1944.03.04–04.17

Right-Bank Ukraine in spring 1944: the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket and Manstein's dismissal

How did the Red Army split Army Group South north and south of the Carpathians in March and April 1944, why could the encircled German First Panzer Army escape, and why was Manstein dismissed?

On 4 March 1944 Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front opened the Proskurov–Chernovtsy offensive and the next day Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front the Uman–Botoșani offensive. In spite of the mud the Red Army cut the Lvov–Odessa railway, crossed the Dniester and the Prut and reached the Romanian border, and at the end of March trapped some 200,000 men of the German First Panzer Army north of Kamenets-Podolsky. After a quarrel with Hitler at the Berghof on 25 March, Manstein, commander of Army Group South, won a breakout to the west and relief by an SS panzer corps; while Zhukov expected the break-out to go south, the First Panzer Army met its relief near Buchach on 6 April. But on 30 March Hitler dismissed Manstein and Kleist and put Model and Schörner in their place.

Soviet UnionGermanyWhat did the front in Right-Bank Ukraine look like in March 1944, and what did each side aim for?

On 18 February 1944, right after the Korsun–Shevchenkovsky battle ended, the Stavka gave the 1st Ukrainian Front a new offensive. The plan was to strike south at the junction of the German Fourth and First Panzer Armies and cut the Lvov–Odessa railway, the lifeline of Army Group South. A drive down to the Dniester would cut all German forces in Right-Bank Ukraine off from Germany and press them against the Carpathian Mountains. But on 29 February, before the offensive opened, the front commander Nikolai Vatutin was badly wounded in an attack by Ukrainian nationalist insurgents at the edge of the village of Milyatin in the rear. Georgy Zhukov, who was with the front as Stavka representative, took over command at once and was appointed front commander by a Stavka directive on 1 March. On the eve of the attack the 1st Ukrainian Front had 646,842 troops, 11,221 guns and mortars, 1,409 tanks and self-propelled guns and 477 aircraft on a 400-kilometre front. The Germans facing it had 314,066 troops and 449 tanks, assault guns and self-propelled guns, and the First Panzer Army itself had only 43 tanks and 50 assault guns. 1 2

In the south the 2nd Ukrainian Front under Ivan Konev was to strike towards Uman against Otto Wöhler's German Eighth Army and part of the Sixth Army. The main blow from the Vinograd–Zvenigorodka–Shpola line fell to the 27th, 52nd and 4th Guards Armies and the 2nd, 5th Guards and 6th Tank Armies, with 415 tanks and 147 self-propelled guns in all. Both offensives had to be fought in the spring mud. With the roads thawing, heavy artillery could hardly move, but Zhukov would not postpone the start, since the mud was getting worse by the day and every day of pause let the Germans recover. On the German side, Erich von Manstein, commander of Army Group South, had in February taken five panzer divisions (the 1st, 6th, 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions and the Leibstandarte) from the Uman direction to protect his northern wing. In his memoir Lost Victories Manstein admitted that this weakened the Eighth Army and the First Panzer Army on his right wing, which also could not replace the six and a half divisions withdrawn to refit after escaping from Korsun, and that "the army group command certainly bears responsibility for the events on its right flank." He added that without the transfer the northern wing would have been crushed by early March. 3 1 4 5

Soviet UnionGermanyRomaniaHow did the offensives unfold: Proskurov–Chernovtsy and Uman–Botoșani

On 4 March, after an artillery preparation, the 60th Army and the 1st Guards Army attacked, and Pavel Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 4th Tank Army were sent into the breach. On the 7th the two tank armies reached the Tarnopol–Proskurov line and cut the Lvov–Odessa railway. The Germans then gathered fifteen more divisions and counter-attacked, and a fierce meeting battle broke out around Tarnopol, Volochisk and Proskurov. Zhukov wrote in his memoir that from the 7th a battle "such as we had not seen since the Kursk bulge" went on for eight days. According to the Russian Wikipedia, the Germans counter-attacked with up to 200 tanks at Tarnopol, up to 100 at Volochisk and up to 300 at Proskurov, and on the 14th Zhukov reported to the Stavka that Rybalko had only 48 tanks and 15 self-propelled guns left. On the northern wing the 13th Army liberated Dubno on the 17th and advanced to the approaches of Brody. 2 4

Things moved faster in the south. The 2nd Ukrainian Front, which attacked on 5 March, took Uman on the move on the 10th, and its forward detachments covered more than 100 kilometres in four days and seized German crossings over the Southern Bug. On the night of the 17th it crossed the Dniester and formed bridgeheads south of Mogilev-Podolsky, and on the 19th it liberated Mogilev-Podolsky (the English Wikipedia article on Transnistria gives the 20th). The German command handed the separated Eighth Army to Ewald von Kleist's Army Group A. On the 26th Soviet troops liberated Bălți in Moldavia and, on an 85-kilometre front north of Ungheni, were the first to reach the pre-war state border; on the night of the 28th they crossed the Prut and carried the fighting onto Romanian soil. On 7 April they took Botoșani, the first large Romanian city. In early April the Grossdeutschland Division counter-attacked at Târgu Frumos in Romania and for a time surrounded the Soviet 35th Guards Rifle Corps. 3 6

In the north the 1st Ukrainian Front resumed its offensive on 21 March. Mikhail Katukov's 1st Tank Army joined the attack, and for the first time in the war three tank armies were used together on one axis. On the 23rd the 1st Tank Army took the road junction of Chortkov, on the 24th it crossed the Dniester at Zaleshchiki, and on the 29th it liberated Chernovtsy, the centre of northern Bukovina. On the 25th Andrei Grechko's 1st Guards Army liberated Proskurov. The 4th Tank Army swung west, took Kamenets-Podolsky on the 26th and then fought inside the city, surrounded, for eight days; its commander had changed on 15 March from Vasily Badanov to Dmitry Lelyushenko. On the 30th the 40th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, coming up from the south-east, reached Khotin, and the next day it met units of the 4th Tank Army and the 1st Guards Army coming down from the north. The German First Panzer Army was thus cut off from the Fourth Panzer Army and trapped north of Kamenets-Podolsky. 4 7 8

Soviet UnionGermanyWho was caught in the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket, and how tight was the ring?

This pocket, also called the "Hube pocket" on the German side, held Hans-Valentin Hube's First Panzer Army. Its ration strength was about 200,000 according to the English Wikipedia, or about 220,000 including rear services, police and members of the Organisation Todt according to the German Wikipedia, and only part of it were combat troops. Kirill Moskalenko, commander of the 38th Army, wrote in his memoir that the trapped Germans had 23 divisions, among them 11 infantry and 10 panzer divisions, more divisions than the group encircled at Stalingrad. But as he noted, many divisions had already been bled white, and only eight kept their main fighting strength. Hube grouped his forces into Corps Group von der Chevallerie in the north under Kurt von der Chevallerie and Corps Group Breith in the south under Hermann Breith. Supplies came by air, and on 24 March Hube ordered every vehicle that was not vital to be destroyed "ruthlessly" to save fuel. 1 9 8

The ring had gaps from the start. According to Moskalenko, the 150-kilometre ring was not firmly closed only in the west, where a gap of up to 15 kilometres lay between the left flank of the 4th Tank Army near Lyantskorun and the right flank of the 1st Guards Army near Chemerovtsy. The 1st Guards Army had lost two rifle corps, one of which went south with the 1st Tank Army, and the 4th Tank Army had fewer than 70 tanks left after earlier fighting (the English Wikipedia says 60). On the whole inner front the Soviets had more men but only about 130 tanks against more than 300 German ones, and their guns lagged behind in the mud. Zhukov too wrote that the troops of the inner ring entered the decisive fight badly weakened, and that the 3rd Guards Tank Army was pulled into reserve on the Supreme Commander's instructions after heavy losses. The English Wikipedia regards Zhukov's decision to move the 18th Guards Rifle Corps from the 60th Army, with which it held the outer ring, to the 1st Guards Army as a miscalculation that harmed the later attempt to destroy the pocket. 8 1 2

GermanyWhat did Manstein and Hitler quarrel about at the Berghof on 25 March?

According to Manstein's memoir, on 23 March he asked the OKH for forces, which could be freed from Hungary now that it had just been occupied, to clear the enemy from the First Panzer Army's rear. The answer on the 24th was that the First Panzer Army should hold its overstretched front, extend it to Tarnopol and clear its rear as well. He replied that unless he had instructions by 3 p.m. he would order the army to break out to the west, and at 4 p.m. Hitler agreed to a breakout to the west in principle while still demanding that the front be held. Manstein saw this as exactly the situation at Stalingrad in December 1942. Hube, commander of the First Panzer Army, thought differently: he wanted to fall back south across the Dniester, where the army could still go without heavy fighting. Manstein wrote in his memoir that this route looked less risky at first, but that crossing a river with only a few bridges would cost the heavy equipment, that the army would be trapped again by Soviet troops already attacking south of the Dniester and pushed into the Carpathians, and above all that without a link to the Fourth Panzer Army the way into Galicia could not be blocked. 5

Flying from Lvov early on 25 March, Manstein joined the midday conference at the Berghof on the Obersalzberg. He wrote in his memoir that a "sharp dispute" followed. Hitler blamed him, saying the army group had squandered the forces it was given, and reproached it for always wanting to fight a war of movement. He also said that, according to air reconnaissance, whole German units had fled from a few Soviet tanks; since such reports reached Hitler only through the Luftwaffe, Manstein took this as Hermann Göring once more venting his hostility to the army. After the conference he asked Rudolf Schmundt, Hitler's Wehrmacht adjutant, to tell Hitler that if his proposals were not accepted he should hand command of the army group to someone else. In the afternoon his chief of staff Theodor Busse telephoned that Hube was again insisting on breaking out to the south, but Manstein kept to his decision for the west. At the evening conference Hitler had changed his mind. According to Manstein, Hitler said he had "thought it all over again," agreed to the breakout to the west, and gave the Fourth Panzer Army's relief attack a newly formed SS panzer corps from the West (the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions) and the 100th Jäger Division and 367th Infantry Division from Hungary. 5

That same evening Manstein proposed handing the Eighth Army to Army Group A and putting the whole southern wing, which had to defend the borders of Romania, including the allied armies, under one command, suggesting the Romanian leader Marshal Ion Antonescu as its commander with a German chief of staff. Hitler would not discuss it, saying the marshal would decline for political reasons. Other sources tell the quarrel somewhat differently. The German Wikipedia writes that Manstein forced Hitler's consent to the breakout with "an ultimatum threatening resignation," and the Russian Wikipedia that Hube decided to break out "at his own risk" in spite of Hitler's demand to hold. At this time Hitler declared road junctions that could not be held to be "fortresses" whose commanders answered for them with their lives, and Tarnopol was one of them. German sources say that of the 4,600 men of the Tarnopol garrison only 55 got out by mid-April, a figure the Russian military historian Alexei Isaev also accepts. Six days earlier, on 19 March, there had been a sign of the distrust between Hitler and his generals: in response to propaganda by General Walther von Seydlitz, captured at Stalingrad, Gerd von Rundstedt handed Hitler a declaration of loyalty by the field marshals, an idea of Schmundt's. Manstein wrote that since all the other field marshals had already signed, he had no choice but to sign too. On the same day German troops occupied Hungary in Operation Margarethe. 5 9 4 1

Soviet UnionGermanyWhy did Zhukov misjudge the direction of the breakout, and how did the First Panzer Army get out?

The Soviet command expected the Germans to break out to the south. Zhukov looked back in his memoir: "Analysing the whole operation now, I believe the 1st Tank Army should have been turned east from the Chortkov–Tolstoye area to strike the encircled group. But we then had well-founded information, obtained from various sources, that the encircled enemy had decided to break out south across the Dniester near Zaleshchiki." He therefore sent the main forces of the 1st Tank Army across the Dniester to take the Zaleshchiki–Chernovtsy–Kolomyya area. The English Wikipedia writes that the front command did not judge the direction of the German breakthrough correctly, and read even the persistent German attacks to the west and the struggles of the 4th Tank Army as attempts to "seep out" to the Dniester crossings near Zaleshchiki. Even after the westward breakout had begun, Zhukov and Konev believed the south was the main direction and kept adding troops south of the pocket. According to the German Wikipedia, the bulk of Katukov's 1st Tank Army had already crossed to the south bank of the Dniester and waited there in vain for a German breakout. As a result the 1st Tank Army achieved its aim of blocking the German retreat south but was left out of the fight to destroy the pocket. 2 1 7

On 27–28 March the First Panzer Army's advance guard moved west towards the Zbruch, while its rearguard fell back fighting. The northern column quickly seized three bridges over the Zbruch and on the 29th formed two bridgeheads at Skala and Zbryzh. The southern column ran into the Soviet 4th Tank Army, which had taken Kamenets-Podolsky, and had to detour around the city. On the 31st armour of the 4th Tank Army struck north between the Seret and the Zbruch, but Hube's southern advance guard halted it. On 2 April the 1st Ukrainian Front, which put the Germans at about fourteen divisions, sent an ultimatum calling for surrender, and Hube rejected it. A snowstorm that began the same day and lasted several days kept Soviet aircraft from reconnoitring. Zhukov moved Lelyushenko's 4th Tank Army and rifle corps towards Chortkov, but the Germans held on every side and, as a "wandering pocket," moved west to the Strypa. The English Wikipedia notes that despite snow and short supplies Hube's troops kept their order and few deserted, in stark contrast to the panic in the Stalingrad and Korsun pockets. 1 7

The relief attack fell to Paul Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps: the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions from France, joined by the 100th Jäger Division, the 367th Infantry Division and others. According to Zhukov, this force struck the outer ring from the Podgaitsy area on 4 April and broke through the defences of the 18th Guards Rifle Corps and the 1st Guards Army; Moskalenko recorded that the 18th Guards Rifle Corps was attacked by four divisions on the morning of the 5th, and Manstein's memoir gives the 5th as the start of the Fourth Panzer Army's attack. On 6 April, near Buchach, the advance guards of the two columns met reconnaissance troops of the SS divisions (the Russian Wikipedia gives the 7th), and according to the German Wikipedia the pocket was fully opened on the 7th. Zhukov admitted that "neither I nor the front staff could ever establish exactly" how many Germans got out, and that it was far more than the "few dozen tanks carrying troops" his units had reported. Moskalenko wrote that "we army commanders" also bore a share of the blame for not tying the "sack" firmly, and could not plead the mud or the cold as excuses; "unfortunately," he wrote, "Stalingrad was not repeated here." 7 2 8 5 1 4

GermanyWhy were Manstein and Kleist dismissed on 30 March?

According to Manstein's memoir, on the morning of 30 March Hitler's Condor transport, having picked up Ewald von Kleist, commander of Army Group A, landed at Lvov to take Manstein to the Obersalzberg. While they waited, Manstein's chief of staff heard from Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of the Army General Staff, that Hitler meant to remove them both. Zeitzler said that after the last meetings Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler, and probably Wilhelm Keitel too, had attacked Manstein again, and that he himself had offered his resignation at once but Hitler had roughly refused it. Manstein reproduced the evening's conversation from the diary he wrote the next day. After presenting him with the Swords to the Knight's Cross, Hitler said that the "time for large-scale operations" in the East, for which Manstein was particularly suited, was over; what mattered now was simply to hold on stubbornly, and this new method had to begin under a new name and a new slogan, so he would give the army group to Walter Model. When Hitler said that Model would "rush around" all the divisions and squeeze the last out of the troops, Manstein replied, as he tells it, that the divisions under his command had long since given their last and nobody would be able to squeeze more out of them. As they left the Berghof, their successors were already standing at the door: Model, promoted to field marshal, and Ferdinand Schörner, who replaced Kleist. 5

Army Group South was renamed Army Group North Ukraine and Army Group A became Army Group South Ukraine; the English Wikipedia says the change took effect on 5 April. Sources differ slightly on the date of the dismissal: the German Wikipedia and Manstein's memoir give 30 March, the Russian Wikipedia article on the Uman–Botoșani offensive gives 31 March and the one on the Proskurov–Chernovtsy offensive 1 April. Because Model was held up in Kraków by a snowstorm, Manstein issued a last order to the army group on 1 April to coordinate the two panzer armies, handed over command on the evening of the 2nd and left Lvov on the 3rd. He wrote in his memoir that by 9 April the First Panzer Army had been freed. Hube, who led the breakout, received the Diamonds to the Knight's Cross from Hitler at the Obersalzberg on 20 April, but the next day the aircraft taking him back to the Eastern Front crashed shortly after take-off and he was killed. Manstein never held a command again before the war ended. According to the English Wikipedia, after this defeat Hitler removed many corps and division commanders and "fortress" commandants and put them on trial, and thousands of middle and junior officers were convicted by military courts. 10 7 3 4 5 11

Manstein framed his dismissal as a clash of two outlooks: that of a dictator who believed his will could pin his armies where they stood and stop the enemy, and that of the German General Staff tradition, which saw war as an art of clear appreciation and bold decision and sought success in mobile operations. He wrote that the army group had prevented the encirclement of the whole southern wing and had twice, at Korsun and with the First Panzer Army, snatched from the enemy "prey" he thought was already his. He also conceded that the kind of war he wanted would have required Hitler to accept great risks on other fronts and heavy political and economic losses. The German Wikipedia judges that the book blames the military collapse on Hitler's incompetence, exculpates the German generals, and shows no doubts or sense of guilt about the war of annihilation. In that sense this passage shows the typical frame of the generals' memoirs that built the post-war myth of the clean Wehrmacht. 5 12

Soviet UnionGermanyRomaniaUkraineWhat happened to the people of the occupied and liberated lands?

From 1943 the retreating Germans emptied the land through the ARLZ measures, carried out in the order of thinning out, evacuation, paralysis and destruction. They drove off livestock, dismantled or wrecked machinery, burned towns, villages and grain fields and carried off people on a mass scale. Evacuees had to walk west in treks of tens of thousands, often short of food and shelter. According to the English Wikipedia, although the Ukrainian Insurgent Army hampered the German administration to some extent, Germany deported some 500,000 people from Western Ukraine and exploited it economically. In the south, between the Dniester and the Southern Bug, lay Transnistria, ruled by Romania since 1941. In 1941–1944, 200,000 Jews and Roma there became victims of the Romanian occupation. The Red Army entered the region on 14 March by taking Bershad; on the very next day, the 15th, Romanian gendarmes killed four Jews in Slobidka, recorded as the last massacre of the Holocaust in Transnistria. Moskalenko, commander of the 38th Army, wrote in his memoir that the Romanian General Staff had set up a system to plunder Soviet property from the start of the war, and that his troops saw little difference between the lands occupied by the Germans and those run by the Romanian military administration. 13 14 6 8

In liberated Western Ukraine another war was going on. On the evening of 29 February Vatutin, travelling from the 13th Army headquarters at Rovno to the 60th Army at Slavuta, came under fire at the edge of the village of Milyatin and was wounded in the thigh. Zhukov in his memoir called the attackers "Banderites," and a report of 6 March by the 1st Ukrainian Front's SMERSH counter-intelligence directorate stated that a group of 100 to 200 men fired on the vehicles. A captured Ukrainian Insurgent Army fighter testified that the "Zeleny" company had taken part in the clash. The English Wikipedia gives the date as 28 February and the German Wikipedia as 25 February. Vatutin was taken to Kiev and treated even with the new penicillin, but gas gangrene set in from 23 March and he died of sepsis early on 15 April. Both his brothers were also killed in February and March. In the 1990s other versions spread, such as an insurgent veteran's account that the shooting was an accident rather than an ambush, or a claim that Germans breaking out of an encirclement had fired. The monument raised over his grave in Kiev in 1948 was taken down in February 2023. 2 15 16 17

A few weeks after Vatutin was shot, an NKVD battalion was wiped out by the insurgents near Rovno, and in spring 1944 a full-scale operation against the insurgents in Volhynia was launched, at first with 30,000 Soviet troops. The casualty figures differ widely by source. In a letter to the State Defence Committee, Lavrentiy Beria reported that the spring clashes left 2,018 insurgents killed and 1,570 captured against 11 Soviets killed and 46 wounded, while a captured insurgent quoted in Soviet archives said he had received reports of 200 insurgent losses against 2,000 Soviet ones. Between February 1944 and May 1946 more than 250,000 people suspected of links with the insurgents were arrested in Western Ukraine. The insurgents were themselves no innocent party. In early 1944 in some regions they cooperated with the Wehrmacht, the Waffen-SS and the German security police, and the "ethnic cleansing" of Poles that began in Volhynia in 1943 spread to Galicia in January 1944. The Polish civilians killed in Volhynia and Galicia are estimated at 60,000 to 120,000. 14

The men of the liberated villages were soon taken into the Red Army. People's Commissar of Defence Order No. 089 of 9 February 1942 called up the inhabitants of areas freed from occupation and formed them into reserve regiments, and those taken in by this so-called "field conscription" were often sent into battle without training or uniforms, earning the name "black infantry." When such uncontrolled mobilisation became a problem, the Stavka laid down the conscription procedure for liberated areas again in Order No. 0430 of 15 October 1943. Even so, there is testimony that on 7–8 April 1944, during the liberation of Odessa, more than 1,000 men mobilised from nearby villages were formed into two battalions and thrown into battle without even being issued weapons, and that about 90 per cent of them were killed. Moskalenko wrote in his memoir that men in the liberated villages asked to be enlisted "to pay back the enemy." Ironically, Manstein in his memoir cited the Soviet mobilisation of every man up to 60 in the retaken territories as the reason for deporting the population. 18 8 5

Soviet UnionGermanyRomaniaWhat were the losses, and what did the spring defeat change?

The loss figures depend heavily on who counted. According to Soviet announcements, the Proskurov–Chernovtsy offensive killed 183,310 enemy soldiers and captured 24,950 Germans between 4 and 31 March alone, and in the Uman–Botoșani offensive 118,400 German and Romanian soldiers were killed and 27,393 taken prisoner. German records show much smaller numbers. Following German records, the English Wikipedia puts the total losses of the First Panzer Army, including the sick, at no fewer than 45,000, and gives 81,888 dead, missing, evacuated wounded and sick for the First and Fourth Panzer Armies together in March and April. The German Wikipedia gives the losses during the breakout as 2,311 killed, 3,567 missing and 8,364 wounded. Accounts of equipment also diverge: the German Wikipedia says all the wounded were taken along (7,270 of them flown out) and the equipment was brought out too, whereas the English Wikipedia writes that the First Panzer Army lost almost all its heavy equipment, with only 45 armoured vehicles escaping, and that many divisions were shattered. 4 3 1 9

Soviet losses were heavy too. According to the Russian Wikipedia, the 1st Ukrainian Front's irrecoverable losses were about 45,000, and the 2nd Ukrainian Front lost more than 66,000 killed and missing and more than 200,000 wounded. A table added by the editors of the 1999 Russian edition of Lost Victories puts Soviet losses for the whole Dnieper–Carpathian operation, from 24 December 1943 to 17 April 1944, at 1,109,528 men (270,198 of them irrecoverable) and 4,666 tanks and self-propelled guns. At Tarnopol the rifle corps of the Soviet 60th Army and the 4th Guards Tank Corps liberated the city on 14 April, and on 17 April the 1st Ukrainian Front went over to the defensive on the Stavka's order. By the Soviet count, 22 German divisions and one brigade lost more than half their strength and most of their equipment. 4 3 19 2

With this spring offensive the Red Army reached the foothills of the Carpathians and split Army Group South's strategic front in two, north and south of the mountains. Having lost the Lvov–Odessa railway, the Germans had to route most supplies for their southern wing the long way round through Romania. Between January and May 1944 Germany had to move 34 divisions, 550,000 men and 853 tanks, assault guns and self-propelled anti-tank guns to Ukraine from other fronts and from Army Group Centre, weakening both the German forces in France awaiting the Allied invasion and Army Group Centre. The heavy losses and the Soviet troops at the border were the main reasons Romania's leaders began secret peace talks in Moscow soon after the offensive ended. The German general Kurt von Tippelskirch called it the biggest defeat since Stalingrad, writing that "even such skilled generals as Manstein and Kleist could not save the German troops." Soviet propaganda counted it among Stalin's "ten blows," but the English Wikipedia points out that during the Cold War Western historians, under the influence of German memoirs and biographies, focused on the successful extrication of the First Panzer Army rather than on the Soviet operations that liberated Ukraine. 10

Consequences

The Red Army retook most of Right-Bank Ukraine and northern Bukovina and entered Romanian territory. Army Group South was split north and south of the Carpathians into Army Groups North Ukraine and South Ukraine. The First Panzer Army saved most of its men but lost almost all its heavy equipment. Manstein never held a command again.

Timeline & Map

Kamenets-Podolsky (today Kamianets-Podilskyi) Milyatin Lvov (Lemberg, today Lviv) Tarnopol (today Ternopil) Proskurov (today Khmelnytskyi) Buchach Chortkov (today Chortkiv) Uman Zaleshchiki (today Zalishchyky) Khotin Mogilev-Podolsky Chernovtsy (today Chernivtsi) Botoșani Berghof (Obersalzberg) 19 Kiev 1 Milyatin 2 Shepetovka area 18 Tarnopol 4 Volochisk 8 Volochisk area 3 Zvenigorodka area 16 Buchach 15 western part of the pocket 20 Stanislav 12 Zbruch river 5 Uman 11 Kamenets-Podolsky 9 Zaleshchiki 6 Bershad 13 Chernovtsy 17 Botoșani 7 Berghof 10 Berghof 14 Berghof
  1. 11944.02.29Soviet UnionUkraine
    Vatutin wounded

    Vatutin, commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, was badly wounded by Ukrainian Insurgent Army fire at the edge of Milyatin. Zhukov took over command.

  2. 21944.03.04Soviet UnionGermany
    Proskurov–Chernovtsy offensive begins

    The 60th Army and 1st Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front attacked, and two tank armies entered the breach.

  3. 31944.03.05Soviet UnionGermany
    Uman–Botoșani offensive begins

    Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front attacked towards Uman and advanced 30 kilometres on the first day.

  4. 41944.03.07Soviet UnionGermany
    Lvov–Odessa railway cut

    Two Soviet tank armies reached the Tarnopol–Proskurov line and cut the railway, opening eight days of heavy fighting.

  5. 51944.03.10Soviet UnionGermany
    Uman liberated

    The 2nd Ukrainian Front took Uman and seized crossings over the Southern Bug.

  6. 61944.03.14Soviet UnionRomania
    Red Army enters Transnistria

    The Red Army took Bershad and entered Romanian-ruled Transnistria.

  7. 71944.03.19GermanyHungary
    Field marshals' loyalty declaration; Hungary occupied

    Rundstedt handed Hitler the field marshals' declaration of loyalty, and the same day German troops occupied Hungary in Operation Margarethe. In the south Mogilev-Podolsky was liberated.

  8. 81944.03.21Soviet UnionGermany
    1st Ukrainian Front resumes the offensive

    With Katukov's 1st Tank Army added, three tank armies were used on one axis for the first time.

  9. 91944.03.24Soviet UnionGermany
    Dniester crossed

    Having taken Chortkov the day before, the 1st Tank Army crossed the Dniester at Zaleshchiki.

  10. 101944.03.25Germany
    Quarrel at the Berghof

    Manstein and Hitler quarrelled over the First Panzer Army's breakout; in the evening Hitler agreed to a breakout west and to commit the SS panzer corps. Proskurov was liberated the same day.

  11. 111944.03.26Soviet UnionGermany
    Kamenets-Podolsky taken; border reached

    The Soviet 4th Tank Army took Kamenets-Podolsky, and the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the pre-war state border north of Ungheni for the first time.

  12. 121944.03.28GermanySoviet UnionRomania
    Breakout west begins; Prut crossed

    The First Panzer Army began moving west to the Zbruch, and in the south the 2nd Ukrainian Front crossed the Prut onto Romanian soil.

  13. 131944.03.29Soviet UnionGermany
    Chernovtsy liberated

    The 1st Tank Army crossed the Prut and liberated Chernovtsy, the centre of northern Bukovina.

  14. 141944.03.30Germany
    Manstein and Kleist dismissed

    At the Berghof Hitler removed Manstein and Kleist and put Model and Schörner in their place. The same day the Soviet 40th Army reached Khotin.

  15. 151944.04.02Soviet UnionGermany
    Surrender ultimatum and snowstorm

    The 1st Ukrainian Front called on Hube to surrender and he refused. A snowstorm lasting several days stopped Soviet air reconnaissance. Manstein handed over command that evening.

  16. 161944.04.06GermanySoviet Union
    Link-up at Buchach

    The First Panzer Army's advance guards met reconnaissance troops of the II SS Panzer Corps near Buchach. The pocket was fully opened on the 7th.

  17. 171944.04.07Soviet UnionRomania
    Botoșani taken

    The 2nd Ukrainian Front took Botoșani, the first large Romanian city.

  18. 181944.04.14Soviet UnionGermany
    Tarnopol liberated

    Tarnopol, declared a "fortress," was liberated. Only 55 of its 4,600-man garrison got out.

  19. 191944.04.15Soviet Union
    Vatutin dies

    Vatutin died of sepsis in a Kiev hospital.

  20. 201944.04.17Soviet UnionGermany
    Offensive ends

    On the Stavka's order the 1st Ukrainian Front went over to the defensive on a line through Brody, east of Buchach and Stanislav.

Related people 18

Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19