote that "this order was completely unexpected for us." In the main text of the 1988 edition he presents the turn as a sign of the Stavka's flexibility, but in passages cut by the censors from the first edition and restored in the 1997 edition he does not hide his criticism: having diverted his main forces, the Stavka should at once have reinforced him with at least two armies and several tank or mechanised corps; then the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front would not have been left hanging in the air, and "the fall of Berlin would have come considerably sooner." 7 12

Zhukov too describes this gap in his memoir, Reminiscences and Reflections. On 25 January Stalin warned that by pushing on to the Oder he would open a gap of more than 150 kilometres to the flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front, and told him to wait about ten days until that front had finished in East Prussia and regrouped across the Vistula. Zhukov asked not to be halted, saying one more army would be enough to cover his right; Stalin in the end let him go on but refused extra forces. On 31 January Zhukov reported that the left wing of the 2nd Belorussian Front had fallen so far behind that his own front now stretched 500 kilometres, and asked for Rokossovsky's 70th Army to be sent west, but, he writes, no quick answer came. 34

Seen from the other side, the memoir of Vasilevsky (then Chief of the General Staff) admits part of the fault. He wrote that failing to stop the main forces of the German 2nd Army from withdrawing across the Vistula into Eastern Pomerania was a fair reproach to the Stavka and the General Staff. But he rejected the charges that the Stavka had made no effort to speed up the operation, or had from the start left East Prussia to the 3rd Belorussian Front alone. The German 2nd Army that escaped in this way was the force that would later block Rokossovsky in Eastern Pomerania. 13

On 25–26 January the 5th Guards Tank Army reached the Vistula Lagoon (Frisches Haff) near Tolkemit (today Tolkmicko), cutting East Prussia off from Germany. From then on Rokossovsky's front had to fight in two directions. On the night of 27 January, in a blizzard, seven German infantry divisions and a panzer division from the Heilsberg area tried to break through to Elbing (today Elbląg) and pushed the 48th Army back about twenty kilometres; Rokossovsky turned his tank army and cavalry corps to stop them. To the south, more than 30,000 Germans trapped in the fortress town of Thorn (today Toruń) on the Vistula broke out towards Graudenz (today Grudziądz). According to the memoir, headquarters had put the Thorn garrison at about 5,000 and blockaded it with a single division. 7

On 10 February the Stavka transferred the 50th, 3rd and 48th Armies and the 5th Guards Tank Army to the 3rd Belorussian Front and ordered the 2nd Belorussian Front to resume its original task westward towards Bublitz (today Bobolice). Rokossovsky wrote that the decision was right in itself, since with East Prussia cut off one front was enough there, but complained that in an already difficult position he had lost half his forces at a stroke, including his tank army. Between 13 January and 10 February the front had indeed lost 159,490 men (18 per cent of its assigned strength); by early February its rifle divisions were down to 3,000–4,000 men each, and the whole front had only 297 worn tanks. 7 8

Soviet UnionGermanyWhy did the first February attack stall, and what was the German Operation Solstice?

On 8 February the Stavka directed the 2nd Belorussian Front to destroy the German forces in Eastern Pomerania, take the Danzig–Gdynia area and clear the coast from the mouth of the Vistula to the Oder. On 10 February Rokossovsky attacked from the line Graudenz–Zempelburg (today Sępólno Krajeńskie). On 15 February his troops took the key junction of Konitz (today Chojnice) and Tuchel (Tuchola), but the advance was slow. Rokossovsky's memoir and Polish Wikipedia give an advance of 15–40 kilometres by 19 February (Russian Wikipedia says 50–70), and on that day Rokossovsky halted the offensive on the line Mewe (Gniew)–Czersk–Konitz. 5 14 15

In his memoir Rokossovsky named the shortage of troops as the main cause. The country of forests, marshes and lakes linked by canals favoured the defence, and the thaw turned roads to mud. After a month of continuous fighting his units were so depleted that he could not create even a brief superiority anywhere, and the further they advanced the wider the front became, until his troops were "stretched into a thread." Graudenz was fully surrounded on 18 February, but its fortress garrison (about 10,000 according to Polish Wikipedia, 15,000 according to prisoners cited in the memoir) held out until 6 March. As early as 13 February German intelligence concluded that the Soviets would clear Pomerania before advancing on Berlin; the German 2nd Army asked to withdraw, but Hitler refused. 7 16 14

Meanwhile the Germans prepared a counter-stroke from Pomerania. Guderian originally wanted to attack simultaneously from Stargard in the north and from Glogau and Guben in the south to cut off Zhukov's spearheads on the Oder, using troops withdrawn from the Courland Pocket and the 6th SS Panzer Army earmarked for Hungary. Hitler refused, insisting on holding Courland and continuing in Hungary, and the meeting degenerated into a shouting match. They settled on a smaller attack, and Guderian persuaded Hitler to give its command to General Walther Wenck instead of Himmler. The Wehrmacht wanted to call it "Hussar Ride", but the SS insisted on the name Operation Solstice (Unternehmen Sonnenwende). 8 17 11

On 15 February the SS division Nordland of Felix Steiner's 11th SS Panzer Army struck first and relieved the encircled German garrison of Arnswalde (today Choszczno); on the 16th the general attack began and pushed the Soviet 47th Army back eight to twelve kilometres. But only three days' ammunition and fuel were on hand, and the Germans bogged down in rain and mud against minefields and anti-tank defences. On the night of 17 February Wenck, driving himself back from Berlin, fell asleep at the wheel and was badly injured, and that day Zhukov threw the 3rd Shock Army into a counter-attack. Army Group Vistula called the operation off on 18 February. 8 6 17

Operation Solstice failed. On 21 February the German command withdrew the headquarters of the XXXIX Panzer Corps and several of its best divisions westward behind Army Group Centre, all but ensuring that Eastern Pomerania would be lost. Yet the attack showed the Soviet command that the threat from Pomerania was real. The Stavka put off the attack on Berlin, planned for February, until April and resolved to clear Pomerania first. 8 16

GermanyHow have the Courland dispute and the quarrel in the Reich Chancellery on 13 February come down to us?

Heinz Guderian, acting Chief of the German Army General Staff, described the meetings of early February at length in his 1951 memoir, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Panzer Leader). Most of the detail of these scenes comes from his account, in which he presents himself as the rational soldier standing up to Hitler. By his account, in early February, just after the Japanese ambassador Hiroshi Ōshima had called on Hitler, he proposed pulling troops out of the Balkans, Italy, Norway and above all Courland to strike both flanks of the Soviet wedge that had reached the Oder. At that time twenty infantry and two panzer divisions were holding the northern part of the Courland peninsula. When Guderian said, "I am doing this only for Germany," Hitler, the whole left side of his body trembling, shouted, "How dare you? Do you think I am not fighting for Germany?", and Hermann Göring took him by the sleeve into the next room for a cup of coffee. Called back in, Guderian repeated the demand; Hitler stood before him with raised fists, and Wolfgang Thomale, chief of staff of the Inspectorate of Panzer Troops, pulled him back by the skirt of his tunic for fear of a scuffle, Guderian wrote. Hitler allowed only four infantry divisions and one panzer division to leave Courland. English Wikipedia writes that Hitler thought Courland necessary to protect the German submarine bases on the Baltic coast, and German Wikipedia that Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz promised to keep it supplied by sea. Army Group Courland stayed there until Germany's surrender on 8 May, and by 12 May some 135,000 men had surrendered. 37 39 40

The decisive meeting took place in the Reich Chancellery on 13 February. Present were Himmler as commander of Army Group Vistula, Sepp Dietrich of the 6th SS Panzer Army and Walther Wenck, head of the General Staff's operations staff. Guderian argued that, by the reckoning of Foreign Armies East, the Soviets could bring up to four divisions a day to the Oder, so the attack had to start on 15 February, and that Wenck, not the inexperienced Himmler, had to direct it. Himmler wanted to wait until the last ammunition and fuel had arrived. According to the memoir, for nearly two hours Hitler shouted, over and over, "I forbid you to accuse me of wanting to wait!" and "I forbid you to tell me that the Reichsführer is incapable of performing his duties!", while Guderian kept his eyes on Lenbach's portrait of Bismarck above the fireplace and repeated his demands. Then Hitler suddenly told Himmler that Wenck would arrive at his headquarters that night and take over the attack, and said to Guderian with a smile: "Today the General Staff has won a battle." Afterwards Wilhelm Keitel reproached him for contradicting the Führer when he might have a stroke. 37

What other sources confirm is the outcome. English Wikipedia's article on Wenck writes that on 13 February, after a long argument, Guderian persuaded Hitler to make Wenck chief of staff of Army Group Vistula under Himmler with the power to launch the attack; its article on Operation Solstice says only that the meeting degenerated into a heated and farcical argument. The words and gestures rest on Guderian's account alone. He had wanted a two-pronged attack drawing on the forces in Courland and Hungary; the attack actually made was a small one from Pomerania only. Guderian blames its failure on Wenck's car accident, saying it was going well on 16 and 17 February, but, as shown above, there was fuel and ammunition for only three days and the attack was already stuck in mud and Soviet defences. Wenck's place was taken by Hans Krebs, until then chief of staff of Army Group B. 38 8 37

German intelligence missed the turn as well. According to German Wikipedia's article on Foreign Armies East, Gehlen's branch entirely missed the signs of the Soviet East Pomeranian offensive that opened on 24 February. It expected the Red Army to turn straight on Berlin, failed to spot the newly arrived Soviet 19th Army in time, and clung to its view for several days until the Soviets reached the sea near Kolberg at the beginning of March. On 7 March Gehlen had to explain the misjudgement to Guderian; he claimed the Soviets had decided on the Pomeranian attack on the spur of the moment, an excuse the article finds at odds with the facts. The failure is counted as the decisive break in Hitler's trust in Gehlen, who was removed as head of the branch on 9 April. In mid-March Guderian visited Army Group Vistula's headquarters at Prenzlau, where its chief of staff, the SS general Heinz Lammerding, greeted him with "Can't you rid us of our commander?"; he then persuaded Himmler, who was nursing a cold at the Hohenlychen sanatorium, to give up the command, he wrote. The successor, appointed on 20 March, was Gotthard Heinrici. 41 37

Soviet UnionWhy did the Stavka take Pomerania before Berlin, and how has that choice been judged?

On 31 January the Soviet advance on the Oder was halted by choice. According to the Russian military historian Alexei Isaev, interviewed by Lenta.ru in 2025, there were voices in the Stavka and among Zhukov's generals for pressing on to Berlin instead of stopping at the Oder, but Zhukov considered it a gamble that could end in disaster. After the war the decision became the subject of a public dispute, mainly between Chuikov (commander of the 8th Guards Army) and Zhukov. 18 19

Chuikov argued that the 1st Belorussian Front should have driven straight on to Berlin in February and taken it, which would have brought the war to an earlier end, and that Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front alone could have dealt with the German counter-stroke from Pomerania. Zhukov answered in his memoir, Reminiscences and Reflections, quoting Chuikov's memoir directly. He granted that the Germans before Berlin were weak in early February. On 26 January the front had proposed to cross the Oder on the move and strike at Berlin by going round it from the north, the Stavka had approved this the next day, and in early February the armies were even sent a planning estimate "to take Berlin in a swift dash on 15-16 February". But from the beginning of February the danger grew of a counter-stroke from Eastern Pomerania into the flank and rear of the main forces that had pushed on to the Oder, for which he cites Keitel's interrogation and Guderian's memoirs. By Zhukov's account only four under-strength armies were left on the Berlin axis in early February: the 5th Shock, half the 8th Guards, the 69th and the 33rd. Rifle divisions were down to about 5,500 men on average and the two tank armies had 740 tanks between them. After an advance of more than 500 kilometres in twenty days the rear had fallen behind and fuel above all was short, while rain had turned the field airfields to mud so that the air force could not move forward. Since Chuikov himself admitted that supply had broken down and the aviation and bridging units had fallen behind, Zhukov wrote, a decisive attack on Berlin in such conditions would have been "a pure gamble". "The experience of war shows that one must take risks, but must not overreach," he added, citing the Red Army's unsupported advance on Warsaw in 1920, which ended in heavy defeat. Chuikov had written that on 4 February, while the army commanders were planning the attack on Berlin at the headquarters of the 69th Army, a call from Stalin stopped the planning; Zhukov replied that no such meeting or call took place, that he himself was at the headquarters of the 61st Army on 4-5 February and that Chuikov was in Poznań on the 3rd. 34 18

Chuikov's own text differs from edition to edition. What Zhukov quoted and rebutted were the reminiscences Chuikov published in the mid-1960s in the magazine Oktyabr and the journal Novaya i noveishaya istoriya (no. 2, 1965), and Zhukov noted that several military specialists had replied in the Military History Journal (nos. 3 and 4, 1965). Chuikov's memoir published as a book in 1973, The End of the Third Reich, contains neither the claim that Berlin could have been taken in February nor the story of the 4 February meeting at the 69th Army's headquarters and Stalin's call. In this edition Chuikov quotes the front's plans of 26-28 January and the front directive of 4 February "to take Berlin in a swift dash on 15-16 February", and writes that the storming of Poznań dragged on for a month instead of the few days planned and that, above all because motor transport could not keep up, the artillery, engineers and aviation fell behind. He then quotes the passage of Zhukov's Reminiscences and Reflections on the danger of a counter-stroke from Eastern Pomerania and records, without criticism, that the Stavka decided to deal with the German forces in Pomerania before the decisive offensive on Berlin. 35 36

Isaev sides with Zhukov: Berlin could not be attacked while the stretched right flank lay open to a blow from the north. He also points to something Chuikov passed over, namely that Chuikov's 8th Guards Army was tied down for nearly a month, until 23 February, storming Poznań, the junction through which the main road to Berlin ran. English Wikipedia sums up the dispute as two positions: one holds that there was a chance to take Berlin much sooner and at lower cost in February; the other that leaving large German forces on the flank could have allowed a successful German counter-attack and prolonged the war. It adds that the delay let the Soviets occupy much of Austria in the Vienna offensive in the meantime. 19 16

In passages restored in the 1997 edition Rokossovsky offers a third view. He located the problem less in the halt before Berlin than in the allocation of forces: once East Prussia was cut off from the west, the destruction of the isolated Germans there could have waited, and the weakened 2nd Belorussian Front could have been reinforced to hasten the decision on the Berlin axis. Instead, he wrote, ten armies were tied up at the decisive moment against an enemy cut off far from the main theatre, while his own front, which had to defeat the Germans in Eastern Pomerania, could not do so with the forces left to it. This too is Rokossovsky's own judgement, at odds with Vasilevsky's account of the forces committed to East Prussia. 15 7

The actual plan was redrawn in mid-February. According to Rokossovsky's memoir, Vasilevsky called him on the high-frequency line to say that Zhukov intended to attack the German forces in Eastern Pomerania and asked his view; Rokossovsky answered that both fronts should strike north to the sea simultaneously from their adjoining wings and cut the German grouping in two. The Stavka fixed the plan along these lines on 17 and 22 February: the two fronts would attack north together towards Kolberg, and on reaching the sea the 2nd Belorussian Front would wheel east against Danzig and Gdynia while the 1st Belorussian Front wheeled west to the Oder. The boundary ran from Linde through Neustettin (today Szczecinek) to Kolberg. 15 14

Rokossovsky was to attack on his left wing on 24 February with the 19th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Corps from the Stavka reserve. They arrived barely in time and had almost no time to prepare. The memoir also describes the strain on the rear services: the front's rear area was 300 kilometres deep, rail freight had to be transshipped where the Soviet broad gauge met the Western European gauge, and pipelines were laid across the bridgeless Vistula to bring up fuel. 15

Soviet UnionGermanyHow did the offensive renewed on 24 February reach the sea at Köslin?

The Germans attacked first, all along the front, on 22 February. Rokossovsky wrote that he was rather glad they spent their strength away from the sector where he was preparing his main blow. On the morning of 24 February, after a forty-minute bombardment, the 19th Army attacked south-west of Chojnice and advanced 10–12 kilometres on the first day. The next day Rokossovsky committed Aleksei Panfilov's 3rd Guards Tank Corps ahead of schedule. The tank corps outran the infantry, covered 40 kilometres in a day and took Baldenburg (Biały Bór) on the morning of 26 February. 15 14 5

The infantry advanced only 25 kilometres in two days. Rokossovsky wrote in his memoir that the 19th Army's commander kept losing touch with his formations and was slow to decide, and that with the Supreme Commander's sanction he replaced him with Vladimir Romanovsky; English Wikipedia likewise records that on 26 February Rokossovsky relieved the original commander, Georgy Kozlov. By now Rokossovsky had committed everything. "For the first time in the war I, a front commander, was left without reserves," he wrote. 15 16

The further north he went, the more his left flank lay open: the neighbouring 1st Belorussian Front had not yet moved, and Neustettin, west of the boundary, was full of German troops. By Rokossovsky's account, when he reported this to the Stavka, Stalin called him on the high-frequency line and asked, "What, is Zhukov being cunning?" Rokossovsky replied that he did not think Zhukov was being cunning but that his troops were not attacking and this endangered the open flank, and asked either for reinforcements or for the 1st Belorussian Front to be made to attack sooner. Stalin offered a salute if Rokossovsky's troops took Neustettin and promised to hurry the neighbouring front. The conversation is known only from Rokossovsky's memoir. 15

Nikolai Oslikovsky's 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps enveloped Neustettin from the flanks and rear and took it (on 28 February according to Russian Wikipedia, the 27th according to English Wikipedia), and Moscow fired the promised salute. According to the memoir, the cavalry scouts met scouts of the 1st Belorussian Front's 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps west of Neustettin; that corps had been ordered on 26 February to advance north to cover Rokossovsky's flank, and Rokossovsky remarks that his talk with Stalin seems to have had an effect. Meanwhile the German 2nd Army commander, Walter Weiß, gathered the VII Panzer Corps at Rummelsburg (Miastko) to strike the 19th Army's flank, but was held off. 15 5 16

Zhukov's right wing (the 3rd Shock and 61st Armies, the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies and the Polish 1st Army) attacked on 1 March. With the Germans out of reserves, the breakthrough was swift. Schivelbein (Świdwin) fell on 3 March, and on 4 March Colonel Morgunov's 45th Guards Tank Brigade of Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army reached Kolberg and tried in vain to take it on the move. By 5 March the 1st Guards Tank Army had reached the coast near Mrzeżyno, and the 2nd Guards Tank Army took Naugard (Nowogard) on 5 March and Cammin (Kamień Pomorski) on the 6th. The German X SS Corps, trapped between the two fronts, was destroyed within three days, while General von Tettau's corps group, taking some 40,000 civilians with it, fought its way to the coast as a moving pocket and was ferried to the island of Wollin on 11–12 March. 5 14 20 6

On Rokossovsky's side, Panfilov's tank corps reached the outskirts of Köslin (Koszalin) and the coast to the east between Lakes Jamno and Bukowo on 3 March (Polish Wikipedia). By Rokossovsky's account Panfilov assured him that with infantry at his side he had the strength to storm the town, and on the morning of 5 March the Köslin garrison surrendered, its commander Lieutenant-General von Zielow and his staff taken prisoner. German Wikipedia says that the same day the 8th Guards Mechanised Corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army took Belgard (Białogard) and Köslin, so the records of both fronts claim the town. Either way the German forces were split in two, and the German 2nd Army in the east was cut off from the rest of its army group. Rokossovsky recalled that the tank crews sent the front's Military Council three bottles of Baltic seawater as a present. 14 15 6 16

PolandSoviet UnionGermanyHow did the Polish 1st Army fight on the Pomeranian Wall and at Kolberg?

The Polish 1st Army grew out of Polish units formed in the Soviet Union and was constituted by decree of the State National Council in July 1944. It was the army of the new Soviet-backed Polish government (often called the Polish People's Army): organisationally under the Polish high command, but operationally under the commanders of Red Army fronts. From January 1945 it was led by Stanislav Poplavsky, a Polish-born general from the Red Army. After taking part in the liberation of Warsaw in January it marched along the left bank of the Vistula to Bromberg (Bydgoszcz), covering the junction of the two Belorussian fronts, and from 29 January it guarded the northern flank as part of the 1st Belorussian Front's first echelon. 21 22

In front of it lay the Pomeranian Wall (Polish Wał Pomorski, German Pommernstellung), a fortified line Germany had built along the old German–Polish border from 1932. Some 275 kilometres long with about 900 reinforced-concrete shelters, it ran from Ustka through Słupsk, Szczecinek and Wałcz to the Noteć. In the fighting to break through it between 30 January and 11 February the Polish 1st Army lost 1,780 killed, 2,767 wounded and 1,055 missing. On 10 February it took Mirosławiec, breaching the defences to a depth of 30 kilometres. Russian Wikipedia calls the breaching of the Pomeranian Wall the largest battle of the Second World War with Polish troops, with 85,000 men of the Polish 1st Army taking part. 22 5

On 1 March the Polish 1st Army attacked alongside Zhukov's offensive, at first without much success. When the neighbouring 3rd Shock Army broke through, the Germans fell back, and the Poles pursued them, taking Drawsko Pomorskie, Złocieniec and Czaplinek by 5 March and then helping Soviet troops destroy the German X SS Corps around Świdwin and Połczyn-Zdrój. On 6 March the Soviet command decided to hand the siege of Kolberg to the Polish forces. 14 23

Kolberg (Kołobrzeg) was declared Festung Kolberg on 4 March. Its commander, Colonel Fritz Fullriede, had been put in charge at Goebbels's request to protect the image of the Nazi propaganda film Kolberg, released in January, which depicted the town's defence against Napoleon in 1807. The defenders, including the Volkssturm, are estimated at 8,000–15,000, among them parts of the French SS division Charlemagne and a Latvian SS division. The town was full of refugees from all over Pomerania, and the pocket battleships Lützow and Admiral Scheer supported the defenders with gunfire from the sea. 23 20

The Polish 6th, 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions went in one after another and fought in the streets from 7 March. On 14 March the Germans rejected a Polish call to surrender, and on the 15th reinforcements even arrived by sea from Swinemünde (today Świnoujście). But the German aim was less to hold the town than to get refugees and soldiers away by sea: meanwhile some 70,000 inhabitants and refugees from the surrounding area and 40,000 soldiers were evacuated from Kolberg, and on the night of 17–18 March most of the last defenders also left. On 18 March the Poles took the town. They lost 1,206 killed and missing and 2,500–3,000 wounded, and more than 80 per cent of the town was destroyed. 23 20

On 18 March Polish soldiers held a "Wedding to the Sea" on the beach at Kolberg, repeating the ceremony General Józef Haller's Polish army had first performed in 1920 when Poland gained its access to the sea. On 6 April a similar ceremony was held in liberated Gdynia by the Polish 1st Armoured Brigade, a naval battalion and civilian officials. In the west, the 1st Belorussian Front eliminated the last German bridgehead east of the Oder, at Altdamm (Dąbie), on 20–21 March, and the German 3rd Panzer Army fell back across the river. At about the same time Hitler removed Himmler from command of Army Group Vistula and replaced him with General Gotthard Heinrici (on 20 March according to English Wikipedia, the 21st according to German Wikipedia). 23 6 14

Soviet UnionPolandGermanyHow were Gdynia and Danzig taken?

After reaching the sea Rokossovsky turned his main forces east. Short of mobile troops, he asked Stalin to lend him one of the 1st Belorussian Front's tank armies for a time; Stalin agreed at once, and from 8 March Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army came under his command, together with the Polish 1st Armoured Brigade. By Rokossovsky's account Zhukov rang him to insist, "The army must be returned in exactly the same composition in which it leaves for you!", and Rokossovsky promised, asking in turn that it be sent fit for battle. 15 24 25

The advance now quickened. On 6 March the 2nd Shock Army at last took Graudenz. According to the memoir, Panfilov's tank corps took a day to circle Stolp (Słupsk) by forest roads and strike it from the flanks and rear; Stolp fell on 8 March. On 8–9 March the front advanced 20–60 kilometres and took more than 700 villages. Lauenburg (Lębork) and Karthaus (Kartuzy) fell on 10 March, Dirschau (Tczew) on 11–12 March, and Neustadt (Wejherowo) and Putzig (Puck) on 12 March, as Soviet troops reached the shore of the Bay of Danzig. The fortress of Marienburg surrendered on 17 March. 15 5 14

The German 2nd Army fell back into the prepared Gotenhafen (Gdynia)–Danzig fortified area. In mid-March some 200,000 German troops were there, supported by the guns of battleships, cruisers and other warships, and about a million refugees from East Prussia and the Danzig region had crowded in. One reason the Germans held the area was to win time to evacuate them by sea. The 2nd Army commander Walter Weiß, who had warned that the Elbing pocket could not be held, was relieved, and General Dietrich von Saucken took over the 2nd Army with orders to keep the evacuation routes open as long as possible. Rokossovsky wrote that the front, 240 kilometres wide at the start of the offensive, had now narrowed to 60, so each army could concentrate on a strip only 10–12 kilometres wide. 14 15 16

The assault began on 14 March. The main blow aimed to drive a wedge towards Zoppot (Sopot), between the two fortresses. According to the memoir, the 4th Air Army destroyed every German aircraft on the Danzig airfield on the first day and drove the German warships from the bay by bombing. The fighting was positional, with gains of a few hundred metres a day. On 22 March the 70th Army reached the shore between Sopot and Orłowo, splitting the Germans in Gdynia from those in Danzig. German Wikipedia dates the fall of Sopot itself to 23 March, Rokossovsky's memoir and Polish Wikipedia to 25 March. 15 14 6 25

Gdynia was attacked by the 19th Army, the 3rd Guards Tank Corps and the Polish 1st Armoured Brigade. The assault began on 26 March, and on 28 March the town and port were taken. The Germans withdrew north to the Oksywie heights (Oxhöfter Kämpe) and held out until 4–5 April, when more than 30,000 were ferried to the Hel peninsula in small boats and landing craft. By the Soviet count in Russian Wikipedia, the Germans lost 50,000 killed and 18,985 captured around Gdynia, and the disabled old battleships Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein and the hulk of the battleship Gneisenau were taken in the harbour. These figures are Soviet claims. 5 14 24 4

Danzig was a fortress ringed by old ramparts, modern forts and low ground to the south-east that could be flooded. According to Polish accounts, on 24 March Rokossovsky called on the garrison to surrender to avoid pointless losses and received no answer (the memoir places the ultimatum after the approach to the city on 26 March). On 27 March the 2nd Shock Army, the 65th Army and others began a concentric assault from three sides, fighting for every house. An infantry battalion and a tank platoon of the Polish 1st Armoured Brigade fought in the west of the city and on 28 March raised the Polish flag on the Artus Court in the old centre. By 30 March the city and port were in Soviet hands; only Westerplatte held out until 7 April. The remaining Germans fell back into the marshy Vistula delta. 26 14 15 24

The city was all but destroyed. On 19 and 20 March Soviet aircraft dropped incendiaries on the centre, setting the Old and Main Towns ablaze, and fires continued after the fighting ended. 12,655 buildings in Danzig (55 per cent) were destroyed; the historic districts were 90 per cent destroyed, leaving barely forty residential buildings standing in the Main Town, and only 7 of 87 harbour installations survived. More than 3,000 Soviet soldiers died in the assault, among them General Sabir Rakhimov of the 37th Guards Rifle Division; the Poles lost 88 killed and 193 wounded. The Germans left on the Hel peninsula and in the Vistula delta held out to the end and surrendered on 9 May 1945. 26 27 14

GermanySoviet UnionHow did the refugees escape by sea?

The speed of the Soviet advance took Pomerania's German inhabitants by surprise. Gauleiter Franz Schwede-Coburg predicted a turn in the war to the very end, issued evacuation orders much too late or not at all, and even had the authorities hold back people trying to flee. When Soviet troops reached the sea at Köslin and Kolberg in early March, the land route west was cut. Only the sea remained: 18,300 people were evacuated from Stolpmünde (Ustka), 4,300 from Rügenwalde (Darłowo) and some 70,000 from Kolberg. Those left behind became victims of murder, rape and plunder. On 6 March the US air force bombed Swinemünde, crowded with refugees, killing an estimated 25,000. 1 4

The evacuation by sea was the German navy's Operation Hannibal. Begun at Gotenhafen on 23 January on the orders of the naval commander-in-chief Karl Dönitz, it used between 494 and 1,080 merchant ships and fishing boats over fifteen weeks to carry 800,000–900,000 civilians and 350,000 soldiers from Courland, East and West Prussia and Pomerania to western Germany and occupied Denmark, one of the largest seaborne evacuations in history. On 30 January the liner Wilhelm Gustloff left Gotenhafen with more than 10,000 people aboard and was torpedoed by the Soviet submarine S-13 off the Pomeranian coast; possibly as many as 9,500 died, the greatest loss of life in a single ship sinking in history. 4

After Danzig and Gdynia fell, the Hel peninsula was the last way out. In April alone some 265,000 people were taken from the Danzig area to Hel, and on 16 April the transport Goya, sailing from Hel, was torpedoed by the Soviet submarine L-3 with the loss of more than 6,000 lives. Between 1 and 8 May over 150,000 more left the beaches of Hel. Across Pomerania as a whole, about 900,000 people reached the west by ship and about 200,000 by land (most before March). About 3 per cent of those who left by ship died at sea; losses among those fleeing over land, in a harsh winter and under air attack, were far higher. 4 1

Rokossovsky's memoir paints the refugees differently. He writes that columns of refugees clogging the roads badly hampered the advance, that people had fled in terror of Goebbels's propaganda, and that they soon saw nobody was harming them and went home reassured. He also writes that on entering German soil the front's Military Council ordered the troops to remember that they were fighting Hitler's army, not Germany's civilian population, and that his soldiers showed true humanity and nobility on German soil. The 1988 Soviet edition of the memoir says nothing about violence by Soviet troops against civilians. 15 7

Soviet UnionGermanyPolandWhat did civilians suffer under the Soviet occupation?

Other records differ from the memoir. English Wikipedia's history of Pomerania states that atrocities against the German civilian population occurred on a large scale along with the Soviet offensive and that those who could not flee became victims of murder, rape and plunder. In Danzig, after the city fell, Soviet soldiers and German saboteurs set houses on fire, and Soviet soldiers committed large-scale rape and looting, stripping especially the port, shipyards and factories. The exact circumstances of the fires and destruction remain disputed: traditional Polish historiography stressed German resistance, but after 1990 reports of deliberate Soviet destruction and arson were published, and with Soviet records inaccessible the question is unresolved. In December 1945 the Soviet consulate explained the "anti-Soviet feelings" in the city by "excesses" of the Red Army. 1 27

The scale of the losses is hard to establish. The West German government's postwar Schieder commission estimated deaths during and shortly after the war, out of the population of December 1944, at 100,000 of 404,000 in Danzig, 440,000 of 1,895,000 in the Province of Pomerania and 70,000 of 310,000 in West Prussia. These are West German estimates that add together deaths in flight, in air raids, by violence and from postwar hunger and disease. German Wikipedia notes that fear of the occupiers' revenge drove the German and Kashubian population to flee west in large numbers, and that they could not return after the war and became expellees. 1 6

PolandGermanySoviet UnionHow did this land become Polish, and what became of its German inhabitants?

Rokossovsky wrote that the East Pomeranian operation liberated "primordially Polish lands" and returned the whole of Polish Pomerania to the Polish people, and Russian Wikipedia takes the same view. Postwar People's Poland called the former eastern German territories and Danzig gained in this way the "Recovered Territories" (Ziemie Odzyskane), on the ground that they had been Polish land under the medieval Piast dynasty. English Wikipedia, however, describes the term as political propaganda used systematically to legitimise the annexation and the expulsion of the Germans. Unlike Gdynia and Pomerelia, which were Polish until 1939, and the Free City of Danzig with its Polish minority, the western Province of Pomerania had been German-speaking for centuries, and apart from groups such as the Kashubians it had few Polish-speaking communities in 1945. 15 5 28

The border was settled at conferences rather than on the battlefield. At Yalta in February 1945 the Allies broadly agreed that in return for ceding its eastern lands to the Soviet Union, Poland would receive part of East Prussia, Danzig, the eastern tip of Pomerania and Upper Silesia. Stettin was at first to remain German, but Stalin, who wanted Königsberg as a year-round port, proposed giving Stettin to Poland. The Potsdam Conference of July–August 1945 placed the land east of the Oder–Neisse line under Polish administration pending a final peace treaty, and Stettin (Szczecin) and Swinemünde (Świnoujście), west of the Oder, went to Poland as well; earlier, in May and June, Soviet forces had expelled Polish administrators from Stettin. The border was recognised by East Germany in 1950, West Germany in 1970 and reunited Germany in 1990. 29

The Germans who remained were expelled. A Polish administration was set up in Danzig on 30 March 1945, and Polish settlers began arriving in April. Germans started leaving of their own accord in mid-April, but after military directives in June ordered their prompt expulsion, deportations began in July. From June to October 1945 alone the Polish authorities expelled some 60,000 people, and by 1947 126,472 German Danzigers had been expelled from the city to Germany, replaced by 101,873 Poles from central Poland and 26,629 from the former eastern Poland annexed by the Soviet Union. German property east of the Oder and Neisse was confiscated by a decree of 2 March 1945. 27 2 30

Article XII of the Potsdam Agreement provided that Germans remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were to be transferred to Germany and that the transfers "should be effected in an orderly and humane manner." But "wild expulsions" by military and civilian authorities had begun before the agreement, and Polish Communists wrote, "We must expel all the Germans because countries are built on national lines and not on multinational ones." People recognised as Slavic "autochthons", such as Kashubians and Slovincians, were largely spared. The emptied land was resettled by people from central Poland and by Poles driven from the eastern lands annexed by the Soviet Union. Some scholars regard the expulsions, by today's standards, as ethnic cleansing. 30 28

Memory of the war shifted with politics. On 30 March 1949, the fourth anniversary of the capture of the Tricity, the councils of Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot made Rokossovsky, that year appointed Poland's minister of defence, an honorary citizen; the Gdańsk council revoked all earlier honorary-citizen resolutions on 18 December 1990. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw bears the inscriptions "Kołobrzeg" and "Gdynia–Gdańsk 27–28 III 1945." Soviet soldiers killed in this fighting lie in many cemeteries in today's Pomeranian Voivodeship; 6,058 are buried at Bojano alone. 25 20 14 5

Soviet UnionGermanyPolandWhat did the operation achieve, and where did Rokossovsky's front go next?

By the Soviet count, the East Pomeranian operation lasted 54 days, from 10 February to 4 April, advanced 130–150 kilometres on a 460-kilometre front and routed 21 German divisions and 8 brigades; German losses are given as 90,000 killed and 100,000 captured. German Wikipedia adds that the Red Army's figures for enemy losses should be treated with caution as a rule. By the same Soviet sources, the Red Army lost more than 225,000 men, of whom 52,740 were killed or missing and 172,474 wounded; the Polish 1st Army lost 8,668, including 2,575 killed or missing. The Soviets also lost 1,027 tanks and 1,073 aircraft. 5 6

The operation achieved its aims: the northern flank of the Soviet drive on Berlin was secured, and the Baltic Fleet gained bases from which to blockade by sea the German forces trapped in Courland and the Vistula delta. With Danzig and Gdynia, Germany lost the shipyards that built its U-boats and its main ports for supplying Courland. Rokossovsky named the uninterrupted pace of the offensive, which gave the enemy no respite to gather reserves, as the most important condition of its success. 5 15

There was no pause. The Stavka ordered the 2nd Belorussian Front to move to the lower Oder, relieve the 1st Belorussian Front from Kolberg past the Oder mouth to Schwedt, and prepare to attack towards Stettin and Rostock. According to the memoir, armies that had been attacking east had overnight to turn west and march 300–350 kilometres. With the railways wrecked, only tanks went by train; everything else moved on foot or by truck at 30–45 kilometres a day. The 49th and 70th Armies set out on 4–5 April, the 65th on the 6th and the 2nd Shock Army after the 8th, while the 19th Army stayed behind to contain the Germans on the spit towards Hel and guard the coast to the Oder mouth. A little over two weeks later, on 20 April, Rokossovsky's front crossed the Oder as the northern wing of the Berlin operation. 31 32 33

Consequences

The German 2nd Army and part of the 3rd Panzer Army were destroyed and the Baltic coast from the Oder mouth to the Vistula mouth passed to the Red Army, securing the northern flank of the Soviet drive on Berlin. By Soviet figures the Red Army lost more than 225,000 men (52,740 killed or missing) and the Polish 1st Army 8,668. Hundreds of thousands of refugees escaped by sea in Operation Hannibal; most of those who stayed suffered Soviet violence and hunger and were then expelled. The Potsdam Conference placed the land, including Stettin, under Polish administration, and Danzig became Gdańsk. In early April the 2nd Belorussian Front moved to the lower Oder to form the northern wing of the Berlin operation.

Timeline & Map

Danzig (Gdańsk) Hel (Hela) Gotenhafen (Gdynia) Stolp (Słupsk) Köslin (Koszalin) Kolberg (Kołobrzeg) Neustettin (Szczecinek) Konitz (Chojnice) Graudenz (Grudziądz) Stettin (Szczecin) Stargard 5 Off Leba (Łeba) 19 Hel (Hela) 17 Oksywie (Oxhöft) 15 Gotenhafen (Gdynia) 14 Sopot–Orłowo 11 Stolp (Słupsk) 12 Near Oliwa 16 Danzig (Gdańsk) 4 Tolkemit (Tolkmicko) 10 Köslin (Koszalin) 13 Kolberg (Kołobrzeg) 8 Schlochau (Człuchów) 6 Graudenz (Grudziądz) 18 The Oder at Stettin (Szczecin) 7 Stargard 9 Reetz (Recz) 3 Schneidemühl (Piła) 2 Mława 1 Różan
  1. 11945.01.14Soviet UnionGermanyPoland
    2nd Belorussian Front attacks

    Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front attacked from the Różan and Serock bridgeheads on the Narew.

  2. 21945.01.20Soviet Union
    Ordered to wheel north

    The Stavka ordered four of the 2nd Belorussian Front's armies to turn north and north-east into East Prussia instead of continuing west.

  3. 31945.01.24Germany
    Army Group Vistula formed

    Germany formed Army Group Vistula under Heinrich Himmler, who set up his headquarters in a special train at Schneidemühl.

  4. 41945.01.26Soviet UnionGermany
    East Prussia cut off

    The main body of the 5th Guards Tank Army reached the Vistula Lagoon near Tolkemit, cutting the land route between East Prussia and Germany.

  5. 51945.01.30GermanySoviet Union
    Wilhelm Gustloff sunk

    The liner Wilhelm Gustloff, which had left Gotenhafen with over 10,000 refugees and soldiers, was torpedoed and sunk by the Soviet submarine S-13.

  6. 61945.02.10Soviet UnionGermany
    East Pomeranian operation begins

    The 2nd Belorussian Front attacked into Eastern Pomerania from the Graudenz–Zempelburg line; the same day four of its armies passed to the 3rd Belorussian Front.

  7. 71945.02.15GermanySoviet Union
    Operation Solstice

    The German 11th SS Panzer Army counter-attacked south from Stargard and relieved the besieged garrison of Arnswalde; the attack was halted on the 18th.

  8. 81945.02.24Soviet UnionGermany
    Offensive renewed

    The 2nd Belorussian Front renewed its offensive with the newly arrived 19th Army, attacking north towards Köslin from south-west of Chojnice.

  9. 91945.03.01Soviet UnionPolandGermany
    Zhukov's right wing attacks

    The 3rd Shock and 61st Armies, two Guards tank armies and the Polish 1st Army of the 1st Belorussian Front attacked northward.

  10. 101945.03.05Soviet UnionGermany
    Köslin taken

    The German garrison of Köslin surrendered. With both fronts on the coast, the German forces in Pomerania were split in two.

  11. 111945.03.08Soviet UnionGermany
    Stolp taken; Katukov's army attached

    The 3rd Guards Tank Corps and the 19th Army took Stolp; from this day Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army came under Rokossovsky's command.

  12. 121945.03.14Soviet UnionGermany
    Assault on Danzig and Gdynia begins

    The 2nd Belorussian Front began its assault on the Gotenhafen–Danzig fortified area, with the main blow aimed at Zoppot between the two cities.

  13. 131945.03.18PolandSoviet UnionGermany
    Kolberg falls

    The Polish 1st Army took Kolberg after most of the garrison had left by sea the night before; Polish soldiers held a Wedding to the Sea on the beach.

  14. 141945.03.22Soviet UnionGermany
    Bay of Danzig reached

    The 70th Army reached the shore between Sopot and Orłowo, splitting the German forces in Gdynia from those in Danzig.

  15. 151945.03.28Soviet UnionPolandGermany
    Gdynia taken

    Soviet troops and the Polish 1st Armoured Brigade took the town and port of Gdynia; the Germans withdrew north to the Oksywie heights.

  16. 161945.03.30Soviet UnionPolandGermany
    Danzig taken

    The city and port of Danzig were wholly in Soviet hands and a Polish administration was set up; the remaining Germans fell back into the Vistula delta.

  17. 171945.04.04Soviet UnionGermany
    Oksywie bridgehead ends

    German resistance on the Oksywie heights north of Gdynia ended, and the Soviets considered the East Pomeranian operation complete.

  18. 181945.04.04Soviet Union
    Move to the Oder begins

    The 49th and 70th Armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front began a march of over 300 kilometres to the lower Oder.

  19. 191945.05.09GermanySoviet Union
    Germans on Hel surrender

    The German forces remaining on the Hel peninsula and in the Vistula delta surrendered.

Related people 18

Soviet Union and Poland (Red Army and Polish 1st Army)11

Related terms

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29reference 30reference 31reference 32reference 33reference 34reference 35reference 36reference 37reference 38reference 39reference 40reference 41