The Yugoslav Partisan War
How did the Yugoslav Partisans turn occupation and civil war into a liberation army that founded the postwar state?
The Yugoslav Partisan War was the Communist-led armed struggle fought from the Axis invasion and partition of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941 until 1945. After Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia organized a nationwide rising against the occupiers and their collaborationist regimes. Led by Josip Broz Tito, the Partisans grew from guerrilla detachments into a regular army while competing with the royalist Chetniks and fighting a civil war inside the wider anti-Axis conflict. They survived major Axis offensives, especially the battles of the Neretva and Sutjeska, won Allied support and recognition in 1943, and liberated Belgrade with Soviet forces in 1944. In March 1945 the army was reorganized as the Yugoslav Army, and the Partisan victory made possible a socialist federal state in place of the monarchy.
A country, but not yet a common political community
The invasion of 6 April 1941 did not simply destroy a stable nation-state from outside. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia had been formed in 1918 by joining Serbia and Montenegro with the South Slav territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was multiethnic and multiconfessional, yet its state institutions and army remained centered on the Serbian dynasty and bureaucracy. The centralized constitution of 1921 was understood by many Serbs as protection for unity, but experienced by many Croats and Slovenes as Serbian hegemony. When King Alexander I dissolved parliament and renamed the country Yugoslavia in the 6 January Dictatorship of 1929, repression of party politics did not remove the national conflict. After the king's assassination in 1934, Prince Paul ruled for the underage Peter II. The regency managed competing interests from above, but did not create a wider social agreement.
The Cvetković–Maček Agreement of 26 August 1939 temporarily patched the crisis. The government and Vladko Maček, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, created an autonomous Banovina of Croatia. It did not settle the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the status of Serb communities inside the new unit. Croatian nationalists considered it insufficient, centralist Serb forces considered it a concession, and the Ustaše attacked it as a betrayal of the cause of an independent Croatia. The country was also a poor predominantly agrarian society, with sharply unequal literacy and industrial development across its regions. These conditions made people's experience of the state diverge. “Defending Yugoslavia” therefore did not carry one identical political meaning for everyone.
International pressure intensified these fractures. During the late 1930s Germany drew Yugoslav trade and raw-material exports into its orbit, while German and Italian expansion threatened the kingdom's borders. After Italy's failed attack on Greece, Germany needed to move through the Balkans to attack Greece itself. Prince Paul's government joined the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941 and granted transit rights, but a coup on 27 March, amid opposition from Serbian officers and much of the public, declared Peter II of age and installed a government headed by Dušan Simović. When the new government sought to reconsider the pact, Hitler treated the move as hostility and ordered Yugoslavia destroyed as a state. The Communist Party had been illegal since 1921, but a small nationwide underground organization under Josip Broz Tito had survived. Before the invasion, forces claiming royal legitimacy, national autonomy, and class emancipation already offered competing answers. Once foreign armies crossed the borders, the central question became who would organize the space left by the state's collapse, and what Yugoslavia would be rebuilt.
From a surrendered kingdom to an organized rising
The collapse of April 1941 was more than a lost military campaign. After officers overthrew the pro-Axis government on March 27, Adolf Hitler ordered Yugoslavia not merely to be defeated but to be destroyed as a state. Bombing and invasion began on April 6, and in little more than ten days the kingdom capitulated. After the unconditional surrender of April 17, its borders were cut according to the occupiers' convenience. Germany directly ruled most of Serbia and annexed northern Slovenia; Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria also took Yugoslav territory. Germany sponsored the Ustasha regime, the Independent State of Croatia, over Croatia and most of Bosnia. The kingdom's collapse removed the weak central authority that had held several peoples within one state and brought occupation, collaborationist governments, and militia violence into everyday life.
Under these conditions, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia did not immediately begin an open rising. It was an illegal organization, and while the German-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact remained in force, the line of the international communist movement also called for avoiding direct conflict with Germany. After the invasion, the party leadership worked from Zagreb and Belgrade to preserve its contacts, safe houses, and weapons. This was not simply passivity. It was a calculation that survival was necessary if a nationwide organization was to act. That calculation changed on June 22, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Comintern's direction required communist parties to turn the defense of the Soviet Union into an anti-fascist struggle in their own countries.
The change appeared not only in slogans but in people and places. On June 22, about forty Croatian communists entered the Brezovica woods near Sisak and formed the 1st Sisak Partisan Detachment. From the next day, this small unit was assigned to disrupt railways and communications and connect party organization with the countryside. It was not yet an army, and the danger of collective reprisals was severe, but an underground cadre had become an armed political unit. This was why Tito's leadership could formalize a nationwide rising on July 4. The Partisans did not begin as a spontaneous expression of national anger after surrender. They began when an underground organization, preserved amid occupation and violence, used the international turn to prepare armed resistance together with a new political order.
Why the uprising began to look like a state in Užice
The decision taken by the Communist Party's Political Bureau in Belgrade on 4 July 1941 was more practical than symbolic. It sought to exploit Germany's redeployment to the Soviet front by cutting occupation railways and communications, joining scattered armed groups into Partisan detachments, and widening the revolt across the country. The balance of forces was desperate. German troops were joined by Italian, Bulgarian and Hungarian units and forces of collaborationist regimes, amounting to roughly 400,000 men in the occupied territories. The Party leadership therefore did not expect to win a conventional war. Its calculation was to use mountains and underground organization to raise the cost of occupation, while building both military strength and political confidence in liberated areas. Later official histories described this as a united front for national and social liberation, but royalists saw the same policy as a premature adventure. For the Chetniks led by Draža Mihailović, the first task was to preserve forces for the restoration of the monarchy after the war. Immediate Partisan attacks, they argued, risked making civilians pay for German reprisals. The disagreement soon became an armed contest. When German forces attacked western Serbia from September, the two movements sometimes fought in the same area, but competed over who would govern liberated territory and mobilize its inhabitants. After Partisans took Užice on 24 September, they tried to create a functioning rear, not merely a refuge for retreating fighters. People’s Liberation Committees administered the area, factories and workshops stopped by the war resumed production, and about 145 kilometres of railway and a postal service were operated. A factory installed in the vaults of the Užice bank produced 16,500 rifles and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition. The newspaper Borba announced not only military orders but the social claim of the new authority. This ‘republic’ was not a stable state. Sources disagree substantially about its population and boundaries, while the territory had to absorb the demands of weapons, food and refugees. The occupiers made the social cost catastrophic through village burnings and hostage executions. Following Hitler’s instruction of 16 September, the German command ordered the revolt crushed ‘in the shortest possible time’ and prescribed the execution of 50 to 100 hostages for every German soldier killed. When the November offensive began, the workers’ battalion defending Užice suffered heavy losses at Kadinjača, and the Supreme Headquarters withdrew toward Sandžak. Yet this was not simply the disappearance of a liberated zone. At the Stolice meeting on 26 September, the Partisans decided to standardize detachments and commands and to expand mobilization through People’s Liberation Committees. The lesson of Užice was that an army could not survive by holding territory alone. Even in retreat it had to carry its fighters, production, administration, and a political legitimacy distinct from the restoration of the monarchy.
Who could speak for Yugoslavia in the name of resistance?
The clash between the Partisans and the Chetniks in the autumn of 1941 was not simply a contest over command. The two movements defined the timing and subject of liberation differently. Josip Broz Tito’s Communist Party believed that the political vacuum created by occupation had to be filled immediately. Weapons could not remain the private property of individuals or local commanders. They had to be placed under people’s liberation committees and a military chain of command, so that the movement could withstand reprisals and bring not only Serbs but also Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Slovenes into a common struggle. Draža Mihailović’s royalist movement, by contrast, argued that the legitimacy of the king and the government-in-exile remained alive. For the Chetniks, a mass rising risked turning German reprisals against civilians and handing the postwar political settlement to the Communist Party. A Yugoslav embassy account submitted to the US State Department in 1943 presented this position as a war for “national freedom” and “a free, democratic and reconstructed Yugoslavia,” grounded in loyalty to the king. This was why the Chetniks understood themselves not as a Serbian militia but as the successor to the Yugoslav army.
Yet the two calculations destroyed each other inside the same occupation regime. When negotiations failed and armed clashes broke out around Ravna Gora and western Serbia in November 1941, some Chetnik commanders came to see the Partisans as the enemy that had to be eliminated first. Some made local arrangements with German forces, the Nedić administration, or Italian troops in order to preserve their units. This does not mean that every Chetnik was a collaborator from the outset. The royalist policy of preserving strength persuaded people because, amid massacres and hostage executions, it presented itself as a defensive plan for keeping villages alive. But that choice gave the Partisans a decisive political weapon. They defined not only the occupiers and their auxiliaries but also forces awaiting a royal restoration as competitors for the postwar order, and built administration and armed struggle inside the same organization.
The result was the AVNOJ session held at Bihać on 26 November 1942. It was not a parliament announcing victory, but an institution testing its claim to representation while no recognized national state operated on the ground. Delegates were allocated among Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Sandžak, and Vojvodina to give the body a pan-Yugoslav character. Macedonia had no representative, and several delegates failed to arrive. Rather than simply conceal these defects, AVNOJ tried to answer practical questions through its connection with the land councils and people’s liberation committees: who would collect resources, distribute food, administer justice, and supply the army? Its chair, Ivan Ribar, had a career connected to the constitutional assembly of the prewar kingdom. The participation of vice-president Nurija Pozderac also made visible the claim that this was not merely a Serbian or Communist institution.
Tito nevertheless did not call AVNOJ a government. Moscow and the Comintern urged the Partisans not to confront the London-backed government-in-exile directly, but to widen the coalition under an anti-fascist, pan-Yugoslav form. Bihać therefore did not yet proclaim the immediate abolition of the monarchy. It adopted a multi-ethnic federation as the principle of the future state and connected the administration of liberated territory to a national political authority. That indirection was also its strength. While the government in London claimed constitutional legitimacy, AVNOJ organized food, manpower, security, and punishment in the territory where the war was actually being fought. Civil war imposed a terrible cost on the Partisans, but it also opened the institutional space in which an army of resistance became a body claiming to represent a state.
The army that survived encirclement refused to abandon its wounded
The two great offensives of 1943 proved not that the Partisans could hold every liberated territory, but that they could remain an army after encirclement. Operation Weiss, begun on 20 January, brought roughly 90,000 German troops, reinforced by Italian formations and Chetnik auxiliaries, against western Bosnia in an attempt to destroy the Bihać liberated zone and the Supreme Headquarters. The Partisans answered by moving their main force and central hospital eastward rather than defending territory at any price. This was not merely a retreat. The hospital held thousands who could not fight. Leaving them meant surrendering them to Axis execution or reprisals by collaborationist forces. After taking Prozor and destroying the bridges over the Neretva, the Partisans made the enemy misread their direction, then improvised a crossing and carried the wounded and the main force across. The March breakthrough was therefore not a battlefield victory in the simple sense. It was an operational survival that preserved both the command and the hospital the Axis had intended to eliminate. The cost was severe: fighters died in battle and on the march, while hunger, disease, cold, air attacks, and the flight of civilians added to the losses. Yet refusing to abandon the hospital was also a political and military choice. It preserved experienced personnel and the confidence on which a mobile revolutionary army depended, rather than treating wounded people as disposable material.
Operation Schwarz began on 15 May. Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, the Croatian state, and supporting forces committed about 127,000 troops and more than 300 aircraft. Around Sutjeska the Partisans had roughly 22,000 soldiers, while the central hospital contained about 3,000 wounded. Hunger, typhus, and shortages made the encirclement worse. After an attempt to break toward Foča failed, the Supreme Headquarters shifted toward the Piva and Sutjeska valleys. In the breakthrough during early June, three brigades and more than 2,000 wounded, together with largely unarmed medical staff, remained inside the ring, and many were captured and killed. Sutjeska cannot therefore be reduced to an inexpensive heroic legend. The Partisans did not save the whole hospital and lost a large part of their force. Nevertheless, the main body and the Supreme Headquarters broke through on 9 June. Tito was wounded, but the command structure survived. That is why German commander Rudolf Lüters judged the Partisans well organized, well led, and possessed of surprisingly high morale. At Neretva and Sutjeska they did not defeat the Axis in a straightforward contest of strength. They survived with an inferior force, difficult terrain, a hospital, and civilian refugees slowing every movement, without disintegrating. That survival helped persuade the Allies in 1943 to recognize Tito and increase support, and it supplied the military credibility behind AVNOJ’s claim at Jajce in November to speak for Yugoslavia as a whole. The federal project was not made only in a meeting hall. It rested on a command that had brought fighters and wounded people together through the encirclement and out the other side.
What kind of country would the armed movement build?
When Italy announced an armistice with the Allies on 8 September 1943 and signed the instrument of surrender on 29 September, the war in Yugoslavia entered a new phase. It was not simply that one occupying power disappeared. A political and military vacuum opened. Italian troops had been stationed in Dalmatia, Montenegro, parts of Slovenia, and the Adriatic islands. When they abandoned their weapons or were disarmed by German forces, the Partisans captured not only rifles and machine guns but also artillery, vehicles, and communications equipment. Some Italian soldiers and Yugoslav prisoners joined their ranks. The importance of the weapons was therefore not only numerical. Across wider areas of the coast and interior, the Partisans could organize administration and mobilization at the same time, turning armed villagers into mobile formations. Yet the gain did not provide a secure rear. German forces soon occupied much of the former Italian zone, while Ustasha and other collaborationist violence continued. The captured arsenal gave the movement time and capacity to build military and political institutions while facing a larger German offensive, not a guarantee of safety.
Under these conditions, the AVNOJ meeting at Jajce on 29 November 1943 translated an existing military reality into a claim to state power. The first session had created a nationwide anti-fascist representative body. The second constituted AVNOJ as Yugoslavia’s highest legislative and representative authority and created the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia to exercise executive power. This was the Communist leadership’s decision to establish a wartime provisional government. The government-in-exile and the monarchy could still be treated internationally as Yugoslavia’s legal representatives, but inside the country the liberation committees and the Partisans were the institutions actually collecting resources, recruiting, distributing food, and administering justice. AVNOJ sought to convert that practice into institutional legitimacy. Its decisions also barred King Peter II and the government-in-exile from returning until the war ended, while declaring that the people would then decide between monarchy and republic. Formally, the final choice was postponed. In practice, the route by which the prewar monarchy could simply resume its authority was closed.
The federal plan was not merely an administrative rearrangement. It proposed a state community of six equal republics, including Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Communist calculation was shaped by the conditions of the war. Ustasha mass violence, the Chetnik vision of a Serb-centered monarchy, and Axis partition had turned national fear into a material force. Restoring the prewar centralized kingdom could therefore revive distrust among armed rivals and threatened communities. Federation offered each national group a place as a subject of liberation while retaining unified command over the army, foreign policy, and economic coordination. A critical assessment must also note that most delegates were selected within a movement controlled by the Communist Party and protected by its armed forces, so the settlement narrowed postwar political competition in advance. From the Partisan point of view, however, Jajce named what the struggle was for before victory had been secured. The movement was now both an army fighting occupation and a power exercising the rights of a new state in territory won by arms.
How did Tito escape the raid on Drvar?
Early in 1944 a standing military channel opened between the Soviet Union and the Partisans for the first time. According to Shtemenko, the General Staff was ordered at the end of 1943 to send a military mission to Tito, and General Nikolai Korneev, a former instructor at the General Staff Academy, was chosen to head it. The mission went by way of Bari in Italy and landed by glider at the Partisan Supreme Headquarters in Bosnia on 23 February 1944; Shtemenko complains that Air Vice-Marshal William Elliot of the Allied air forces had held up its departure, citing fog and snow. Korneev's deputy, Colonel S. V. Sokolov, stayed in Bari in charge of Soviet transport and fighter squadrons. Britain had had Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean's mission with Tito since 1943, and until then most arms deliveries came from Britain and the United States.
On the morning of 25 May 1944 the German XV Mountain Corps struck the Supreme Headquarters at Drvar in western Bosnia. The operation was code-named Rösselsprung, "Knight's Move". After a Luftwaffe bombardment the 500th SS Parachute Battalion came down on the town by glider and parachute, while ground forces including Croatian Home Guard troops and Chetniks closed in from all sides. According to English Wikipedia the German Second Panzer Army could muster only about 16,000 men for the operation. Tito was in a cave north of the town; while officer cadets and his escort held off the paratroopers, he climbed down by rope and got away east to Potoci. One surviving British mission radio called in support from the Allied Balkan Air Force. Shtemenko, quoting Korneev, says the Germans deliberately chose Tito's birthday, but Tito was born on 7 May; as president he later celebrated 25 May as his birthday to mark his survival of the raid.
After six days on the run Korneev proposed an air evacuation. According to Shtemenko, Tito hesitated because a supreme commander could not leave his country, and Korneev talked him round by citing Lenin, who had led the party from exile. On the night of 3 June seven transport aircraft flew Tito, his staff, the Allied missions and 118 wounded Partisans from a makeshift strip on the Kupres plain to Bari. One was flown by A. S. Shornikov of the Soviet air group in Bari and the rest by American crews (English Wikipedia). Shtemenko stresses that Tito left on Shornikov's first flight, and records that the three crew members were made Heroes of the Soviet Union and People's Heroes of Yugoslavia. On the 6th the British destroyer HMS Blackmore took Tito to the Adriatic island of Vis, where the Supreme Headquarters spent a little over three months under the protection of the Royal Navy and RAF.
According to German reports, the 500th SS Parachute Battalion was effectively destroyed with 576 killed, and the ground forces lost 213 killed and 881 wounded. The same report claimed 6,000 Partisans killed, while the commander of the 7th SS Division, Otto Kumm, gave 1,916 confirmed and 1,400 estimated dead, so the German figures already disagree among themselves. Through intercepts the British knew an operation called "Rösselsprung" was being prepared, but not where or against what. The Soviet foreign commissar Vyacheslav Molotov suspected the British had known of the raid in advance and set out his suspicions in a message to Korneev on 28 May.
Why did Tito slip away from Vis to Moscow?
On Vis, with British mediation, Tito reached a first agreement on 16 June with Ivan Šubašić, the new prime minister of the royal government-in-exile (the Tito–Šubašić Agreement), and on 12 August he met Winston Churchill in Naples. Churchill asked for a public pledge not to impose the postwar system by force; Tito evaded it. Meanwhile the Red Army was approaching Yugoslavia's frontier through Romania and Bulgaria. According to Shtemenko, early in September Tito asked through the Soviet mission for the Red Army to enter Yugoslav territory "temporarily", and Stalin had the General Staff prepare the material.
On the night of 19 September Korneev handed the Soviet pilots from Bari a map marked "Craiova" in heavy pencil. The transports headed as if for Bari, turned over the Adriatic, crossed Bosnia and Serbia and the Danube, and landed at Craiova in Soviet-held Romania. The Supreme Headquarters left Vis for Craiova at the same time. The British and American missions left on Vis found Tito gone only in the morning. Shtemenko records Elliot demanding of Sokolov in Bari, "Where have you put Tito?" and Sokolov answering only "I have no idea", and says Stalin later told Churchill that Tito was in Moscow to coordinate operations. The sources differ slightly on the dates. Shtemenko has Tito in Moscow "in the twenties of September", and English Wikipedia's article on the Belgrade offensive dates his arrival in Romania to the 21st, while the same encyclopedia's article on the Tito–Šubašić Agreements says he met Stalin on the 18th, which fits neither.
In Moscow Tito talked over dinner at Stalin's dacha at Kuntsevo. As Antonov, who was there, told Shtemenko, Tito came with a mandate from the National Committee for the Liberation of Yugoslavia to ask for Soviet troops in eastern Yugoslavia and to settle the principles of their cooperation with the People's Liberation Army, and he hoped Belgrade would be freed. Stalin promised the help of the Third Ukrainian Front and the Danube Flotilla, and in turn obtained consent for the left wing of the Second Ukrainian Front to pass through Yugoslav territory into Hungary; the rest of the country the Liberation Army would free itself. English Wikipedia (Tito–Stalin split) notes that in this Yugoslavia differed from the rest of Eastern Europe: Tolbukhin's front had to ask Tito's provisional government for formal permission to enter and had to accept Yugoslav civil authority in liberated territory, and Soviet troops were to leave soon after the operation. In Moscow Tito also met Dimitrov and discussed Bulgarian participation.
Arms deliveries grew at this point as well. According to Shtemenko the Liberation Army's weapons had so far been a mixture of captured German and Italian arms and British ones, and Soviet weapons had counted for little because they had to cross enemy-held ground. After the Moscow agreement the State Defence Committee decided to hand Yugoslavia an air group of the 10th Guards Ground-Attack and the 236th Fighter Divisions (under Major General A. N. Vitruk, 244 aircraft) with its support units; the agreement was signed in Belgrade on 15 November. Shtemenko writes that the group fought until May 1945 and trained the cadres of the Yugoslav air force. The Soviet mission grew too: Soviet officers went to the main staffs of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro, and once the mission was formally accredited to the National Committee, specialists in foreign affairs and banking were added. On 9 October, shortly after Tito's return, Churchill and Stalin concluded in Moscow the Percentages Agreement, which put influence in Yugoslavia at fifty-fifty.
How was the Belgrade operation planned and fought?
In late September the General Staff in Moscow, the headquarters of the Third Ukrainian Front, the Liberation Army's Supreme Headquarters in Craiova and the Main Staff of Serbia planned the Belgrade operation together. Shtemenko writes that Antonov and Korneev had studied together at the Academy, so they could agree directly over the high-frequency line from Craiova. The front's proposal of 30 September aimed to destroy the German forces in north-eastern Yugoslavia, cut their routes of retreat from central and southern Yugoslavia into Hungary, and free Belgrade. The main Soviet forces were Nikolai Gagen's 57th Army and Vladimir Zhdanov's 4th Guards Mechanised Corps, with the 17th Air Army overhead. Shtemenko puts the Soviet force at 2,200 guns and mortars, 149 rocket launchers, 358 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,292 aircraft and about 80 vessels of the Danube Flotilla. The Stavka set the start of the offensive for 13–14 October and told the front not to hurry the Bulgarian army until full agreement had been reached with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian commands. On the night of 2 October Tito sent his decision: the 12th and 1st Corps would pin down the Germans south and south-west of Belgrade and then turn on the capital.
Facing them were Army Group F under Field Marshal Maximilian von Weichs, Commander-in-Chief South-East, and General Hans Felber's Army Detachment Serbia, hastily formed to defend the country. Shtemenko counts 270,000 German troops in Yugoslavia, 270,000 in collaborationist forces and 30,000 Hungarians, 570,000 in all, while the German historian Klaus Schmider, cited by English Wikipedia, puts the German troops left in Serbia in June 1944 at only about 10,000. Army Group E in Greece received its order to withdraw on 3 October; cutting its way north through Serbia into Hungary was the operation's strategic point. From 1 September Allied air forces and the Partisans had been hammering German railways and bridges in Operation Ratweek, and of the 44 trains that left Athens with the 117th Jäger Division only 17 had reached Belgrade by 8 October.
The two countries' accounts differ even on when the operation began. Soviet and Russian histories take the Belgrade operation to run from 28 September, when the Red Army crossed from Romania and Bulgaria, to 20 October (some count from 15 September, when the 17th Air Army's raids began), and include the fighting across Serbia, Niš among it. Yugoslav and today's Serbian histories mean the battle around the capital from 11 to 22 October, or more narrowly from 14 to 20 October (Serbian Wikipedia). Shtemenko himself writes that before the planned start three corps of the 57th Army had already pushed into the eastern Serbian mountains and encircled German troops at Negotin and Zaječar, so the Stavka simply let the offensive roll on without a separate start date.
Negotin fell on 30 September and Zaječar on 7 October, taken together with the Liberation Army's 45th Division. The 4th Guards Mechanised Corps crossed the Morava near Velika Plana on the 10th and on the 12th, after meeting units of the Serbian 21st Division east of Topola, raced for Belgrade. On the Stavka's instructions Tolbukhin asked Tito to put Liberation Army infantry on Soviet tanks and trucks so they could advance on the capital together. On the 14th Soviet tanks carrying soldiers of Peko Dapčević's 1st Proletarian Corps reached the southern edge of Belgrade. The assault was delayed by the need to deal with several thousand Germans of Walter Stettner's group trapped between Belgrade and Smederevo, and after the resistance around the Kalemegdan fortress was overcome the street fighting ended on the 20th. That day Zhdanov and Dapčević reported the city liberated and spoke together at a public rally. Around Niš and Leskovac the Bulgarian Second Army fought alongside the Yugoslav 13th Corps.
According to Serbian Wikipedia, 2,953 Liberation Army fighters and about 960 Red Army soldiers were killed in the battle for Belgrade from 14 to 20 October, while the Germans lost about 15,000 dead and 9,000 prisoners. What happened to prisoners rarely found its way into the record of victory. Maclean, head of the British mission, wrote in his memoirs that just after the battle he saw more than a hundred bodies lying in rows beside a road near Belgrade, plainly not killed in combat; a lieutenant he met on the road said that prisoners who surrendered in large groups were sent to the rear, but if there were only a few "we don't bother". The German dead were buried in unmarked mass graves. Tito was not in Belgrade during the street fighting: he stayed at Vršac in the Banat from the 16th to the 25th and entered the capital on the evening of the 25th aboard an armoured boat of the Soviet Danube Flotilla. At the end of October the Third Ukrainian Front left for Hungary, leaving only Vitruk's air group in Yugoslavia. Shtemenko gives 8,000 as the number of Soviet soldiers buried in Yugoslav soil.
Turning a liberated capital into an army and a government
The liberation of Belgrade was not simply a military operation that recovered a capital. On 20 October 1944, the Partisan 1st Corps finished the fighting in the city alongside the Soviet 3rd Ukrainian Front commanded by Fyodor Tolbukhin. Soviet tanks and heavy weapons were decisive in cutting German routes of withdrawal, while Partisan infantry, familiar with the city and its approaches, seized streets and bridges. This cooperation did not make the Partisans proxies of a foreign army. Tito used Soviet operational support to enlarge his own military and political initiative. While consulting Moscow about the operation, he also sought to prevent the Red Army from becoming a long-term occupying power in Yugoslavia. Soviet forces did withdraw from Belgrade, and administration and security in the capital remained in the hands of the national liberation movement.
Yet a victorious army did not automatically possess national legitimacy. To exclude the monarchy in exile and the Chetniks of Draža Mihailović, supported by Britain, the power created by AVNOJ in occupied territory had to be translated into the language of domestic administration and international diplomacy. In November 1944 Tito and Ivan Šubašić, representing the royal government in exile, signed the Tito–Šubašić Agreement. Its surface was compromise. The question of the king was left unresolved for the moment, while a coalition government combining representatives of the national liberation movement and the government in exile was proposed. From the Partisan side, this was a tactic to secure Western Allied recognition and gain time until the postwar elections. From the royalist side, it was the last channel for preventing Communist one-party rule and preserving the monarchy’s legal continuity. But behind the formal balance permitted by the agreement, the Partisans already controlled the armed forces, police, and administrative networks of the liberated areas. The compromise did not divide power equally. It more closely translated existing Partisan power into the form of a state.
That translation was completed on 1 March 1945. The National Liberation Army and Partisan detachments were consolidated as the Yugoslav Army. The measure stripped the guerrilla formations of their local and explicitly political status and gave the state a regular army organized into corps, divisions, and military districts. The change of name declared that the war was entering its end, but it also answered who could legally possess weapons. Chetniks and collaborationist forces lost the space to survive as independent military-political actors. This consolidation was not a spontaneous national reconciliation. In northern Yugoslavia, retreating anti-Partisan forces and civilians were captured, executed, or interned, while postwar trials and purges combined punishment for occupation-era crimes with the removal of revolutionary competitors. The Yugoslav Army of 1945 was therefore both a product of liberation and a state apparatus created by the victor of a civil war. The Partisans changed from the force that had seized the capital into the army of the state, but that state rested on military victory, a federal promise, and coercive exclusion of its rivals.
Who liberated Belgrade, and where did the diverging memories come from?
Cracks opened between the Soviet army and the Yugoslav leadership right after liberation. According to Milovan Djilas's memoir Conversations with Stalin (1962), 121 rapes, 111 of them involving murder, and 1,204 cases of looting with assault were recorded in the north-east of Yugoslavia through which the Red Army had passed. Djilas wrote that the figures were hardly insignificant given that the Red Army had crossed only that one corner of the country. The Partisan leadership feared such stories would weaken its standing among the population. Tito summoned Korneev, head of the Soviet mission, to protest; when Djilas remarked that British officers had not committed such excesses while liberating other parts of Yugoslavia, Korneev shouted that he protested most sharply at this insult to the Red Army in comparing it with the armies of capitalist countries. Soon afterwards in the Kremlin Stalin rebuked Djilas in person, asking whether Djilas, himself a writer, could not understand a soldier who had crossed thousands of kilometres through blood and fire and death having fun with a woman or taking some trifle. Djilas believed that the rejection of this protest angered the Yugoslav leadership and was one of the causes of the later break. These figures and words come only from Djilas's recollection; Shtemenko's book says nothing of the matter.
When the Cominform expelled the Yugoslav Communist Party in 1948 (the Tito–Stalin split), the memory of autumn 1944 split in two as well. The monument to the Soviet fallen erected on Republic Square in Belgrade in November 1944 was pulled down in 1951, when relations were at their worst (Russian Wikipedia). Even the name of the operation differed: the Soviet side spoke of the Red Army's "strategic offensive operation" across Serbia from late September, the Yugoslav side of the battle for the capital in which the Liberation Army bore the brunt.
Shtemenko's second volume came out in 1973, after the two countries had patched up the split and restored relations. He calls Tito "Marshal Tito" throughout, retells in detail the escape from Drvar, the Moscow agreement and the letter of thanks Tito sent Tolbukhin on 21 October, and ends the chapter by saying that the two peoples' friendship was "sealed with blood" shed together. The 1948 break and the protest Djilas reported are absent; British arms get a single sentence; and the British-brokered talks between Tito and Šubašić on Vis are not mentioned. His 1944 is shaped by the eye of the 1970s, when Soviet-Yugoslav relations had improved again. Today the Liberation Army and Red Army dead lie together in the Cemetery of the Liberators of Belgrade, and since 2009 a Russian president or prime minister has visited it on the anniversary (English Wikipedia). The question of who liberated Belgrade carries not only the fighting of 1944 but the ups and downs of the two countries' relations since.
What the victory decided, and what it left unsettled
The Partisan victory decided more than which army would enter Belgrade first. On 1 March 1945, the National Liberation Army became the Yugoslav Army, turning the wartime party organization and military command network into permanent state institutions. The federation of six republics announced at Jajce promised not simply to restore the prewar kingdom’s centralism, and the November 1945 election and founding of the Federal People’s Republic consolidated that promise into a constitutional order dominated by the Communist Party. The Partisans understood themselves not merely as the force that expelled Germany, but as a movement that would end the order of massacre and collaboration and build a state in which different peoples could live together. “Brotherhood and unity” compressed that claim. For people who had lived through Ustaša massacres of Serbs and the occupiers’ reprisals, it could appear a practical alternative to repeating a cycle of revenge among competing national states.
Liberation, however, was not the beginning of a neutral contest among parties. The return of the royal government-in-exile and Peter II was postponed, while the coalition space promised by the Tito-Šubašić agreement rapidly narrowed before the Partisans’ control of administration and armed force. The killings around Bleiburg in spring 1945, followed by forced marches and executions of defeated Chetnik and Ustaša-aligned soldiers and civilians, show that the new state did not separate liberation from revolution. The persistence of armed groups in the mountains into 1946 likewise shows that the end of occupation did not mean the end of political consent. From the Partisan standpoint, eliminating armed collaborators and preventing a renewed civil war were acts of state construction. To victims and opponents, they were victor’s revenge and the beginning of one-party rule.
Historians therefore disagree less about the fact of victory than about its meaning and cost. Yugoslav authorities put the wartime death toll at 1.7 million, while Bogoljub Kočović and Vladimir Žerjavić, working from demographic evidence in the 1980s, estimated roughly one million. The difference is tied to how scholars count Ustaša genocide, Chetnik attacks on civilians, occupier massacres, and Partisan executions during and after the war. One line of interpretation treats the Partisans as agents of multiethnic liberation and social revolution; another sees a communist revolution using the anti-fascist war to eliminate political rivals. Current scholarship need not erase either dimension. It can ask simultaneously how the Partisans really defeated occupation and rebuilt a state, and how that state, in the name of victory, restricted political pluralism and the lives of the defeated. The war settled the birth of a socialist federation. It did not settle whether its different communities would accept that federation as their own state.
Consequences
The war ended Axis occupation, but its settlement was not a peaceful restoration. Partisan military victory and AVNOJ’s plan for a federation of six republics laid the foundations of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945, closing the way for the monarchy and government-in-exile to return as governing authorities and sharply narrowing the political survival of rival forces. The cost was immense: occupation, civil war, genocide and other mass violence against civilians, and reprisals and prosecutions that continued after liberation against Chetniks and other anti-Partisan forces. The independent socialist state and Tito’s autonomous line created by this victory reappear as the central issue in 「티토-스탈린 결별」.
Timeline & Map
- 11941.04.06Invasion and partition
Germany, Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; after its surrender on April 17, the territory was divided among occupations and Axis-backed regimes.
- 21941.06.22The turn to armed resistance
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia began organized armed resistance, and the first Partisan detachment was formed at Sisak.
- 31941.07.04Order for a national rising
The Communist leadership formally ordered an uprising, and Partisan fighting spread across Serbia and other regions.
- 41941.09The Užice Republic
The Partisans established a liberated zone centered on Užice in western Serbia, but an Axis offensive forced their withdrawal in December and destroyed most of the early foothold.
- 51941.10Civil war within the resistance
Tito’s strategy of immediate revolt clashed with the royalist Chetniks’ strategy of preserving strength, breaking cooperation and intensifying civil war.
- 61942.11.26AVNOJ at Bihać
The Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia first met at Bihać, creating a national political body linking military struggle with administration in liberated areas.
- 71943.03The Battle of the Neretva
Axis forces sought to encircle and destroy the Partisan supreme command and wounded, but the Partisans crossed the Neretva and broke through while preserving their main force.
- 81943.05.15The Sutjeska breakthrough
At Sutjeska the Partisans suffered heavy losses but broke out of encirclement; their survival helped persuade the Allies to recognize Tito as the principal Yugoslav resistance leader.
- 91943.11.29The federal plan at Jajce
At its second session, AVNOJ assumed powers approaching those of a provisional government, adopted a federation of six republics, and made Tito marshal of Yugoslavia.
- 101943.09Italy’s surrender and captured arms
Italy’s surrender gave the Partisans large quantities of captured arms and ammunition and altered the military balance in the Adriatic and the Balkans.
- 111944.02.23Soviet military mission arrives
General Nikolai Korneev's Soviet military mission flew in from Bari and landed by glider at the Partisan Supreme Headquarters in Bosnia.
- 121944.05.25The raid on Drvar
The German XV Mountain Corps and the 500th SS Parachute Battalion struck the Supreme Headquarters; Tito and his staff escaped from their cave towards Potoci.
- 131944.06.03Air evacuation from Kupres
At night seven transport aircraft flew Tito, his staff, the Allied missions and 118 wounded from the Kupres plain to Bari in Italy; one had a Soviet crew.
- 141944.09.19Tito leaves Vis for Craiova
Tito and the Supreme Headquarters left Vis without telling the British and American missions and flew to Soviet-held Craiova in Romania; Tito went on to Moscow and agreed with Stalin on the entry of Soviet troops.
- 151944.10.20The liberation of Belgrade
The Partisans and the Soviet Red Army liberated Belgrade, after which the main campaign became the expulsion of remaining German and collaborationist forces.
- 1945.03.01Reorganization as the Yugoslav Army
The National Liberation Army was reorganized as the Yugoslav Army, becoming the regular state force, and by May the Partisans held political and military dominance across Yugoslavia.
Related people 31
Leadership2
As general secretary of the underground Communist Party before the invasion, he directed its organization and preparations for resistance, later becoming the Partisans' supreme leader.
Prime Minister of the post-coup governmentDušan Simović1882–1962He tried to reverse Yugoslavia's accession to the Tripartite Pact, prompting the German invasion.
Implementers & commanders10
He commanded the 1st Army in the liberation of Belgrade and led its transition into a regular army.
Partisan command staff in SerbiaSreten Žujović1899–1976He helped organise the wartime partisan uprising and served with the Supreme Headquarters.
Party leader organizing resistance and political institutionsAndrija Hebrang1899–1949As a wartime leader of the Communist Party of Croatia, he helped organize resistance to occupation and political institutions in liberated territory.
Croatian Partisan political commissarVladimir Bakarić1912–1983From 1941 to 1943, he served as political commissar in the Croatian Partisan liberation movement.
Chief of staff of the Partisan Supreme HeadquartersArso Jovanović1907–1948During the Second World War, he led operational command as chief of staff of the Partisan Supreme Headquarters.
Partisan political commissarBoris Kidrič1912–1953During the Second World War, he was a chief organizer of the Slovene Liberation Front and Partisan resistance.
Partisan security-agency founderAleksandar Ranković1909–1983In May 1944, he founded OZNA, the Partisan security agency.
Montenegrin uprising leaderMilovan Djilas1911–1995He led the Partisan uprising in Montenegro.
Political and ideological head of Slovene PartisansEdvard Kardelj1910–1979In the summer and autumn of 1941, he helped organize armed resistance and served as the political and ideological head of the Slovene Partisan units.
Commander of the Third Ukrainian FrontFyodor Tolbukhin1894–1949In the Belgrade operation of October 1944 he commanded the 57th Army and the 4th Guards Mechanised Corps, and asked Tito to put Liberation Army infantry on Soviet tanks for the advance on the capital.
Participants8
A former president of the royal constitutional assembly, he chaired AVNOJ and lent it national political legitimacy.
Royal government representativeIvan Šubašić1892–1955Negotiated the November 1944 agreement with Tito and accepted the AVNOJ framework.
Vice-President of the National Liberation CommitteeNurija Pozderac1892–1943As a Bosnian Muslim representative, he symbolized the multi-ethnic coalition policy of AVNOJ.
Liaison to Allied military missionsVladimir Velebit1907–2004In 1942–1943, he served at Partisan Supreme Command as liaison to Allied military missions.
Yugoslav partisanMiklós Gimes1917–1958He escaped labor service in 1944 and joined the Yugoslav partisans.
Soviet leaderJoseph Stalin1878–1953In Moscow in September 1944 he agreed with Tito on the Red Army's temporary entry and the Belgrade operation. According to Djilas he personally rebuked Djilas over the Yugoslav protest at Soviet soldiers' crimes.
Chief of staff of the Third Ukrainian FrontSergei Biryuzov1904/1905–1964In October 1944 he met Tito twice at Craiova, presented the plan of the Belgrade operation and obtained his consent to the Bulgarian army's advance towards Niš.
British prime ministerWinston Churchill1874–1965In 1944 he pushed for Šubašić as prime minister of the government-in-exile and for his talks with Tito, met Tito at Naples in August, and concluded the Percentages Agreement with Stalin in October.
Opposition & resistance6
He led the royalist Chetniks in opposition to the Partisans, eventually collaborating with the occupiers.
German Wehrmacht commanderRudolf Lüters1883–1945He left an enemy-side assessment of Partisan organization and morale.
Participant in the Tito capture operationOtto Skorzeny1908–1975In 1944 he helped plan Operation Rosselsprung to capture Tito and was to command it, but argued against carrying it out.
Commander in the invasion of YugoslaviaVittorio Ambrosio1879–1958In 1941, as commander of the Second Army, he commanded Italy's invasion of Yugoslavia.
German Führer who ordered Yugoslavia destroyedAdolf Hitler1889–1945After the March 1941 coup he ordered Yugoslavia dismantled as a state, and in September ordered the uprising crushed in the shortest time.
German Commander-in-Chief South-EastMaximilian von Weichs1881–1954As commander of Army Group F he directed the defence of Serbia and the withdrawal of Army Group E from Greece in the autumn of 1944.
Targets & victims1
Historians & interpreters3
His demographic estimate is cited to show why the scale of wartime losses remains contested.
Independent statistician of victim estimatesBogoljub Kočović1920–2013He independently recalculated the number of victims in the Partisan War.
Historian of the Yugoslav liberation struggleLeonid Gibianskii1936–He studied the Yugoslav peoples’ anti-fascist liberation struggle during the Second World War.
Related terms
Sources: Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945: Occupation and Collaboration, Stanford University Press, 2001Marko Attila Hoare, The Partisans and the Jews: The Persecution and the Politics of Liberation in Yugoslavia, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011Encyclopaedia Britannica Editors, Partisan, Encyclopaedia BritannicaEncyclopaedia Britannica Editors, Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia, Encyclopaedia BritannicaThe National WWII Museum, Conflict in Post-War Yugoslavia: The Search for a NarrativeS. M. Shtemenko, Generalnyi shtab v gody voiny, book 2 (1st ed. 1973; Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989), ch. 6 «В Югославии», http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shtemenko/23.htmlS. M. Shtemenko, Generalnyi shtab v gody voiny, book 2 (1st ed. 1973; Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989), ch. 1 (Soviet military mission to Tito), http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/shtemenko/18.htmlreference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14