The general who sought an Italian exit from the Axis under the monarchy
“The Axis is besieged, it is in a closed ring; it is necessary to get out.”
Vittorio Ambrosio was an Italian cavalry officer and general who served in both world wars and commanded forces during the invasion of Yugoslavia. As Chief of the Italian Armed Forces General Staff in 1943, he concluded after the defeats in North Africa and Sicily that Italy could not remain tied to Germany, and worked through the king and the military command to remove Mussolini and negotiate an armistice with the Allies. His course was not a democratic break with Fascism so much as a monarchic and military attempt to manage Italy's withdrawal from the war; the September armistice nonetheless failed to prevent German occupation and the disintegration of Italian command.
Activities and affiliations
Career Timeline
- 1898Commissioned as a cavalry officer
- 1911–1913Served in the Italo-Turkish War
- 1915–1918Served in World War I and covered the retreat after Caporetto
- 1941Commander of the Second Army during the invasion of Yugoslavia
- 1942Chief of Staff of the Army
- 1943.02–11Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, pursuing Mussolini's removal and an armistice with the Allies
- 1943.11Demoted to Inspector-General of the Army
Related historical events
- 1914–1918First World WarItalian Army officerHe served in the First World War and covered the retreat after Caporetto.
- 1943–1945The Italian Campaign and the Fall of Mussoliniarmy general who prepared the military defectionIn early 1943 he recognized the likely defeat and prepared a military defection centered on the crown.
- 1941–1945The Yugoslav Partisan WarCommander in the invasion of YugoslaviaIn 1941, as commander of the Second Army, he commanded Italy's invasion of Yugoslavia.
Military conditions in the 1943 armistice negotiations
At the Hitler-Mussolini meeting at Feltre on 19 July 1943, Ambrosio, chief of the Italian High Command, asked German Chief of Staff Wilhelm Keitel about the Eastern Front. He criticized Germany for merely wearing down Soviet forces and surrendering the initiative, and asked whether the Axis had any prospect of escaping encirclement. His remarks linked his opposition to continuing the alliance with Germany to an assessment of the military situation, rather than only to the crisis immediately preceding the September armistice.
Contacts with the Allies centered on military conditions. According to a report sent to President Franklin Roosevelt on 8 September, Ambrosio sent Giuseppe Castellano and Giuseppe Zanussi, the second Italian emissary, to Allied headquarters. At Fairfield in Sicily on 31 August, Zanussi and Castellano met Allied chief of staff Walter Bedell Smith. Citing the presence of nineteen German divisions in Italy, they said Italy could not sign unless the Allies landed north of Rome. They proposed that if Allied airborne troops entered Rome's airfields, Italian forces would not oppose the landings and would help secure the airfields.
The Allies pressed for an immediate signature and considered an airborne operation in the Rome area. After the Italian representatives returned to Rome, Allied Force Headquarters sent a message on 1 September proposing such an operation; on 3 September Castellano signed the armistice terms at Cassibile in Sicily. The contacts Ambrosio initiated were military negotiations to secure Italy's withdrawal amid the risks of German retaliation and an Allied landing; the Allies did not guarantee a landing north of Rome.