1944.08–10

Warsaw Uprising

Why did the Home Army government-in-exile rise in Warsaw with the Red Army nearby, and how was the city destroyed?

The Warsaw Uprising was an armed rising by the Polish Home Army from 1 August to 2 October 1944 against German occupation, intended to liberate the capital and assert Polish sovereignty before Soviet forces and a Soviet-backed authority took control. The approaching Red Army, German evacuation measures, and the unresolved dispute between the London government-in-exile and the Soviet Union over Poland’s borders and government pushed the decision forward. The Home Army seized parts of the city and built an underground administration, but German reinforcements and mass violence against civilians turned the battle into a siege. Western airdrops were limited, while Soviet forces remained east of the Vistula and offered only restricted assistance in September. After 63 days the Home Army capitulated, and Germany deported the population and systematically demolished Warsaw.

Before a country was placed on two empires’ map

To understand 23 August 1939, one must first see what kind of Poland was placed on the negotiating table. The Second Polish Republic had been rebuilt from the partitions of the empires in 1918, then fixed between Germany and Soviet Russia through the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and the border wars of 1919–1921. Its population stood at about 35.1 million in 1939, but it was not a state of Poles alone. Ukrainians made up 13.9 percent, Ashkenazi Jews 10 percent, Belarusians 3.1 percent, and Germans 2.3 percent. The eastern countryside and western industrial districts were sharply unequal, while the state had to bind together different imperial legacies and borders through one army and administration. The Home Army that would later fight in Warsaw grew out of the effort to preserve these state institutions underground during the war.

Politically, the republic began as a parliamentary state but changed after Józef Piłsudski’s May 1926 coup into the authoritarian Sanacja, or “healing,” regime. After the 1935 constitution, the country was directed by President Ignacy Mościcki, Foreign Minister Józef Beck, and Commander-in-Chief Edward Rydz-Śmigły. The government imprisoned opponents and manipulated elections, while discrimination against Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Jews also intensified. The Polish ruling group of 1939 therefore cannot be turned into uncomplicated defenders of democracy. Yet its defence of sovereignty was not merely rhetoric. Germany sought to overturn the Versailles settlement and demanded Danzig and the Polish Corridor, while the Soviet state carried memories of the 1920 war and its own claims concerning the eastern frontier. Becoming a protectorate of either neighbour meant the disappearance of an independent state.

The crisis acquired a military shape when Britain and France guaranteed Polish independence in March 1939 and Adolf Hitler repudiated the 1934 German-Polish declaration of non-aggression in April. Warsaw expected Western assistance, but it also refused to accept Soviet troops entering or crossing Polish territory to fight Germany. Moscow believed the West wanted to divert German aggression eastward, while London and Paris distrusted Soviet military power. In that deadlock, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 23 August. The public treaty promised ten years of mutual non-aggression, but its Secret Additional Protocol divided Poland into German and Soviet spheres. The frontier was not yet fixed by battle, but the right to decide Poland’s existence had already been exercised outside Poland. The dual occupation of September, and the exile government, underground state, and Home Army that followed, began under conditions created by that document.

Poland Disappearing Between Two Agreements

Poland in 1939 was not simply a country defeated by two armies. The secret supplementary protocol to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed in Moscow on 23 August divided Poland into German and Soviet spheres of influence, turning a public promise of non-aggression into an agreement about borders and power. When Germany invaded from the west on 1 September, the Soviet Union entered from the east on 17 September. The Soviet government said that the Polish state had collapsed and could no longer protect Ukrainians and Belarusians, so the Red Army was acting to provide security. In practice, occupation brought annexation wrapped in the form of elections, arrests, and deportations. Polish officers, police, officials, and intellectuals in the east were treated as potential organizers of resistance to the new order. On 5 March 1940, Stalin and leading Politburo members approved the execution of 25,700 Polish prisoners in camps and prisons. The result was the Katyn massacre and killings at Kalinin, Kharkiv, and other sites. This was not merely the removal of prisoners of war. It targeted the human infrastructure from which a Polish state might be rebuilt after the war.

The situation changed briefly after Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Sikorski-Mayski Agreement of 30 July 1941 stated that the territorial changes imposed by the 1939 German-Soviet treaties had lost their validity, and provided for the restoration of diplomatic relations, the formation of a Polish army on Soviet territory, and an amnesty for Polish citizens detained there. The London government accepted it as a practical truce against a common enemy. Yet Moscow did not accept the prewar frontier as settled, and it did not explain what had happened to the missing officers. On 13 April 1943, German radio announced the discovery of graves in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk. The Polish government-in-exile asked the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate. For the Polish side, confirming the fate of the missing and establishing Soviet responsibility could take priority over preserving a cooperation whose political foundations were already broken. The Soviet government called the request collusion with Germany, blamed the killings on German forces, and broke relations with the government-in-exile on 25 April. In Soviet security terms, the London government was not only an ally but also a rival claimant to Poland's postwar borders and state power. Katyn therefore became more than the exposure of an earlier crime. It became a wartime rupture over who could speak for Poland. Later Soviet documents confirmed responsibility for the executions and their concealment, but by 1943 the question of whether the Home Army would be liberated alongside the Soviet advance, or whether a separate Soviet-backed authority would take power, was already being shaped by this distrust.

The State They Tried to Establish Before Liberation

When the Red Army crossed Poland’s prewar frontier on 4 January 1944, the Home Army faced a problem that could not be solved by simply choosing between Germany and the Soviet Union. The defeat of the German occupation was impossible without the Soviet advance, yet relations between the London government-in-exile and Moscow had been broken after Katyn. Operation Tempest, conceived under Home Army commander Stefan Rowecki and carried forward by Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, turned that contradiction into an operational plan. As German forces retreated, the Home Army would attack them from the rear and reveal its civilian administration just before the Red Army arrived. The aim was to show that the London government’s representatives remained the sovereign authority in Poland. The Home Army could cooperate tactically with Soviet forces, but it would not surrender command or the legal identity of the Polish state.

This decision cannot be explained by military necessity alone. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, speaking for the exile authorities, warned that the Soviet Union might turn Poland into a dependent state, even a seventeenth Soviet republic. An earlier, more cautious position associated with Władysław Sikorski had been to greet Soviet troops as allies for the moment, reveal the administration if hostility became unmistakable, and withdraw the armed units in order to save them. Leaders inside Poland reached the opposite conclusion: if they remained invisible, a Soviet-backed organization could take the state in the name of liberation. This was not an abstract fear. On 13 July, in Vilnius, Home Army commanders who had cooperated in defeating German forces were arrested after being invited to negotiations, while their soldiers faced disarmament and forced enlistment. Tempest did inflict real losses on Germany, but its success also gave Soviet security organs a reason to eliminate the Home Army as an independent claimant to state power.

The conflict became an open contest between authorities on 21 July. The Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation presented the State National Council as the sole legal source of power, and in its July Manifesto denounced the London government and its underground delegation as illegal. The manifesto promised land reform, confiscation of German property, and restoration of the 1921 Constitution, while insisting that no other administration could operate on Polish soil once it was liberated. For some peasants and anti-German Poles, that language offered social reform and national reconstruction. To London, however, it was not the program of a negotiating partner but the declaration of a rival government already occupying liberated territory. The lesson of Tempest was therefore double. The Home Army proved that Poles could fight Germany as an organized national force, but when Soviet troops arrived, military courage alone could not decide who would translate that victory into state power.

They were not merely waiting for help, they were trying to seize sovereignty first

The approval on 25 July was not issued from military optimism alone. Home Army commander Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski and the government delegate Jan Jankowski saw two timetables colliding. German authorities had begun withdrawing institutions and stores from Warsaw amid the collapse of the Eastern Front, yet on 27 July they ordered 100,000 Polish men and women to build fortifications around the city. The apparent gap would last only until German forces reorganized their defence. The Polish leaders calculated that a rising could last only a few days before the Red Army crossed the Vistula. But the deeper calculation was political. The Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation had just denounced the government-in-exile as usurpers. If Warsaw were liberated under the Home Army and the Underground State's administration, London could demonstrate that Poland had expelled Germany through its own authority. If Soviet troops entered first, liberation could instead be translated into rule by the Lublin Committee.

There was evidence against this decision. The Home Army had far too few weapons for its numbers and possessed no artillery, tanks, or aircraft. Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, a courier who had just returned from London, warned that Western aid would be limited, but the leadership judged that the short interval between German withdrawal and Soviet arrival outweighed the danger. Soviet signals pushed the judgement further. On 29 July, Moscow's Radio Station Kosciuszko declared that “the hour of action has struck” and called on Warsaw to attack the Germans and show the Red Army routes across the Vistula. It would be too simple to say that the Home Army treated this as a binding promise of a joint Soviet assault. The broadcast nevertheless gave an already political decision the appearance of immediate military necessity.

Events began to disprove the calculation that same day. Forward Soviet armoured units commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky reached Warsaw's eastern approaches but were counterattacked by the German 39th Panzer Corps and 4th SS Panzer Corps. The Soviet armies were not yet in a position to encircle the city, and communication with the Home Army could not be maintained except through London or Moscow. The late-July decision was therefore not simply the error of believing that victory was certain because Soviet troops were nearby. It was a choice of danger, made under the fear that missing the last chance to act against the occupation would mean losing the political subject of the postwar state itself. The attempt allowed Poles to establish authority in their own capital first, but it also tied the city's survival to inadequate arms and an uncertain ally.

Within five days, the war was aimed at the population itself

At 5 p.m. on 1 August, the Home Army began its rising under tighter conditions than its planners had expected. Antoni Chruściel, commander of the Warsaw District, mobilized roughly 45,000 people, but only about one in four had weapons. The Germans had around 25,000 troops, supported by artillery, tanks, and aircraft. The first attacks linked the city centre, the Old Town, and several outer districts, yet they did not eliminate German strongpoints such as police headquarters, the airport, and the bridges. The decision still had an internal logic. The commanders believed that a short uprising could seize the capital’s administration and communications while German control was breaking, turning the London government-in-exile’s national authority into an accomplished fact before Soviet troops entered. They paid for this calculation with an underestimation of German will and military capacity.

German repression deliberately targeted civilians under Hitler’s and Himmler’s orders to destroy Warsaw and its population. From 5 August, SS and police units carried out mass executions in Wola; Dirlewanger’s SS special regiment, serving in Reinefarth’s battle group, participated. USHMM estimates approximately 40,000 deaths on 5–7 August, while the Museum of the Second World War presents estimates for the Wola massacre ranging from 15,000 to 65,000. These figures reflect differing scopes and evidence, rather than a settled total. USHMM, Museum of the Second World War.

The first five days therefore brought the Home Army’s political gamble, to take the capital before liberation arrived, into collision with Germany’s punitive campaign to remove a population as an example. The Home Army had not defeated every armed German position, while German forces used the rising to expand their existing colonial terror into the planned destruction of an entire city. The Wola massacre showed that civilians were not merely collateral victims but targets of German operations, making the subsequent fighting impossible to judge only as a contest of military success and failure.

Hospital massacres and violence in Ochota

Hospitals in Wola offered no reliable refuge. On 5 August, SS troops murdered the director, a physician and the chaplain of Wolski Hospital, then marched patients and staff to execution sites. At St Lazarus Hospital that day, troops belonging to Dirlewanger’s assault group massacred wounded people, staff and refugees and set the buildings alight. These were crimes directed at protected people, not simply incidental battle casualties. Hospital histories and survivor testimony.

In Ochota, the separate RONA regiment committed murder, rape and looting. Its crimes must be distinguished from those of Dirlewanger’s formation in Wola to identify the units and commanders responsible. Warsaw Uprising Remembrance Association.

Deportation and destruction after capitulation

German authorities also expelled civilians to the Dulag 121 transit camp outside Warsaw, sending some onward to concentration camps and forced labour. Expulsion and systematic destruction continued after the 2 October capitulation. Civilian suffering therefore extended beyond those killed during the uprising to deportees, forced labourers and survivors deprived of their homes. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

The 1st Belorussian Front east of the Vistula: what happened in August

When the rising broke out, the Soviet force facing Warsaw was the 1st Belorussian Front under Konstantin Rokossovsky, which had just crossed Belarus into Poland in Operation Bagration, begun at the end of June. In his memoir A Soldier's Duty (Soviet edition of 1988) Rokossovsky wrote that the front's right wing had advanced more than 600 kilometres in that operation, and that taking Warsaw, with its strong fortifications and large garrison, needed time to bring the troops up to strength and move up the rear. He gives the front's positions on 1 and 2 August as follows. The 48th and 65th Armies were fighting more than 100 kilometres east and north-east of Warsaw; the 70th Army had just taken Brest and was clearing out encircled German troops; the 47th Army was fighting near Siedlce facing north. The 2nd Tank Army was beating off German armoured counterattacks before Praga, the Warsaw suburb on the east bank of the Vistula, while the Polish 1st Army, the 8th Guards Army and the 69th Army had crossed the Vistula south of Warsaw at Magnuszew and Puławy and were widening their bridgeheads, the main task of the front's left wing. Rokossovsky, ch. 20

The fighting before Praga went badly for the Soviets. According to Rokossovsky, the Germans aimed at the gap between Praga and Siedlce, gathered the 4th Panzer Division, the Hermann Göring Panzer Division, the 19th Panzer Division and the 73rd Infantry Division, and ran into the 2nd Tank Army coming up from the south. Commanded by its chief of staff after Semyon Bogdanov was wounded, the 2nd Tank Army held on with difficulty against Germans backed by the Warsaw fortified area. The account in the English Wikipedia, which draws on German and Polish material as well, agrees in outline. The 2nd Tank Army's spearhead, which had reached Wołomin 15 kilometres east of Warsaw at the end of July, was pushed back about 10 kilometres in the battle of Radzymin and had suffered heavy losses by about 10 August. Since one of the triggers of the Home Army command's decision to rise was a false report that Soviet tanks were entering Praga, this counterattack coincides with the start of the rising. On 9 August Stalin told Stanisław Mikołajczyk, prime minister of the government-in-exile, that the Soviets had planned to be in Warsaw by 6 August but had been stopped by a counterattack of four panzer divisions. English Wikipedia

Rokossovsky wrote that he heard of the rising only on 2 August, through the intelligence services, and that at first he suspected a rumour spread by the Germans. "Frankly speaking, the worst possible time to start a rising was precisely the time at which it started." He claimed that the leaders of the rising did not intend to join forces with the approaching Soviet and Polish troops and were following London's instruction to take power in the capital before the Soviet army arrived. He also recalled an earlier meeting in the woods north of Lublin with a Home Army unit whose officers said: "We will not use our weapons against the Red Army, but we want no contact with it either." The other side's record gives a different picture. According to research cited in the English Wikipedia, the Soviets first heard of a possible rising from Mikołajczyk on the night of 31 July, about three hours after Bór-Komorowski had given the order to begin it. The Home Army sought tactical cooperation with the Soviet army without handing over the legitimacy of the London government, while the Soviet Union dealt only with the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin. Both sides' records agree that there was no contact between the leaders of the rising and the front; they differ on who was to blame. Rokossovsky, ch. 20 English Wikipedia

On 8 August Georgy Zhukov and Rokossovsky submitted a plan to Stalin: after a pause of a few days to rest and bring up the rear, the right wing would seize a bridgehead on the Narew between 10 and 20 August, and then, not before about 25 August, a large operation would encircle Warsaw from two bridgeheads to the north and south, with the capture of the city itself left to the Polish army. According to the Russian Wikipedia the plan made no provision for coordination with the insurgents, and the historians Boris Sokolov and Eugeniusz Duraczyński hold that no orders followed from it. The National WWII Museum's account says Stalin rejected the plan Zhukov had approved. On 29 August the Stavka halted the 1st Belorussian Front's offensive except on its right wing. That wing pushed to the Narew in early September, and according to Rokossovsky the Don Tank Corps of the 65th Army crossed the river near Pułtusk on 5 September. Zhukov's memoir, Reminiscences and Reflections, does not mention this plan of 8 August. After describing a visit to the Magnuszew bridgehead at this time, he writes that on 23 August he was recalled by the Stavka to prepare for war with Bulgaria, and he does not treat the August fighting before Warsaw. Zhukov, ch. 20 Russian Wikipedia National WWII Museum Rokossovsky, ch. 20

Rokossovsky gave the same line of explanation during the war. According to the British journalist Alexander Werth's Russia at War (1964) and the studies that cite it, he told Werth on 26 August that the rising had been a bad mistake and would have made sense only if the Red Army had been ready to enter Warsaw.

Zhukov's memoir describes in detail what happened in early October, just after the rising ended. Sent to the Warsaw sector by Stalin, Zhukov visited Perkhorovich's 47th Army, which was attacking between Modlin and Warsaw. Advancing over open ground, it had lost heavily and was exhausted and weakened; the neighbouring 70th Army, fighting in the Serock–Pułtusk sector, was no better off. He wrote that he could not see the operational purpose of this attack. Rokossovsky agreed with him, but Stalin was demanding that the 47th Army reach the Vistula between Modlin and Warsaw and that the bridgeheads on the Narew be widened. When Zhukov asked by telephone for permission to halt the offensive and go over to the defensive, Stalin summoned them both to Moscow. There Molotov asked whether it was sensible to stop the offensive at a moment when the beaten enemy could not hold back the Soviet advance; Zhukov replied that the enemy had already built up a defence and brought up reserves, and that the Soviets were suffering losses that nothing justified. The area north-west of Warsaw, he said, was not much needed operationally; the city should be taken by going round it from the south-west while preparing a powerful splitting blow towards Łódź and Poznań. Stalin sent the two men out to the library next door to think again, then called them back and agreed to the switch to the defensive. Passages restored in the later uncut edition add that Beria (People's Commissar of Internal Affairs) joined in with a sneer at Zhukov, that in the library Rokossovsky said "Didn't you feel how Beria was egging Stalin on? I know what Beria is capable of, I have been in his cells," and that Malenkov came in to say he would back them. Zhukov, ch. 20

The memoir of Sergei Shtemenko, then head of the Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, The General Staff in the War Years (1989 edition), shows the same August from the Moscow side. According to him Mikołajczyk, who left London on 27 July, met emissaries from Warsaw in Cairo on the 28th, yet on 31 July at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs he said only that the exile government was "considering" a plan for a general rising and asked for the airfields near Warsaw to be bombed, saying nothing of a rising whose start was already set. Aleksei Antonov of the General Staff was sometimes called into the talks. After Mikołajczyk spoke of the insurgents' shortage of arms at his last meeting with Stalin on 9 August, Stalin told Rokossovsky over the high-frequency telephone to re-examine the Warsaw operation and, as a first step, to send the insurgents weapons and drop a parachutist with a radio to make contact. Shtemenko wrote that the parachutist, not knowing where the insurgents were, fell straight into German hands. Earlier, on 6 August, Zhukov and the front's military council had reported that they lacked the forces to break the German grouping from Sokołów Podlaski to Wołomin and Praga, asked to commit the 70th Army just placed in reserve and for three days to prepare, and said that the offensive could not begin before 10 August because ammunition had to be brought up. The General Staff agreed and the Stavka gave permission, but the situation did not change. Shtemenko, vol. 2, ch. 3

Shtemenko recorded the thoughts Stalin voiced aloud, pacing his office, at a night briefing in early September, vouching "for the general sense" though not the exact words. The responsibility for the rising lay with the exile government in London; an impartial commission should establish on whose order it began and why the Soviet command was not told in advance; air drops were a low-yield form of help, but if Churchill and Roosevelt insisted, they could be made jointly by a plan agreed beforehand. On 29 August the three Belorussian Fronts and the 1st and 4th Ukrainian Fronts were ordered over to a firm defence, the only exceptions being the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, which had Warsaw as its task, and two armies of the 2nd Belorussian Front south of East Prussia. Shtemenko portrayed the Home Army command and the exile government who decided on the rising as "adventurers", and the Warsaw citizens and communist People's Army fighters as heroes. This judgement of a Soviet memoir is one side's account against the records of the London side. He put the Home Army in Warsaw at 16,000, of whom 3,500 had weapons; the research summarised by English Wikipedia estimates the Home Army of the Warsaw district at 20,000 to 49,000. Shtemenko, vol. 2, ch. 3 English Wikipedia

Praga and the Czerniaków crossing: the Soviet army and the Polish 1st Army in September

In September the situation east of Warsaw changed. According to Rokossovsky, the SS panzer divisions Wiking and Totenkopf, the 19th Panzer Division and about two infantry divisions remained in the forefield east of Warsaw and threatened the Soviet bridgeheads on the Vistula and the Narew; once the 70th Army arrived, the front gathered the 47th and 70th Armies, part of the Polish 1st Army and the 16th Air Army to attack Praga. The attack began on 10 to 11 September and Praga was taken on the 14th. By then the Germans had blown up all the Vistula bridges. Rokossovsky wrote that this was the right moment for a rising: "That was when the most suitable time for a rising in the Polish capital came!" Had the front struck from the east while the insurgents struck from inside the city and seized the bridges, he argued, Warsaw could have been liberated and held, though even in the best circumstances the front could have done no more than that. The other side reads the same facts differently. The English Wikipedia notes that the German 73rd Infantry Division holding Praga was a weak formation and that the Soviets took the suburb in three days, and argues that a crossing would have been much easier had this attack come in early August, when the insurgents held long stretches of the riverbank. By mid-September German attacks had reduced their riverside foothold to a narrow strip in Czerniaków. Rokossovsky, ch. 20 Russian Wikipedia English Wikipedia

The memoir also records a high-frequency telephone call from Stalin at this time. Asked whether the front could now mount an operation to liberate Warsaw, Rokossovsky said it could not; Stalin then asked him to give the insurgents what help he could and approved his proposals. "The awareness that it was impossible to undertake a large operation to rescue the insurgents was agonising," he wrote. The help he lists is this. From 13 September Po-2 night bombers flew low to drop weapons, ammunition, food and medicine at points the insurgents named. From 13 September to 1 October the front's aviation flew 4,821 sorties in support of the rising, 2,535 of them carrying supplies. Anti-aircraft guns covered the insurgents' districts against German aircraft, field artillery engaged German batteries, and liaison and spotting officers were dropped into the city by parachute. The Russian Wikipedia records that on 15 September 172 field guns and 88 anti-aircraft guns were in position on the east bank, rising to 622 guns and mortars by the 19th, but that by then the stocks of shells were spent and fire was down to 20 to 25 rounds per gun a day. Rokossovsky, ch. 20 Russian Wikipedia

The most direct help on the ground was the crossing by the Polish 1st Army under Zygmunt Berling, a Polish force raised in the Soviet Union and fighting under Soviet command. On the night of 14 to 15 September patrols crossed to Czerniaków and Powiśle and made contact with the Home Army, and battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment of the 3rd Infantry Division followed. Soviet artillery and air support could not silence the German machine guns trained on the men crossing the river, and in attempts that went on until 23 September the Poles lost most of their landing boats and crossing equipment. Of about 900 men who reached the far bank, only a handful came back to the east bank; the attempt to help the rising cost the Polish 1st Army 5,660 killed, missing or wounded. Berling was soon removed from command by his Soviet superiors. The Russian Wikipedia gives the losses of the whole 1st Belorussian Front in August and September as 171,665 and those of the Polish 1st Army as 7,371. English Wikipedia Russian Wikipedia

Rokossovsky explained the crossing differently. He dates the landing to 16 September and writes that its time and place and the artillery and air support had been agreed in advance with the leaders of the rising, that the Poles were to land on stretches of bank held by the insurgents, and that on landing they found Germans there instead. He claimed that Bór-Komorowski and Antoni Chruściel (code name Monter), commander of the Warsaw district, had pulled Home Army units back from the riverbank into the city just before the landing without warning the units of the communist underground People's Army in the same area. Judging that the troops could not hold on the west bank, he stopped the operation, and by 23 September the units of three infantry regiments had returned to the east bank. This is the claim of a Soviet memoir. The account summarised in the English Wikipedia says the landed troops made contact with the Home Army in Czerniaków and Powiśle and held the riverbank together with it, and that German attacks had already narrowed the insurgents' riverside positions. Rokossovsky also wrote that Bór-Komorowski never tried to contact the front headquarters directly although the General Staff had given him a code, and that the front's offers to evacuate people to the east bank were ignored. According to the Russian Wikipedia, at the end of September the 2nd Division of the Polish 1st Army prepared to bring the Home Army group in Żoliborz across the river, but its commander declined once he received the Home Army command's order to surrender. Rokossovsky, ch. 20 English Wikipedia Russian Wikipedia

Zhukov's memoir takes the same side. Returning from Bulgaria at the end of September, he was sent by Stalin to the Warsaw sector, and he records what he found. The front command and the command of the Polish 1st Army had received no advance warning from Bór-Komorowski, the leader of the rising, and the Soviets learned of it after the fact from local people who had crossed the Vistula. On Stalin's instructions Rokossovsky sent two officers by parachute to Bór-Komorowski to establish contact and coordinate action, but he refused to receive them and their fate remained unknown. When Soviet and Polish troops crossed the river and seized part of the Warsaw riverbank, the leaders of the rising again made no attempt to work with them; about a day later the Germans brought up strong forces and pressed them back, and after heavy losses the front command withdrew the troops to its own bank. Zhukov concludes that "our troops did everything in their power to help the insurgents," adding that before and after the withdrawal the front kept dropping food, medicine and ammunition from aircraft, and that false reports in the Western press misled public opinion. It is a Soviet account at odds with the English Wikipedia's, in which the landed troops made contact with the Home Army on the riverbank and fought alongside it. Zhukov, ch. 20

Setting Rokossovsky's account beside the opposing view narrows the dispute. Western research largely accepts that the 2nd Tank Army was thrown back by the German armoured counterattack in early August and that the front was worn out by its long advance. The main criticism from Polish and Western scholarship is that two things cannot be explained by military circumstances alone: Stalin's calling the insurgents "a handful of criminals" and refusing on 22 August the Western request for Allied aircraft to land on Soviet airfields, and the failure of the Soviet main force to cross the river even after taking Praga in three days in mid-September. Rokossovsky's memoir is a Soviet edition of 1988, and his portrait of the rising's leaders as "politicians" following London's orders matches the official Soviet view of the time. English Wikipedia

Shtemenko's memoir adds the General Staff's side of September. On the afternoon of 13 September, after a report from Shtemenko and Antonov, Stalin ordered the air supply stepped up; Shtemenko wrote that the first drops succeeded that night and regular supply began two days later. At the same meeting Stalin accepted Rokossovsky's report that Warsaw could not be liberated now, and sent Zhukov, just back from the Ukrainian fronts, to the 1st Belorussian Front again to see whether a "partial operation" across the Vistula by Berling's troops could be mounted. In Stalin's words as Shtemenko gives them, the Poles were "still people without experience", so Zhukov should set them their task in person together with Rokossovsky and help them organise it. Zhukov flew out on the 15th and on the morning of the 16th visited the 1st Polish Army's command post in Praga with Rokossovsky, where Berling reported that he had sent a battalion of 500 men across to Czerniaków with nine heavy machine guns, sixteen 82 mm mortars and one 45 mm gun. Zhukov's report to the Stavka that evening proposed that Berling's main force take the southern part of the city below Jerusalem Avenue and Third of May Avenue, that if contact were made with the insurgent group holding the north the city be enveloped from both sides, and that if things went well a reinforced rifle corps of the 47th Army be added to create a "Warsaw bridgehead". Shtemenko, vol. 2, ch. 3

On liaison, Shtemenko wrote that the General Staff passed Bór-Komorowski the documents needed for contact through London, that on 15 September a Home Army radio officer in Żoliborz reported he had been charged with establishing radio contact with the Red Army in Praga, and that drops could thereafter be made on agreed points. Major General N. M. Molotkov, head of the General Staff's representatives with the Polish army, crossed with Colonel Yevseyev in the first echelon of the 3rd Infantry Division. On 21 September Molotkov reported that contact had been lost with the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Regiment after it called artillery fire onto its own position at 8.30 that morning, and with a battalion of the 8th Regiment. On 20 September seven officers from the staff of Antoni Chruściel ("Monter"), the Warsaw district commander, came over to Praga to contact the Red Army and Polish commands. Shtemenko wrote that one of them said Bór-Komorowski had issued a secret order to force units loyal to the Lublin government to obey his orders, a claim reported in his book. After the general German assault of 28 September the last liaison officers of the 1st Polish Army left the insurgents' headquarters, and on 30 September a plan to evacuate Żoliborz across the river was overtaken by the Home Army's order to capitulate; only a small group under Major Szaniawski crossed in boats brought by the Polish army. Shtemenko, vol. 2, ch. 3

The figures for air supply differ between sources. Shtemenko wrote that from 14 September to 1 October the aviation of the 1st Belorussian Front flew 2,243 sorties to Warsaw and dropped 156 mortars, 505 anti-tank rifles, 2,667 submachine guns and rifles, 3 million cartridges, about 42,000 hand grenades, 500 kilograms of medicines and over 113 tonnes of food. This differs from the 2,535 supply sorties given by Rokossovsky and the 131 tonnes of food in the section below. Soviet aircraft dropped by night from 150–200 metres, guided by signals from the ground. Of the American B-17 daylight drop of 18 September, Shtemenko wrote that nearly a thousand parachutes opened from about 4,000 metres but no more than twenty reached the insurgents; Western figures have 288 of 1,284 containers reaching the Home Army. Shtemenko, vol. 2, ch. 3

Why aid from the sky could not break the blockade

What the insurgents needed was not food alone. Once ammunition, radios, and anti-tank weapons ran short, resistance groups in each district became isolated inside the German encirclement. For the government-in-exile in London and the Western air forces, therefore, an airlift was not symbolic consolation. It was the material condition for continuing the fight. On 4 August, Winston Churchill informed Iosif Stalin that 60 tons of equipment and ammunition would be dropped in south-western Warsaw. The British presented this not as an endorsement of every political aim of the uprising, but as aid to Polish resistance against Germany and as an Allied obligation. Yet the operation had to begin from Brindisi and other bases in Italy. A round trip of roughly 2,100 kilometres crossed German-held territory and the Carpathians, then required aircraft to approach at night and at low altitude, without fighter escort, amid fires and anti-aircraft fire over a city in combat. Even a safe arrival did not guarantee an accurate drop. The Home Army recovered roughly half of the supplies sent in the Western operations of August and September. In all, 41 British, Polish, South African, and American aircraft and about 360 airmen were lost. It was a brutal exchange, roughly one bomber for each ton delivered.

The more decisive obstacle was not the distance alone, but the lack of a place to land. The United States and Britain wanted to use Soviet-held airfields such as Poltava to refuel, rearm, and send aircraft out again. On 18 August, however, the Soviet People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated that the Soviet government did not object to British or American aircraft dropping supplies near Warsaw, but would not permit them to land on Soviet territory. From the Soviet standpoint, this drew a boundary: the state would not become militarily associated with an adventure led by the London government. Soviet officials also had genuine operational concerns after Poltava had been badly damaged by a German raid in June 1944, including the safety and defence of the airfields. But the cost of the decision was paid by the insurgents. Soviet permission for Western aircraft to land came only after 9 September. On 18 September, a large US Eighth Air Force daylight drop reached Warsaw at high altitude, and strong winds meant that only 288 of 1,284 containers reached the Home Army. Soviet aircraft began their own drops on the night of 13 September, but at first released containers without parachutes, damaging supplies or sending them into German-held positions. Around 2,500 Soviet sorties delivered 131 tons of food along with ammunition, grenades, and medicine, but this was not the same as a ground offensive to break the siege. An attempt by part of the Polish force under Soviet command to cross the Vistula did not expand into a bridgehead.

Primary text

The Warsaw Uprising 1944: Fifteen Soviet–British–American Diplomatic DocumentsСталин — Черчиллю (16 августа 1944 г., из послания)

16 августа 1944 г.
Секретно и лично

1. После беседы с г. Миколайчиком я распорядился, чтобы Командование Красной Армии интенсивно сбрасывало вооружение в район Варшавы. Был также сброшен парашютист-связной, который, как докладывает командование, не добился цели, так как был убит немцами.

В дальнейшем, ознакомившись ближе с варшавским делом, я убедился, что варшавская акция представляет безрассудную ужасную авантюру, стоящую населению больших жертв. Этого не было бы, если бы советское командование было информировано до начала варшавской акции и если бы поляки поддерживали с последним контакт.

При создавшемся положении советское командование пришло к выводу, что оно должно отмежеваться от варшавской авантюры, так как оно не может нести ни прямой, ни косвенной ответственности за варшавскую акцию. [...]

It therefore misses the point to say simply that the West did nothing or that the Soviet Union did nothing. The West took serious risks to deliver supplies, but distance and recovery rates made the airlift incapable of sustaining the uprising. The Soviet Union eventually sent supplies, but did not accept the political consequence of the London government-in-exile's army liberating the capital itself and creating a basis for postwar power. Military necessity and calculations about the postwar state were using the same sky in different directions.

Capitulation did not save the city

The 2 October capitulation was a military bargain to end the fighting, not a peace agreement that guaranteed Warsaw’s inhabitants safety. The most important clause won by the Home Army command was recognition of its fighters as prisoners of war. More than 11,000 were captured, including Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski and Antoni Chruściel. That clause gave the insurgents a barrier against summary execution or treatment as unlawful combatants, but it did not settle the fate of the people left in the city. German forces drove civilians to Dulag 121, a transit camp outside Warsaw, and then sorted them for forced labor or concentration camps. About 650,000 people were expelled from the city. Families were separated, and homes and possessions ceased to be places to which they could return. The fighters gained a path to survival by laying down their arms, while civilians paid for it with the loss of the city itself.

What followed was not merely the aftermath of battle but a separate operation to erase the city. On 5 August Hans Frank had already promised that Warsaw would be completely destroyed, and on 11 October Ludwig Fischer, head of the Warsaw District, ordered that it be torn down to its foundations, with materials and furniture removed first. German Vernichtungskommando units burned and demolished one quarter after another after the inhabitants had been driven out. Their targets were not only barricades. The Royal Castle, Sigismund III’s Column, archives, and libraries that preserved the material memory of the Polish state and culture were also destroyed. The language of suppressing the Home Army thus expanded into a colonial punishment aimed at removing the capital’s social foundations and historical memory. Within the German leadership, the destruction was understood both as immediate reprisal and as a long-term plan to eliminate the centre of Polish resistance.

When Soviet troops entered the western bank of the Vistula on 17 January 1945, Warsaw was nearly empty, and about 85 percent of it lay in ruins from the cumulative destruction of the war. It would be wrong to say simply that the Soviet Union destroyed the city. German forces carried out the direct burning and demolition. Yet the Soviet army did not attempt a main-force crossing during the uprising, and by the time its offensive resumed, the London government-in-exile and the Home Army had lost the organized base from which they might have exercised state power in the capital. Soviet and Allied explanations emphasized operational limits and the German counterattack; Polish critics saw a city that could have been aided being left aside for political reasons. The evidence fixes the facts between those positions. Germany deliberately erased the city, while the Soviet Union’s late entry allowed a Soviet-backed authority to build the postwar state over the ruins without an organized rival in Warsaw.

The defeat was settled, but the question of responsibility was not

The Warsaw Uprising settled two matters. First, the Home Army did not expel the German occupiers or restore the authority of the London government-in-exile in the capital. The 2 October 1944 capitulation was not only the end of the fighting. It was also the moment when the Home Army lost militarily in the contest over who would exercise power in postwar Poland. German forces deported the population, burned and demolished the city, and when Soviet troops entered in January 1945, what remained was a ruin that a new authority could take over. The Soviet-backed Lublin Committee network organized administration and armed power on that ruin. The London government's legal claim to legitimacy survived as a memory, but its chance to control the state disappeared. This does not make the uprising a “futile sacrifice.” The fact that an underground state and Warsaw's civilians tried to establish an independent state through their own action against German rule, and that this attempt was crushed amid German massacres and Soviet non-intervention, became part of the moral vocabulary of later Polish politics.

Yet the uprising's consequences cannot be described by reducing Soviet intentions to one sentence. One interpretation holds that Stalin regarded the Home Army as an obstacle to postwar power and therefore waited on the eastern bank of the Vistula. The August decision to refuse Allied aircraft permission to land at Soviet airfields, together with the fact that Soviet forces took possession of a ruined city after the uprising had been crushed, strongly supports that interpretation. Another interpretation emphasizes the German armoured counterattack in late July 1944, extended supply lines, the exhausted 1st Belorussian Front, and the operational problem of crossing a river to attack a fortified metropolis. Several scholars agree that Soviet forces were not in a position to carry out an immediate full-scale rescue when the rising began. The dispute, therefore, is not simply whether the Soviets could have helped. Even if the operational limits were real, did political calculation turn those limits into a reason to delay assistance and obstruct Western relief routes? The evidence suggests that military difficulty and political choice were not mutually exclusive.

A further dispute concerns the judgment of the Home Army command. Its leaders believed that unless they used the German retreat and Soviet approach to demonstrate Polish sovereignty in the capital, liberation would become the installation of a Soviet-backed regime. That calculation was politically intelligible, but it was joined to a military expectation that the capital could be held despite ammunition stocks lasting only a few days, inadequate heavy weapons, and uncertain outside support. The result was not German defeat but the deaths of 150,000 to 200,000 civilians, mass deportation, and the planned destruction of the city. The uprising thus established the legitimacy of resistance to German occupation, but it also showed that legitimacy cannot guarantee victory. The central historical question today is not whether to choose heroism or recklessness. It is how to establish, separately and with evidence, the German criminal decision to destroy Warsaw and the Soviet choices that shaped the uprising's isolation, while reconstructing the international conditions and information under which the attempt to assert sovereignty first was made.

Consequences

The uprising failed to expel Germany and left the Home Army and Warsaw’s civilians facing catastrophic death, deportation, and destruction. After the 2 October capitulation, German forces sent about 650,000 civilians to a labor camp system and demolished the city. Soviet troops entered the devastated capital in January 1945, while the possibility that the London government-in-exile would control postwar Poland had effectively disappeared. The dispute over aid exposed an early fracture between the Soviet Union and its Western allies, and the uprising’s memory later reappeared as political language in Solidarity and Martial Law in Poland.

Timeline & Map

Warsaw 2 Radzymin 4 Wola 3 6 Ożarów 7 the First Polish Army · entry into Warsaw 5 the First Polish Army · the Vistula 1 Lublin the First Polish Army57
  1. 1939.08.23
    The Partitioning Premise

    The secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact divided Poland into spheres of influence, and the German and Soviet occupations in September 1939 made Poland’s postwar future a question of borders and political authority.

  2. 1943.04
    The Katyn Break

    After the Katyn massacre became public, the Soviet Union broke relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London, while Home Army leaders continued to regard both Germany and the Soviet Union as potential enemies.

  3. 1944.01
    Operation Tempest

    When the Red Army crossed Poland’s prewar frontier, the Home Army began Operation Tempest, attacking German forces in the rear and attempting to establish Polish administration before Soviet troops arrived.

  4. 11944.07.21
    The Lublin Committee

    The Soviet-backed Polish Committee of National Liberation was established in Lublin and claimed authority in liberated territory, making the Home Army and the London government-in-exile view an uprising as a demonstration of sovereignty as well as a military operation.

  5. 1944.07.25
    Approval to Rise

    The government-in-exile in London approved an uprising in Warsaw at the Home Army command’s request, while leaving the precise timing to the local commanders.

  6. 21944.07.29
    Radio Appeal and Counterattack

    Radio Station Kosciuszko in Moscow called on Warsaw’s population to attack the Germans, while Soviet tank units reaching the city’s eastern approaches were counterattacked by German panzer corps.

  7. 31944.08.01
    The Rising Begins

    Under the command of Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski and Antoni Chruściel, the Home Army attacked at 5 p.m., taking parts of the centre and several districts while German strongpoints and heavy weapons remained intact.

  8. 41944.08.05
    The Wola Massacre

    Reinefarth’s battle group, including Dirlewanger’s formation, massacred civilians in Wola. Patients and medical staff were also killed. In Ochota, the separate RONA regiment committed murder, rape and looting.

  9. 1944.08.13
    Airdrops Without a Corridor

    British and Polish air forces began supply drops from Italian bases, but long flights and German air defences caused heavy losses, and the Home Army recovered less than half of the supplies sent.

  10. 51944.09.13
    Late Soviet Assistance

    From 13 September Soviet aircraft began their own supply missions, and part of the Polish force under Soviet command crossed the Vistula, but no main-force crossing or relief of the city followed.

  11. 1944.09.14
    Praga taken

    The 47th and 70th Armies of the 1st Belorussian Front and part of the Polish 1st Army took Praga, the Warsaw suburb east of the Vistula; the retreating Germans blew up all the bridges.

  12. 1944.09.16–23
    The Czerniaków crossing

    Units of Zygmunt Berling's Polish 1st Army crossed the Vistula to join the Home Army in Czerniaków and Powiśle, but suffered heavy losses and had mostly withdrawn by the 23rd.

  13. 61944.10.02
    Capitulation and Deportation

    After 63 days of fighting, the Home Army capitulated; the agreement granted combatants prisoner-of-war status, but German forces expelled civilians and continued the systematic destruction of Warsaw.

  14. 71945.01
    A New Authority over Ruins

    When Soviet forces entered Warsaw in January 1945, the capital was a ruin and the Soviet-backed Polish authority had secured the initiative over the postwar state.

Related people 19

Participants8

Foreign minister of the exile governmentEdward Raczyński1891–1993

As foreign minister, he requested an International Red Cross investigation of the Katyn massacre.

Architect of Operation TempestStefan Rowecki1895–1944

He conceived Operation Tempest, weighing German withdrawal and Soviet entry, and understood its political aims.

military leader in the London exile governmentKazimierz Sosnkowski1885–1969

Warned against the danger of Soviet subjugation and influenced operational directives.

Prime Minister of the London government-in-exileStanisław Mikołajczyk1901–1966

Negotiated with Stalin and relayed information about the uprising.

liaison officer carrying the Western support messageJan Nowak-Jeziorański1914–2005

Returning from London, he delivered the message of limited Western support to the Home Army leadership on July 29, but it was not accepted.

British prime minister · Warsaw airliftWinston Churchill1874–1965

On 4 August 1944 he told Stalin that supplies and ammunition would be dropped on Warsaw and pressed for the use of Soviet airfields.

Stavka representativeGeorgy Zhukov1896–1974

Reported on 6 August that the forces before Warsaw were insufficient, and on Stalin's orders returned to the 1st Belorussian Front on 15 September to organise the 1st Polish Army's crossing of the Vistula.

Deputy chief of the Soviet General StaffAleksei Antonov1896–1962

Was sometimes called into the talks with Mikołajczyk in August, and with Shtemenko reported the Warsaw situation to Stalin on 13 September.

Related terms

Sources: Anna M. Cienciala, “The Diplomatic Background of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944: The Players and the Stakes,” The Polish Review, 1994Jennifer Popowycz, “The Allied Responses to the Warsaw Uprising of 1944,” The National WWII Museum, 2021Włodzimierz Borodziej, The Warsaw Uprising of 1944, University of Wisconsin Press, 2006Norman Davies, Rising ’44: The Battle for Warsaw, Penguin Books, 2003reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941–1945, Barrie and Rockliff, 1964reference 13reference 14