Ставка · 1941–1945

Stavka

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The Stavka (Ставка Верховного Главнокомандования, Headquarters of the Supreme High Command) was the extraordinary highest military command organ that exercised strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War. Established on 23 June 1941 by resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Party Central Committee, it was initially chaired by Timoshenko until Stalin assumed direct chairmanship on 10 July 1941. The General Staff served as Stavka's planning and executive agent, while Stavka representatives (most notably Zhukov and Vasilevsky) were dispatched to critical fronts for every major operation, bridging Moscow's strategic decisions with field command.

In depth

Establishment and renaming

The Stavka was the extraordinary supreme military command organ that exercised strategic leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War. On 23 June 1941, by resolution No. 825 of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces was established, comprising Timoshenko (chairman), Zhukov, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Budyonny and the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov; the Main Military Council of the Red Army was abolished the same day. On 10 July 1941, by a decree of the State Defense Committee (GKO), it became the Stavka of the High Command (Ставка Верховного командования), with Stalin as chairman and Shaposhnikov newly introduced; on 8 August it was renamed the Stavka of the Supreme High Command (Ставка Верховного Главнокомандования). Stalin became People's Commissar of Defence on 19 July and Supreme Commander-in-Chief on 8 August. On 17 February 1945 the State Defense Committee fixed the final composition (Stalin as Supreme Commander, Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Antonov, Bulganin and Kuznetsov), and in October 1945 the Stavka was abolished.

Why was there no Stavka before the war?

Before the war the Soviet military leadership assumed that in wartime the People's Commissar of Defence, together with the Main Military Council created in 1938, would direct the fronts. Vasilevsky, then working in the General Staff, wrote in his memoir A Lifelong Cause that "there was no plan to create a Stavka of the High Command". On 22 June the Main Military Council directed operations as planned, but the Stavka was created the very next day.

Vasilevsky judged that this first Stavka had "a somewhat democratic character", because at its head stood not a commander-in-chief but a chairman, the People's Commissar of Defence Timoshenko. On the same day a body of permanent advisers was attached to it, among them Vatutin, Voznesensky, Voronov, Zhdanov, Meretskov, Mikoyan and Shaposhnikov, soldiers and Party and state leaders. After the July reorganisation its members were Molotov, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, Shaposhnikov and Budyonny, and according to Vasilevsky this composition lasted almost to the end of the war. In his view the change made the Stavka a "sufficiently centralised and flexible" organ of command.

Place in the command system

The Stavka carried out its work under the leadership of the State Defense Committee (GKO). Its role was to evaluate military-strategic situations, adopt strategic and operational decisions, and organize, coordinate and support action among field, naval and partisan commands. The General Staff served as its planning and executive agent, while Stavka representatives, including Zhukov and Vasilevsky, were frequently dispatched as intermediaries between the Moscow headquarters and major field commands. Subordinated to it were the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement, rocket artillery formations, long-range aviation and the Guards armies.

In July 1941 an intermediate tier was placed between the Stavka and the fronts: the Main Commands of the North-Western, Western and South-Western Directions, headed by Voroshilov, Timoshenko and Budyonny. Vasilevsky wrote that they failed because they had neither real powers, nor capable staffs, nor reserves. Events moved too fast for the Stavka to work through an intermediate link, so it had to address the front commanders directly, and by the summer of 1942 the direction commands had been dissolved and the Stavka directed the fronts itself. The Main Command of Soviet Forces in the Far East, created for the 1945 war against Japan, was in his judgment a success, given the distance from Moscow and the scarce communications.

How did the Stavka actually work?

The Stavka had no building or meeting room of its own. Vasilevsky wrote that "the office of the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee was also the office of the Stavka". When he was in Moscow, Stalin or his secretary Poskrebyshev would usually telephone in the evening and ask him to come to the Central Committee at about eight or nine. No agenda was given in advance, so the Chief of the General Staff had to guess what would be asked beyond the general situation at the front. Most often the situation at the front and the supply of the army were discussed.

At these sessions the members of the Politburo and the State Defense Committee always outnumbered the members of the Stavka, so Vasilevsky regarded the chief's daily report as a report to the Stavka, the Politburo and the GKO at once. No minutes were kept. Decisions needed were drafted on the spot and issued, depending on their content, as a resolution of the Party Central Committee, a resolution of the GKO or a directive of the Stavka.

Major operations were discussed with the front commanders concerned summoned to attend. According to Vasilevsky, a decision and plan approved by the Stavka and the Central Committee became "law", and the operations at Stalingrad, Kursk, in Ukraine and in Belorussia were reviewed several times by the Politburo and the Stavka both at the decision stage and while under way. On 13 November 1942 a session of the Politburo and the Stavka approved the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, Operation Uranus, on the report of Zhukov and Vasilevsky. The course of the Berlin operation was reviewed almost daily.

What did the General Staff do for the Stavka?

The Stavka had no staff apparatus of its own; the Red Army General Staff served as its "main operational working organ". Vasilevsky summed up the duties of its chief in three points: to keep the Supreme High Command fully informed of events at the front, drawing on every kind of intelligence, and to warn it of the enemy's intentions in time; to prepare timely and feasible strategic decisions for the Stavka; and to organise the Stavka's uninterrupted control of the fronts and help it change the situation by committing strategic reserves or bringing neighbouring fronts into an operation. The General Staff also worked out the detailed plans of operations, drafted the directives to the fronts and prepared the final reports on operations. Its organisation and its chiefs are covered under Soviet General Staff.

What did Stavka representatives do?

A Stavka representative was a senior commander appointed by the Supreme Commander and answerable to him personally. Representatives were sometimes sent to clarify a sudden dangerous situation, but more often to major offensives. As Vasilevsky describes it, once the Stavka conceived a large offensive, he and Zhukov (sometimes other commanders) first went to the front to study the enemy and the ground and refine the idea, then returned to take part in the Stavka's final decision and the General Staff's planning, and after the Stavka issued its directives flew back to help the fronts carry the operation out.

Before leaving, a representative studied at the General Staff the concept of the operation, its plan by stages, the tasks of his fronts and their neighbours, supply and the reserves available. The General Staff set up his command post at one of the fronts, with a signals centre linking it to Moscow and to all fronts, and assigned him a group of officers. Representatives of the air force, artillery and armoured troops went with him, and the officers of the so-called corps of General Staff officers, posted at the headquarters of fronts, armies and corps, gave him further information.

A representative had to report by telegraph on the day's work and his proposals by midnight every day, and according to Vasilevsky Stalin sharply rebuked any delay of even a few hours. No other reporting was required. All representatives' reports went through the General Staff to Stalin. Vasilevsky himself wrote that from the spring of 1942 he spoke to Stalin by telephone almost every day, often several times a day.

The representative's powers had limits. Before July 1944 neither Zhukov nor Vasilevsky could take any new major decision during an operation without the Supreme Commander's sanction, nor move even a single division from one front to another, nor change the boundary lines between fronts. A front commander about to lose troops would telephone Stalin at once and complain that he was being "robbed". From the Belorussian operation in the summer of 1944 Zhukov was charged not only with coordinating but with directing the 1st and 2nd Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts, and Vasilevsky the 3rd Belorussian and 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts. From then on a representative's order to transfer troops was simply carried out.

After the war some front commanders said that the Stavka representatives had been an almost superfluous link that only complicated their work. Vasilevsky rejected this as lacking objectivity. He argued that representatives held the fronts' interests to the common aim of the operation, settled cooperation between fronts and arms on the spot, and when necessary stopped fronts from asking the Stavka for extra reserves. As an example he tells how in the spring of 1944, before the liberation of the Crimea, another Stavka representative, Voroshilov, doubted that the 4th Ukrainian Front had enough strength and wanted to report this to the Stavka, and how he himself refused and kept the approved plan and timetable.

Could a Chief of the General Staff spend so long at the front?

Vasilevsky was both Chief of the General Staff and the most frequently dispatched Stavka representative. According to his memoir, someone calculated that of the 34 months in which he headed the General Staff he worked 12 in the General Staff itself and spent 22 at the front on Stavka assignments. The memoir's sentence says "34 months of the war", but the figure corresponds to his tenure from the spring of 1942 to February 1945.

To the criticism that a Chief of the General Staff belongs in the General Staff, Vasilevsky answered that the practice was perhaps not the best form of his work but was unavoidable in the conditions and made command more concrete. From his command posts at the front he heard reports from the General Staff's senior officers several times a day and gave his instructions. When in December 1942 he complained that the General Staff was short of senior officers, Stalin replied, as he recalls, that "it is not you who should help the General Staff now, but the General Staff you". He nevertheless obtained Stalin's consent to bring Antonov, former chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front, into the General Staff; Antonov succeeded him as Chief of the General Staff in February 1945.

Why it stayed in Moscow

Throughout the war the Stavka did not leave Moscow. Its members met in Stalin's Kremlin office; when the bombing of Moscow began, work moved to a small mansion at Kirov Street 37, and during raids to an underground strategic centre prepared at the Kirovskaya metro station. From 1942 the Kremlin was used again.

Famous orders

On 16 August 1941 the Stavka issued Order No. 270, "On the Responsibility of Servicemen for Surrendering and Leaving Weapons to the Enemy", and on 17 November 1941 Order No. 0428, "Destroy and Burn to the Ground All the Settlements in the Rear of the German Troops". The first defined surrender and capture as a matter of military responsibility; the second directed scorched-earth measures.

A note on the name

"Stavka" is also used for the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Imperial Russian armed forces in World War I (1914–1918, successively at Baranovichi, Mogilev and Orel); Lenin abolished that body in March 1918 on conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk agreement. The Soviet Stavka of 1941–1945 was a distinct institution, marked by its mixed military-civilian composition.

The World War I Stavka was officially the Staff of the Supreme Commander; the telegraphic abbreviation "Stavka" stuck as its name. Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich was Supreme Commander at first, and from August 1915 Emperor Nicholas II himself. That Stavka was a field headquarters commanding only the army and navy in the field; in November 1917 the Bolshevik Krylenko took it over and used it for the peace negotiations and the demobilisation of the old army. The Stavka of 1941, by contrast, seated Party and state leaders alongside soldiers and worked in step with the State Defense Committee and the Party Politburo as an organ for directing the war.

Related people

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Sources

  1. Wikipedia (EN) establishment, composition, chairmanship succession, abolition October 1945, famous orders (No. 270, No. 0428)
  2. encyclopedia.com Encyclopedia of Russian History: Stavka's role evaluating military-strategic situations, adopting strategic/operational decisions, the General Staff as planning/executive agent, Stavka representatives as intermediaries
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  4. encyclopedia.com
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