Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov

Георгий Константинович Жуков
Soviet Union state institutions Marxism–Leninism Soviet Union Russia 1896.12.2.–1974.6.18. ○ Natural causes

Stalin's Marshal of Victory, twice demoted for his own fame

At 00:43 Moscow time on 9 May 1945, at Karlshorst in Berlin, Zhukov signed Germany's unconditional surrender for the Soviet Union. On 24 June he took the salute at the Victory Parade on Red Square.

Born into a poor Russian peasant family at Strelkovka in Kaluga province, he was conscripted into the tsarist army in 1915, rose to junior sergeant in a dragoon regiment, joined the Red Army in 1918 and the party in 1919. He fought as a cavalry commander in the Civil War; at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 he encircled and destroyed the Japanese forces and became a Hero of the Soviet Union. Chief of the General Staff from February 1941, he commanded the defence of Leningrad and Moscow, and from August 1942 as deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief directed the Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin offensives. He accepted Germany's surrender in 1945, but was pushed to Odessa in 1946 and the Urals in 1948. Restored in 1953, he helped arrest Beria, served as Defence Minister from 1955, and was removed in 1957. His memoirs appeared in 1969; he died in hospital in 1974.

Activities and affiliations

Career Timeline

The Soviet Politburo

1957.10 removed · Ousted amid charges of Bonapartism

Related historical events

The 1937–1939 purges and the rupture of 1941

Zhukov gave his own explanation of the 1941 catastrophe: neither the People's Commissar nor he had the experience needed to prepare the armed forces for such a war, the experienced military cadres had been destroyed in 1937–1939, and the frequent turnover of senior command staff in the People's Commissariat of Defence and the General Staff before the war prevented sound plan development and a competent professional team. The purge atmosphere had touched him too. At a district party conference, as commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, he was accused of having 'failed to discern enemies of the people' and of being 'politically short-sighted'; he sent a telegram to Stalin and Voroshilov, received no answer, and was not further troubled. In a passage restored only in the uncut edition of his memoirs, Zhukov described a meeting of some eighty party activists of his division and corps at which he was accused of treating subordinates rudely and of training cadres by "hostile methods," and questioned about his closeness to Ieronim Uborevich and Danilo Serdich; he admitted only the rudeness, and the meeting resolved to "confine itself to discussion."

As Chief of the General Staff and deputy People's Commissar of Defence from February to July 1941, he took part in drafting the 'Considerations on the plan of strategic deployment of the forces of the USSR in case of war with Germany and its allies', dated no earlier than 15 May 1941. It proposed not to cede the initiative to the German command but to forestall the enemy in deployment and attack German forces while still deploying; Timoshenko and Zhukov reported its content to Stalin. The plan's fate is not settled: the document is unsigned although signature places are marked, and in a 26 May 1965 interview Zhukov said Stalin did not approve it but did not specify which plan was actually in force when the war began.

After the German attack of 22 June, Zhukov prepared Directives No. 2 (sent 07:15) and No. 3 (sent 23:50) of the People's Commissar of Defence, ordering counter-attacks. The border district commands could not fulfil these tasks because the troops had not been brought to combat readiness in time, and the offensive of 23–28 June turned into a series of ineffective counter-blows. After the loss of Smolensk, Zhukov was removed as Chief of the General Staff and given the Reserve Front, where he conducted the Yelnya offensive. In his memoirs he wrote that on 29 July he proposed to Stalin that Kiev be given up and the Southwestern Front pulled back behind the Dnieper; rebuked ("How could you think of surrendering Kiev to the enemy?"), he asked to be relieved, and on the 30th was appointed to the Reserve Front. Yelnya was the first successful Red Army offensive operation since the start of the war, at the cost of 31,853 Soviet troops out of 103,200 engaged.

By an order of 11 September he was appointed commander of the Leningrad Front. According to his memoirs he flew to Leningrad on 10 September and took over that evening on the strength of Stalin's personal note, without an official order. On 17 September he ordered the military councils of the 42nd and 55th armies to shoot immediately any commanders, political workers and soldiers who left a defence line without orders, and on 22 September he sent an encrypted telegram to the 8th Army demanding that its command personally lead troops into battle and warning that commanders who abandoned Peterhof would be shot as 'cowards and traitors'. Some publications assert that on 28 September he sent encrypted telegram No. 4976 to Leningrad Front troops instructing that it be explained to all personnel that the families of those who surrendered to the enemy would be shot and that they themselves would be shot on return from captivity. Assessments of his command style differed. Pokrovsky recorded that dealings with army commanders became rude under Zhukov and that one heard more about 'having heads removed' than about fixing matters; Rokossovsky, recalling the defence of Moscow in a passage censored from the first edition of his memoirs, published in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal in 1989 and restored in the 1997 edition, wrote that no self-respecting commander has the right to insult subordinates, that Zhukov lacked this feeling, and that his personal 'I' often prevailed over common interests. At the same time Shtemenko recorded that Zhukov, a man of great generalship talent, bold and original in judgement and firm in carrying decisions through, could fairly sharply contradict Stalin when he felt he was right, which no one else dared do.

Command and the cost of victory

Georgy Zhukov mattered for more than winning individual battles. At Khalkhin Gol he coordinated armor and air power in an encirclement operation, and after Germany invaded in 1941 he helped hold the front together during the defense of Leningrad and Moscow. As a member of the high command, he then helped direct the offensives at Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin, concentrating forces and matériel as the strategic initiative shifted toward the Soviet side. His method valued operational scale and speed, but it cannot be separated from a harsh mobilization system that imposed enormous costs on soldiers and civilians. Zhukov should therefore be understood both as a highly capable operational commander and as a representative figure of a Soviet war effort that accepted extreme human costs for victory.

After the war, his reputation became both a source of military authority and a political liability. Stalin pushed him into peripheral commands, while Khrushchev used his authority during Beria's arrest and the ensuing reorganization of power in 1953. After clashing with the party leadership in 1957, Zhukov was removed from every post; in his memoirs he later presented his experience of the war and his tensions with the leadership. His career shows how a commander who exercised independent judgment in war remained subject to the political control of the party-state.

From the Istra to the Narew: Zhukov and Rokossovsky, 1941–1944

Zhukov and Konstantin Rokossovsky first met in 1924 at the Higher Cavalry School in Leningrad. From May 1930, for about a year, Zhukov commanded the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Samara Cavalry Division under Rokossovsky, who wrote in his November 1930 appraisal that Zhukov could usefully serve as a deputy division commander or commander of a mechanised formation but was unsuited to staff or teaching work, which he "organically hates." Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that Rokossovsky treated him "with great tact" and that he in turn valued Rokossovsky's military erudition and long experience of training and educating troops. In October 1941 the roles were reversed: Zhukov took over the Western Front, and Rokossovsky held the Volokolamsk direction under him with the 16th Army.

Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs that their working relations at the time were "not very good." In late November he asked to pull back behind the Istra reservoir; refused by Zhukov, he telegraphed the Chief of the General Staff, Boris Shaposhnikov, who approved the withdrawal. Before the order had reached all his troops, a telegram came from Zhukov: "I command the troops of the front! I cancel the order to withdraw behind the Istra reservoir." Rokossovsky obeyed, and, as he had foreseen, the Germans crossed the river and seized bridgeheads. A few nights later Stalin telephoned him, did not ask about his measures, and said, "Please hold out a little longer, we will help you"; by morning a Katyusha regiment and two anti-tank regiments had arrived. Zhukov's memoirs do not mention this dispute over the Istra reservoir.

Rokossovsky granted Zhukov a strong will and decisiveness, but thought the two of them understood differently how a commander should exercise his will. Passages censored from the first edition, published in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal in 1989 and restored in the 1997 edition, are harsher: Rokossovsky told Zhukov he would hang up if the insults on the telephone did not stop; Zhukov brought the neighbouring 5th Army commander, Leonid Govorov, to lecture Rokossovsky in front of his staff; and he tried to have Fyodor Zakharov, the 16th Army deputy commander who had lost Klin, prosecuted. Yet Rokossovsky also noted that Zhukov, too, was counting every battery in those days. Zhukov's memoirs also tell of taking Govorov to Rokossovsky, but give another reason: Stalin, angered by a false report that Dedovsk had fallen (the Germans held only a few houses in the village of Dedovo), ordered Zhukov to retake it in person and to bring Govorov, an artilleryman, to help organise the 16th Army's fire.

At Kursk in July 1943 Zhukov was with the Central Front as the Stavka representative. In the 1988 edition Rokossovsky wrote that Zhukov spent a long time with the front during the preparations, helped settle questions of principle, and, when there was no time to ask the Stavka before dawn on 5 July, left the decision on the artillery counter-preparation to him. A passage restored in the 1997 edition says instead that Zhukov arrived only on the eve of the battle; he was right to leave that decision to the front commander, but he reported to Stalin on the morning of 5 July and left at once, and his presence changed nothing. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that from late June he toured the 13th Army and the 2nd Tank Army with Rokossovsky and was at his headquarters on the evening of 4 July. When, after 2 a.m., Rokossovsky asked whether to report to the Stavka or order the counter-preparation, Zhukov answered: "Let's not lose time. Give the order as planned, and I will ring Stalin and report"; Stalin approved. He stayed at the Central Front command post until the morning of 9 July and, on Stalin's instruction, was at Bryansk Front headquarters that evening. It has also been objected that Rokossovsky's claim of a departure on the first day is not confirmed by documents.

Planning Operation Bagration in May 1944, Rokossovsky wrote, Stalin and his deputies insisted on a single main blow from the Rogachev bridgehead; twice told to step into the next room and think it over, he held out for two main blows. Zhukov replied in his memoirs that both blows had already been approved on 20 May on the General Staff's draft, before Rokossovsky arrived; Ivan Bagramyan, who was at the meeting, supported Rokossovsky's account.

A passage restored in the 1997 edition tells how in the autumn of 1944, in the triangle between the Narew and the Vistula, Zhukov as Stavka representative would not let the attacks stop, until Rokossovsky lay out with an assault battalion under the German barrage, called off the attack himself and had Stalin approve the decision. Zhukov's memoirs tell it the other way round: in early October, seeing the 47th Army attacking between Modlin and Warsaw, he asked Stalin to halt an offensive whose purpose he could not see; at the Kremlin Molotov objected, but Rokossovsky backed him on giving the troops a rest, and the switch to the defensive was approved. In mid-November Stalin moved him to the 2nd Belorussian Front and gave the 1st Belorussian Front to Zhukov. Rokossovsky asked why he was being taken off the main direction, and answered that Zhukov was a fully worthy choice. Zhukov wrote that Stalin told him of the change the day after that Kremlin meeting, and that he received the order in Lublin on 15 November and took command on the 16th; in a passage restored in the uncut edition he wrote that their long warm comradeship ended there; if Rokossovsky thought he had asked for the post, that was a deep misconception. Vasilevsky, in his memoirs, called Zhukov the most brilliant commander of the war and wrote that he constantly sought to teach commanders to win quickly and with the fewest losses.

26 June 1953 — the day Beria was arrested

26 June 1953, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee in the Kremlin. Lavrenti Beria strode in confidently. Three months since Stalin's death, Beria had already merged the MGB into his MVD, amnestied camp prisoners, and proposed to solve the East German uprising himself. He was a threat to everyone.

On Malenkov's pre-arranged signal, Marshal Georgy Zhukov and officers waited outside the meeting room with concealed weapons. Mid-session, Malenkov suddenly pressed a buzzer under the table. Zhukov entered with armed officers and approached Beria: 'Stand up. You are under arrest.'

Beria, momentarily stunned, asked 'What's going on?' before being disarmed. He was held in a cell in the Kremlin until nightfall and then smuggled out in the trunk of a car. On 23 December he was tried for treason and other charges by a special session of the USSR Supreme Court, with no defence counsel and no right of appeal, sentenced to death and shot. Zhukov had defeated Hitler's armies, but the most political moment of his life was walking through a Kremlin office door.