Операция «Малый Сатурн» · 1942.12.16–30

Operation Little Saturn

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Operation Little Saturn (officially the Middle Don offensive, Среднедонская операция) was the offensive of the Soviet South-Western Front and the left wing of the Voronezh Front on the middle Don from 16 to 30 December 1942. The original plan, Operation Saturn, was to smash the Italian Eighth Army and drive on to Rostov, cutting the line of retreat of German Army Group A in the Caucasus. When the destruction of the Stalingrad pocket dragged on and Manstein launched his relief offensive, the aim was cut back: after the breakthrough the mobile corps turned south-east toward Morozovsk and Tatsinskaya, into the rear of the relief force. The collapse of the Italian Eighth Army and the raid on Tatsinskaya airfield forced the Germans to give up the attempt to rescue the encircled Sixth Army.

In depth

What was Operation Saturn meant to achieve?

When Operation Uranus closed the ring round the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad on 23 November 1942, the Soviet command looked for a way to widen the success. West of the pocket, the middle Don was held by the Italian Eighth Army and the German Army Detachment Hollidt; far to the south lay Rostov, the bottleneck through which German Army Group A, deep in the Caucasus, was connected with the rest of the German forces. A drive to Rostov could trap the whole German southern wing. Vasilevsky wrote in his memoirs that the main blow of the original plan was to run "through Millerovo to Rostov, into the rear of the entire enemy grouping on the southern wing".

In a note to his memoirs Vasilevsky says he first heard the name "Saturn" from Stalin by telephone on 24 November. On his account, the aim of the offensive was to create a "new ring" round the encircled enemy, and it was also Stalin who named the final operation against the pocket "Ring" (Koltso); all operation names, he adds, were given by Stalin personally.

How was it planned?

As a representative of the Stavka, Vasilevsky inspected the sector of the Voronezh Front's 6th Army with its commander Filipp Golikov on 25 November and the right wing of the South-Western Front with Nikolai Vatutin on 26 November, then reported his outline to Stalin. The South-Western Front's operational group was to be split into the 1st Guards Army under V. I. Kuznetsov and the 3rd Guards Army under Dmitry Lelyushenko. The 1st Guards would strike south from the bridgehead below Verkhny Mamon toward Millerovo, while the 3rd Guards struck west toward Millerovo from the east, closing a ring round the Italians. Mobile forces would then seize the Northern Donets crossing at Likhaya and open the way to Rostov, and the Voronezh Front's 6th Army under Fyodor Kharitonov would cover the western flank by striking toward Kantemirovka. The troops were to be ready by 10 December. Before that, the South-Western Front's 5th Tank Army under Prokofy Romanenko was to clear the enemy along the Chir and take Morozovsk and Tormosin, sealing off the pocket from the south-west.

Stalin approved the outline in the main, told Vasilevsky to concentrate on destroying the pocket and left Saturn to Vatutin and Kuznetsov. On 2 December the Stavka approved the final plan without substantial changes and sent the artillery commander Nikolai Voronov to both fronts as its representative. By 12 December the South-Western Front had received five rifle divisions, the 18th, 24th and 25th Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Mechanised Corps and sixteen artillery and mortar regiments, and the Voronezh Front the 17th Tank Corps among other units.

At about the same time a proposal reached the Stavka to treat the encircled Sixth Army as a "hare on a leash", leave only a guard force around it and send the main forces straight to Rostov to create a second great pocket in the North Caucasus. Vasilevsky recalled that he opposed it and that Stalin rejected it, because the encircled enemy still had considerable fighting power.

Why was it cut down to "Little Saturn"?

The first thing that upset the plan was the size of the pocket. Soviet intelligence put the encircled force at 85,000 to 90,000 men; Vasilevsky later learned that it was over 300,000. The attempt to break it up on the move failed, and seven Soviet armies remained tied down around it. Second, the 5th Tank Army never managed to eliminate the German bridgeheads on the lower Chir around Nizhne-Chirskaya. Third, the start of the offensive slipped from 10 to 16 December. Then on 12 December Erich von Manstein's Army Group Don attacked north from Kotelnikovo to relieve the Sixth Army.

On 13 December the Stavka turned Rodion Malinovsky's 2nd Guards Army, held back as the main force for destroying the pocket, south against the relief force. That army had also been meant to support the drive on Rostov from the east. Stalin's directive of 13 December to Voronov, Vatutin and Golikov, which Vasilevsky quotes, said that at the end of November conditions for Saturn had been favourable, but "since then, however, the situation has changed to our disadvantage". With Romanenko's 5th Tank Army and Lelyushenko's 3rd Guards Army held up by German reinforcements, the blow from the north would get no support from the east, so an advance toward Kamensk and Rostov could not succeed. The breakthrough was to be made in the same sectors as planned, but the main blow was then to turn south-east toward Nizhny Astakhov and Morozovsk, catching the enemy grouping between Bokovskaya and Morozovsk in a pincer, while Golikov's Voronezh Front helped Kuznetsov finish off the Italians and screened the west along the Boguchar. This reduced operation was "Little Saturn". Russian Wikipedia likewise explains that the aims and scale were cut back because the forces for the original plan were judged insufficient.

How did the offensive unfold?

According to Russian Wikipedia the Soviet side committed 36 divisions with more than 1,000 tanks and about 400 aircraft, against 27 Axis divisions of the Italian Eighth and Romanian Third Armies and others with about 600 tanks. The Italian positions had poor shelters and trenches.

The offensive opened on 16 December. The Voronezh Front's 6th Army and the South-Western Front's 1st Guards Army delivered the main blow at their junction, and the 3rd Guards Army struck toward them from the east. Thick fog blunted the artillery and air support on the first day and progress was slow. The Italians, outnumbered nine to one in some sectors, at first fought well. But on 17 December the Soviets committed the 17th, 18th, 24th and 25th Tank Corps, the tactical defences broke, and on 19 December the Italian Eighth Army headquarters ordered its battered divisions back to new lines. Vasilevsky wrote that by the fifth day the whole Italian front had been smashed and a disorderly retreat had begun.

In eight days the Soviet mobile forces advanced 100 to 200 kilometres and by about 24 December reached the line Millerovo-Tatsinskaya-Morozovsk. The main forces of the Italian Eighth Army, except the Alpine Corps, were destroyed, and the remnants of the Romanian Third Army and Army Detachment Hollidt were badly mauled. Russian Wikipedia counts 17 Axis divisions and three brigades destroyed or heavily damaged and 60,000 prisoners. The operation ended on 30 December.

How did the raid on Tatsinskaya end?

Major General Vasily Badanov's 24th Tank Corps entered the breach on 17 December, covered about 240 kilometres and on 24 December took the village and airfield of Tatsinskaya by surprise. The airfield was a main base of the Luftwaffe airlift to the encircled Sixth Army. Figures for the aircraft destroyed differ widely. German estimates put them at 72, almost a tenth of the Luftwaffe's transport capacity, while about 100 got away. Soviet accounts are higher: Zhukov wrote in his memoirs of 200 transport aircraft crushed as they waited to take off, and Russian Wikipedia gives about 300 destroyed on the airfield and on trains at the station.

The corps was soon cut off by the German 6th and 11th Panzer Divisions and fought on encircled for several days. The 25th Tank Corps and 1st Guards Mechanised Corps, sent to its aid, could not break through, and on 28 December the corps was allowed to break out. Accounts of the cost differ too. Vasilevsky wrote that it rammed through the enemy and returned without heavy losses; English Wikipedia says most of its equipment and many men were lost in the breakout. Russian Wikipedia adds that the tanks escaped on captured aviation fuel mixed with engine oil. Badanov became the first holder of the newly created Order of Suvorov, 2nd Class, and the corps was renamed the 2nd Guards Tank Corps with the honorific "Tatsinskaya".

How did it affect Manstein's relief attempt?

Little Saturn tore open the left wing of Manstein's Army Group Don and threatened its rear. According to Vasilevsky, the German command had to throw against the South-Western Front all the troops it had been gathering at Tormosin for a second relief blow, and also sent four panzer and four infantry divisions, earlier meant to strike toward Stalingrad from Nizhne-Chirskaya, to the Millerovo-Tatsinskaya-Morozovsk area. The strongest division of the relief force, the 6th Panzer, was turned west as well. Russian Wikipedia notes that Manstein himself named this diversion of reserves as the reason his relief operation failed.

In the south, the German LVII Panzer Corps of Operation Winter Storm reached the Myshkova River and was stopped 35 to 40 kilometres from the pocket by Malinovsky's 2nd Guards Army and the 51st Army. Manstein called off the attack on 23 December, and the 4th Panzer Army fell back toward its starting point at Kotelnikovo. The Sixth Army could no longer hope for relief, and at the end of December Army Group A in the Caucasus was ordered to withdraw.

How is the result judged?

Little Saturn destroyed the Italian Eighth Army, completed the defeat of the Romanian Third Army and broke the Stalingrad relief attempt, clearing the way for Operation Ring. Distinguished formations received honorifics such as "Don", "Kantemirovka" and "Tatsinskaya". In January and February 1943 follow-on offensives shattered the Hungarian Second Army on the upper Don, and in February Soviet troops entered Rostov, the original objective of Saturn.

The narrower aim had its price. English Wikipedia argues that the limited scope gave Kleist time to pull Army Group A back toward the Kuban, while the 1st Panzer Army joined Army Group Don through Rostov. The over-extended Soviet fronts also invited the German counterstroke of February and March 1943 (the Third Battle of Kharkov). Vasilevsky knew that some writers doubted whether cutting back Saturn had been right and answered them at length in his memoirs. He argued that the root cause was the failure to destroy the pocket quickly, and that had Saturn begun as planned on 10 December, Manstein's offensive of 12 December might not have happened at all. The objection of Don Front commander Konstantin Rokossovsky to the transfer of the 2nd Guards Army away from the pocket is covered in the entry on Operation Ring.

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Sources

  1. Wikipedia (RU)
  2. militera.lib.ru
  3. Wikipedia (EN)
  4. militera.lib.ru
  5. Wikipedia (EN)
  6. Wikipedia (RU)
  7. Wikipedia (EN)
  8. Wikipedia (EN)
  9. Wikipedia (RU)