Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan

Иван Христофорович Баграмян
Soviet Union state institutions Marxism–Leninism Soviet Union Armenia 1897.12.2.–1982.9.21. ○ Natural causes

The Armenian front commander, from Bagration to the Baltic

In summer 1944, his troops reached the Baltic. Bagramyan sent Stalin a bottle of Baltic seawater, but Germans retook the shore before it arrived. Stalin said: 'Return it — let Comrade Bagramyan pour it back into the sea himself.'

An Armenian born into a railwayman's family near Elisavetpol (now Ganja, Azerbaijan), he trained at a railway technical school in Tiflis, volunteered for the Imperial Army in 1915, fought in the army of the Armenian Republic in 1918–1920 and joined the Red Army at the end of 1920. Early in the German-Soviet War he was operations chief and then chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, until the disastrous Kharkov offensive of May 1942, which he had helped plan, led Stalin to remove him as chief of staff. He recovered as commander of the 16th (later 11th Guards) Army and became, after the Latvian Max Reyter, the second non-Slav to command a Soviet front. At the head of the 1st Baltic Front, through Operation Bagration and the Memel offensive that autumn, he isolated German Army Group North in the Courland pocket. Marshal of the USSR, twice Hero of the Soviet Union.

Also known as: Hovhannes Bagramyan · Ovanes Bagramyan

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How did a railwayman's son pass through the tsarist and Armenian armies to the Red Army?

Ivan Bagramyan was born on 2 December (20 November Old Style) 1897 into a poor Armenian family in a railwaymen's barracks near the village of Chardakhly in Elisavetpol Governorate (near present-day Ganja, Azerbaijan). His birth name was Ovanes Khachaturovich (Hovhannes in Armenian); "Ivan Khristoforovich" was the Russified form that stuck later. His father Khachatur worked on the railway, educated himself and became a foreman; his mother Mariam came from a village blacksmith's family. After an Armenian parish school in Elisavetpol he attended the railway school in Tbilisi in 1907-1912 and the Tbilisi railway technical school in 1912-1915, finishing with excellent marks despite his parents' straitened means. He later admitted that Russian, which he had learned from childhood, always came hard to him.

After working a few months as a railway technician in 1915, he volunteered for the imperial army that October. Posted to a frontier infantry regiment on the Caucasus front, he went into Persia with the Russian expeditionary corps and took part in the Hamadan operation; in 1917 he completed the Tbilisi school for ensigns and was commissioned as a praporshchik, the lowest officer rank.

After the February Revolution he backed the Armenian nationalist socialist party Dashnaktsutyun (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation) and joined it. Demobilised from the Russian army in December 1917, he joined the army of the newly independent Armenian Republic in 1918. With a cavalry regiment he fought the advancing Ottoman forces around Kars and Sarikamish and took part in the battle of Sardarapat in May 1918, the decisive victory in which Armenia halted the Ottoman army. He commanded a company and a cavalry squadron and was promoted to lieutenant.

In 1920, as Soviet power pushed into the South Caucasus, he grew dissatisfied with the Dashnak government's policies and took part in the failed May 1920 uprising against it. He was arrested and sent to work in the fields for several months; the Russian account says he was transferred to the reserve in November 1920 as "unreliable". When Turkey invaded Armenia he was allowed back into the army, and when Armenia was Sovietised in December 1920 and the national army disbanded, he joined the Armenian Red Army as a squadron commander. With the 11th Army he fought Dashnak armed bands and took part in establishing Soviet power in northern Armenia and then in Georgia.

His youth was eventful even by the standards of South Caucasian soldiers. His past as a tsarist officer, member of a nationalist party and officer of independent Armenia later became a dangerous weakness under the Soviet system. Yet for Armenians he also became a symbolic figure: a veteran of Sardarapat, the battle that saved the independent state, and a Marshal of the Soviet Union, carrying both national identity and Soviet loyalty.

How did a cavalry officer with a Dashnak past survive the purges and grow into a staff officer?

After the Civil War Bagramyan completed a commanders' refresher course and in 1923 became commander of the Leninakan (now Gyumri) cavalry regiment of the Armenian Rifle Division, which he led until 1931. From autumn 1924 he spent a year at the Higher Cavalry School in Leningrad, where his classmates included Georgy Zhukov, Konstantin Rokossovsky and Andrei Yeryomenko, future leaders of the war against Germany. His bond with Zhukov would prove decisive more than once.

In 1931 he entered the Frunze Military Academy and graduated with first-class honours in 1934. His academy report described "a broad general and political outlook, exceptional culture in his work, great military erudition, a strong will and impeccable discipline". He then became chief of staff of the 5th Cavalry Division in the Kiev Military District and was made colonel in 1935.

But his past caught up with him. According to the Ukrainian commander Petro Grigorenko, his superiors learned that he had been a secret member of the banned Dashnaktsutyun for more than a decade and sought to expel him from the academy. Awaiting arrest, he was deeply depressed and said he only wished they would arrest him soon and get it over with; at Grigorenko's urging he reluctantly appealed. The Russian-language account says that around 1936 compromising material was gathered on him for his service in the "bourgeois Armenian army", but that he was saved by the intervention of Anastas Mikoyan, the Armenian member of the Politburo. It was a time when many commanders with similar records were shot.

In autumn 1936 he joined the first intake of the new General Staff Academy, a class later called the "marshals' course" because it produced four marshals, six army generals and more. He graduated with distinction in 1938 and stayed on as an instructor in the tactics of higher formations. While the purges emptied the high command and his classmates rose rapidly, he remained in the same post and the same rank of colonel until 1940; his record was holding him back.

The breakthrough again came through Zhukov. When Zhukov took over the Kiev Special Military District in 1940, Bagramyan wrote asking to serve under him, and Zhukov agreed. In September 1940 he became chief of operations of the 12th Army, and in December he won Zhukov's confidence by helping draft the paper "Conducting a Contemporary Offensive Operation" for a conference of district commanders. He soon moved up to chief of operations and deputy chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District. He joined the Communist Party in 1941. When Germany invaded a few months later, he was responsible for operational planning in the largest military district of the Soviet army.

What victories and disasters did he go through as a Southwestern Front staff officer in the first year of the war?

When Germany invaded in June 1941 the Kiev Special Military District became the Southwestern Front, and Bagramyan, as its chief of operations, helped organise the first large counterattacks of Soviet mechanised corps around Dubno, Rovno and Lutsk. The Soviet side failed to stop the Germans in this border tank battle, and in early July Kleist's 1st Panzer Group broke through the fortified line on the old frontier, collapsing the defence of western Ukraine.

The defence of Kiev in July-September ended in catastrophe. The withdrawal order came too late, and by mid-September four armies and the front headquarters were encircled. On 19 September Bagramyan was ordered to take some 150 NKVD troops and guard the rear of the headquarters column, but at the last moment the front commander Kirponos changed the order and sent his detachment to seize a ridge and a bridge: without telling him, he was using it as a diversion. Bagramyan's group slipped through the German cordon and reached Soviet lines near Gadyach on 21 September, while Kirponos, his chief of staff Tupikov and dozens of other generals were killed or captured. He was promoted to major general during the operation.

As a staff officer of the Southwestern Direction he then planned the counteroffensive that retook Rostov-on-Don in November 1941, and during the December counteroffensive before Moscow, as chief of staff of a mobile group of the Southwestern Front, he devised the operation that eliminated the Yelets salient. He was made lieutenant general on 27 December and chief of staff of the Southwestern Direction the next day. The Barvenkovo-Lozovaya operation in January 1942 gave the Red Army a large salient on the Northern Donets near Izyum.

In March 1942 he went to Moscow with the Direction's commander Timoshenko and its political commissar Khrushchev to present Stalin with a plan to retake Kharkov from that salient. Stalin approved it, and in April Bagramyan also became chief of staff of the Southwestern Front. The offensive that began in May at first seemed to succeed, but Kleist's forces cut the base of the Barvenkovo salient and trapped a huge Soviet force. According to the English-language account, on 18 May Bagramyan asked Timoshenko to change the plan, but Timoshenko and Stalin refused. German figures counted 240,000 prisoners; Soviet figures give 277,000 losses, 171,000 of them irrecoverable. The disaster opened the way for the Germans to the Caucasus and Stalingrad.

Stalin named Bagramyan the chief culprit. In a letter to the front command of 26 June he wrote that Bagramyan satisfied headquarters neither as chief of staff nor "as a simple informant obliged to report honestly", while adding that "the matter is not only Bagramyan" but the errors of the whole Military Council, "above all Timoshenko and Khrushchev". Khrushchev recalled that after the offensive was called off Bagramyan "burst into tears ... He was weeping for our army." Zhukov shielded him from a court martial, telling Stalin that part of the blame lay with Supreme Headquarters and the General Staff. The British military historian John Erickson considers him unfairly scapegoated in Stalin's "hunt for culprits". He was demoted to chief of staff of the 28th Army and wrote to Stalin asking to serve at the front "in any capacity, however modest".

How did the staff officer blamed for a disaster come back to sweep the Baltic as a front commander?

The 28th Army that Bagramyan joined was already disintegrating, and when Rossosh fell almost without a fight on 7 July 1942 he again faced the threat of a court martial. Once more Zhukov intervened and had him transferred to the Western Front, and on 13 July he succeeded Rokossovsky, who had left to command the Bryansk Front, as commander of the 16th Army. Handing an army to a staff officer who had never led a combat unit before the war reflected Zhukov's high opinion of his abilities. The 16th Army repelled a German attack in August 1942 and in February-March 1943 broke through the deep defences north of Zhizdra; in April 1943 it was awarded Guards status and became the 11th Guards Army.

When Supreme Headquarters discussed the offensive against the Orel salient (later Operation Kutuzov) at the end of April 1943, he proposed that two neighbouring armies strike towards each other to encircle the German forces at Bolkhov first. He argued that the original plan was too audacious and that forces had to be concentrated to avoid repeating the previous year's failure at Kharkov. The front commanders objected, but Stalin backed his proposal. On 12 July, after the German Kursk offensive (Operation Citadel) had been worn down, his army struck the Orel salient from the north, and in August he was made colonel general. In November he was promoted to army general and given command of the 1st Baltic Front, becoming, after the Latvian Max Reyter, the second non-Slav to command a Soviet front.

In December 1943 the Gorodok operation encircled and destroyed four German divisions, but attacks on Vitebsk in early 1944 failed repeatedly. In Operation Bagration, the summer 1944 offensive that shattered German Army Group Centre in Belarus, his front encircled Vitebsk together with the 3rd Belorussian Front. He insisted on making the main thrust not from the apparently favourable bridgehead in the centre but across the marshy right flank where the Germans least expected it, and within two days the breach was 90 km wide and 30 km deep. The two men remembered the preparations differently. In a 1961 article in the Military History Journal Bagramyan wrote that the Stavka representative Vasilevsky arrived about three days before the attack, was taken aback by a breakthrough sector as wide as 25 km, rejected his objection that narrowing it in marshland would weaken the first blow, and left the decision in place only because there was no time to redo it. Vasilevsky called this inaccurate in his memoirs. By his account he approved Bagramyan's first-stage decision at the front's command post on 8 June, sixteen days before the attack, and there were no serious disagreements, since breaking through between the lakes and marshes was already laid down in the Stavka directive. To being called "calculating" and "cautious" he replied that in due measure these were virtues in a commander. Once the attack began Vasilevsky coordinated the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, and when the Vitebsk pocket closed he, Bagramyan and Chernyakhovsky agreed to leave only part of their forces to reduce it and push the main forces west. In mid-July Vasilevsky, after consulting Bagramyan, asked the Stavka to release the front from its main thrust towards Kaunas and let it concentrate against Dvinsk and towards Panevėžys and Šiauliai. The Polotsk and Šiauliai operations that followed liberated much of Lithuania and Latvia and reached the Gulf of Riga, isolating German Army Group North in the Baltic. On 29 July he was made Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Memel operation of October 1944 is reckoned his masterpiece. To cut Army Group North off from East Prussia completely, Supreme Headquarters had him secretly shift his main forces from before Riga to the Šiauliai area and strike towards Klaipėda (Memel). According to Vasilevsky, the Stavka moved the main blow after reconnaissance reported no more than eight German divisions left in the Klaipėda area; the regrouping began on 24 September, and he drew up the operational plan with the front's Military Council. Moving mostly at night, he redeployed three combined-arms armies and a tank army up to 200 km in six days, broke through the German defences in a surprise attack on 5 October and reached the Baltic coast on the 10th. More than thirty German divisions were cut off in Courland. This shift of a front's main forces from one wing to the other became a subject of study at many military academies after the war. A well-known anecdote has him sending Stalin a bottle of Baltic seawater to celebrate reaching the coast; by the time it arrived the Germans had retaken the beachhead, and Stalin said, "Give it back to Comrade Bagramyan and let him pour it into the Baltic Sea."

When the 1st Baltic Front was dissolved in February 1945 he led the Samland Group and became deputy commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In mid-March the 3rd Belorussian Front's command adopted the Samland Group's plan for storming Königsberg. The group was abolished at the end of March, but Bagramyan stayed on as deputy front commander, and the front began storming the fortress, which Hitler had called an impregnable bastion, on 6 April 1945 and took its surrender three days later, on the 9th. When Vasilevsky left at the end of April to prepare the Far Eastern campaign, Bagramyan took command of the 3rd Belorussian Front and finished off the German forces on the Samland peninsula. At the Victory Parade in Moscow on 24 June he led the composite regiment of the 1st Baltic Front.

After the War: Last Front Commander to Cuba

After the war Bagramyan remained at the centre of the Soviet military elite, serving as commander of the Baltic Military District (1945–54), Deputy Defence Minister (1955–56, 1958–68), and commandant of the General Staff Academy (1956–58). During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis he led the planning of Operation Anadyr, the clandestine deployment of Soviet forces to Cuba, whose codename was deliberately chosen from a Chukotka river to deflect attention northward. From 1968 he served as inspector-general of the Defence Ministry while remaining active as a Central Committee member and Supreme Soviet deputy.

As an Armenian, Bagramyan embodied the tension between national identity and imperial loyalty inside the Soviet system. A famous story recounts that at the first session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, when every speaker used Latvian, Bagramyan deliberately delivered his speech in Armenian; thereafter proceedings were conducted in Russian, which all could understand. When he died in September 1982 he was the last surviving marshal who had commanded a front in the Great Patriotic War. His ashes were interred in the Kremlin Wall.