“Stone-arse”: the man who never changed his mind
For the four years his wife was imprisoned and exiled, Molotov had dinner set for two every evening. 'She suffered because of me,' he said later.
A Bolshevik from 1906 and Stalin's longest-serving lieutenant: he chaired the Council of People's Commissars for eleven years (1930–41), directing collectivisation and crash industrialisation. As Foreign Commissar he signed the Nazi–Soviet pact, refused the Marshall Plan, and as deputy chair of the State Defence Committee led the wartime diplomacy that produced the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences and the founding of the United Nations. Lenin is said to have coined his nickname 'stone-arse' for his indomitable stubbornness. He stood by Stalin even as his own wife was taken to the camps; in 1957 he tried to oust Khrushchev, failed, and was exiled as ambassador to Mongolia. He died at 96, regretting nothing.
Career Timeline
- 1912On the founding staff of Pravda
- 1930–41Chairman of Sovnarkom (premier)
- 1939Signs the Nazi–Soviet pact
- 1939–49, 1953–56Foreign Commissar, then Foreign Minister
- 1957The Anti-Party Group; ambassador to Mongolia
- 1962/1984Expelled from the party; readmitted twenty-two years later
Related historical events
- 1917.02–07The February RevolutionBolshevik in the capitalOne of the few Bolshevik leaders in Petrograd in February, he ran Pravda.
- 1918–1922The Civil War and Foreign InterventionRed Army service
- 1928–1937The Five-Year Plans and the Soviet TransformationSovnarkom chairmanHead of government from 1930, he oversaw plan implementation and led the 1932 grain procurement commission to Ukraine.
- 1932–1933The Holodomor and the Collectivisation FamineChairman of the USSR Sovnarkom; dispatched to Ukraine as plenipotentiary to enforce procurementsDispatched to Ukraine in late December 1931 to enforce the quota. In June 1932 he declared: 'Even if we are confronted with the spectre of famine, the collection plans must be fulfilled at all costs.'
- 1937–1938The Great PurgePolitburo approverAs a Politburo leader, he participated in approving purge policy and execution lists.
- 1939.08–1940.08The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Partition of Eastern EuropeLitvinov's successor as Foreign Commissar, signatory of the pactAppointed Foreign Commissar on 3 May 1939, replacing Litvinov. He led the triple-alliance talks with Britain and France while opening the door to Germany, signing the Non-Aggression Pact on 23 August.
- 1939.11–1940.03The Winter WarDiplomacy and the peace treatyHe pressed the border and Hanko demands in the autumn talks; his claim that the bombing of Helsinki was a food drop gave the Molotov cocktail its name. He signed the peace treaty in March 1940.
- 1941–1945The Great Patriotic WarGKO deputy chairmanHe announced the outbreak of war to the people in the radio address of 22 June and, as foreign commissar, led the diplomacy of the anti-fascist coalition.
- 1941–1944The Second Front and the Normandy LandingsSoviet diplomatic representativeIn May 1942 he pressed for a second front in London and Washington, negotiating the American expectation and British reservations.
- 1945.02–08The Yalta and Potsdam ConferencesAs foreign commissar, ran the working negotiations.
- 1945.08The Soviet Entry into the War against JapanSignatory to the Neutrality Pact and its denunciationSigned the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact (1941), denounced it (5 April 1945), and delivered the declaration of war to Ambassador Satō on 8 August 1945. Also co-signed the Yalta secret protocol.
- 1947–1948The Marshall Plan and the Cold WarBroke off the Paris talksHe led the Soviet delegation out of the Paris talks.
- 1948–1955The Tito-Stalin SplitCo-signatory of the letters of denunciationSigned the letters denouncing the Yugoslav party alongside Stalin
- 1950–1953The Korean WarForeign Minister in the post-Stalin collective leadership who concurred on ending the warJoined Malenkov and Beria in the 19 March resolution and subsequently coordinated the diplomatic direction of the armistice talks.
- 1953The Fall of BeriaPresidium backerHe backed the Presidium’s resolve against Beria.
- 1955The Founding of the Warsaw PactSoviet Foreign Minister, 1939–1949 and 1953–1956Molotov called the Paris Agreements a direct threat to Europe. His proposals to exclude the US from collective security and supersede NATO were rejected by the West, setting the stage for the Warsaw Pact.
- 1956.02The Twentieth Party Congress and the Secret SpeechAgainst the demotionHe opposed both the assessment of Stalin and the new line, and was expelled with the Anti-Party Group in 1957.
- 1957The Anti-Party GroupAnti-Party GroupA leader of the move against Khrushchev, defeated and demoted to ambassador to Mongolia.
- 1975The Helsinki Accordsoriginator of the first proposalAt the Berlin foreign ministers' conference in February 1954 Molotov proposed a pan-European collective security treaty, launching the Soviet European-security campaign that culminated in the Helsinki Accords.
The Great Purge — 372 execution lists, more signatures than anyone
In 1937-38, Vyacheslav Molotov, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was a central agent of the Great Purge. He signed 372 documented execution lists. That is more than Stalin (357). Each list bore hundreds of names, and the Politburo leadership signed in sequence: Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Zhdanov. From approval to execution, days might pass.
In 1938 alone, 20 of the 28 People's Commissars in Molotov's own government were arrested and executed. When his deputy Rudzutak was imprisoned, Molotov visited him and heard firsthand that he had been badly tortured. He did nothing. When a denunciation of Gosplan deputy chairman Lomov arrived, Molotov wrote on it: 'For immediate arrest of that bastard Lomov.'
The post-Stalin Shvernik Report named Molotov, alongside Stalin, as 'personally responsible for the organization and execution of groundless mass political repressions.' Late in life, in his conversations with Felix Chuev, Molotov said: 'Admittedly there were mistakes and excesses. But on the whole, the policy was correct. I have never regretted it, and will never regret it.'
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact — twenty minutes to sign, four years of reckoning
On the night of 23 August 1939, Vyacheslav Molotov received Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in the Kremlin. Days earlier, it would have been unthinkable. Nazis and communists at the same table.
At Stalin's direction, Molotov signed the Non-Aggression Pact. A secret protocol divided Eastern Europe. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and Bessarabia were split into Soviet and German spheres. The signing took less than twenty minutes.
Molotov considered it his finest hour as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The USSR gained two years to prepare for war and pushed its western border hundreds of kilometres forward. On 22 June 1941, Hitler tore the pact up.
Molotov defended it for the rest of his life: 'It was unavoidable, and the right decision.' Yet the name 'Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact' endures as twentieth-century diplomacy's most cynical moment.
Wartime diplomacy and the postwar order
After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Molotov joined the State Defense Committee and helped build the wartime alliance with Britain and the United States. Beginning with the Anglo-Soviet agreement of July 1941, his diplomacy institutionalized Allied cooperation while placing Soviet military and security demands on the negotiating table. It sought to prevent the USSR from being isolated in the antifascist war, but also prepared the postwar contest over security and influence in Eastern Europe.
Molotov attended the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, as well as the 1945 San Francisco Conference. He firmly represented Soviet positions on German disarmament and reparations, Poland’s borders, and the political character of Eastern European governments, while helping sustain great-power agreement during the drafting of the UN Charter. His wartime diplomacy was therefore not merely a personal anti-Western posture, but the practical expression of a state strategy to secure the USSR and institutionalize the international standing of a socialist power. That strategy also left unresolved the conflict between Eastern European self-determination and Soviet security claims.