Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilevsky

Александр Михайлович Василевский
Soviet Union state institutions Marxism–Leninism Soviet Union Russia 1895.9.30.–1977.12.5. ○ Natural causes

The seminarian-turned-staff-officer who designed Uranus

At a Kremlin dinner in the winter of 1940 Stalin asked why he gave his father no help. Vasilevsky replied that he had broken off all contact with his parents in 1926; Stalin told him to restore the tie at once and support them (as told in his memoirs).

Born in 1895 in Novaya Golchikha, Kineshma district, the fourth of eight children of a church regent and psalmist who later became a priest; he studied at the Kostroma seminary and joined the Red Army in 1919. He became Chief of the General Staff on 26 June 1942 and from 14 October 1942 was also Deputy People's Commissar of Defence, coordinating the Stalingrad counteroffensive and later operations at Kursk, the Crimea, Belorussia and the Baltics as Stavka representative; he was made Marshal of the Soviet Union on 16 February 1943. From February to April 1945 he commanded the 3rd Belorussian Front and directed the storming of Königsberg, then in the second half of 1945 commanded Soviet forces in the Far East. After the war he was Chief of the General Staff 1946–1948 and Minister of the Armed Forces 1949–1953.

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

Related historical events

1909–1930: From Seminarian to Red Army Regimental Commander

Vasilevsky was born in 1895 in Novaya Golchikha, Kineshma district, Kostroma province, the fourth of eight children of Mikhail Vasilevsky, a church choir director and psalm reader; when he was two the family moved to Novopokrovskoye, where his father became a priest, and he grew up in poverty. In 1909 he entered the Kostroma theological seminary. That year he joined the nationwide seminarians' strike against a rule barring seminary graduates from universities, was expelled from Kostroma by the police and returned only months later. In his memoirs he wrote that most seminarians saw the seminary as a springboard to a secular higher school, and that he himself planned to teach in a village school for a few years, save money, and then study agronomy or enter the Moscow Land Survey Institute.

The First World War changed those plans. Before his final year he and several classmates sat their final examinations early, receiving their diplomas in January 1915; in February he entered the Alekseyevsky Military School in Moscow, and in May, after a four-month accelerated course, he was commissioned a praporshchik (ensign). In September he was posted to the 409th Novokhopyorsk Regiment of the Russian army's Southwestern Front, became a company commander in spring 1916 and took part in the Brusilov offensive that summer. Heavy officer losses left him in charge of a battalion, and he rose to staff captain.

The news of the October Revolution reached him near Adjud Nou on the Romanian front. In his memoirs he wrote that he concluded "the old army and the Soviet state are incompatible", decided his military career was over and went home on leave at the end of November 1917. In late December a telegram reported that the regiment's soldiers' assembly, under the elective principle then in force, had chosen him as regimental commander; but the Romanian Front's commander, General Shcherbachev, had sided with the Ukrainian Central Rada, and on the advice of the Kineshma military department he did not go. From June to August 1918 he was a Vsevobuch (universal military training) instructor in Uglets volost; he recalled that the military department still distrusted him as a priest's son and a tsarist staff captain. From September he taught in village primary schools in Novosil district, Tula province.

In April 1919 the Novosil military commissariat called him up into the Red Army as a platoon instructor in the 4th Reserve Battalion at Yefremov, and in May he was enrolled as a Red Army commander. His first task was to lead a 100-man detachment helping grain requisitioning and fighting armed bands. When the Tula Rifle Division was formed that summer he became a company and then battalion commander, and in early October took command of its 5th Rifle Regiment, holding a sector of the fortified area southwest of Tula as Denikin's White army approached from the south. The regiment never saw action.

At the end of 1919 he moved with the division to the Western Front and in 1920 fought in the Soviet–Polish War as an assistant regimental commander. When the brigade commander Oskar Kalnin ordered him to take over at once the 427th Regiment, which had fallen back in disorder and whose whereabouts nobody knew, Vasilevsky reported that he could not carry out the order in the time given. He was arrested on the spot and sent towards the revolutionary tribunal at Vawkavysk, then recalled halfway and demoted to platoon commander; after an inquiry the division commander cancelled the order. According to the memoirs the two men later became friends, and Kalnin was killed fighting Bulak-Balakhovich's forces.

After the war he fought Bulak-Balakhovich's detachments in Belarus and armed bands in Smolensk province until August 1921. Over the next ten years he commanded in turn all three regiments of the 48th Rifle Division at Tver and ran the divisional school for junior commanders, and in 1926–1927 he completed the regimental commanders' course of the "Vystrel" rifle-tactical courses. In autumn 1930 the 144th Regiment, considered the weakest in the division before he took it over, came first in the district manoeuvres, and straight afterwards the military theorist Triandafillov told him he was being moved to staff work. He then became a candidate member of the Communist Party, but because of the party purge of 1933–1936 he was admitted as a full member only in 1938, while serving in the General Staff.

Staff Work and the Formation of Military Doctrine

Vasilevsky's historical importance lies not only in commanding armies at the front. From the interwar years he worked to connect troop training with staff practice, helping translate the principles of deep operations and cooperation among infantry, artillery, tanks, and aviation into manuals and instruction. In the early 1930s he served in the Red Army's Combat Training Directorate, contributing to guidance on deep combined-arms battle and staff service, then studied at the General Staff Academy founded in 1936 before moving into operational planning.

The memoirs relate that in 1937, before the Academy course ended, arrests among commanders, teachers and students sent more than thirty members of the first intake hastily into senior posts, and only a quarter finished the course; the 1978 edition calls this "completely groundless repression". Vasilevsky himself was suddenly put in charge of the Academy's rear-services chair at the end of August 1937 and a month later called to the General Staff, where in October he became head of the section for the operational training of senior commanders.

In 1939 he became deputy head of the General Staff's Operations Directorate. According to the memoirs, Shaposhnikov drew up the main ideas of the General Staff plan for a conflict with Finland, but the Main Military Council rejected it and gave Meretskov's Leningrad Military District the task of drafting a new one. During the Winter War he stood in for the deputy chief of staff Smorodinov, who had gone to the front; in March 1940 he joined the Soviet delegation at the peace talks, preparing the proposals for the new border, and then for two months chaired the Soviet side of the mixed commission that demarcated it. In May 1940 he became first deputy head of the Operations Directorate and worked on the strategic deployment plans for a war with Germany. He recalls that when the plan was presented to Stalin in the Kremlin in September 1940 he, having delivered it, waited for hours in the secretariat. In November he travelled to Berlin as a military expert in the delegation led by Molotov.

The memoirs describe in detail how at a Kremlin dinner in the winter of 1940 Stalin asked him why he had not become a priest, and why he and his brothers gave their father no help. Vasilevsky replied that he had broken off contact with his parents in 1926, without which he could hardly have been a party member or a General Staff officer, and added that when he reported a letter from his father to his party secretary a few weeks earlier he had been told to keep things as they were. Stalin told him to restore the tie at once and support them. His autobiography of 1938 gives 1924 as the year contact was lost.

This career unfolded under the destructive conditions of the Great Purge. The vacuum in the command cadres accelerated his promotion, but his work was more than the filling of vacant posts. On 1 August 1941 he became head of the Operations Directorate and deputy chief of the General Staff. In the Battle of Moscow, from 16 October to the end of November, while the main General Staff was evacuated, he led the ten-man General Staff operations group left in the capital, assessing reports from the fronts and converting Stavka decisions into operational directives. The method depended on continual reporting and adjustment, linking plans made at headquarters to command in the field.

After becoming Chief of the General Staff in June 1942, Vasilevsky worked with Zhukov to shape the Stalingrad counteroffensive and later coordinated fronts as Stavka representative in the campaigns at Kursk, in Belorussia, and in the Crimea. His strength was less a solitary hero's battlefield drama than the organizational ability to bring multiple armies and fronts under a common operational purpose. He is therefore best understood not as the single maker of Soviet victory, but as a leading representative of a staff system that combined industry, mobilization, intelligence, and frontline command in strategic planning.

November 1942, the Planner of Operation Uranus

In the Red Army Vasilevsky showed his talent less in field command than in staff work, and he caught the eye of Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov, growing into a mainstay of the General Staff's operations directorate. From late April 1942, before his own appointment, he was already standing in as Chief of the General Staff for the ailing Shaposhnikov, and in June he was sent with the Volkhov Front commander Meretskov to Malaya Vishera to organize the breakout of the 2nd Shock Army, encircled south of Leningrad.

Appointed Chief of the General Staff on 26 June 1942, Vasilevsky was Stavka representative with the Stalingrad Front from 23 July to 26 August, coordinating the defensive battle. The scene in which the counteroffensive was first broached comes from Zhukov's memoirs. On the afternoon of 12 September 1942 in Stalin's office, after the two of them had reported that a counter-blow north of Stalingrad could not succeed with the forces at hand, they stepped away from the table and said quietly that "another solution" had to be found; Stalin looked up and asked: "And what 'other' solution?" He told them to think it over at the General Staff and come back the next evening. They spent the 13th working at the General Staff and at 10 p.m. presented the first outline of a counteroffensive against the flanks held by Romanian troops. Stalin said that for now the main task was to hold Stalingrad, and that no one but the three of them was to know of the plan. Vasilevsky's memoirs say only that the decision was taken in mid-September after an exchange of views among Stalin, Zhukov and himself. While the attritional battle inside the city pinned the German Sixth Army, the plan called for breaking through the weakly held Romanian sectors on both flanks and closing a vast encirclement: Operation Uranus. For two months men and materiel were concentrated in secrecy, and Vasilevsky coordinated the preparations on the spot as the Stavka representative.

The counteroffensive opened on 19 November 1942, and within four days the pincers closed at Kalach, trapping some 330,000 men of the Sixth Army. Until mid-December Vasilevsky directed the reduction of the pocket, then was switched to meeting Manstein's relief force advancing from the Kotelnikovo direction. Vasilevsky went on coordinating the great operations at Kursk, in the Crimea and in Belorussia as Stavka representative at the front. Moving between the General Staff's desks and frontline command posts, he was called the quietest of the planners of the Soviet victory.

1943–1945: From Stavka Representative to Front Commander

As Chief of the General Staff Vasilevsky spent more time at the front than in Moscow. In the memoir chapter "In the General Staff" he cites a count that of 34 months of war he spent 12 in the General Staff and 22 at the fronts as a Stavka representative. He describes the routine: when Stavka conceived a major offensive, he, Zhukov or others went to the front first to study the situation and the enemy, returned to Stavka to take part in the decision and in drafting the General Staff plan, and once the directives to the fronts were approved flew back to help carry the operation out. He defends the practice as bringing conditions on the spot into the plans, while noting the criticism that the Chief of the General Staff was too often away. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that Stalin held Vasilevsky in particular respect: he did not err in judging the operational and strategic situation, and when Stalin disagreed he could persuade him, with dignity and weighty arguments, that no other decision should be taken. Working out the Kursk defence together in April 1943, Zhukov added, they "were of one mind on all questions."

He was made General of the Army on 18 January 1943 and, only 29 days later, Marshal of the Soviet Union on 16 February. At Kursk in July 1943 he coordinated the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts as Stavka representative, and he went on to direct the planning and conduct of the operations to retake the Donbas, right-bank Ukraine and the Crimea. On 10 April 1944 he received the Order of Victory, the second ever awarded after Zhukov's. On 9 May, the day Sevastopol was retaken, his car ran over a mine while crossing a German trench on the Mekenziev heights as he drove to see the city. According to the memoirs the engine and front wheels were thrown several metres, the driver's left leg was injured and Vasilevsky, sitting beside him, took a hard blow to the head; Russian Wikipedia adds concussion, several days' loss of hearing and a face cut by windscreen glass.

In the summer of 1944, during Operation Bagration, he coordinated the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, joined from 10 July by the 2nd Baltic Front, and from 29 July directly commanded the offensive in the Baltic region. That day he was made Hero of the Soviet Union.

Stalin himself planned and launched the East Prussian operation while Vasilevsky was in the Baltic; when Stalin and the deputy chief of staff Antonov left for the Yalta Conference, Vasilevsky returned to the duties of Chief of the General Staff. According to the memoirs, on the night of 18 February 1945 Stalin advised him to go to East Prussia to help the front commanders, and Vasilevsky asked to be released as Chief of the General Staff, since he now spent most of his time at the front, proposing that Antonov, who was already doing the job, be appointed, while he kept only the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defence. Stalin, he wrote, asked whether such a decision would not offend him. That afternoon the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Chernyakhovsky, was mortally wounded near Mehlsack, and Stalin named Vasilevsky to succeed him and made him a member of Stavka.

He commanded the front from 20 February to 26 April. The assault on Königsberg began on 6 April. In his memoirs he writes that on the 8th, to avoid pointless losses, he called on the fortress garrison to surrender and was refused. The fortress fell on the 9th, and his surrender appeal of 11 April to the German troops on the Samland peninsula announced that the fortress commandant, General Lasch, had capitulated and that 92,000 soldiers had been taken prisoner. In the Samland operation that followed, the front and the Baltic Fleet destroyed the German forces on the peninsula and took Pillau on 26 April. Stalin had already told him in February that two or three months after Germany's surrender he might be sent to the Far East, and according to the memoirs two of the three armies moved east, the 5th and 39th, came from East Prussia.

"In the General Staff" was a new chapter added in the 1975 second edition, and it dwells at length on working with Stalin. Vasilevsky writes that in the first months of the war Stalin rarely consulted the General Staff or the front commanders and decided alone, producing poor decisions such as the task set for the Southwestern Front at the start of the war, the plan for the winter campaign of 1941/42 and the plan for spring and summer 1942. He names September 1942 as the turning point after which Stalin relied on the collective experience of his commanders, calls him, especially in the second half of the war, "the strongest and most striking figure of the strategic command", yet describes his character as "difficult, quick-tempered, inconstant". As an instance of Stalin's memory he recalls how in November 1941 Stalin sent him, exhausted, to the Arkhangelskoye sanatorium for a night's sleep and then promptly telephoned to ask where a militia division was. The chapter quotes the 1956 Central Committee resolution criticizing the personality cult and stays within the official assessment of its time.

9 August 1945, the Manchurian Strategic Offensive

In February 1945, when the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Chernyakhovsky, was killed in action, Vasilevsky took over the front and in April reduced the fortress of Königsberg. After the German surrender his next assignment lay on the other side of the globe. As commander-in-chief of the war against Japan that the Soviet Union had promised at Yalta, he directed the largest strategic redeployment in history, moving forces from Europe to the Far East. Relying on the single Trans-Siberian railway, hundreds of thousands of troops and their equipment covered nine thousand kilometres in three months. He reached Chita on 5 July in a colonel general's uniform with papers in the name of "Vasilyev", and on 30 July a State Defence Committee directive formally appointed him commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in the Far East.

At midnight on 9 August 1945, one and a half million men in three fronts struck the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria simultaneously from three directions. The tank forces of the Transbaikal Front crossed the Greater Khingan range and the fringe of the Gobi, terrain judged impassable, and drove deep into the Kwantung Army's rear. It was the most complete realization of the deep operations theory the Red Army had developed through the whole war, and within some ten days the Kwantung Army lost the capacity for organized resistance.

The Manchurian operation is judged one of the factors that hastened Japan's decision to surrender, and it became a textbook of mobile warfare long studied by American strategists. Vasilevsky received his second title of Hero of the Soviet Union for the operation, served after the war as Chief of the General Staff and as Minister of the Armed Forces and then of War, and on his death in 1977 was buried in the Kremlin Wall.

Post-War Command and the 1950s Removal

From 22 March 1946 to November 1948 Vasilevsky was Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and deputy minister of the armed forces, becoming first deputy minister from 1948. He was Minister of the Armed Forces from 24 March 1949 to 25 February 1950, then Minister of War until 15 March 1953; the change of title followed the February 1950 division of the Ministry of the Armed Forces into a War Ministry and a Navy Ministry. Stalin was head of government throughout. He sat on the CPSU Central Committee from 1952 to 1961 and was a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the 2nd to 4th convocations from 1946 to 1958.

After Stalin's death his military career changed sharply. When the War Ministry and the Navy Ministry were merged into the Ministry of Defence in March 1953, Bulganin became defence minister, while Vasilevsky was First Deputy Minister of Defence from 16 March 1953 to 15 March 1956. On 15 March 1956 he was relieved of the post officially 'at his own request'. According to Vasilevsky himself, Zhukov, who conveyed that wish for a 'personal request', told him plainly that it was Khrushchev's personal demand. From 14 August 1956 he was Deputy Minister of Defence for military science, and in December 1957 he was retired on grounds of illness with the right to wear military uniform. In January 1959 he became general inspector of the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defence, holding that post until 5 December 1977. In 1956 he became the first chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans and afterwards took an active part in Great Patriotic War veterans' organizations. In 1973 he published his memoirs, Delo vsei zhizni (The Cause of My Whole Life), adding two new chapters, "The Heroic Defence of Leningrad" and "In the General Staff", in the 1975 second edition.

An English-language account summarizes these years as a fall from grace: the 1956 post for military science was a secondary position with no real military power, and Khrushchev pensioned him off, making him a victim of the bloodless purge that also saw the end of Zhukov. That assessment is recorded here as interpretation alongside the factual record.

Vasilevsky held that the 1937 repressions played a significant role in Soviet history: 'Without the thirty-seventh year, perhaps there would have been no war at all in forty-one. In Hitler's decision to start the war in 1941, a large role was played by his assessment of the degree to which our military cadres had been destroyed.' On his relations with Stalin, recollections of Stalin's sensitivity to his personal problems stand alongside hard telegrams over delays in sending reports; both rest on his own memoirs, and are attributed as such.