Stalin's Marshal of Victory, twice demoted for his own fame
At 00:43 Moscow time on 9 May 1945, at Karlshorst in Berlin, Zhukov signed Germany's unconditional surrender for the Soviet Union. On 24 June he took the salute at the Victory Parade on Red Square.
Born into a poor Russian peasant family at Strelkovka in Kaluga province, he was conscripted into the tsarist army in 1915, rose to junior sergeant in a dragoon regiment, joined the Red Army in 1918 and the party in 1919. He fought as a cavalry commander in the Civil War; at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 he encircled and destroyed the Japanese forces and became a Hero of the Soviet Union. Chief of the General Staff from February 1941, he commanded the defence of Leningrad and Moscow, and from August 1942 as deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief directed the Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin offensives. He accepted Germany's surrender in 1945, but was pushed to Odessa in 1946 and the Urals in 1948. Restored in 1953, he helped arrest Beria, served as Defence Minister from 1955, and was removed in 1957. His memoirs appeared in 1969; he died in hospital in 1974.
Activities and affiliations
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1939–
Soviet Union state institutionsMilitary and defenceMain
Military command- Minister of Defence of the USSR1955–1957
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–1974
Soviet Communist Party and Bolsheviks
Military command
Career Timeline
- 1915.08Conscripted into the imperial army, cavalry
- 1918.10Joins the Red Army (party member from March 1919)
- 1930.05–1931Commands 2nd Brigade, 7th Samara Cavalry Division, under Rokossovsky
- 1937Commands 3rd, then 6th Cossack Cavalry Corps
- 1939Defeats the Japanese at Khalkhin Gol
- 1940.06–1941.01Commander, Kiev Special Military District
- 1941.02–07Chief of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defence
- 1941.07–09Commands the Reserve Front; Yelnya offensive
- 1941.09–10Commands the Leningrad Front
- 1941.10–1942.08Commands the Western Front: defence of Moscow and counter-offensive
- 1942.08–1945Deputy Supreme Commander; Stavka representative at Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussia
- 1944.11–1945Commands the 1st Belorussian Front: Vistula–Oder and Berlin
- 1945Takes the German surrender; commands the occupation zone
- 1946.06–1948.02First disgrace: from Ground Forces commander to the Odessa district
- 1948.02–1953Commander, Urals Military District
- 1953–1957First Deputy Defence Minister; helps arrest Beria; Defence Minister 1955; removed 1957
- 1969.03Publishes his memoirs, Reminiscences and Reflections
The Soviet Politburo
- Candidate 1956.02–1957.06
- Full member 1957.06–1957.10
1957.10 removed · Ousted amid charges of Bonapartism
Related historical events
- 1914–1918First World WarTsarist cavalry junior sergeantConscripted into the tsarist army in 1915, he rose to junior sergeant in a dragoon regiment.
- 1938–1941The Soviet-Japanese Border Wars and the Neutrality PactCommander, 57th Special CorpsReplaced Feklenko as Khalkhin Gol commander on 5 June 1939, formed the 1st Army Group, and destroyed the Japanese 23rd Division by double envelopment in the August offensive.
- 1939.08–1940.08The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Partition of Eastern EuropeCommander of Soviet-Mongolian forces at Khalkhin GolIn August 1939, as the German-Soviet talks accelerated, he launched the general counter-offensive against the Kwantung Army at Khalkhin Gol, removing the threat in the east.
- 1941–1944Siege of LeningradCommander of the Leningrad FrontIn September 1941, Georgy Zhukov took command of the Leningrad Front and directed measures to prevent the front from collapsing and the city from being abandoned.
- 1941–1945The Great Patriotic WarDeputy Supreme CommanderHe directed and coordinated the defense of Moscow and the Stalingrad and Berlin operations, and accepted the German surrender at Karlshorst.
- 1941.07.07–09.26Battle of Kiev (1941)Chief of the General Staff (until 29 July)By his account proposed abandoning Kiev on 29 July and was removed as Chief of the General Staff.
- 1941.07.10–09.10Battle of Smolensk (1941)Commander of the Reserve FrontAfter his removal as Chief of the General Staff he took the Reserve Front and directed the counter-offensive against the Yelnya salient.
- 1941.09.30–1942.04.20Battle of MoscowCommander of the Western FrontCommanded the Western Front from 10 October through the Mozhaisk line and the November defence, then planned and led the counteroffensive; reportedly opposed the January general offensive. Clashed with Rokossovsky over a withdrawal to the Istra line.
- 1942–1943Battle of Stalingradco-planner of Operation UranusGeorgy Zhukov coordinated the double-envelopment concept of Operation Uranus with Aleksandr Vasilevsky, targeting the German flanks.
- 1942.01.08–1943.03.31The Battles of the Rzhev Salient (1942–1943)Western Front commander, Stavka representativeCommanded the Western Front until August 1942 and coordinated both fronts in Operation Mars.
- 1942.07.25–1943.10.09The Battle of the Caucasus (1942–1943)Stavka representativeCoordinated the North Caucasus Front's Krymskaya offensive in the Kuban in April-May 1943.
- 1943.07.05–08.23The Battle of KurskDeputy Supreme Commander and Stavka representativeProposed defence followed by counteroffensive in his letter of 8 April, coordinated the northern fronts as Stavka representative and ordered the pre-emptive bombardment of 5 July.
- 1943.08.26–12.23The Battle of the DnieperStavka representative (Voronezh and Steppe Fronts)Proposed cutting off the Germans in the Donbas rather than attacking head-on, without success. Coordinated the attack on Kiev, and was named in Stalin's directive as responsible for the Bukrin airborne failure.
- 1944–1948Poland: From the Lublin Committee to the United Workers' PartyStavka representative, commander of the 1st Belorussian FrontStavka representative who received the directive to take Lublin in July 1944; from January 1945 he commanded the 1st Belorussian Front, with the 1st Polish Army under it, through Warsaw, Pomerania and Berlin.
- 1944–1949Bulgaria: From the Fatherland Front to the Kostov TrialStavka representative who finalised the Bulgarian operationSent by Stalin to the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts in early September 1944, he finalised the plan to enter Bulgaria and, after the armistice request of the 6th, passed on the order to halt at a set line.
- 1944.01.24–02.17The Korsun–Cherkassy PocketStavka representative (coordinating both fronts)Put the encirclement plan to Stalin on 11 January and signed the surrender demand. From 12 February he was responsible for the outer ring, and in his memoirs criticised the change of command and the order that left out the 1st Ukrainian Front.
- 1944.03.04–04.17Right-Bank Ukraine in spring 1944: the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket and Manstein's dismissalCommander, 1st Ukrainian FrontLed the front from 1 March after Vatutin was wounded; in his memoir admitted misjudging the German breakout as heading south.
- 1944.08–10Warsaw UprisingStavka representativeReported on 6 August that the forces before Warsaw were insufficient, and on Stalin's orders returned to the 1st Belorussian Front on 15 September to organise the 1st Polish Army's crossing of the Vistula.
- 1944.08.29–10.28The Slovak National Uprising and the Carpathian–Dukla OperationDeputy Supreme CommanderVisited Konev's and Petrov's fronts on 19–20 September and reported to Stalin.
- 1945–1949East Germany: from Soviet military administration to the German Democratic RepublicFirst supreme chief of SMADHeaded SMAD and the Soviet forces in Germany from June 1945 to spring 1946.
- 1945.01.12–02.03The Vistula–Oder OffensiveCommander, 1st Belorussian FrontAttacked from the Magnuszew and Puławy bridgeheads, passed Warsaw, Łódź and Poznań and reached the Oder before Küstrin. Planned a dash on Berlin in February, but the Stavka chose to clear Pomerania first.
- 1945.02–08The Yalta and Potsdam ConferencesBehind the scenes at Potsdam as commander of the occupation of Berlin.
- 1945.02.10–04.04The East Pomeranian Offensive of 1945Commander of the 1st Belorussian FrontHaving reached the Oder he stopped Operation Solstice, then on 1 March struck north with his right wing to take Kolberg and western Pomerania. After the war he disputed with Chuikov over the decision not to push on to Berlin in February.
- 1945.04.16–05.02The Battle of Berlin and the Last Days of the FührerbunkerCommander of the 1st Belorussian FrontLed the main thrust from the Küstrin bridgehead, broke through the Seelow Heights at heavy cost and took central Berlin. Presided over the final German surrender at Karlshorst on 8 May.
- 1945.08The Soviet Entry into the War against JapanThe commander who crushed the Kwantung Army at Khalkhin GolHis 1939 destruction of the Kwantung Army at Khalkhin Gol collapsed the Japanese 'Strike North' faction, won Stalin's trust, and ensured Japan avoided direct conflict with the USSR thereafter.
- 1953The Fall of BeriaHe made the arrestWith army officers under his command, he arrested Beria in the meeting room.
- 1955The Founding of the Warsaw PactSoviet Defence Minister, 1955–1957The military was kept out while the Foreign Ministry drove the drafting; Zhukov was only tasked, at very short notice, with the unified-command document after the Central Committee fixed the conference date on April 1.
- 1956The Hungarian RevolutionDefense ministerAs defense minister, he backed the military intervention.
- 1956.02The Twentieth Party Congress and the Secret SpeechDefence minister · Khrushchev's military backerHe took part in Beria's arrest in 1953, flew to Warsaw with Khrushchev in 1956, and ordered the tanks into Hungary.
- 1957The Anti-Party GroupDecisive supportHe flew Central Committee members in to back Khrushchev, then was himself dismissed months later.
The 1937–1939 purges and the rupture of 1941
Zhukov gave his own explanation of the 1941 catastrophe: neither the People's Commissar nor he had the experience needed to prepare the armed forces for such a war, the experienced military cadres had been destroyed in 1937–1939, and the frequent turnover of senior command staff in the People's Commissariat of Defence and the General Staff before the war prevented sound plan development and a competent professional team. The purge atmosphere had touched him too. At a district party conference, as commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, he was accused of having 'failed to discern enemies of the people' and of being 'politically short-sighted'; he sent a telegram to Stalin and Voroshilov, received no answer, and was not further troubled. In a passage restored only in the uncut edition of his memoirs, Zhukov described a meeting of some eighty party activists of his division and corps at which he was accused of treating subordinates rudely and of training cadres by "hostile methods," and questioned about his closeness to Ieronim Uborevich and Danilo Serdich; he admitted only the rudeness, and the meeting resolved to "confine itself to discussion."
As Chief of the General Staff and deputy People's Commissar of Defence from February to July 1941, he took part in drafting the 'Considerations on the plan of strategic deployment of the forces of the USSR in case of war with Germany and its allies', dated no earlier than 15 May 1941. It proposed not to cede the initiative to the German command but to forestall the enemy in deployment and attack German forces while still deploying; Timoshenko and Zhukov reported its content to Stalin. The plan's fate is not settled: the document is unsigned although signature places are marked, and in a 26 May 1965 interview Zhukov said Stalin did not approve it but did not specify which plan was actually in force when the war began.
After the German attack of 22 June, Zhukov prepared Directives No. 2 (sent 07:15) and No. 3 (sent 23:50) of the People's Commissar of Defence, ordering counter-attacks. The border district commands could not fulfil these tasks because the troops had not been brought to combat readiness in time, and the offensive of 23–28 June turned into a series of ineffective counter-blows. After the loss of Smolensk, Zhukov was removed as Chief of the General Staff and given the Reserve Front, where he conducted the Yelnya offensive. In his memoirs he wrote that on 29 July he proposed to Stalin that Kiev be given up and the Southwestern Front pulled back behind the Dnieper; rebuked ("How could you think of surrendering Kiev to the enemy?"), he asked to be relieved, and on the 30th was appointed to the Reserve Front. Yelnya was the first successful Red Army offensive operation since the start of the war, at the cost of 31,853 Soviet troops out of 103,200 engaged.
By an order of 11 September he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front. According to his memoirs he flew to Leningrad on 10 September and took over that evening on the strength of Stalin's personal note, without an official order. On 17 September he ordered the military councils of the 42nd and 55th armies to shoot immediately any commanders, political workers and soldiers who left a defence line without orders, and on 22 September he sent an encrypted telegram to the 8th Army demanding that its command personally lead troops into battle and warning that commanders who abandoned Peterhof would be shot as 'cowards and traitors'. Some publications assert that on 28 September he sent encrypted telegram No. 4976 to Leningrad Front troops instructing that it be explained to all personnel that the families of those who surrendered to the enemy would be shot and that they themselves would be shot on return from captivity. Assessments of his command style differed. Pokrovsky recorded that dealings with army commanders became rude under Zhukov and that one heard more about 'having heads removed' than about fixing matters; Rokossovsky, recalling the defence of Moscow in a passage censored from the first edition of his memoirs, published in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal in 1989 and restored in the 1997 edition, wrote that no self-respecting commander has the right to insult subordinates, that Zhukov lacked this feeling, and that his personal 'I' often prevailed over common interests. At the same time Shtemenko recorded that Zhukov, a man of great generalship talent, bold and original in judgement and firm in carrying decisions through, could fairly sharply contradict Stalin when he felt he was right, which no one else dared do.
Command and the cost of victory
Georgy Zhukov mattered for more than winning individual battles. At Khalkhin Gol he coordinated armor and air power in an encirclement operation, and after Germany invaded in 1941 he helped hold the front together during the defense of Leningrad and Moscow. As a member of the high command, he then helped direct the offensives at Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin, concentrating forces and matériel as the strategic initiative shifted toward the Soviet side. His method valued operational scale and speed, but it cannot be separated from a harsh mobilization system that imposed enormous costs on soldiers and civilians. Zhukov should therefore be understood both as a highly capable operational commander and as a representative figure of a Soviet war effort that accepted extreme human costs for victory.
After the war, his reputation became both a source of military authority and a political liability. Stalin pushed him into peripheral commands, while Khrushchev used his authority during Beria's arrest and the ensuing reorganization of power in 1953. After clashing with the party leadership in 1957, Zhukov was removed from every post; in his memoirs he later presented his experience of the war and his tensions with the leadership. His career shows how a commander who exercised independent judgment in war remained subject to the political control of the party-state.
From the Istra to the Narew: Zhukov and Rokossovsky, 1941–1944
Zhukov and Konstantin Rokossovsky first met in 1924 at the Higher Cavalry School in Leningrad. From May 1930, for about a year, Zhukov commanded the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Samara Cavalry Division under Rokossovsky, who wrote in his November 1930 appraisal that Zhukov could usefully serve as a deputy division commander or commander of a mechanised formation but was unsuited to staff or teaching work, which he "organically hates." Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that Rokossovsky treated him "with great tact" and that he in turn valued Rokossovsky's military erudition and long experience of training and educating troops. In October 1941 the roles were reversed: Zhukov took over the Western Front, and Rokossovsky held the Volokolamsk direction under him with the 16th Army.
Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs that their working relations at the time were "not very good." In late November he asked to pull back behind the Istra reservoir; refused by Zhukov, he telegraphed the Chief of the General Staff, Boris Shaposhnikov, who approved the withdrawal. Before the order had reached all his troops, a telegram came from Zhukov: "I command the troops of the front! I cancel the order to withdraw behind the Istra reservoir." Rokossovsky obeyed, and, as he had foreseen, the Germans crossed the river and seized bridgeheads. A few nights later Stalin telephoned him, did not ask about his measures, and said, "Please hold out a little longer, we will help you"; by morning a Katyusha regiment and two anti-tank regiments had arrived. Zhukov's memoirs do not mention this dispute over the Istra reservoir.
Rokossovsky granted Zhukov a strong will and decisiveness, but thought the two of them understood differently how a commander should exercise his will. Passages censored from the first edition, published in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal in 1989 and restored in the 1997 edition, are harsher: Rokossovsky told Zhukov he would hang up if the insults on the telephone did not stop; Zhukov brought the neighbouring 5th Army commander, Leonid Govorov, to lecture Rokossovsky in front of his staff; and he tried to have Fyodor Zakharov, the 16th Army deputy commander who had lost Klin, prosecuted. Yet Rokossovsky also noted that Zhukov, too, was counting every battery in those days. Zhukov's memoirs also tell of taking Govorov to Rokossovsky, but give another reason: Stalin, angered by a false report that Dedovsk had fallen (the Germans held only a few houses in the village of Dedovo), ordered Zhukov to retake it in person and to bring Govorov, an artilleryman, to help organise the 16th Army's fire.
At Kursk in July 1943 Zhukov was with the Central Front as the Stavka representative. In the 1988 edition Rokossovsky wrote that Zhukov spent a long time with the front during the preparations, helped settle questions of principle, and, when there was no time to ask the Stavka before dawn on 5 July, left the decision on the artillery counter-preparation to him. A passage restored in the 1997 edition says instead that Zhukov arrived only on the eve of the battle; he was right to leave that decision to the front commander, but he reported to Stalin on the morning of 5 July and left at once, and his presence changed nothing. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that from late June he toured the 13th Army and the 2nd Tank Army with Rokossovsky and was at his headquarters on the evening of 4 July. When, after 2 a.m., Rokossovsky asked whether to report to the Stavka or order the counter-preparation, Zhukov answered: "Let's not lose time. Give the order as planned, and I will ring Stalin and report"; Stalin approved. He stayed at the Central Front command post until the morning of 9 July and, on Stalin's instruction, was at Bryansk Front headquarters that evening. It has also been objected that Rokossovsky's claim of a departure on the first day is not confirmed by documents.
Planning Operation Bagration in May 1944, Rokossovsky wrote, Stalin and his deputies insisted on a single main blow from the Rogachev bridgehead; twice told to step into the next room and think it over, he held out for two main blows. Zhukov replied in his memoirs that both blows had already been approved on 20 May on the General Staff's draft, before Rokossovsky arrived; Ivan Bagramyan, who was at the meeting, supported Rokossovsky's account.
A passage restored in the 1997 edition tells how in the autumn of 1944, in the triangle between the Narew and the Vistula, Zhukov as Stavka representative would not let the attacks stop, until Rokossovsky lay out with an assault battalion under the German barrage, called off the attack himself and had Stalin approve the decision. Zhukov's memoirs tell it the other way round: in early October, seeing the 47th Army attacking between Modlin and Warsaw, he asked Stalin to halt an offensive whose purpose he could not see; at the Kremlin Molotov objected, but Rokossovsky backed him on giving the troops a rest, and the switch to the defensive was approved. In mid-November Stalin moved him to the 2nd Belorussian Front and gave the 1st Belorussian Front to Zhukov. Rokossovsky asked why he was being taken off the main direction, and answered that Zhukov was a fully worthy choice. Zhukov wrote that Stalin told him of the change the day after that Kremlin meeting, and that he received the order in Lublin on 15 November and took command on the 16th; in a passage restored in the uncut edition he wrote that their long warm comradeship ended there; if Rokossovsky thought he had asked for the post, that was a deep misconception. Vasilevsky, in his memoirs, called Zhukov the most brilliant commander of the war and wrote that he constantly sought to teach commanders to win quickly and with the fewest losses.
26 June 1953 — the day Beria was arrested
26 June 1953, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee in the Kremlin. Lavrenti Beria strode in confidently. Three months since Stalin's death, Beria had already merged the MGB into his MVD, amnestied camp prisoners, and proposed to solve the East German uprising himself. He was a threat to everyone.
On Malenkov's pre-arranged signal, Marshal Georgy Zhukov and officers waited outside the meeting room with concealed weapons. Mid-session, Malenkov suddenly pressed a buzzer under the table. Zhukov entered with armed officers and approached Beria: 'Stand up. You are under arrest.'
Beria, momentarily stunned, asked 'What's going on?' before being disarmed. He was held in a cell in the Kremlin until nightfall and then smuggled out in the trunk of a car. On 23 December he was tried for treason and other charges by a special session of the USSR Supreme Court, with no defence counsel and no right of appeal, sentenced to death and shot. Zhukov had defeated Hitler's armies, but the most political moment of his life was walking through a Kremlin office door.