The Battle of the Caucasus (1942–1943)
Why did the Germans go down into the Caucasus in the summer of 1942 after the oil of Baku, and what did Hitler's decision to split his forces between Stalingrad and the Caucasus cost him? Why could German mountain troops who planted their flag on Elbrus not cross the range, and why was Army Group A, retreating after Stalingrad, not trapped in the bottleneck of Rostov?
On 23 July 1942 Hitler's Führer Directive No. 45 sent Army Group A to the Caucasian oilfields and Army Group B to Stalingrad at the same time. Past Rostov, the Germans took the Kuban and Maikop within a month and planted their flag on Elbrus, but they were stopped at Malgobek before Grozny, before Tuapse and before Ordzhonikidze, and never crossed the passes of the range. In January 1943, its rear endangered by the encirclement at Stalingrad, Army Group A withdrew, but the Soviets failed to cut its line of retreat at Bataysk, and the 17th Army stayed on the Taman Peninsula. After the 225 days of Malaya Zemlya and the Kuban air battles, Novorossiysk was freed in September 1943 and the Taman Peninsula on 9 October, ending the battle.
Why did the Germans go for the Caucasus, and what did it mean to the Soviet Union?
The Caucasus is the range that runs between the Black Sea and the Caspian, together with the lands north and south of it. North of the mountains, the Kuban and the Stavropol country were grain land, and there were oilfields at Maikop near the Black Sea and at Grozny in the foothills. South of the range lay Transcaucasia (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), and in it Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, whose fields produced about 80 per cent of Soviet oil in 1942, some 24 million tons. Maikop and Grozny together gave only about 10 per cent, so the real prize the Germans sought in the Caucasus was Baku beyond the mountains. For a Soviet Union that had lost Ukraine, the Kuban grain and the tungsten and molybdenum mine at Tyrnyauz were also resources it could not do without. 3 1
Germany's own position was more desperate. It imported 85 per cent of the three million tons of oil it used each year, and once the war began the British blockade cut it off from American, Venezuelan and Iranian oil, leaving it dependent on the Romanian fields and synthetic fuel. At the end of 1941 Romania warned that it could no longer meet German demands. From the outset the summer offensive of 1942, Case Blue, aimed to seize the oilfields of Maikop, Grozny and Baku, ending Germany's fuel shortage and cutting off the Soviet supply. Germany set up companies in advance to exploit Caucasian oil, granting them an exclusive 99-year lease, and arranged for 15,000 oil industry workers to follow the troops. 3 2
The Caucasus was also the gateway for Allied aid. British and American supplies were landed at ports on the Persian Gulf, carried across Iran and then sent on from Tehran to Baku, or shipped from the southern Caspian ports to Baku and Makhachkala. Of the 17.5 million long tons of American Lend-Lease aid, 7.9 million (45 per cent) went through this Persian Corridor. Sergei Shtemenko of the Soviet General Staff wrote in his memoirs that the staff reckoned a German arrival on the Volga would cost the country both the Caucasian oil and the Allied supply line through Iran. After Rostov fell in July 1942, the only links left between the Caucasus and central Russia were the shipping lanes of the Caspian and the Volga and the railway from Salsk to Stalingrad. 4 26 1
Turkey, beyond the southern border, also worried the Soviet command. According to Shtemenko, by mid-1942 twenty-six Turkish divisions had gathered on the border with Transcaucasia, and the Soviet Union had to keep its 45th Army tied down there, with the 15th Cavalry Corps on the Iranian-Turkish border as well, in case Turkey entered the war on Germany's side. Aleksandr Vasilevsky likewise wrote in his memoirs that the German leadership linked a breakthrough into the Caucasus with drawing Turkey into the war and preparing an invasion of the Middle East. Turkey never entered the war. 27 28 1
Why did Hitler split his forces in two, and what did it cost him?
The original design of Case Blue (Führer Directive No. 41 of April 1942) went in stages: first destroy the Soviet forces west of the Don, then push towards Stalingrad to cover the flank, and then take the Caucasian oilfields and the passes over the range. Vasilevsky summed it up: the directive named the Caucasus as the goal of the "main operation" and treated the drive on Stalingrad as cover for its left flank. When the Soviet front collapsed in the offensive that opened on 28 June, Army Group South was split on 9 July into Wilhelm List's Army Group A and Maximilian von Weichs's Army Group B. 28 3
On 23 July Hitler issued Führer Directive No. 45. Believing that the main Soviet forces had already been broken, he ordered the two army groups to strike at their objectives at the same time rather than one after the other: Army Group A was to go down into the Caucasus and take the oilfields (Operation Edelweiss), and Army Group B was to advance to the Volga and Stalingrad (Operation Fischreiher). With ammunition and fuel supply already at breaking point, sending the two army groups off in different directions was bound to open a dangerous gap between them. Army Group A, which had to fight in high mountains, had only three mountain divisions. There is no record that Franz Halder, the army chief of staff, or anyone else objected to the directive before August. 3
The decision sent forces back and forth. Hitler first turned the 4th Panzer Army south to help the 1st Panzer Army cross the lower Don, then two weeks later sent it back towards Stalingrad. Ewald von Kleist, commander of the 1st Panzer Army, later complained that the 4th Panzer Army had only clogged the roads, and that had it carried on to Stalingrad it could have taken the city in July. Erich von Manstein's 11th Army, freed after the Battle of the Kerch Peninsula and the fall of Sevastopol, was supposed to come to the Caucasus too, but most of it was sent north towards Leningrad, and the Romanian 3rd Army was soon pulled away to cover the Stalingrad flank. In the end the Caucasus was entered by the 1st Panzer Army, Richard Ruoff's 17th Army and part of the Romanian forces. 3 1
The further south the Germans went, the shorter of fuel they became. The Black Sea route was judged too dangerous, so fuel came by rail through Rostov or by air; panzer divisions sometimes stood still for weeks, and oil was even carried up on camels. As the fighting at Stalingrad dragged on, Kleist lost his flak corps and most of the air units supporting the southern front. On 9 September Hitler sacked List for advancing too slowly and took command of Army Group A himself, but his command from his headquarters was nominal; day-to-day business was handled by Hans von Greiffenberg, List's former chief of staff. Only on 22 November did Kleist take over the army group. Some historians see the decision to divide the strategic objectives with too few forces as the reason both the Stalingrad and the Caucasus offensives failed. 3 1 2
How did the North Caucasus collapse within a month?
On 23 July 1942 the Germans took Rostov-on-Don, called the "gate to the Caucasus", and on 25 July they crossed the Don and poured south; in Russia this day is taken as the start of the Battle of the Caucasus. The Soviet Southern Front opposing them (Rodion Malinovsky) was already worn out by the failed Kharkov offensive and the retreat to the Don, and on 25 July it had 112,000 men and only 121 tanks. On 28 July the Southern Front was dissolved into Semyon Budyonny's North Caucasus Front. When the Germans cut the last direct railway between central Russia and the Caucasus on 29 July, Moscow was alarmed, and at this time Stalin issued Order No. 227, known as "Not a step back!". But the ordered withdrawal soon turned into flight, and the Germans flooded into the Kuban steppe with little resistance. 1 3
Stavropol (then called Voroshilovsk) fell on 3 August, Maikop on the 9th, and Krasnodar and Elista in Kalmykia on the 12th. The 1st Panzer Army covered more than 480 km in under two weeks. Germany had even formed an SS guard regiment and a Cossack regiment to keep the oil installations from being destroyed by Soviet units under Nikolai Baibakov and Budyonny, but the Maikop fields had already been wrecked by the Soviet side so thoroughly that they would take about a year to repair. The 1st Panzer Army pushed east along the northern foot of the range and took Mozdok on the Terek on 25 August. 1 3 2
Shortage of weapons was a large part of the speed of the Soviet collapse. Shtemenko notes that on 10 August the 417th Rifle Division had only 500 rifles, while the 151st was armed only by half, and that with foreign rifles. Even so, the great encirclements the Germans hoped for did not happen. Because the Soviets more often retreated than fought, the Germans took only 83,000 prisoners, far below expectations. In early September the Soviet command dissolved the North Caucasus Front into the Black Sea Group under Ivan Petrov and brought all forces in the Caucasus under Ivan Tyulenev's Transcaucasian Front. 27 3 1
On the Black Sea side the 17th Army attacked towards Novorossiysk and Anapa on 19 August. Anapa fell on 31 August, cutting off the marines defending the Taman Peninsula, and on 10-11 September German and Romanian troops took most of Novorossiysk, the Black Sea Fleet base. But the 47th Army under Andrei Grechko and the city defence under Rear Admiral Sergei Gorshkov stopped them among the cement works on the eastern side of the town. After a counter-attack in late September almost wiped out the Romanian 3rd Mountain Division, the Germans went over to the defensive there, and that line hardly moved for the next year. The Germans held the port but could not use it. 1 27 3
Why could the German mountain troops not cross the Caucasus range?
The Main Caucasus Range is a wall of high peaks, and only a few passes lead from its northern side down to the Black Sea coast and Georgia. The German plan was to go round the range in the west (Novorossiysk and Tuapse) and in the east (Grozny and Baku) while at the same time crossing it in the middle, over the Klukhor, Marukh and Sancharo passes, down to Sukhumi, Kutaisi and Tbilisi. The task went to Rudolf Konrad's XLIX Mountain Corps, that is Hubert Lanz's 1st Mountain Division ("Edelweiss") and the 4th Mountain Division, many of whose men were Tyroleans, along with two Romanian mountain divisions. 1 2
The Soviet defence of the passes was thin. According to Shtemenko, the Transcaucasian Front, busy strengthening the Terek line on the way to Baku, left the whole range to the small 46th Army: the Marukh Pass was held by one rifle company with a mortar platoon and a sapper platoon, the Klukhor Pass by two rifle companies and a sapper platoon. He writes that the front command greatly overrated how impassable the mountains were. As a result the Klukhor Pass fell to a single short surprise attack on 15 August, and 46th Army headquarters learned of it only on the third day. A German vanguard of 150 men under Captain Heinz Groth crossed the Khotyu-tau Pass, which nobody was defending. 27 2
On 21 August men of the 1st Mountain Division planted the flag of Nazi Germany on the summit of Elbrus, the highest peak in Europe. It made good propaganda but had almost no military meaning: having taken the climbers' hut "Shelter of the Eleven" on the northern slope, the Germans got no further. In early September they also took the Marukh and Sancharo passes, and the 4th Mountain Division came 30 km down towards Sukhumi, threatening the Black Sea coast. 1 2 27
The Soviet side hurried to plug the gaps. At the end of August, on Tyulenev's orders, independent mountain rifle detachments began to be formed, made up of alpinists and highlanders such as the Svans. The road from Krasnaya Polyana to Sochi was blocked by the 20th Mountain Rifle Division and the NKVD's 23rd Border Regiment and 33rd Mechanised Regiment. Against the Germans who had come over the Sancharo Pass, NKVD Colonel Ivan Piyashev put together a special group. Mixed in with recruits who did not know how to handle the new grenades and with cadets of the Tbilisi infantry school, it stopped the 4th Mountain Division near Lake Ritsa on its way to the sea and retook the pass by 20 October. On 27 August Konstantin Leselidze took command of the 46th Army. 1 27 19
The mountains punished the attacker more. The German mountain units had to rely on mules and horses for supply, and when winter came the animals died of hunger and disease. When the XLIX Mountain Corps came down out of the mountains in January, it lacked both draught animals and half-tracks and could not even take its artillery with it. Kleist thought the locally raised Soviet troops fought harder for their homeland, and the Germans were held up above all by Georgian mountain troops. On 13 and 17 February 1943 climbers of the Soviet 46th Army took down the German flags on the western and eastern summits of Elbrus and raised Soviet ones. 1 3
How were the Germans stopped on the Terek, before Tuapse and before Ordzhonikidze?
In the east Kleist's 1st Panzer Army was aiming for the Grozny oilfields, the Caspian coast beyond and the Georgian Military Road over the mountains into Georgia. The Northern Group of the Transcaucasian Front under Ivan Maslennikov held a line on the Terek and Urukh rivers. On 2 September the Germans crossed the Terek near Mozdok, and on 24 September, reinforced with the SS Panzer Division "Wiking" taken from the Tuapse sector, they attacked along the Elkhotovo gap in the Terek valley towards Ordzhonikidze (today Vladikavkaz) and along the Sunzha valley towards Grozny. But they were held before Malgobek, and on 28 September the German command ordered the Grozny offensive abandoned. Bombing by the Soviet 4th Air Army caused the Germans heavy losses in this fighting. 1 9 27
Unable to reach the oilfields on the ground, Hitler turned to the air force. On 10 and 12 October bombers of the 4th Air Fleet struck the refineries at Grozny, and black smoke rose to 5,500 metres. But the main fields at Baku were beyond the range of German fighter escort, and when Operation Uranus began on 19 November the remaining bombers were called away to Stalingrad. The Grozny and Maikop fields that Germany could reach produced only ten per cent of Soviet oil between them. 3
On the Black Sea side the 17th Army was aiming for Tuapse. Taking it would open the coast road to Sochi and Sukhumi and cut off the rear of the Black Sea Group. Already stopped 50 km short of Tuapse in August, the Germans attacked again on 25 September after two days of bombing, and again in mid-October and mid-November. But with forces being drained away to Stalingrad they could not cross the last ridge before Tuapse. The Stavka sent Grechko to command the 18th Army in mid-October, and on 26 November the Soviets counter-attacked, driving the Germans back across the Pshish river by 17 December. That closed the Tuapse defensive operation (25 September to 20 December). 7 1 27
The last great German attack came on 25 October towards Nalchik. Having regrouped in secret, the Germans built up against a 6 km stretch held by the Soviet 37th Army, which had no tanks at all, a threefold superiority in men, elevenfold in guns and an overwhelming one in tanks. Nalchik fell (on 27 October according to the Russian Wikipedia; the English Wikipedia says Romanian mountain troops took it on 2 November), and in early November the 13th Panzer Division reached Gizel, just outside Ordzhonikidze. Over 600 km from its starting point, this was the furthest the Germans ever got in the Caucasus. The Soviets halted the advance on 5 November and retook Gizel on the 11th. The 13th Panzer Division, nearly encircled, broke out with help from "Wiking", and Kleist gave up further offensives. Pavel Bodin, who had come to Tbilisi with Shtemenko and stayed on as chief of staff of the Transcaucasian Front, was killed by German bombing near Ordzhonikidze on 1 November. 8 1 2 3 27
From the German side, the offensive was short of strength from the start. In September the Romanian 3rd Army left to guard the Stalingrad flank, and in December some German divisions were taken out of the Caucasus too. By early 1943 the Germans in the Caucasus were outnumbered by the Soviets in both men and equipment. As early as October Army Group A drew up plans for a winter defensive line north of the range and for its supply. The Russian Wikipedia puts Army Group A's dead in the 1942 offensive phase at almost 100,000. 1
What did Beria and the General Staff do in the defence of the Caucasus?
In late August Moscow began to take the Caucasus in hand directly. Shtemenko, then a colonel in charge of the Caucasus direction in the General Staff's Operations Directorate, recalls in his memoirs the night of his first report to Stalin. He says that in reporting on the Terek defences and the Baku and Georgian Military Road directions he did not hide how weakly the passes of the range were held. A few days later, on 22 August, he left Moscow with Pavel Bodin, head of the Operations Directorate. The direct route was already cut by the Germans, so the plane landed at Krasnovodsk in Central Asia and crossed the Caspian at night to Baku and on to Tbilisi. 27
According to Shtemenko, in Tbilisi Bodin told the front commander that the Allies were trying to exploit the Soviet Union's difficulties to extract consent for bringing British troops into Transcaucasia, and that the State Defence Committee would not allow it. Martial law was declared in Transcaucasia on 24 August, and units falling back from the north were put back into positions on the Terek, in the foothills and on the Tuapse and Novorossiysk approaches. Defence districts were set up at Baku, Grozny and Vladikavkaz, and on 28 August the 58th Army began forming on the Baku axis. On 16 September the State Defence Committee decided to mobilise 90,000 local people a day for defence works around Makhachkala, Derbent and Baku. 27
At the same time Lavrentiy Beria, the People's Commissar for Internal Affairs, was in the Caucasus with a group of generals and officers as plenipotentiary of the State Defence Committee, from 21 August until 16 or 17 September, directing the organisation of the defence. A Georgian who had long led the party and the security organs in Transcaucasia, he knew the region well. Soviet and Russian accounts such as the Russian Wikipedia say he led the measures to organise a firm defence of the Caucasus. NKVD border guards and internal troops regiments were indeed thrown into the defence of the passes, and Piyashev, who retook the Sancharo Pass, came from command of an NKVD division. 17 27 19
There is another side. The 1989 edition of Shtemenko's memoirs does not name Beria, but it calls the separate "staff of the troops for the defence of the Caucasus range", set up under front headquarters and given to General G. L. Petrov from the NKVD, "a completely unnecessary, contrived intermediate level". In effect, he says, this staff took the place of 46th Army headquarters, so that command of the mountain defence was split in two. Meanwhile, at his trial after his arrest in 1953 Beria was even accused of trying, while organising the defence of the North Caucasus in 1942, to let the Germans occupy the Caucasus. The same indictment counted as treason the 1941 attempt to sound out peace with Hitler through the Bulgarian ambassador, although Beria had acted on the orders of Stalin and Molotov. His contribution and the confusion he added have to be read between Soviet-era praise and the political charges brought after 1953. 27 18
The Stavka and the front command did not always see things the same way. On 15 October the Stavka told Tyulenev that, judging by his frequent visits to the Northern Group and the fact that most of his forces went there, he was "underestimating the significance of the Black Sea Group and the operational-strategic role of the Black Sea coast". Shtemenko, who drafted the document himself, explains that behind it lay planning for the coming counter-offensive. Tyulenev proposed enlarging the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps into a cavalry army and caught Stalin's interest, but the General Staff objected that so large a purely mounted force would be too vulnerable from the ground and the air, and Stalin agreed. 27 20
Why did the German retreat not end in encirclement?
Once Operation Uranus had encircled the German 6th Army at Stalingrad in November 1942 and Operation Little Saturn had broken the relief attempt of Operation Winter Storm in December, Army Group A in the Caucasus was in danger of being cut off from behind. If the Soviet Southern Front reached Rostov, all the German forces strung out along the foothills, on the Terek and before Novorossiysk could be trapped. The only way back across the Don for Army Group A was in effect one narrow passage through Rostov and Bataysk: a bottleneck. On 29 December Hitler ordered the 1st Panzer Army round Mozdok, Nalchik and Prokhladny to withdraw in haste. 5 27 6
On the Soviet side, too, some saw a larger opportunity. Vasilevsky recalls that in early December a proposal reached the Stavka to leave Paulus's army at Stalingrad under a guard force and turn the main forces straight on Rostov, creating a "second great cauldron" in the North Caucasus. He opposed it, arguing that the 6th Army, though weakened, still had fighting power and must not be underrated, and Stalin took his side. Many forces stayed tied up reducing the Stalingrad pocket, and as the Russian Wikipedia puts it, in January 1943 the Southern Front lacked the strength to encircle the Germans. 29 1
On 4 January 1943 Stalin dictated to Shtemenko a directive for the Transcaucasian Front: "It is not to our advantage to push the enemy out of the North Caucasus." If Maslennikov's Northern Group merely followed the enemy frontally, it would only push him out; instead the Black Sea Group was to drive through Tikhoretsk to Bataysk and Azov and block Rostov from the east. Stalin added that Petrov had been on the defensive all along and had no experience of attack, and must value every day and every hour. Vasilevsky reproduced the same directive in his memoirs as an example of Stalin's strategic grasp. On this basis the Black Sea Group drew up Operation "Mountains" against Krasnodar and Operation "Sea" against Novorossiysk; Stalin objected that the "Mountains" plan left out a third stage, the advance on Bataysk, and approved it on 11 January. 27 29
The plans did not keep pace with reality. The Northern Group's pursuit began two days late, and from the first day units became so mixed up that headquarters did not know where their own troops were. Early on 8 January Stalin sent Maslennikov a telegram rebuking him for having "broken away from your troops and lost contact with them". The cavalry divisions' horses were so exhausted they could manage only 20-25 km a day. Hauling artillery over mountain roads in rain and snow, the Black Sea Group could start "Mountains" and "Sea" only on 16 January; the 56th Army got to the approaches of Krasnodar, but the 47th Army before Novorossiysk failed. 27 1
The decisive point was Bataysk. On 23 January the Stavka ordered the Southern Front to turn its main forces there, declaring that taking Bataysk would trap 24 German and Romanian divisions in the North Caucasus. But Andrei Yeryomenko's Southern Front was repeatedly stopped by Germans defending with tanks and aircraft; Shtemenko writes that "a kind of armoured shield" stood before Rostov. The German 1st Panzer Army linked flanks with the 4th Panzer Army of Manstein's Army Group Don, which held Bataysk, and slipped out through Rostov by 6 February. Meanwhile Stavropol was liberated on 21 January, Maikop on the 29th and Krasnodar on 12 February, and Rostov was retaken in mid-February, but Army Group A was not encircled. On 1 February Hitler made Kleist a field marshal. 27 6 1 5
The 17th Army did not go to the Don; on Hitler's orders it fell back into the Kuban bridgehead on the Taman Peninsula. Hitler meant to hold it as a base from which, once the initiative was regained, to advance on the Grozny oilfields again. Shtemenko writes that the General Staff, too, judged that the bridgehead was held deliberately rather than by force of circumstance, to cover the Crimea from the east and threaten the Sea of Azov and the lower Don. In the North Caucasus offensive of January and February 1943 the Red Army lost more than 154,500 men. 5 27 10
What kind of fight was Malaya Zemlya, and why was it inflated in the 1970s?
Operation "Sea", the attempt to retake Novorossiysk, was renewed on the night of 4 February with two landings. At the main landing site, Yuzhnaya Ozereyka, poor preparation and naval gunfire that failed to suppress the enemy meant only some 1,400 men got ashore; they could not hold a beachhead and had to fight their way, with heavy losses, to the other landing force. Meanwhile the diversionary landing at Stanichka, the southern suburb of Novorossiysk, by Major Tsezar Kunikov's detachment (almost 900 men according to Shtemenko, 800 according to the English Wikipedia) seized a small foothold and held it. The diversion had become the main landing. Kunikov was killed on 14 February and made a Hero of the Soviet Union. The beachhead widened to Cape Myskhako, about 28 km², and came to be called Malaya Zemlya, "the Small Land". 27 15 1
The beachhead held for 225 days, until Novorossiysk was liberated on 16 September. All supplies and reinforcements had to be ferried across Tsemes Bay, and ammunition and food were always short. On 17 April the Germans tried to wipe out the beachhead with 27,000 men under General Wilhelm Wetzel (Operation Neptun); the I Air Corps of the German 4th Air Fleet flew 1,560 sorties in the operation. The Soviets brought in three air corps (500 aircraft) from the Stavka reserve, won back the sky and counter-attacked the flanks, and by the end of April the Germans were back on their start lines. Twenty-one men from the beachhead were made Heroes of the Soviet Union. 13 6
The fight became a symbol for the whole Soviet Union more than thirty years later. Leonid Brezhnev came to the Caucasus in 1942 as deputy head of the political administration of the North Caucasus Front, and in April 1943 became head of the political department of the 18th Army (a colonel), crossing to Malaya Zemlya a number of times. In 1978, when he was General Secretary, a memoir under his name, Malaya Zemlya, appeared in issue 2 of Novy Mir. It was printed in 15 million copies, sent to the national libraries of 120 countries and put on the school literature syllabus, and in 1980 Brezhnev received the Lenin Prize for Literature for the trilogy of memoirs that included it. The journalist Arkady Sakhnin is commonly named as the one who actually wrote it up. Novorossiysk was given the title of Hero City in 1973. 16 14 13 27
The exaggeration soon became a joke. The English Wikipedia judges that the memoir treated the minor battles near Novorossiysk as a decisive theatre of the war. Jokes about the book spread until veterans of Novorossiysk were sometimes embarrassed to say where they had fought, and a fight that had been an example of courage and professionalism came to be seen as almost invented. Editions one to six of Zhukov's memoirs contained a passage in which Zhukov wanted to talk to Brezhnev; the historian Nikolai Yakovlev judged it the work of an editor, saying "the style is not Zhukov's". In 1987, during perestroika, Brezhnev's memoirs were withdrawn from bookshops and pulped. With the exaggeration stripped away, the fact remains that the small beachhead held for seven months while drawing in nearly five German divisions. 16 14 27
What happened in the skies over the Kuban and on the Blue Line?
In the spring of 1943 the German 17th Army built several belts of defences from the lower Kuban across the Taman Peninsula, which the Germans called the Gotenkopf position and the Soviets the Blue Line. At the end of February twelve German and four Romanian divisions held a 120 km front, and 4,000 tons of supplies a day were carried across the Kerch Strait in small craft. When Maslennikov's North Caucasus Front repeatedly failed to break through, Stalin told Georgy Zhukov to go and see for himself, and on 18 April Zhukov flew to Krasnodar with Shtemenko, the air force commander Aleksandr Novikov and the People's Commissar of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov. 6 1 27
Zhukov chose to make the main effort south of the Kuban at Krymskaya rather than in the roadless marshes north of the river. The attack opened on 29 April after a hundred minutes of artillery and air bombardment, and Krymskaya was taken on 4 May. Shtemenko notes that the Germans had used Novorossiysk cement to turn the cellars of every stone house in the village into pillboxes and had dug tanks into the ground. After that the offensive stalled again before a new line at Kievskoye and Moldavanskoye, and on 15 May it was called off. Stalin replaced Maslennikov as commander of the North Caucasus Front with Ivan Petrov. Shtemenko also tells how Piyashev, commanding the special NKVD division committed there, first answered the urging of Zhukov, who was hiding under the cover name "Konstantinov", with a curse, then realised who he was and complied. 27 19
In the same weeks one of the largest air battles of the war was fought over the Kuban. More than 2,000 aircraft took part on the two sides, and on some days there were dozens of group engagements with 50 to 100 aircraft on each side. By Shtemenko's count, on 15 April the Germans flew 1,560 sorties to the Soviets' 447. The Soviets brought in reserve air corps, won back the upper hand over Myskhako on 17-24 April, and flew some 35,000 sorties between 17 April and 7 June. Aces such as Aleksandr Pokryshkin, Grigory Rechkalov and the Glinka brothers made their names, and Soviet fighter pilots learned here to fly formations stepped up in height (the "Kuban stack"), to fight in the vertical and to use ground radio guidance. Fifty-two airmen were made Heroes of the Soviet Union. 12 27 1
Assessments differ. Soviet historiography holds that the Kuban air battles badly weakened the Luftwaffe and laid the ground for Soviet air supremacy along the whole front in the summer of 1943. A post-war report by British air intelligence, based on German documents, put it more cautiously: Soviet pressure forced the Luftwaffe to commit an average of some 400 sorties a day to the Kuban throughout May, making major operations elsewhere impossible and forcing other plans to be postponed. In June both sides moved their aircraft towards Kursk. 12
When the Battle of Kursk and the retreat to the Dnieper changed the whole picture that summer, the German command decided on 3 September to give up the Kuban bridgehead (Operation Krimhild). While the withdrawal was being prepared, before dawn on 10 September the Soviet North Caucasus Front put 8,930 men ashore in Novorossiysk harbour from 129 vessels, while Leselidze's 18th Army attacked from the east and from Malaya Zemlya. Semyon Timoshenko oversaw the operation as Stavka representative. Novorossiysk was liberated on 16 September, and the Germans fell back in stages. On 9 October Soviet troops reached the Kerch Strait at the tip of the Taman Peninsula, and the Battle of the Caucasus was over. 6 27 1
This was one of the few withdrawals on the Eastern Front in which the Germans got the bulk of their troops and heavy equipment away. By the German count, by 9 October 239,669 soldiers, 16,311 wounded, 27,456 civilians, 74,657 horses, 21,230 vehicles and 1,815 guns had been taken across the strait to the Crimea. Soviet aircraft and ships tried to cut the strait but could not stop it. Shtemenko records about 4,000 prisoners, nearly 1,300 guns and mortars and 92 tanks taken in the month of fighting. Sent to the Crimea, the 17th Army was put into the defence of the Perekop isthmus and was destroyed in the Crimean Offensive in the spring of 1944. 6 27 1
What happened to the people of the occupied North Caucasus and its mountain peoples?
The German command believed that many Terek and Kuban Cossacks and many of the North Caucasus mountain peoples were hostile to Soviet rule and meant to exploit this. Several Cossack and mountaineer units were in fact formed and fought on the German side, and in Chechnya there had been an anti-Soviet insurgency led by Khasan Israilov since 1940. The scale of that insurgency is much disputed, however. Official figures differ from agency to agency and show signs of being fitted to predetermined results; it has been pointed out that Israilov's band never numbered more than 14 men even counting the NKVD agents planted in it, and some historians regard the "broad anti-Soviet movement" in Checheno-Ingushetia as a performance staged by the security organs. 1
The occupation brought mass killing. In Krasnodar and Krasnodar Krai, Sonderkommando 10a killed about 7,000 people in gas vans, among them prisoners of the Gestapo, patients of the city hospital and passers-by caught in round-ups. After liberation, on 14-17 July 1943, Soviet citizens who had served in the unit were tried in Krasnodar. It was the first Soviet trial of collaborators with the occupiers; eight were sentenced to death and hanged in the city's central square on 18 July. Who was to play which part at the trial had been set out in advance in a secret memorandum from Molotov and Vyshinsky to Stalin. 21
After liberation the Soviet government carried out the deportation of nationalities, moving whole peoples of the North Caucasus on charges of collaboration and "banditry". The NKVD deported 68,614 Karachays on 2-22 November 1943, some 93,000 Kalmyks from 28 December, between 500,000 and 650,000 Chechens and Ingush on 23 February to 9 March 1944 (Operation Lentil) and 37,713 Balkars on 8-9 March, to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Siberia. Among the Chechens and Ingush alone, about 123,000, roughly one in four, died in transit and the following years. Beria initiated and organised the Balkar deportation, and Piyashev, who had retaken the Sancharo Pass, was one of the men who directed the deportations. The autonomous territories of these peoples were abolished; only in 1956-1957 were they allowed to return. The highest state bodies of the Soviet Union and later Russia recognised the deportations of the Karachays, Balkars, Kalmyks and others as unlawful and as acts of genocide. 22 25 23 24 19 1
What were the losses, and what did the battle leave behind?
Loss figures vary by source and by period. The Russian Wikipedia gives Soviet losses in the defensive phase (July to December 1942) as 192,791 irrecoverable (killed, missing and captured) and 181,120 wounded and sick. In the North Caucasus offensive of January and February 1943 the Soviets lost more than 154,500 (about 155,000, including some 70,000 dead, according to the German Wikipedia), and in the Novorossiysk-Taman operation of September and October 14,564 irrecoverable and 50,946 wounded and sick. Losses in the Krasnodar offensive of February to May and the spring attacks on the Blue Line are not included in these figures. 1 10 5 11
German losses are even less consistent. The Russian Wikipedia puts Army Group A's dead in the 1942 offensive phase at nearly 100,000, and the Soviet side claimed to have inflicted 281,000 casualties in the January-February 1943 offensive. For the Novorossiysk-Taman operation, the Soviet Information Bureau announced German and Romanian losses of 58,000 in 1944, and official Russian studies after the Soviet collapse give more than 30,000 killed and about 4,000 prisoners. But the report of Wolf-Dietrich von Xylander, chief of staff of the German 17th Army, gave losses for the same period as 921 German dead, 3,729 wounded and 250 missing, and 109 Romanian dead, 470 wounded and 32 missing: 5,592 in all. With figures for the same fighting differing more than tenfold, each has to be read together with whose count it is. 1 10 11
The Battle of the Caucasus meant the failure of Germany's design to win the war by taking Soviet oil. Apart from the wrecked Maikop fields Germany gained no oil at all, and Baku and Grozny stayed in Soviet hands. Turkey did not enter the war, and the Allied aid route through Iran was never cut. On the other hand, the Red Army could not follow the victory at Stalingrad with a second encirclement in the Caucasus, and most of the German 1st Panzer Army and 17th Army got away. The medal "For the Defence of the Caucasus" was instituted on 1 May 1944, and in Russia 9 October is kept as a Day of Military Glory for the victory in the Battle of the Caucasus. 1 3 4
Consequences
Apart from the wrecked Maikop fields Germany got no Caucasian oil; Baku and Grozny stayed Soviet, Turkey stayed out of the war and the Allied aid route through Iran held. But the Red Army failed to encircle Army Group A: the German 1st Panzer Army got out through Rostov and most of the 17th Army crossed the Kerch Strait to the Crimea in October 1943. Soviet irrecoverable losses in the defensive phase alone were over 190,000. After liberation the Karachays, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush and Balkars were deported wholesale, and Malaya Zemlya was inflated by Brezhnev's memoir in the 1970s.
Timeline & Map
- 11942.07.23Directive No. 45 and the fall of Rostov
Hitler issued Führer Directive No. 45, sending Army Group A into the Caucasus and Army Group B to Stalingrad at the same time. The same day German troops took Rostov-on-Don.
- 21942.08.09Fall of Maikop
The German 1st Panzer Army entered Maikop. The oilfields had already been destroyed by the Soviet side.
- 31942.08.12Fall of Krasnodar
After fighting the Soviet 56th Army, the German 17th Army took Krasnodar, the chief city of the Kuban.
- 41942.08.15Klukhor Pass lost
German mountain troops took the Klukhor Pass, held by two rifle companies, in a surprise attack. Soviet 46th Army headquarters learned of it only on the third day.
- 51942.08.21Nazi flag on Elbrus
Men of the German 1st Mountain Division planted the flag of Nazi Germany on the summit of Elbrus.
- 61942.08.24Martial law in Transcaucasia
After Bodin and Shtemenko reached Tbilisi, martial law was declared in Transcaucasia. Beria was in the Caucasus at the same time as plenipotentiary of the State Defence Committee.
- 71942.09.10Halted at the Novorossiysk cement works
German and Romanian troops took most of Novorossiysk, but the Soviet 47th Army and the city defence stopped them among the cement works on the east side of town.
- 81942.09.25Tuapse offensive begins
After two days of bombing, the German 17th Army began its attack towards Tuapse.
- 91942.11.11Gizel retaken
Soviet troops drove back the German 13th Panzer Division, which had come right up to Ordzhonikidze, and retook Gizel.
- 101943.01.04Stalin's directive of 4 January
Stalin dictated to Shtemenko a directive for the Transcaucasian Front, ordering the Black Sea Group to drive on Bataysk and trap the Germans in the North Caucasus.
- 111943.01.21Stavropol liberated
The Soviet 44th Army, together with partisans, retook Stavropol (Voroshilovsk).
- 121943.02.04Landing at Malaya Zemlya
Major Kunikov's landing force came ashore at Stanichka, south of Novorossiysk, and took a foothold. The main landing at Yuzhnaya Ozereyka failed.
- 131943.02.12Krasnodar liberated
The Soviet North Caucasus Front retook Krasnodar. The Germans blew the bridge and fell back across the Kuban.
- 141943.05.04Krymskaya taken
The Soviet 56th Army, with Zhukov coordinating, enveloped Krymskaya from both sides and took it.
- 151943.09.16Novorossiysk liberated
Leselidze's 18th Army and the Black Sea Fleet freed Novorossiysk completely, ending the 225 days of Malaya Zemlya.
- 161943.10.09Taman Peninsula cleared
The Soviet 56th Army took the whole north of the Taman Peninsula and reached the Kerch Strait. The German 17th Army's withdrawal to the Crimea ended the same day.
Related people 25
Soviet Union (Southern, North Caucasus and Transcaucasian Fronts, Black Sea Fleet)21
Leadership2
On 4 January 1943 dictated the directive that it was "not to our advantage to push the enemy out of the North Caucasus", demanding a drive on Bataysk; in May replaced Maslennikov with Petrov.
Commander, Transcaucasian FrontIvan Tyulenev1892–1978Built the Terek line and ordered mountain rifle detachments formed; in October the Stavka told him he was underestimating the Black Sea Group, and his proposal for a cavalry army was turned down.
Participants19
Led the North Caucasus Front, which absorbed the Southern Front on 28 July 1942, until the front was dissolved in early September.
Commander, Northern Group and North Caucasus FrontIvan Maslennikov1900–1954Held the Terek and Ordzhonikidze, but lost touch with his troops in the January 1943 pursuit and was rebuked by Stalin; replaced after the Blue Line offensive stalled in May.
Commander, Black Sea Group and North Caucasus FrontIvan Petrov1896–1958Commanded the Black Sea Group from September 1942; became commander of the North Caucasus Front in May 1943 and freed Novorossiysk and the Taman Peninsula in September-October.
State Defence Committee plenipotentiary, People's Commissar for Internal AffairsLavrentiy Beria1899–1953Directed the organisation of the defence in the Caucasus from 21 August to mid-September 1942; the NKVD units and separate staff for the passes were criticised for splitting the chain of command. Led the deportations of North Caucasus peoples in 1943-1944.
Head of the Caucasus direction, General Staff Operations DirectorateSergei Shtemenko1907–1976Organised the defence in Tbilisi with Bodin in August-September 1942, took down Stalin's directives in January 1943 and went to the Kuban with Zhukov in April-May; described the battle in detail in his memoirs.
Chief of the General StaffAleksandr Vasilevsky1895–1977Opposed the proposal to leave the Stalingrad pocket and drive on Rostov; reproduced the directive of 4 January in his memoirs.
Stavka representativeGeorgy Zhukov1896–1974Coordinated the North Caucasus Front's Krymskaya offensive in the Kuban in April-May 1943.
Stavka representativeSemyon Timoshenko1895–1970As Stavka representative oversaw the preparation of the breakthrough of the Blue Line and the Novorossiysk-Taman operation in August-September 1943.
Commander, 47th, 18th and 56th ArmiesAndrei Grechko1903–1976Commanded the Novorossiysk defence district and the defence of Tuapse, then the 56th Army in Operation "Mountains" towards Krasnodar in January-February 1943 and at Krymskaya in May.
Head of the Novorossiysk city defence, commander of the Azov FlotillaSergei Gorshkov1910–1988Took charge of the city defence of Novorossiysk in September 1942, stopping the Germans among the cement works.
Commander, Black Sea FleetFilipp Oktyabrsky1899–1969Commanded the Black Sea Fleet in the defence of Novorossiysk in the summer of 1942 and during the Novorossiysk landings of February 1943.
Commander, Southern FrontAndrei Yeryomenko1892–1970In January 1943 tried to cut Army Group A's line of retreat by advancing on Bataysk and Rostov but could not break the German defence.
Commander, Southern Front and Don Operational GroupRodion Malinovsky1898–1967Led the Southern Front as it fell back from the Don in July 1942, then the Don Operational Group of the North Caucasus Front; again commanded the Southern Front from February 1943.
Head of the political department, 18th ArmyLeonid Brezhnev1906–1982As head of the 18th Army's political department from April 1943 crossed to Malaya Zemlya; the memoir Malaya Zemlya published under his name in 1978 greatly inflated the fight.
Squadron commander, 16th Guards Fighter RegimentAlexander Pokryshkin1913–1985One of the leading aces of the Kuban air battles in the spring of 1943.
Fighter pilotGrigory Rechkalov1920–1990An ace who fought in the air battles over Krymskaya in April-May 1943.
Commander of the Red Army Air ForceAlexander Novikov1900–1976Went to the Kuban with Zhukov in April 1943 and coordinated the commitment of air forces to the air battles.
People's Commissar of the NavyNikolai Kuznetsov (admiral)1904–1974Went to the Kuban with Zhukov in April 1943 to see to the supply of Malaya Zemlya and Black Sea Fleet support.
In charge of destroying the oil installationsNikolai Baibakov1911–2008Was responsible for destroying the installations of Maikop and other North Caucasus oilfields as the Germans approached.
Germany, Romania and Slovakia (Army Group A)4
Implementers & commanders1
Participants2
In January 1943 his 4th Panzer Army held the approaches to Rostov, keeping open the way out for Army Group A's 1st Panzer Army.
Chief of the German Army General StaffFranz Halder1884–1972There is no record of his objecting to Directive No. 45, which split Army Groups A and B, before August 1942; dismissed in September.
Sources: reference 1reference 2reference 3reference 4reference 5reference 6reference 7reference 8reference 9reference 10reference 11reference 12reference 13reference 14reference 15reference 16reference 17reference 18reference 19reference 20reference 21reference 22reference 23reference 24reference 25reference 26reference 27reference 28reference 29