The Battles of the Rzhev Salient (1942–1943)
Why did the Red Army attack the Rzhev salient, 150 to 180 kilometres from Moscow, four times over more than a year, and what did it cost?
Around the Rzhev–Vyazma salient left at the end of the Moscow counter-offensive, the Soviet Kalinin and Western Fronts launched major offensives in January–April, July–October and November–December 1942 (Operation Mars) without destroying the German 9th Army. They lost the 33rd Army and its commander Yefremov, and soldiers called the place the "Rzhev meat grinder". In March 1943 the Germans emptied the salient themselves in Operation Büffel.
What was the Rzhev salient, and why could neither side let it go?
The Soviet counter-offensive that began before Moscow in December 1941 had driven the Germans back 100 to 250 kilometres by early January 1942. The German line did not fall back evenly, however. Because the Germans held on to the railways and roads linking Rzhev, a town on the upper Volga, with Sychyovka and Vyazma to its south, the front formed a bulge pointing towards Moscow. A part of the front that juts into the other side's territory is called a salient. The Rzhev–Vyazma salient had a perimeter of 530 kilometres, a depth of 160 kilometres and a base 200 kilometres wide. In Russia today, the whole of the fighting around it from January 1942 to March 1943 is called the Battle of Rzhev. Its starting point, the general offensive of January 1942, was also the last stage of the Battle of Moscow. 10 1 2
For the Germans the salient was a springboard from which Moscow could be attacked again. From the German positions at its north-eastern tip, Moscow lay 150 to 180 kilometres away in a straight line; the town of Rzhev itself was about 180 kilometres west of the capital. The German command saw it as "a pistol aimed at the heart of Moscow", and German accounts called Rzhev the "cornerstone" and "breakwater" of the Eastern Front. Through 1942 nearly two-thirds of Army Group Centre, with the 9th Army at its core, stood inside it. Adolf Hitler attached great psychological weight to keeping the capital under threat, and having held the front in the winter of 1941 by forbidding retreat, he was reluctant to give the salient up. 10 3 7
Seen from the Soviet side, the salient was both a threat to the capital and a shape that seemed to invite the encirclement of Army Group Centre's main force. Cut the base from the north (the Kalinin Front) and from the south-east (the Western Front) at the same time, and dozens of German divisions would be trapped inside. That calculation, simple on a map, drew the Red Army back to the same ground again and again for more than a year. Rzhev had been taken by the Germans on 14 October 1941 and stayed under occupation for almost seventeen months, until 3 March 1943. 10 12 1
How did the first offensive of January to April 1942 end with the encircling armies themselves encircled?
The Kremlin meeting of 5 January 1942, the Stavka (Supreme Command headquarters) directive of 7 January, Joseph Stalin's decision on 19 January to take away the 1st Shock Army, and the recapture of Sukhinichi by Konstantin Rokossovsky's 16th Army are covered under the Battle of Moscow. Here we follow only what happened around Rzhev and Vyazma. On 8 January Ivan Konev's Kalinin Front attacked north-west of Rzhev, and its 39th Army pushed behind Rzhev to the area of Sychyovka; two days later Georgy Zhukov's Western Front joined the attack. In mid-January Walter Model took over command of the German 9th Army. Model counter-attacked west of Rzhev, closed the gap in the German line again and cut the supply routes of the 39th Army, part of the 29th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, which had gone through it. The 29th Army broke out in late February, but only 5,200 men (800 of them wounded) got out. 4 3
In the south the Western Front aimed at Vyazma. Airborne troops landed south of Vyazma on 18 to 22 January, and on 27 January Pavel Belov's 1st Guards Cavalry Corps crossed the Warsaw highway into the German rear. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that at the end of January a wide gap appeared in the German line before Vyazma, so it was decided to seize the town at a stroke before the enemy brought up reserves. Three divisions of the 33rd Army under Mikhail Grigoryevich Yefremov reached the approaches to Vyazma on 1 February, but on 3 and 4 February the Germans cut the base of the breach and restored their line on the Ugra. The 33rd Army's second echelon and the neighbouring 43rd Army never got through. Between 18 and 23 February 7,373 men of the 4th Airborne Corps were dropped west of Yukhnov, but they too were stopped by German aircraft and counter-attacks and went over to the defensive. Belov's cavalry, part of Yefremov's 33rd Army and the paratroops were thus trapped in the forests south-west of Vyazma, where they fought in the German rear alongside partisans for more than two months. 17 4 16
When the Germans closed in during April to pull out this "thorn", the Western Front ordered the trapped forces to come out south towards Kirov through the partisan districts. According to Zhukov, Yefremov judged the 180-kilometre route to Kirov too long for his exhausted men and radioed the General Staff directly, asking to break out by the shortest way, across the Ugra. When Stalin telephoned Zhukov for his view, Zhukov says he "refused categorically", but Stalin said Yefremov was an experienced army commander and his request should be granted. The 43rd Army attacked towards him, but no move came from Yefremov's side. Contact with the 33rd Army headquarters was lost on the evening of 13 April, and the headquarters group ran into an ambush on its way to the Ugra. Badly wounded in the back and unable to move, Yefremov took his own life rather than be captured. Most sources give the date as 19 April; others give the 17th or 18th. Earlier, when the Stavka had sent an aircraft to fetch him, he reportedly refused to leave his soldiers and sent out the army's colours and wounded instead. Only 889 men of the 33rd Army got back to Soviet lines in small groups. The chief of the German army general staff, Franz Halder, noted in his diary on 16 April: "The Russian 33rd Army has been liquidated." 17 9 4
Responsibility for Yefremov's death is still argued over. In his memoirs Zhukov called him "a talented and very brave commander" who "fought like a true hero". Yet the service report Zhukov himself wrote on 28 January 1942 concluded that Yefremov "does not fully meet the requirements of an army commander". Officers of the 33rd Army and some historians charge that the Western Front issued order after order without reinforcements, and that on 2 February it moved the division guarding the 33rd Army's supply road to another army, letting the Germans cut the army in two. Against this stands Zhukov's account that the final change of breakout route was Stalin's permission, so responsibility cannot be settled from either side's recollection alone. The Germans found Yefremov's body first and buried it with military honours in the village of Slobodka. A Soviet veteran testified that a German general then told prisoners, "Fight for Germany as Yefremov fought for Russia"; German recollections also describe prisoners carrying his body to the grave. Yefremov was made a Hero of the Russian Federation in 1996. 17 9
Belov's cavalry and the paratroops broke out on the night of 26 May and moved south through the German rear. Russian Wikipedia says they reached the 10th Army's lines on 24 June; Zhukov's memoirs give 18 July. To the north the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps held a narrow corridor around Kholm-Zhirkovsky until July. On 20 April the two fronts went over to the defensive along the line Rzhev–Gzhatsk–Kirov–Zhizdra. Soviet losses from 8 January to 20 April are put at 776,889, of whom 272,320 were "irrecoverable" losses (killed, missing and captured). Army Group Centre is estimated to have lost about 200,000 men in the same operation (8 January to 20 April, wounded included), or about 330,000 if the period is taken as 1 January to 30 March. Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs that the winter armies had to go over to the defensive without completing the operations they had begun because reserves of weapons, ammunition and equipment were far short of the scale of the task. 4 17 1 18
Why did the Red Army strike at Rzhev again in summer 1942, and what did it gain?
Before summer came, the Germans moved first. On 2 July Model's 9th Army launched Operation Seydlitz against the 39th Army and the 11th Cavalry Corps, still holding the forests and marshes on the western side of the salient. On 6 July German tank divisions coming from north and south met on the Bely–Olenino road and split the Soviet forces into two pockets; German accounts date the end of the operation to 12 July. Soviet troops fought to break out until late July, and the deputy commander of the 39th Army, Lieutenant-General Ivan Bogdanov, was wounded in the breakout and died. Soviet losses came to nearly 60,000; German losses were 810 killed, 84 missing and 3,087 wounded. 15 3
On 30 July, while the main German forces in the south were advancing on the Caucasus and Stalingrad in Case Blue, the Kalinin and Western Fronts struck at Rzhev again. This was the First Rzhev–Sychyovka operation. Its aim was to smash the German 9th Army and retake Rzhev, Zubtsov and Sychyovka. Even without its corps the Soviet force numbered more than 486,000 men, with 1,715 tanks. But torrential rain began on the first day and all but grounded the air support, and Dmitry Lelyushenko's 30th Army, attacking north of Rzhev, "gnawed" through the German defences at one or two kilometres a day. The 20th Army, attacking at Pogoreloye Gorodishche on 4 August, broke through 18 kilometres wide and 30 deep in two days and reached the Vazuza and Gzhat rivers. But when three tank divisions brought up by Model collided with the Soviet mobile group on the riverbanks, the advance slowed again. On 23 August the 31st Army took Zubtsov and the 20th Army Karmanovo; that was the end of the major gains. 5 3
Fighting for the town itself went on into September. When Zhukov moved up to become Deputy Supreme Commander on 26 August, Konev took over the Western Front and Maksim Purkayev the Kalinin Front. On 21 September assault groups of the 30th Army broke into the northern part of Rzhev, and the town's fall seemed so near that the US presidential envoy Wendell Willkie was allowed to visit the 30th Army near Rzhev on 24 September. But the Germans did not give up the town, and the offensive died away in early October. The war correspondent Ilya Ehrenburg, who visited Rzhev at this time, wrote that he never got to Stalingrad but would never forget Rzhev, where "for weeks there was fighting over five or six broken trees, a wall of a ruined house and a tiny hillock". 5
The losses depend on how the operation is bounded. Krivosheyev's official count takes the operation as 30 July to 23 August and gives 51,482 irrecoverable losses; total losses in the operational sector in the same period were 193,683. Extended to early October, Soviet total losses are estimated at close to 300,000. The 9th Army's quartermaster reported 9,955 killed, 5,551 missing and 36,893 wounded between 30 July and 10 September, 52,392 in all, and sixteen German divisions lost 50 to 80 per cent of their fighting strength. In his memoirs Zhukov quotes the German general Kurt von Tippelskirch to the effect that three tank divisions and several infantry divisions bound for the south had to be held back to stop the offensive, and writes that with one or two more armies the whole German grouping in the salient could have been destroyed, "but this real opportunity was missed by the Supreme High Command". 1 5 17
How did Operation Mars unfold in November and December 1942, and how did Zhukov write about it?
The Second Rzhev–Sychyovka operation, code-named Mars, was conceived at the end of September 1942 as a continuation of the first. This time four sectors where there had been no major offensive yet were to be broken at once: in the east the 20th Army across the Vazuza towards Sychyovka, in the west the 41st Army south of Bely, in the north-west the 22nd Army in the Luchesa valley and in the north the 39th Army at Molodoi Tud, encircling the German 9th Army inside the salient. If this succeeded, a follow-on operation (Jupiter) would send the 5th and 33rd Armies towards Gzhatsk and Vyazma. Konev commanded the Western Front and Purkayev the Kalinin Front, with Zhukov coordinating both as Stavka representative. The Soviet armies around the salient numbered 702,924 men with 1,718 tanks, more than the armies committed to Operation Uranus at Stalingrad (667,478 men, 1,318 tanks). 6 7
The offensive opened before dawn on 25 November, six days after Uranus began. Fog and snow kept the aircraft on the ground and made artillery observation difficult. The 20th Army, across the Vazuza, advanced only slowly, and the 39th Army in the north barely moved. Only the 41st Army in the west broke in deeply south of Bely. The Germans held out in strongpoints built in every village, shifted reserves inside the salient towards the Soviet breaches and pinched off their spearheads. In early December a German counter-attack trapped Major-General Mikhail Solomatin's mechanised corps south of Bely, which was rescued after more than three days of fighting. On 8 December the Stavka issued a new directive to take Sychyovka by 15 December and Rzhev by the 23rd, and the attack was renewed, but it only added to the losses. The operation came to a halt around 20 December. In Krivosheyev's count Soviet losses were 70,373 irrecoverable and 145,301 sick and wounded; the American historian David Glantz puts them much higher, at about 100,000 killed and missing, 235,000 wounded and 1,600 tanks. The German 9th Army lost 53,500 men in October to December, 80 per cent of them, 40,000 to 45,000, in this operation. 7 6 17 1
Zhukov's memoirs never call the operation Mars. He writes that after the Uranus plan was approved, he and Aleksandr Vasilevsky proposed to Stalin an attack on the Rzhev salient so that the Germans could not move troops from around Vyazma south to save Stalingrad, with Vasilevsky taking charge at Stalingrad and himself of the Kalinin and Western Fronts. His account begins by quoting the directive of 8 December and does not cover the first attack of 25 November or its losses. He writes that the Kalinin Front accomplished its task but the Western Front failed to break the defences, and that when he arrived he concluded "it was pointless to repeat the operation: the enemy had guessed our intention and brought up considerable forces from other sectors". As the main cause of failure he names German defences hidden on reverse slopes and "underestimation of the difficulties of the terrain". He concludes that although the aim was not achieved, the Germans had to bring four tank divisions and a motorised division into the area, so the attack helped Stalingrad. This passage is almost the same in the 1975 edition; it is not a later-restored censored section. 17 17
On 24 November, a day before Mars, the 3rd Shock Army on the Kalinin Front's right wing attacked Velikiye Luki to the north-west. That operation ended with the town's capture on 17 January 1943 and threatened the Germans at the northern base of the salient. Right after Mars failed, the commander of Army Group Centre, Günther von Kluge, recommended abandoning the salient to save manpower and fall back to a more defensible line, but Hitler refused. 1 8 7
Was Mars "Zhukov's greatest defeat", or a diversion for Operation Uranus?
Official Soviet histories said almost nothing about Mars. The first serious study of it was by the American military historian David Glantz in the 1990s. In his 1999 book Zhukov's Greatest Defeat he argued that Mars was a main effort on a par with Uranus, and that the explanation that it had been a diversion was added afterwards, once the plan to smash Army Group Centre had failed. As evidence he points to the larger forces and tank numbers committed to Mars than to Uranus. "In the unlikely event that Zhukov was correct and Mars was really a diversion," Glantz wrote, "there has never been one so ambitious, so large, so clumsily executed, or so costly." The Russian historian Svetlana Gerasimova likewise treats it as Zhukov's defeat. 7 6
The leading Russian rebuttal came from Makhmut Gareev, later president of the Academy of Military Sciences. He argued that Mars and Uranus belonged to one plan and that the main strategic task of Mars was to pin down German reserves to help the Stalingrad counter-offensive, so there was no good reason to call it a failure or "Zhukov's greatest defeat". Vasily Gurkin, who published the first Russian study of the operation in 2000, also saw pinning as its main purpose. The British historian Antony Beevor sided against Glantz, noting that Zhukov spent less time planning Mars than Uranus and that Uranus received 2.5 to 4.5 basic loads of ammunition per gun against less than one for Mars. In between, historians such as Mikhail Myagkov and Alexei Isaev hold that even if the Soviet command knew Army Group Centre as a whole could not be destroyed, eliminating the 9th Army in the salient was a real aim that would have changed the 1943 campaign. Many on all sides accept that to stop the offensive the Germans used up all of the army group's reserves and cancelled divisions' moves to the south. 6 7
A third explanation concerns intelligence. Pavel Sudoplatov, a senior NKVD intelligence officer, wrote in his memoirs that through Monastery, a radio deception game run against German intelligence, the double agent Aleksandr Demyanov (code name Heine, known to the Germans as Max) told the Germans on 4 November 1942 that the Red Army would strike not at Stalingrad but in the North Caucasus and at Rzhev. The Germans, he says, waited for the attack at Rzhev and beat it off, and Zhukov, who knew nothing of the game, paid a heavy price. Gareev repeated the story. It is strongly disputed, however. A German historian showed that the German "Max" reports were fabricated by a different man from open sources such as newspapers, and Isaev points out that Sudoplatov got even the double agent's code name wrong and that the agent's surviving reports for November 1942 contain nothing about a planned offensive at Rzhev. What can be confirmed is only that Sudoplatov made the claim; no documentary evidence has emerged that the plan was leaked on purpose. 6 7
How did the Germans empty the salient and leave in March 1943?
With the 6th Army lost at Stalingrad and Velikiye Luki taken as well, the reasons for holding the salient shrank and the risk of encirclement grew. After repeated requests from Kluge and the army chief of staff Kurt Zeitzler, Hitler on 6 February 1943 allowed the 9th Army and part of the 4th Army to withdraw to the Dukhovshchina–Dorogobuzh–Spas-Demensk line; the final order was signed on 28 February. The operation was named Büffel (Buffalo). Over four weeks the 9th Army built 200 kilometres of new roads for motor vehicles and 600 kilometres for sledges and carts, shipped out more than 100,000 tonnes of goods by rail, tore up 1,000 kilometres of track and built a new defensive line behind. Twenty-nine divisions, 250,000 men, were to pull out in stages. 8 3
The withdrawal began at 7 p.m. on 1 March. Only rearguards stayed in Rzhev, leaving the town at 6 p.m. on 2 March, and German engineers blew up the Volga bridge; a telephone line is said to have been run from the demolition team to Hitler's headquarters because he wanted to hear the explosion himself. The Soviet side had detected the preparations from mid-February but reacted slowly. The commander of the 30th Army, Vladimir Kolpakchi, ordered his attack only at 2.30 p.m. on 2 March, and that day Stalin issued a directive rebuking the fronts that "the pursuit of the retreating enemy is being conducted sluggishly and indecisively". On the morning of 3 March the 30th Army entered an empty Rzhev. Gzhatsk (6 March, or the 5th in some sources), Sychyovka (8th), Bely (10th) and Vyazma (12th) followed. Held up by prepared intermediate positions, minefields and broken roads, Soviet troops managed only six or seven kilometres a day, and around 22 March they reached the new German line and stopped. Soviet histories call this pursuit the Rzhev–Vyazma operation of 1943, ending on 31 March. Soviet losses were 38,862 irrecoverable and 99,715 sick and wounded. On 4 March the British prime minister Winston Churchill sent Stalin a message congratulating him on the liberation of Rzhev. 8 1 3
Militarily, Büffel was a German success. The front shrank from 530 kilometres to a little over 200, and one army headquarters, four corps headquarters, fifteen infantry divisions, two motorised divisions, three tank divisions and an SS cavalry division were freed as reserves (English Wikipedia gives 22 divisions). The American historian Steven Newton wrote that the forces released, together with divisions brought from France, "almost made up for the loss of the 6th Army at Stalingrad". Model's 9th Army then moved into the Oryol salient and in July 1943 led the northern attack at the Battle of Kursk. But Heinz Guderian, the inspector of armoured troops, doubted the wisdom of Operation Citadel, which gave up the far more valuable Rzhev–Vyazma salient to attack the less important Kursk salient, and Isaev argues that the infantry losses suffered in Mars were never made good, leaving the 9th Army short of strength at Kursk. The Soviet side, for its part, finally removed the threat to Moscow, pushed the front more than 100 kilometres further from the capital and was able to pull several armies into reserve. 8 2 7 10
What happened to the people of Rzhev and the salient under occupation?
Before the war Rzhev had 56,000 inhabitants. When the Germans occupied it in October 1941, about 20,000 people remained in the town and roughly as many in the surrounding district. On the day of liberation, 3 March 1943, 150 residents were left in the town and 362 including the district. English Wikipedia says that more than a sixth of the population was sent to forced labour in Germany during the occupation and that some 9,000 people were shot, starved or tortured to death in a camp set up in the town centre. Carl Becker, the German town commandant in 1941–42, was sentenced to 25 years at a war crimes trial in Kalinin in 1945. In Vyazma, transit camps (Dulag) Nos. 184 and 230 held Soviet prisoners of war and civilians from Rzhev, Sychyovka and elsewhere; in the winter of 1941–42 about 300 people a day died there of disease, cold and hunger. Two mass graves found in the area after the war are estimated to hold about 70,000 bodies; English Wikipedia places them at the Vyazma Dulag, German Wikipedia at the Rzhev camp. 11 1 12 3 2
The town itself all but disappeared: of Rzhev's 5,443 houses, only 297 survived. Official Soviet sources blamed the Germans for the destruction, but it is now thought that most of it came from Soviet shelling and bombing during the long attempts to retake a town the Germans had turned into a strongpoint. Operation Büffel brought another disaster for the inhabitants. Under the plans of the German Economic Staff East, about 120,000 civilians were forced to build rear positions in the weeks before the withdrawal, 60,000 were carried off westwards with the troops, and 12,789 railway wagons of farm produce and livestock were shipped out. According to the American historian Newton, Model ordered all men of military age taken away, food stocks confiscated, wells poisoned and many villages burned to the ground. The "anti-partisan" sweep before the withdrawal turned into terror against the population. On 8 March, in the village of Kolodezki in the Tyomkino district, 93 inhabitants, 24 of them children, were locked in a house and burned alive. On the strength of these orders and sweeps the Soviet Union named Model a war criminal. The German general Friedrich von Mellenthin, by contrast, wrote that the inhabitants themselves insisted on leaving out of fear of their own country's soldiers; Soviet and Russian historians reject this. 1 3 8
How great were the losses of the "Rzhev meat grinder", and why did all four offensives fail?
To read the loss figures one needs two terms. "Irrecoverable" losses are the killed, those who died of wounds, the missing and the captured; "sanitary" losses are the wounded and sick who could return after treatment. The official count by Grigory Krivosheyev, drawn from Russian defence ministry records, puts the irrecoverable losses of the four offensives of 1942–43 at 433,037: 272,320 in the Rzhev–Vyazma operation of 1942, 51,482 in the First Rzhev–Sychyovka operation, 70,373 in Mars and 38,862 in the Rzhev–Vyazma operation of 1943. The military historian Isaev, working from defence ministry archives, counted 392,554 irrecoverable and 768,233 sanitary losses on the 200–250-kilometre arc around Rzhev from January 1942 to March 1943. Those irrecoverable losses include prisoners: 50,000 men were captured from the 39th, 22nd and 41st Armies and the 11th Cavalry Corps alone. 1 2
There are higher estimates. The Russian historian Gerasimova argues that the official total of 1,324,823 for the four offensives covers only about eight of the fifteen months of fighting, and that adding the missing months (May to July and October to November 1942, January to February 1943) brings the losses (all casualties) to some 2.3 million. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, who took part in the fighting, put the Red Army's total losses at over a million. Around 2009 some journalists wrote that one to two million had been killed, which Isaev criticised as exaggeration without archival basis. German losses are even less certain. Adding the estimates operation by operation gives a little over 390,000, wounded included; reports of several German armies in the area from March 1942 to March 1943 list 162,713 killed, 35,650 missing and 469,747 wounded, but these include fronts outside the salient. Gerasimova notes that the commonly cited German figure of 350,000 to 400,000 lacks documentary grounding. Isaev put the loss ratio at 6 to 1 in the First Rzhev–Sychyovka operation and 4 to 1 in Mars. These numbers are why soldiers called the place the "meat grinder". 2 11 1
There was no single reason why all four offensives failed. First, in the first half of 1942 the Red Army was badly short of ammunition. Zhukov wrote that in January 1942 the Western Front received 55 per cent of its planned 82 mm mortar bombs and 44 per cent of its artillery rounds, and that during the offensive guns had to be limited to one or two rounds a day; infantry attacked defences that had not been suppressed, and losses were heavy. Second, the Germans turned every village into a strongpoint ringed with wire, mines and machine guns, and built deep layered defences hidden in forests, marshes and behind reverse slopes; rain, thaw and snow hurt the attacker more. Third, there were failures of command. In early 1942 the Stavka let several fronts attack separately without coordination, objectives were far too large for the forces available, and hesitation to withdraw when encirclement threatened led to the 29th, 33rd and 39th Armies being trapped one after another. Attacking the same places head-on again and again also let the Germans anticipate the blows. Rokossovsky recalled that in early 1942 at Sukhinichi, ordered to "wear down" the enemy by attacking, he sent a report pointing out the "paradox" that "the stronger side is defending and the weaker side attacking, and waist-deep in snow at that", and the answer came back: "Carry out the order!" 17 2 19 4
Why did the Soviet Union long stay silent about this fighting, and how is it remembered today?
Official Soviet histories never grouped the fighting for the Rzhev salient in 1942–43 into a single battle. The Soviet Military Encyclopedia and the six-volume History of the Great Patriotic War had no entry for a Battle of Rzhev, and Mars did not appear at all in that six-volume history or in the 1985 encyclopedia The Great Patriotic War. Between the victory stories of Stalingrad and Kursk, offensives that cost so much and achieved their aims so little were recorded piecemeal as "local operations on the Moscow axis". The name "Battle of Rzhev" was brought into scholarship in the 1990s by Russian researchers such as Gerasimova, and the Great Russian Encyclopedia now treats the fighting as a series of connected offensives. 1 6
Amid that silence it was literature that kept Rzhev in memory. The poet Aleksandr Tvardovsky counted a visit as a war correspondent to the front near Rzhev among his "most depressing and bitter" memories of the whole war, and in 1946 wrote the poem "I Was Killed Near Rzhev" (Я убит подо Ржевом). Spoken by a dead soldier to the living, it entered the school curriculum, and one of its lines, "We fell for the Motherland, but it is saved", is now carved on the marble slab of the Rzhev memorial. The veteran writer Viktor Astafyev, who did not himself fight at Rzhev, said of it: "We drowned them in rivers of blood and buried them under mountains of corpses." 13 14 1
After the Soviet collapse, Rzhev became a site where the politics of memory collided. When NTV's 2009 documentary Rzhev: Georgy Zhukov's Unknown Battle made no attempt to hide the huge losses, there were even calls to arrest those involved in it. When President Vladimir Putin made Rzhev a "City of Military Glory" in 2007, it was argued whether the title fitted a town whose actual defenders had been the Germans. Since 1989 search teams have been recovering and reburying the remains of Soviet and German soldiers from the fields. Yefremov received a monument by Yevgeny Vuchetich in a square in Vyazma in 1946 and became a Hero of the Russian Federation in 1996. 1 2 9
On 30 June 2020 the Rzhev Memorial to the Soviet Soldier opened beside the Moscow–Riga highway at the turning for the village of Khoroshevo near Rzhev. Opened jointly by Putin and the president of Belarus, it is a 25-metre bronze soldier on a 10-metre mound, the hem of his cape dissolving into a flight of cranes, a motif drawn from Tvardovsky's poem and the song "Cranes". The walls of a trench-like passage in front of the mound carry the names of more than 17,000 men who fell here. Led by the Russian Military Historical Society and built with donations, the memorial gathered the deaths of Rzhev, long scattered among "failed offensives", into a national story of "sacrifice that saved Moscow". What to remember on this ground, and how to speak of the command's decisions and the soldiers' sacrifice together, remains an open question. 14 2 13
Consequences
The salient disappeared with the planned German withdrawal of March 1943, ending the threat to Moscow. Official Soviet irrecoverable losses were over 430,000, and other estimates run much higher. The Germans freed some twenty divisions from the shortened front and sent them towards Kursk. Little spoken of in Soviet times, the battle entered the centre of memory through research after the 1990s and the 2020 Rzhev memorial.
Timeline & Map
- 11941.10.14Rzhev occupied
Units of the German 9th Army occupied Rzhev.
- 21942.01.08Kalinin Front attacks
Ivan Konev's Kalinin Front attacked north-west of Rzhev, and its 39th Army pushed towards Sychyovka.
- 31942.02.0333rd Army cut off
The Germans cut off the spearhead of Yefremov's 33rd Army at the approaches to Vyazma.
- 41942.04.19Yefremov's death
The 33rd Army headquarters was ambushed on its way to the Ugra, and the badly wounded Yefremov took his own life (some sources give the 17th or 18th).
- 51942.07.02Operation Seydlitz
Model's 9th Army began an operation to encircle the 39th Army and 11th Cavalry Corps in the west of the salient.
- 61942.07.30First Rzhev–Sychyovka operation begins
The Kalinin Front's 30th and 29th Armies attacked north and east of Rzhev in torrential rain.
- 71942.08.04Breakthrough at Pogoreloye Gorodishche
The Western Front's 20th Army broke through the defences of the German 46th Panzer Corps.
- 81942.08.23Zubtsov and Karmanovo retaken
The 31st Army retook Zubtsov and the 20th Army Karmanovo.
- 91942.09.21Into northern Rzhev
Assault groups of the 30th Army broke into the northern part of Rzhev.
- 101942.11.25Operation Mars begins
The Kalinin and Western Fronts attacked at four points of the salient at once.
- 111942.12.08Stavka orders a renewed attack
The Stavka ordered Sychyovka taken by 15 December and Rzhev by the 23rd.
- 121943.01.17Velikiye Luki retaken
The Kalinin Front's 3rd Shock Army retook Velikiye Luki.
- 1943.02.06Hitler permits withdrawal
Hitler allowed the 9th Army and part of the 4th Army to withdraw from the salient.
- 131943.03.01Operation Büffel begins
At 7 p.m. the main German forces began falling back to the first withdrawal line.
- 141943.03.03Rzhev liberated
The 30th Army entered Rzhev after the Germans had left.
- 151943.03.08Kolodezki massacre
Retreating German troops locked 93 inhabitants of Kolodezki in the Tyomkino district in a house and burned them.
- 161943.03.12Vyazma liberated
The Western Front retook Vyazma.
- 172020.06.30Rzhev memorial opened
The Rzhev Memorial to the Soviet Soldier opened near Khoroshevo outside Rzhev.
Related people 22
Soviet Union (Red Army)14
Leadership3
Commanded the Western Front until August 1942 and coordinated both fronts in Operation Mars.
Kalinin and Western Front commanderIvan Konev1897–1973Commanded the Kalinin Front until August 1942, then the Western Front.
Supreme CommanderJoseph Stalin1878–1953Ordered the offensives repeatedly and approved Yefremov's final breakout route.
Participants8
Commanded the Kalinin Front from August 1942 in Mars and the 1943 pursuit.
33rd Army commanderMikhail Gr. Yefremov1897–1942Encircled near Vyazma, he took his own life in April 1942.
Chief of the General StaffAleksandr Vasilevsky1895–1977According to Zhukov, proposed the attack on the Rzhev salient together with him.
16th Army commanderKonstantin Rokossovsky1896–1968Fought around Sukhinichi in early 1942 and criticised the order to keep attacking.
30th Army commanderDmitry Lelyushenko1901–1987Led the summer 1942 attack north of Rzhev.
39th Army commanderIvan Maslennikov1900–1954Led the 39th Army behind Rzhev and was evacuated during Operation Seydlitz.
Western Front chief of staff and commanderVasily Sokolovsky1897–1968Western Front chief of staff in 1942 and its commander in the 1943 pursuit.
2nd Guards Cavalry Corps commanderVladimir Kryukov1897–1959Led his cavalry corps in the August 1942 Vazuza battles.
Witnesses & chroniclers3
Visited the Rzhev front in autumn 1942 and wrote about it.
Poet, war correspondentAleksandr Tvardovsky1910–1971Wrote the poem "I Was Killed Near Rzhev".
Participant, later Marshal of the Soviet UnionViktor Kulikov1921–2013Put the Red Army's losses in the Battle of Rzhev at over a million.
Germany (Wehrmacht)5
Leadership3
Held the salient from January 1942 and directed the Büffel withdrawal in 1943.
Army Group Centre commanderGünther von Kluge1882–1944Recommended abandoning the salient after Operation Mars.
German FührerAdolf Hitler1889–1945Insisted on holding the salient until permitting withdrawal in February 1943.
Participants1
Outside the camps
Witnesses & chroniclers1
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19